United States v. Mata-Rodriguez

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSDecember 7, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 15-3041
v.
(D.C. No. 2:10-CR-20024-JWL-1)
(D. Kan.)
ADRIAN MATA-RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HOLMES, MATHESON, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Adrian Mata-Rodriguez, proceeding pro se, appeals
from the district court’s order modifying his sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2), wherein he sought a reduction of his sentence based on Amendment
782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”). Exercising
our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and construing Mr. Mata-Rodriguez’s
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
decided unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
filings liberally, see Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1201 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010), we
affirm the district court’s order.
In 2010 a jury convicted Mr. Mata-Rodriguez of, inter alia, several drug-
related offenses, including possession with the intent to distribute and distribution
of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B).
The district court did not adopt the United States Probation Office’s findings in
the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), which assigned an advisory
Guidelines sentencing range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. 1 Instead, the
court—having determined that Mr. Mata-Rodriguez’s offense level was thirty-
four and his criminal history category was I—determined that his advisory
Guidelines sentencing range was 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment, and
sentenced him to 188 months.
After Mr. Mata-Rodriguez was sentenced, the United States Sentencing
Commission retroactively lowered the Guidelines sentencing range for his crime.
See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 782 (2014). He then filed a motion for a sentence
reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The government and Mr. Mata-
Rodriguez presented the district court with a proposed order to have his sentence
reduced in light of the recent amendment. Taking into account the amendment,
the district court reduced Mr. Mata-Rodriguez’s offense level from thirty-four to
1
The United States Probation Office utilized the 2009 edition of the
United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines (hereinafter “U.S.S.G.”)
Manual in drafting the PSR.
2
thirty-two, assigned him a new Guidelines sentencing range of 121 to 151 months
of imprisonment, and reduced his sentence from 188 months to 151 months—the
high end of the new range.
Mr. Mata-Rodriguez appeals from the district court’s § 3582(c)(2) order,
arguing that the court erred because it failed to order a new PSR and to conduct
an evidentiary hearing where he could present evidence of his rehabilitative gains
while in prison. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s order
reducing a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Osborn,
679 F.3d 1193, 1195 (10th Cir. 2012). “The scope of a district court’s authority
in a resentencing proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) is a question of law that we
review de novo.” United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 837 (10th Cir. 2008).
The government contends that Mr. Mata-Rodriguez is only entitled to plain-error
review because he did not first raise his appellate arguments before the district
court. However, we need not reach a conclusion on this matter, because even
under the standard of review that is more favorable to Mr. Mata-Rodriguez (i.e.,
abuse of discretion), he cannot prevail.
Mr. Mata-Rodriguez’s arguments depend on the contours of the sentence-
modification procedure set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). That procedure is
limited and our caselaw has articulated its contours. See United States v.
Washington, 759 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that “the
modification procedure set out in § 3582(c)(2) is carefully constrained”). The
3
district court, within its discretion, modified Mr. Mata-Rodriguez’s sentence
under the limited jurisdictional allotment afforded it by § 3582(c)(2). That
provision applies only “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The
Commission modified the Guidelines range applicable to Mr. Mata-Rodriguez’s
sentence. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 782 (2014).
However, in determining whether a movant satisfies the baseline eligibility
criterion for a sentence modification, “courts must act ‘consistent[ly] with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’”
Washington, 759 F.3d at 1182 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2)); see also United States v. McGee, 615 F.3d 1287, 1292 (10th Cir.
2010) (holding that courts must begin the process by “follow[ing] the
Commission’s instructions in [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.10 to determine the prisoner’s
eligibility for a sentence modification” (quoting Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S.
817, 827 (2010))).
The key policy here is that § 3582(c)(2) proceedings “do not constitute a
full resentencing of the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(3). Instead, a district
court must begin by determining “the amended guideline range that would have
been applicable to the defendant if the amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in
subsection (d) had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced.”
4
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) (emphasis added). “In making such determination, the
court shall substitute only the [retroactively applicable amendments] for the
corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was
sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.”
Id. (emphasis added). Standing alone, the Guidelines language strongly indicates
that the district court, in modifying Mr. Mata-Rodriguez’s sentence, was not
positioned to broadly revisit and consider anew the propriety of his sentence by
ordering a new PSR or conducting an evidentiary hearing to assess his
rehabilitative efforts since he was first sentenced.
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in Dillon, 560 U.S. 817, reinforces
this conclusion. In Dillon, the Court noted that “[b]y its terms, § 3582(c)(2) does
not authorize a sentencing or resentencing proceeding.” 560 U.S. at 825. The
Court emphasized that district courts do not “impose a new sentence in the usual
sense,” but merely reduce an otherwise final sentence in certain limited
circumstances. Id. at 825–27. The Court specifically held that district courts
cannot recalculate aspects of a sentence that are unaffected by a retroactively
applicable amendment to the Guidelines. See id. at 831; see also Freeman v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2693 (2011) (plurality opinion) (“All Guidelines
decisions from the original sentencing remain in place, save the sentencing range
that was altered by retroactive amendment.”).
5
From this line of cases and the plain language of the Guidelines, which
§ 3582(c)(2) incorporates by reference, 2 we conclude that Mr. Mata-Rodriguez’s
arguments find no legal support. The district court was authorized to consider
only the reduced Guidelines range in modifying his sentence; thus, it was obliged
to “leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(b)(1). A new PSR, or evidentiary hearing to consider Mr. Mata-
Rodriguez’s rehabilitative efforts, would have had no effect on his modified
sentence. More specifically, it would have been legally improper under the
foregoing authority for the district court to order such procedural steps, and doing
so would have amounted to no more than a meaningless gesture.
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentencing-
modification order.
Entered for the Court
JEROME A. HOLMES
Circuit Judge
2
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (permitting only sentence reductions that
are “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission”).
6