Mena-Flores v. Holder

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 23, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
GUSTAVO MENA-FLORES,
Petitioner,
v. Nos. 13-9532, 13-9584 & 13-9605
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United
States Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petitions for Review from the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Mark R. Barr, Lichter Immigration, Denver, CO, for Petitioner.
Robert Michael Stalzer, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C. (Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Anh-
Thu Mai-Windle, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Julie M. Iversen, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., on the briefs) for Respondent.
Before HOLMES, BACHARACH, and M C HUGH, Circuit Judges.
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
The Department of Homeland Security initiated proceedings to
remove Mr. Gustavo Mena Flores from the United States on the ground that
he was in the country illegally. Mr. Mena Flores conceded removability,
but applied to adjust his status to permanent residency based on his
marriage to a U.S. citizen. The immigration judge eventually denied the
request, stating that Mr. Mena Flores was ineligible for permanent
residency because of a “reasonable belief” that he had participated in drug
trafficking. On appeal the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed,
concluding that the immigration judge had sufficient evidence to find a
reason to believe that Mr. Mena Flores had participated in drug trafficking.
Mr. Mena Flores petitioned this court to review the Board’s denial of
his request for adjustment in status. While the petition was pending, the
Board denied Mr. Mena Flores’s subsequent motions to reopen the case and
reconsider the denial of his motion to reopen. Mr. Mena Flores then filed
petitions seeking review of these denials.
We deny Mr. Mena Flores’s petitions to review the Board’s three
orders, which affirmed the denial of his application to adjust his status and
denied his requests to reopen the proceedings and to reconsider the refusal
to reopen. The Board of Immigration Appeals did not err when it held that
Mr. Mena Flores had failed to
● prove eligibility for an adjustment in status or
● justify reopening or reconsideration.
2
I. Removal Proceedings and Request for an Adjustment in Status
Mr. Mena Flores entered the United States unlawfully in 1990.
Sixteen years later, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal
proceedings on the ground that he was present in the United States without
admission or parole. Mr. Mena Flores admitted that he was removable
because he was “undocumented.” But, Mr. Mena Flores tried to change
this status, seeking permanent residency based on his marriage to a U.S.
citizen. If he had succeeded, he would have avoided removal.
The Department of Homeland Security contended that Mr. Mena
Flores could not become a permanent resident based on his criminal
activity. This contention stemmed from an arrest of Mr. Mena Flores on
drug charges. 1 Though Mr. Mena Flores was acquitted, an immigration
judge cannot adjust an alien’s status if the evidence creates even a “reason
to believe” that the applicant participated in drug trafficking. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(a)(2)(C)(i), 1255(i)(2)(A). This standard is lower than the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, so the acquittal did not guarantee
eligibility to become a permanent resident. See, e.g., Cuevas v. Holder,
737 F.3d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding “that an alien can be
1
The charges included (1) one count of distribution of a controlled
substance, cocaine, (2) one count of distribution of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, (3) one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled
substance, cocaine and methamphetamine, (4) one count of possession of a
controlled substance, methamphetamine, and (5) one count of possession of
a controlled substance, cocaine. R. (Case No. 13-9532) at 590-92.
3
inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2)(C) even when not convicted of a crime”);
Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Section
1182(a)(2)(C) does not require a conviction, but only a ‘reason to believe’
that the alien is or has been involved in drug trafficking.”); Garces v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that
§ 1182(a)(2)(C) renders an alien inadmissible based on a “reason to
believe” standard, which does not require a conviction).
Both parties submitted evidence on the allegations of drug
trafficking, relying on some of the records from the state criminal trial. At
a hearing, the immigration judge granted Mr. Mena Flores’s request for
adjustment in status. The immigration judge found that Mr. Mena Flores
had shown there was no reason to believe he was a participant in drug
trafficking. R. (Case No. 13-9532) at 261-62.
The Department of Homeland Security appealed, urging that the
agency had a reason to believe Mr. Mena Flores had trafficked in drugs.
The Board of Immigration Appeals remanded to the immigration judge to
address all of the evidence.
