DocketNumber： 15-4059
Citation Numbers： 691 F. App'x 526
Judges： Holmes, Murphy, Bacharach
Filed Date： 6/27/2017
Status： Non-Precedential
Modified Date： 10/19/2024
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs-Appellants Alan and Colelyn Blakely appeal from an adverse summary judgment in which the district court determined that they failed to demonstrate the damages necessary to advance a cognizable claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (“Implied Covenant”) against their homeowner’s insurance provider, USAA Casualty Insurance Company (“USAA”). This is the third time the Blakelys have appealed to' this court based on the same underlying facts and allegations.
I
Mr. and Ms. Blakely own a home in Bountiful, Utah, which was insured under ■a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by USAA. The policy insured against losses to the home and personal property.
The Blakelys prepared an inventory of their losses and made a claim under their USAA policy. USAA then sent an adjuster to inspect the damage, and USAA’s preferred contractor ultimately repaired most of the damage to the home. By mid-2003, USAA had paid out $93,332.20 on the claim — viz., $47,789.94 for the home, $37,832.70 for personal property, and $7,709.56 for temporary housing. However, the Blakelys were dissatisfied with the repairs to their home and the extent to which their personal property had been cleaned or replaced. Although USAA refused to authorize additional expenses, the Blakelys paid for further cleaning and repairs themselves. Around this time, the Blakelys also filed suit against Stone Touch.
In January 2005, the Blakelys invoked their contractual right to an appraisal.
In 2006, the Blakelys filed suit against USAA in state court, claiming breach of contract, breach of the Implied Covenant, breach of industry and statutory standards, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Blakelys alleged, inter alia, that they suffered financial and emotional damages resulting from USAA’s failure to make adequate and timely repairs, reimbursements, and investigations. USAA removed the suit to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of USAA on all claims except the claim for breach of the Implied Covenant. Instead of summary judgment, the district court granted USAA’s oral motion to dismiss the Blakelys’ Implied-Covenant claim as frivolous under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(2)(A).
The Blakelys appealed for the first time, and our court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, but reversed the dismissal of the Implied-Covenant claim. Without expressing an opinion “on the merits of the Blakelys’ claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” we specifically held that
the Blakelys alleged and put forth the following evidence suggesting that USAA acted unreasonably in taking its initial position regarding the loss amount: the appraisal award was nearly three times, or $200,000 more, than USAA’s initial payout of $93,322.20; USAA’s adjuster refused to communicate with the Blakelys; USAA’s adjuster claimed that he could not smell smoke when the smell proved noticeable [to the appraisers] in the house three years later; USAA delegated adjustment of the contents claim to a non-adjuster; and USAA refused to pay for any repairs other than structural ones.
Blakely v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 633 F.3d 944, 950 (10th Cir. 2011). On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of USAA on the Blakelys’ Implied-Covenant claim. See Blakely v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-00506, 2011 WL 6218212 (D. Utah Dec. 6, 2011), reversed and remanded by 500 Fed.Appx. 734 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
The Blakelys appealed a second time to this court, mounting a challenge to the district court’s determination that they had put forward no genuine issue of material fact. See Blakely, 500 Fed.Appx. at 738. A panel of this court concluded that the following four material facts suggested that USAA acted unreasonably: viz., (1) USAA refused to replace several charred floor joists, and only replaced a small section of burned subflooring after repeated complaints from the Blakelys; (2) USAA’s structural adjuster refused at times to communicate with the Blakelys; (3) the structural adjuster claimed not to be able to smell smoke, even though the appraisers could smell smoke three years later; and (4) USAA’s personal-property adjuster did not travel to Utah, delegated her duties to a person who was not an adjuster, and denied coverage for numerous per
On remand a second time, the district court again granted summary judgment in USAA’s favor. This time, however, the district court reasoned that the Blakelys “failed to proffer plausible damages attributable to the alleged breach of the implied contract covenant,” and “[a]bsent viable damages, the exercise of trial pursuant to the Tenth Circuit’s mandate and application of Jones would be purely academic.” Aplts.’ App., Vol. VIII, at 1683 (Dist. Ct. Order, dated Apr. 2, 2015). More specifically, the district court considered the Blakelys’ alleged damages for emotional distress, economic loss, and attorney’s fees and costs, and concluded that none were recoverable under Utah law.