On remand, the immigration judge denied Mr. Mena Flores’s
application. On essentially the same record, the judge found that there was
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence creating a reason to believe
that Mr. Mena Flores had been involved in drug trafficking. Id. at 30. For
these findings, the immigration judge relied on
4
● the statements from “[a]t least five witnesses” involved in the
drug operation,
● an affidavit by a special agent identifying two other witnesses
to Mr. Mena Flores’s trafficking activities, and
● a determination that Mr. Mena Flores was not credible because
of his demeanor while testifying.
Id. at 28-30.
Mr. Mena Flores appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals,
which affirmed and adopted the immigration judge’s decision. Id. at 3.
II. Mr. Mena Flores’s Administrative Motions for Reopening and
Reconsideration
After the Board’s decision, Mr. Mena Flores hired new counsel, who
moved for the Board to reopen the removal proceedings to consider
transcripts from the criminal trial and additional character references. See
R. (Case No. 13-9605) at 122-23. Mr. Mena Flores argued that his prior
attorney had been ineffective by failing to present this evidence earlier.
The Board denied the motion to reopen, holding that prior counsel’s failure
to introduce the evidence did not amount to “egregious circumstances” or
result in prejudice. Id. at 123.
Following the denial of his motion to reopen, Mr. Mena Flores
moved for the Board to reconsider the denial of his motion to reopen,
arguing that the Department of Homeland Security had misrepresented
critical evidence by splitting one witness’s statements, correctly attributing
one part and misattributing the other part to another witness. Mr. Mena
5
Flores argues that this error caused the immigration judge to mistakenly
believe that there was an additional witness. The Board denied the motion,
reasoning that Mr. Mena Flores could not establish prejudice because the
misattributed statements were merely “cumulative [of] other consistent and
corroborative evidence relied upon by the Immigration Judge.” Id. at 4.
III. Denial of Adjustment in Status
When the immigration judge disallowed an adjustment in status, he
reasoned that Mr. Mena Flores had not satisfied his burden of proof on
eligibility because of the evidence of drug trafficking. The Board of
Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal, and we conclude that this
dismissal did not constitute error.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This court generally has subject matter jurisdiction to review final
orders of removal, such as the order against Mr. Mena Flores. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1), (5). But, exceptions exist, and the Department of Homeland
Security invokes three of them:
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), which bars review of orders against
aliens who are removable because they have participated in
drug trafficking;
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which bars review of orders
involving discretionary relief, including adjustment in status;
and
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), which bars review of unexhausted
arguments.
6
These provisions do not preclude jurisdiction. 2
1. Criminal Aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)
In 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), federal law precludes jurisdiction to
review an order of removal of an alien who “is removable” based on
commission of certain crimes, including drug trafficking. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(C). We must decide if this provision applies when the agency
ordered removal based on illegal presence in the country and relied on
criminality only to decline an adjustment in status. We conclude that
§ 1252(a)(2)(C) does not apply in these circumstances.
The Department of Homeland Security argues that Mr. Mena Flores is
removable because the government could have ordered him removed based
on drug trafficking. We disagree with this logic. The agency did not find
Mr. Mena Flores removable for drug trafficking, so application of this
jurisdictional bar would require us to make new factual findings. Because
such fact finding would be inappropriate, we hold that § 1252(a)(2)(C)
does not preclude jurisdiction in situations like ours, when there is no
2
The Department of Homeland Security argues that if § 1252 applies,
our jurisdiction would be limited to considering constitutional claims.
But, we conclude that § 1252 does not foreclose jurisdiction. Thus, we
need not consider the Department’s argument that our jurisdiction is
limited to constitutional claims.
7
conviction and the alien was not ordered removed for a covered crime
(such as drug trafficking). 3
Section 1252(a)(2)(C) precludes jurisdiction when an alien “is
removable” based on participation in drug trafficking. But, the phrase “is
removable” can be interpreted in two ways:
1. as requiring a finding by the immigration judge that the alien
was removable for drug trafficking, or
2. as capturing all instances in which the agency could have
removed the alien for criminal activity, even when no
immigration judge had found criminal activity and the alien had
not been convicted of a covered crime.
See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 n.2 (2001) (stating that
§ 1252(a)(2)(C) “is not without its ambiguities”).