The Blakelys timely appealed this decision of the district court.
II
This appeal presents the single issue of whether the Blakelys advanced a theory of recoverable damages as part of their claim against USAA for breach of the Implied Covenant. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of their claim on a motion for summary judgment. See Hertz v. Luzenac Grp., 576 F.3d 1103, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We review the dismissal of these claims on a motion for summary judgment de novo.”); accord Harvey Barnett, Inc. v. Shidler, 338 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2003). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Macon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 743 F.3d 708, 712 (10th Cir. 2014).
Because this is a diversity case, we must independently discern the content of and apply state law — specifically, Utah law. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Gas. Co. v. Circle S Feed Store, LLC, 754 F.3d 1175, 1178 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Because this is a diversity case, we ascertain and apply state law— in this case, New Mexico law.”); Yousuf v. Cohlmia, 741 F.3d 31, 47 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that, where jurisdiction is based on the parties’ diverse citizenship, a federal court is “not to reach our own judgment regarding the substance of the common law, but simply to ascertain and apply state law.” (quoting Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc., 621 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2010))); McIntosh v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 251, 253 (10th Cir. 1993) (“We review de novo the district court’s rulings with respect to Kansas law.”). Under Utah law,' the construction of an insurance policy is a legal question, which we review de novo. See Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 754 F.3d at 1178; see also S.W. Energy Corp. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 974 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1999) (“Interpretation of an insurance policy involves ordinary rules of contract construction. We accord no deference to the trial court’s interpretation of the policy, but review the court’s legal conclusions for correctness.” (citation omitted)).
A
“When the federal courts are called upon to interpret state law, the federal court must look to the rulings of the highest state court, and, if no such rulings exist, must endeavor to predict how that high court would rule.” Stickley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v.
At the outset, we must clarify the scope of the legal claim at issue in this appeal. As discussed above, what remains of the Blakelys’ original cause of action is their claim that USAA breached the Implied Covenant prior to January 2005 by failing, inter alia, to reasonably investigate the loss caused' by the 2002 fire in their home. See Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1046 (Utah 1989) (“Utah has recognized that all contracts contain a covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). Utah courts have stated that “an insurer’s ‘implied obligation of good faith performance contemplates, at the very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim.’ ”
Under Utah law, “[djamages recoverable for breach of contract include both general damages, i.e., those flowing naturally from the breach, and consequential damages, i.e., those reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the cbntract was
Utah law recognizes “a broad range of recoverable [consequential] damages” in an action for breach of the Implied Covenant. Beck, 701 P.2d at 802 (noting that a “broad range” of damages “in excess of the policy limits” may be “foreseeabl[e]” and “provable” in the Implied-Covenant context, because “an insured frequently faces catastrophic consequences if funds are not available within a reasonable period of time to cover an insured loss”); accord Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 116 P.3d 342, 345-46 (Utah 2005) (discussing Beck’s holding). Although Utah law categorizes actions for breach of the Implied Covenant as contractual disputes, Utah courts have stated that “the measure of damages ... should ‘not ignor[e] the principal reason for [other courts’] adoption of the [otherwise theoretically unsound] tort approach.’ ”
However, Utah’s adoption of a doctrine expanding insurers’ exposure “beyond the bare contract terms” in the Implied-Covenant context remains subject to important limitations. Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. More precisely, an insured is entitled only to “those [consequential damages] reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made.” Machan, 116 P.3d at 346 (quoting Beck, 701 P.2d at 801). And, Beck teaches that “[t]he foreseeability of [consequential] damages will always hinge upon the nature and language of the [insurance] contract and the reasonable expectations of the parties.” Beck, 701 P.2d at 802; see J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts, § 14-5 at 548 (4th ed. 1998) (noting that “there must be an express or implied manifestation of intent to assume the risk of foreseeable consequential damages”).
B
With these principles in mind, we turn to the theories of consequential damages that the Blakelys have advanced in their claim for breach of the Implied Covenant
1
Turning first to the Blakelys’ theory that they were entitled to consequential damages related to emotional distress and aggravation of medical conditions, they argue that the district court erred in ruling that “such damages are only available in ‘rare’ and ‘unusual’ cases.” Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 26 (quoting the record). In their view, Utah law only requires an insured to “convince a jury that his damages are ‘unusual’ in that they are more than the typical disappointment, frustration, and anxiety ‘normally’ associated with an insurance claim.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added). In this regard, the Blakelys assert that they need not “show both bad faith and that it was unusual,” to survive a motion for summary judgment with respect to emotional distress damages. Id.
a
The Blakelys have asserted, as part of their theory of emotional-distress damages, that “stress related to USAA’s misconduct” exacerbated Ms. Blakely’s preexisting medical condition and her high blood pressure. Id. at 33. However, having concluded that the Blakelys’ amended complaint “makes no mention of physical injuries and otherwise fails to provide notice that [the Blakelys] seek damages for physical injuries,” the district court declined to consider physical injuries as a basis for an award of damages. Aplts.’ App., Vol. VIII, at 1683 n.36.
USAA argues that the Blakelys failed to allege a separate theory of physical injuries, apart from their prayer for emotional-distress damages. In addressing this argument, the Blakelys point to several filings that refer to Ms. Blakely’s medical condition: viz, an expert report attached to USAA’s memorandum in support of summary judgment, which notes that stressful situations tended to aggravate Ms. Blakely’s fibromyalgia; statements by the Blake-lys’ counsel during a pretrial conference that Ms. Blakely’s fibromyalgia had been aggravated; and an assertion at the first summary-judgment hearing that Ms. Blakely’s medical conditions had been aggravated.
Despite these references to Ms. Blakely’s medical conditions in the summary-judgment proceedings, we cannot glean from the pleadings any assertion of damages for physical injuries separate from the claimed emotional-distress damages. That is, the Blakelys reference medical conditions only in advancing a theory of emotional-distress damages, not in support of independent damages related to the aggravation of a medical condition. For this reason, we consider this separate theory of physical-injury damages to be forfeited in the district court and — given that the Blakelys do not call for application of plain-error review on appeal — to be also effectively waived. See, e.g., Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he failure to argue for plain error and its application on appeal— surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the district court.”).
b
Although we consider the Blakelys’ physical-injury damages theory waived, we must still assay the Blakelys’ theory of emotional-distress damages under Utah’s
Challenging the district court’s summary-judgment decision, the Blakelys draw our attention to an interpretive dispute — namely, whether Beck’s limitation of “damages for mental anguish” to “unusual cases” envisions “unusual”'conduct by the insurer (the view advanced by USAA and adopted by the district court), or “unusual” damages by the insured (the Blakelys’ competing perspective). Beck, 701 P.2d at 802 (emphasis added); see also Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 27-30. We need not — and thus do not — definitively opine on this interpretive dispute. That is because, even assuming arguendo that Beck speaks to unusual damages — the view the Blakelys have propounded — the express limitations on a consequential-damages award for emotional distress squarely defeat the Blakelys’ entitlement to such damages here.
Critically, Beck stated that, in “unusual cases,” “damages for mental anguish might be provable” if “foreseeabl[e]” given “the nature and language of the [insurance] contract and the reasonable expectations of the parties.” Beck, 701 P.2d at 802 (emphasis added). Beck, however, expressly defined those damages to exclude “the mere disappointment, frustration, or anxiety normally experienced in the process of filing an insurance claim and negotiating a settlement with an insurer.” Id. at 802 n.6. In other words, Beck stressed the noncom-pensable nature of damages derived from the stress, strain, and aggravation inherent in any loss of property and subsequent insurance adjustment. Analogously, the Utah Supreme Court teaches us that some delay necessarily attends claim administration, stating that “parties to an insurance contract should expect that an insurance company may require a reasonable amount of time to process or investigate a claim before determining whether to pay or deny it.” Machan, 116 P.3d at 347 (emphasis added). Accordingly, “[w]here an insurance company’s breach consists only of ultimately resolving a claim incorrectly and failing to pay the insured, we may presume that any damages sustained by the insured during the initial reasonable investigation period were not caused by the- breach, as these damages would have been sustained even if the insurance company had resolved the claim correctly in the insured’s favor.” Id.