Our resolution of this ambiguity determines whether we have
jurisdiction. We retain jurisdiction if we adopt the first definition because
Mr. Mena Flores was not removed based on drug trafficking. (He was
ordered removed based on his “undocumented” status.) We might lack
jurisdiction if we adopt the second definition because there is evidence that
Mr. Mena Flores trafficked in drugs. 4
3
Under federal law, an alien is considered inadmissible when
convicted of certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)-(B). Thus, fact-
finding may be unnecessary when the alien was convicted of a crime. But,
our case does not involve a conviction.
4
Under the second definition, we would need to decide in the first
instance whether the government had proven by clear and convincing
evidence that there was a reason to believe the allegations of drug
8
We adopt the first definition based on
● the “strong presumption in favor of judicial review of
administrative action,” 5
● the “longstanding principle of construing any lingering
ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien,” 6 and
● definitions of the term “removable” in other sections of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.
Applying these factors, we conclude that § 1252(a)(2)(C) does not strip us
of jurisdiction.
Because the phrase “is removable” is ambiguous, we find guidance in
principles of statutory interpretation. See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533
U.S. 348, 350 n.2 (2001) (explaining that because § 1252(a)(2)(C) is
ambiguous, “[the] background principles of statutory construction and
constitutional concerns must be considered”). These principles include a
strong presumption favoring judicial review of administration action. See
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001) (explaining that the agency had to
overcome this presumption by showing that statutes “stripped the courts of
jurisdiction to decide the question of law presented by” a habeas corpus
application).
trafficking. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a). We are not
making this assessment in the first instance because we adopt the first
definition and reject the second.
5
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001).
6
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
9
As noted above, the phrase “is removable” can be interpreted in two
ways. One would apply whenever the court could ultimately deem the
alien removable; the other would apply only when the immigration judge
found the alien removable for covered crimes. Interpreting the phrase to
require a finding by the immigration judge, we adopt a definition that
facilitates judicial review of administrative action.
In doing so, we also follow the established principle of construing
ambiguities in removal statutes in favor of the alien. See United States v.
Quintana, 914 F.2d 1409, 1410 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Statutes relating to
deportation of aliens are liberally construed in favor of the alien concerned
as the deportation penalty can be harsh.”). This principle applies here
because § 1252(a)(2)(C) contains a lingering ambiguity (“is removable”)
and relates to removability by governing the appealability of orders of
removal.
We interpret “is removable” in favor of aliens by defining it to
require that the agency actually removed aliens on the ground of drug
trafficking (rather than ineligibility for an adjustment in status because of
evidence involving drug trafficking). The statute strips us of jurisdiction
to review orders of removal only when an alien is actually removed for
trafficking. This interpretation expands aliens’ opportunities to seek
judicial review. As a result, our interpretation favors aliens.
10
We rely not only on canons of construction, but also on other parts of
the Immigration and Nationality Act. To do so, we examine the statute to
see how it uses the terms “removal” and “removable.”
We start with the section we are interpreting: § 1252(a)(2)(C). This
section refers to an alien who “is removable.” Elsewhere in the statute,
Congress provided that removal proceedings must take place before an
immigration judge. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, the
immigration judge must “decide whether [the] alien is removable.” 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A). “Section 1229a’s use of the term ‘removable’
suggests . . . that a person is not ‘removable’ on a particular basis unless
or until the [immigration judge] determines that he is.” Alvarez-Santos v.
INS, 332 F.3d 1245, 1251 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Choeum v. INS, 129
F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 1997) (concluding that a statute―stripping courts of
jurisdiction “‘by reason of [an alien] having committed’ certain types of
criminal offenses”―applies only to “aliens who have actually been
adjudged deportable” for the specified crimes). Therefore, the phrase “is
removable” can be satisfied only when an immigration judge concludes that
the alien is removable for committing a covered crime.
The government relies on Shepherd v. Holder, 678 F.3d 1171 (10th
Cir. 2012), arguing that we lack jurisdiction because of evidence that could
have allowed removal of Mr. Mena Flores based on drug trafficking.
Shepherd involved removal of an individual based on forgery after she had
11
been convicted of forgery. See Shepherd, 678 F.3d at 1175. The
immigration judge initially denied removal, concluding that the individual
was a citizen under the Child Citizenship Act. See id. Subsequently, the
government again sought removal, arguing that the alien was removable
based on the forgery conviction because she was too old to qualify for
citizenship under the Child Citizenship Act. See id. at 1175-76. The
immigration judge agreed and ordered removal. See id. at 1176.