Not so. The Blakelys’ claim of “unusual” damages relies on the prototypical “disappointment, frustration, or anxiety normally experienced in the process of filing an insurance claim and negotiating a settlement with an insurer” — a patently insufficient basis under Beck for an inward of emotional-distress damages. Beck, 701 P.2d at 802 n.6 (emphases added). Indeed, the first two alleged breaches — USAA’s effort to replace the Blakelys’ “custom furnishings with mediocre replacements" and the initial “lowballf]” adjustment, Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 32 — express only the Blakelys’ disappointment and frustration with USAA’s evaluative process. Beck forecloses precisely this sort of consequential-damages award.
The Blakelys’ third source of distress— that they had to live in their home before construction was completed and had to endure the smell of smoke for more than three years — fares no better in advancing their cause. Although the Blakelys take exception to living in an unrepaired house smelling strongly of smoke, they offer no explanation for their three-year delay in invoking the appraisal procedure authorized by the parties’ policy. As discussed above, Utah law makes clear that damages under the Implied Covenant must at least be foreseeable within “the nature and language of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the parties.” Beck, 701 P.2d at 802. Because the policy here expressly authorized the Blakelys to demand an appraisal — viz., to invoke a contractual mechanism clearly designed to bring loss-payment disputes to a reasonably prompt conclusion — we see nothing foreseeable about their purported, delay-related distress, which allegedly stemmed from the Blakelys’ need to occupy an unrepaired home that was permeated with the smell of smoke for three years.
Furthermore, although the cases the Blakelys cite — e.g., Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50, 53 (1980); Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816, 824 (1957); and Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1949) — support an award of damages for emotional distress when the failure to perform contractual obligations “concerns matters of mental concern and solicitude,” Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 31, the Blakelys provide no direct legal support for an award of emotional-distress, damages in the context of an insurance policy that provides, as here, a basis to enforce contractual obligations against the insurer (i.e., the appraisal provision). Again, the Blakelys do not explain their delayed invocation of the appraisal clause — and when they did finally invoke it, USAA fully compensated them for the damage to their home in accordance with that procedure.
2
The Blakelys next argue that “had USAA fulfilled its obligations to fairly and timely investigate, evaluate, and pay, [they] would not have been forced to invoke the insurance policy’s appraisal policy, which cost them significant amounts of money.” Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 39. At the outset, it is clear that Utah law forbids contracts from abrogating relief appropriately available under the Implied Covenant. See Christiansen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 116 P.3d 259, 261-62 (Utah 2005) (“A claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing ... is based on judicially recognized duties not found within the four corners of the contract. These duties, unlike the duties expressly stated in the contract, are not subject to alteration by the parties.” (citation omitted)). However, relief under the Implied Covenant must be “ ‘consistent with the agreed common purpose’ of the contract.” Id. at 262 (quoting St. Benedict’s Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict’s Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991)).
As the district court explained, the Blakelys “have not argued that [USAA] did not pay the cost of its own appraiser or split the other expenses of the appraisal and the compensation of the umpire.” Aplts.’ App., Vol. VIII, at 1689. The appraisal clause provided that “[e]ach appraiser will be paid by the party selecting that appraiser,” id. Vol. VI, at 1226, and that “[o]ther expenses of the appraisal and the compensation of the umpire will be equally paid by you and us,” id. Because the Blakelys argue only that they should be compensated for the costs of the appraisal, in order to grant the Blakelys’ requested relief, the district court would have had to override the express terms of the policy (which, as noted, allocated appraisal-related expenses between the parties). Put another way, the Blakelys are, in effect, seeking compensatory damages for the cost of the appraisal, not consequential damages for a breach of the Implied Covenant. Granting such damages on appeal would require us to override an express provision of the policy. For this reason, the Blakelys’ prayer for consequential damages with respect to the appraisal clause must fail.
3
The Blakelys next argue that they are entitled to be compensated for attorney’s fees incurred as a result of (1) their suit against Stone Touch (the contractor that caused the fire), (2) their invocation of
It is beyond peradventure that “[u]nder Utah law, plaintiffs may recover attorney fees if they are successful in pursuing a first-party bad faith suit against their insurer.” Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1168 (Utah 2001), vacated on other grounds by 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003); accord Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 949 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997) (“[I]n first-party actions, attorney fees are recoverable where there has been a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which inheres in every insurance contract.”); see also Billings, 918 P.2d at 468 (“Attorney fees may be recoverable as consequential damages flowing from an insurer’s breach of either the express or implied terms of an insurance contract.”). “However, as consequential damages, attorney fees are recoverable only if they were ‘reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made.’ ” Billings, 918 P.2d at 468 (quoting Beck, 701 P.2d at 801). And, “[t]he foreseeability of any such damages will always hinge upon the nature and language of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the parties.” Beck, 701 P.2d at 802. In this case, we cannot conclude that additional attorney’s fees would have been foreseeable to the parties, because the Blakelys only invoked the appraisal clause after filing suit against Stone Touch and the policy’s express terms clearly spelled out the allocation of the resulting appraisal costs.
As for the attorney’s fees related to the instant case, the Blakelys are correct that they would be entitled to a fee award if they were adjudicated the prevailing party. See Highland Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1981) (“In any action brought upon either of the bonds provided herein ... the prevailing party, upon each separate cause of action, shall recover a reasonable attorney’s fee to be taxed as costs.” (alteration in original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-8 (1953))). However, as the district court noted, this rule does not provide an independent cause of action for attorney’s fees, but rather allows a fee award “upon each separate cause of action.” Id. (quoting Utah Code. Ann. § 14-1-8). Therefore, to be entitled to a fee award in the instant case, the Blakelys must prevail in advancing a theory of damages under the Implied Covenant independent of attorney’s fees.
Because the Blakelys have not done so, an attorney’s fees award for costs incurred in litigating the instant case would not be proper. We are equally unpersuaded that attorney’s fees incurred in litigating the Stone Touch case and in invoking the appraisal clause are warranted, because those costs and fees were avoidable or accounted for under the express terms of the policy, and the Blakelys have not offered an explanation to the contrary.
The Blakelys nonetheless argue that they would be entitled to a fee award if they prevailed in a claim for nominal damages. See Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 44; see, e.g., Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1982) (“Nom-
4
Finally, we address the Blakelys’ entitlement to consequential damages for the alleged diminution in their property’s value. During the final pretrial hearing on April 23, 2013, the Blakelys’ counsel and the district court engaged in the following colloquy concerning the diminution-in-value claim:
Court: Now, does that come in — well, now, you talk about devaluation of the home. I thought the home was paid for by the express con-traed
Counsel: The reason why [the Blakelys] are asserting a claim for the devaluation in their home is based upon the following. Had USAA paid the appropriate amount, done their investigation, properly evaluated and timely paid, they would not have incurred the attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, both associated with the Stone Touch as well as the appraisal. And because of the attorney’s fees and expenses in that regard, they did not have sufficient money to replace the floor joists and the other items that needed to be done.
Court: That was part of the adjustment amount.
Counsel: Pardon me?
Court: They were paid for that. The adjustment amount paid for the house.
Counsel: Correct. But the consequential damages under the bad faith claim is that because they incurred the attorney’s fees and expenses, that was not available to them to—
Court: They were paid for that. The fact that they didn’t do it is telling in two ways. It’s one thing to talk about attorney’s fees and quite another thing to talk about a house that you say is diminished because they didn’t do what they were paid to do. That’s just gone. I won’t deal with the devaluation of the home.
Aplts.’ App., Vol. VIII, at 1575-76 (capitalization omitted) (Tr. of Final Pretrial Hr’g, dated Apr. 23, 2013). Thus, the Blakelys contended that USAA’s allegedly bad-faith adjustment required them to incur “attorney’s fees and [litigation] expenses” to obtain full payment on their insurance claim, leaving them without “sufficient” funds to perform repairs, even after being paid the appraisal amount; that, in turn, resulted in a devaluation in their home’s fair market value. Id. at 1576; see also Aplts.’ Reply
On appeal, the Blakelys challenge the district court’s reasoning, arguing that the district court erroneously “assumed that the appraisers’ determination of policy benefits barred the Blakelys’ claims for consequential damages arising from the untimely payment of those benefits.” Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 48. Citing Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 44 P.3d 663 (Utah 2002), the Blakelys contend instead that Utah law “quite clear[ly]” permits this very claim for consequential damages, e.g., a devaluation claim arising from the untimely payment of insurance benefits. Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 48. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Blakelys’ diminution-in-value claim is untenable.
yVe first introduce Miller, then explain our reasoning. In Miller, the Miller family filed an insurance claim with USAA after their basement water heater burst, and USAA retained an independent adjuster to assess the damage. 44 P.3d at 667. Dissatisfied with the assessment, the Millers filed suit against USAA asserting a contractual claim for the recovery of physical damage to their home, and extra-contractual claims for, among other things, emotional distress and loss of use. USAA moved to dismiss, arguing that the parties’ appraisal clause — in all material respects, the same one implicated here — required that the parties’ dispute “be resolved via the appraisal process.” Id. at 668 (quoting the record). Reasoning that the “parties [were] bound by contract to settle the dispute in th[e] case by appraisal,” the trial court “dismissed all of the Millers’ claims, including the extra-contractual claims, because USAA invoked the appraisal clause of the insurance contract.” Id. at 675 (first alteration in original). After the appraisal panel declined “to embark on the laborious task of analyzing the extra-contractual claims” — but did reach an award on their contractual claims, id. at 669 — the Millers proceeded to raise their extra-contractual claims in a separate civil' action. The trial court in that separate civil action, however, “dismiss[ed] the extra-contractual claims,” reasoning that the earlier dismissal “constituted a final judgment on the merits and, thus, those claims were precluded by res judicata and the appraisal agreement.” Id. at 668-69.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court considered the Millers’ argument that the trial courts’ treatment of their extra-contractual claims deprived them of due process. As part of that inquiry, the Miller court noted that the appraisal clause required only that the appraisers “set the ‘amount of loss,’ ” meaning that “the clause necessarily appliefd] only to property damage claims.” Id. at 676. The court then explained that the “amount of loss as used in the appraisal clause refers to the value
In contesting the district court’s order, the Blakelys seize on Miller to rebut any suggestion that their “amount of loss” payment under the appraisal clause precluded them, as a matter of law, from recovering consequential damages under a diminution-in-value theory. We do not question that if the district court had predicated its dismissal on this legal ground, its ruling would, at the very least, have been in tension with Miller. But we do not interpret the district court’s order that way. In response to the Blakelys’ argument, the district court held: “They were paid for that.... It’s one thing to talk about attorney’s fees and quite another thing to talk about a house that you say is diminished because they didn’t do what they were paid to do.” Aplts.’ App., Vol. VIII, at 1576 (emphases added) (capitalization omitted). In other words, the district court simply reasoned that the Blakelys’ own conduct— i.e., failing to allocate the money from the appraisal process to restoration and repairs, as intended — caused any diminution in value, see id., not that the appraisal award itself precluded, as a matter of law, the recovery of consequential damages under a diminution-in-value theory. Accordingly, we perceive no conflict between the district court’s rationale and Miller.
Nor, for that matter, can we conclude that these sorts of self-inflicted injuries would have been foreseen by the parties or within their reasonable expectations, as Beck requires. As articulated in Beck, Utah law limits an award of consequential damages to “those [harms] reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made.” Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. The harms at issue here — that effected the alleged diminution in value of the Blakelys’ property — do not satisfy this standard because USAA and the Blakelys could not have reasonably contemplated or foreseen that the Blakelys would be the primary actors in imposing these harms on themselves, especially when doing so involved the Blakelys’ decision to forgo contractual
Finally, even if the Blakelys could overcome these deficiencies, we detect an alternative ground for affirmance. See Elwell v. Byers, 699 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 2012) (“We can affirm a lower court’s ruling on any grounds adequately supported by the record, even grounds not relied upon by the district court.”). Specifically, regardless of the substantive merits of their diminution-in-value claim, the Blakelys do not directs us — as USAA observes — to any record evidence of the alleged diminution in value. Rather, they cite an irrelevant portion of USAA’s briefing before the district court, and then assert, without actual evidentiary support, that “the burned joists, floor, and other fire/smoke damage ,., caused a significant devaluation in the home’s fair market value.” Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 17. That is not enough. On this alternative ground too, we find the diminution-in-value claim untenable. In sum, the Blakelys cannot prevail on appeal on their diminution-in-value claim. We uphold the district court’s judgment regarding this claim.
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In sum, we see no viable footing for the recovery of consequential damages, nor have the Blakelys advanced a cognizable theory for nominal damages. Accordingly, the Blakelys cannot prevail on their claim for breach of the Implied Covenant and are not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs.
Ill
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant-Appellee, USAA.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
. The Blakelys filed a fourth appeal from the same district court action, see Blakely v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 15-4017, but voluntarily dismissed the appeal prior to merits briefing.
. The policy provided the following procedure in the event of a loss:
2. Your Duties After Loss. In case of a loss to which- this insurance may apply, you must see that the following are done:
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e. prepare an inventory of damaged personal property showing the quantity, description, actual cash value and amount of loss. Attach all bills, receipts and related documents that justify the figures in the inventory;
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g. send to us, within 60 days after our request, your signed, sworn proof of loss which sets forth, to the best of your knowledge and belief:
(1) the time and cause of loss;
(2) the interest of the Insured and all others in the property involved and all liens on the property;
(3) other insurance which may cover the loss;
(4) changes in title or occupancy of the property during the term of the policy;
(5) specifications of damaged buildings and detailed repair estimates;
(6) the inventory of damaged personal property described in 2e above;
(7) receipts for Additional Living Expenses and Temporary Living Expense, incurred and records that support the Fair Rental Value loss; and
(8) evidence or affidavit that supports a claim under ADDITIONAL COVERAGES, Credit Card, Fund Transfer Card, Forgery and Counterfeit Money coverage, stating the amount and causes of loss.
Aplts.’ App., Vol. VI, at 1225-26 (Ins. Policy, dated Nov. 2, 2001- through Nov. 2, 2002).
. USAA later intervened in the Stone Touch suit under a subrogation claim for the $93,332.20 that it paid on the Blákelys' claim and any additional sums.
. The homeowner’s insurance policy contained an “appraisal clause” related to the determination of the loss amount;
Appraisal. If you and we do not agree on the amount of loss, either party can demand that the amount of the loss be determined by appraisal. If either makes a written demand for appraisal, each will select a competent, independent appraiser and notify the other of the appraiser's identity within 20 days of receipt of the written demand. The two appraisers will then select a competent, impartial umpire. If the two appraisers are not able to agree upon the umpire within 15 days, you and we can ask a judge of a court of record in the state where the residence premises is located to select an umpire.
The appraisers will then set the amount of loss. If they submit a written report of any agreement to us, the amount agreed upon will be the amount of loss. If they fail to agree within a reasonable time, they will submit their differences to the umpire. Written agreement signed by any two of these three will set the amount of the loss. Each appraiser will be paid by the party selecting that appraiser. Other expenses of the appraisal and the compensation of the umpire will be equally paid by you and us.
Aplts.' App., Vol. VI, at 1226.
, Although the district court calculated the remaining balance as $197,524.32, the actual remainder appears to have been $198,024.32.
. US A A underscores the distinction between the implied obligation to perform an insurance contract in good faith in the "first-party” and "third-party” contexts. In a first-party case, as here, "the insured sue[s] its insurer for bad faith refusal to settle the insured’s claim,” Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). On the other hand, in the third-party context, “an insurer is obligated to defend the insured against claims by others.” Id. at 138. More specifically, in the third-party context, because the insurer owes a "fiduciaiy duty to its insured to protect the insured’s interests,” Beck, 701 P.2d at 799, "an insured may state a cause of action in tort for an insurer's breach of its obligations,” Campbell, 840 P.2d at 138. However, the implied contractual obligation to perform a first-party insurance contract in good faith — though implicating similar considerations as a third-party tort claim — involves a contractual obligation. See Beck, 701 P.2d at 800 ("We therefore hold in a first-party relationship between an insurer and its insured, the duties and obligations of the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary.”); see also Black v. Allstate Ins. Co., 100 P.3d 1163, 1169 (Utah 2004) (noting that, with respect to a first-party situation, "[w]ith-out more, a breach of those implied or express duties can give rise only to a cause of action in contract, not one in tort” (alteration in original) (quoting Beck, 701 P.2d at 800)).
. To be clear, Utah courts have observed that there are two approaches to measuring damages that various states apply to claims for breach of the Implied Covenant: viz., the contract approach and the tort approach. See Beck, 701 P.2d at 801, Although Utah courts have "rejected the tort approach” in first-party insurance claims, Billings, 918 P.2d at 466, and even noted that "the ability of a plaintiff to recover in tort for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a contract 'has the potential for distort-tag well-established principles of contract law,’ ” Berube, 771 P.2d at 1046 (quoting Beck, 701 P.2d at 799), "a first-party insurer who breaches the implied covenant by unreasonably denying the insured the benefits bargained for may be held liable for broad consequential damages foreseeably caused by the breach, damages which might include those for mental anguish and which would be closely analogous to those available in states taking a tort approach,” Billings, 918 P.2d at 466.
. The Blakelys also argue that they are entitled to damages for economic loss and lost income because they "had to spend their personal time [performing remedial work], resulting in lost income.” Aplts.' Opening Br. at 45. They assert that the district court conflated benefits and damages when it noted that “[t]he policy does not provide personal injury protection or other first-party losses' for lost wages or income that are typically a part of other types of insurance policies (e.g., auto insurance).” Aplts.’ App., Vol. VIII, at 1687. Although the Blakelys are correct that consequential damages may exceed contract benefits, see Billings, 918 P.2d at 467, they must still allege and develop facts showing that USAA’s alleged breach of the Implied Covenant caused the consequential loss and that the loss was foreseeable within the nature of the contract, see Beck, 701 P.2d at 802. The Blakelys have not made this showing.
. We view the district court's pretrial exclusion of the Blakelys’ diminution-in-value claim as .an effective dismissal. See Blakely, 633 F.3d at 949 (construing similar action by the district court as a "dismissal”).
. In arguing to the contrary, the Blakelys refer to remarks made during an earlier pretrial hearing on March 31, 2008. See Aplt.'s Reply Br. at 27. There, they claim, the district court expressed a view that "the ‘measure’ of the Blakelys’ ■ damage [was] the amount awarded in the property damage appraisal.” Id. Our reading of the relevant aspect of the pretrial hearing transcript reveals some ambiguity in the district court’s remarks regarding the legal effect of the appraisal award. See Aplts.’ App., Vol. VII, 1360-61 (Tr. of Pretrial Hr’g, dated Mar. 31, 2008). Nonetheless, even if we interpreted the court’s comments in the 2008 pretrial hearing as the Blakelys do, we would recognize our focus should be on the rationale the court articulated in dismissing the diminution-of-value claim more than five years later. That is because district courts are not encouraged or obliged to adhere to prior interlocutory rulings — much less prior comments — if they conclude that those rulings (or comments) are erroneous and would result in reversal. See, e.g., Major v. Benton, 647 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1981) ("When a lower court is convinced that an interlocutory ruling it has made is substantially erroneous, the only sensible thing to do is to set itself right to avoid subsequent reversal.”); see also Unioil v. Elledge (In re Unioil, Inc.), 962 F.2d 988, 993 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Only final judgments may qualify as law of the case; where a ruling remains subject to reconsideration, the doctrine is inapplicable.”); United States v. Bettenhausen, 499 F.2d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 1974) (“The rule of the law of the case does not apply unless there is a final judgment that decided the issue.... The ruling in question here could have been reconsidered by the trial court and was not final.” (citations omitted)). And the district court’s rationale supporting its dismissal five years after the 2008 pretrial hearing do not evince any conflict with Miller.