On appeal we determined that we had jurisdiction to consider the
threshold jurisdictional question of whether the individual was a citizen,
but lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the individual was removable
because of her forgery conviction. Id. at 1179. For this holding, we
quoted Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001), where we had said:
The [statute] divests courts of jurisdiction only if an alien “is
removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense.”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added). It does not say
that courts lack jurisdiction if the . . . alien is found deportable
for commission of certain criminal offenses [by the
[Immigration Judge/Board of Immigration Appeals]. Thus, the
statutory language clearly requires that we determine whether
[the triggering statutory] conditions exist before dismissing the
appeal.
Id. at 1180 (quoting Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001)).
We quoted this language only for the proposition that we can consider the
jurisdictional facts, not to indicate that we can make new factual findings
triggering the jurisdictional bar in § 1252(a)(2)(C). Id. There was no need
for the court to make a new factual finding on removability for commission
12
of a covered crime; the agency had already made that finding. Id. at 1176. 7
Thus, Shepherd does not suggest that a court can lose jurisdiction by
making new factual findings of criminality.
Because Shepherd does not apply, we conclude that we have
jurisdiction over the petition. Mr. Mena Flores was not removed for
trafficking in drugs; he was removed because he was undocumented and
unable to satisfy his burden for an adjustment in status. The evidence of
criminality was relevant not to prove Mr. Mena Flores was removable as a
criminal, but to rebut his argument that he was eligible for an adjustment
in status.
Ultimately, Mr. Mena Flores bore an obligation to dispel any reason
to believe the drug trafficking allegation. But, the immigration judge
could deny an adjustment in status even if he had not regarded Mr. Mena
Flores as a drug trafficker. Because Mr. Mena Flores was removed on
noncriminal grounds, we retain jurisdiction notwithstanding
§ 1252(a)(2)(C). See Syblis v. Att’y Gen., 763 F.3d 348, 351 n.5 (3d Cir.
2014) (stating that § 1252(a)(2)(C) does not bar jurisdiction when the
7
The same was true in Garcia v. INS. There, we addressed 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(A)(2)(A)(iii), which provides for removal of aliens convicted of
aggravated felonies. Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir. 2001).
There was no question about whether the alien was guilty. The statute
authorized removal based on a conviction, and the alien had been convicted
of driving under the influence. Id. The sole jurisdictional issue was
whether the crime involved an aggravated felony. Id. at 1221.
13
agency found the alien removable based on the overstay statute rather than
his criminal conviction).
2. Discretionary Relief, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips the federal courts of jurisdiction to
review decisions “regarding the granting of [discretionary] relief” under
§ 1229b. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Because adjustment in status
involves a form of discretionary relief under § 1229b, the Department of
Homeland Security argues that we lack jurisdiction. We disagree.
Even when an alien seeks a discretionary form of relief, the
jurisdictional bar in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not apply to nondiscretionary
aspects of that relief. Sabido Valdivia v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1144, 1148-
49 (10th Cir. 2005). In evaluating an application for adjustment in status,
an immigration judge must make both discretionary and nondiscretionary
determinations. The judge must determine if the alien
● satisfies the eligibility requirements and
● merits the favorable exercise of discretion by the court.
8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4)(A). The second element involves a discretionary
determination, but the first one does not.
The immigration judge declined relief based on the first
determination, concluding that Mr. Mena Flores could not become a
14
permanent resident because of the evidence of drug trafficking. R. (Case
No. 13-9532) at 63-65. With this conclusion, the immigration judge noted
that he had not reached the discretionary determination. Id. at 65 n.1.
Therefore, our review is limited to the nondiscretionary aspects of the
immigration judge’s determination that Mr. Mena Flores is ineligible for
relief. In these circumstances, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not preclude
jurisdiction.
3. Exhaustion of Arguments, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)
We can review an order of removal only if the alien has exhausted
available administrative remedies. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). The government
argues that Mr. Mena Flores makes two unexhausted arguments on appeal:
1. The statements by trafficker-informants were not credible
because of internal inconsistencies.
2. The government misattributed Mr. Kenneth Fuqua’s
statements to Mr. Gary Smith, making it appear that an
additional person had identified Mr. Mena Flores as a part of
the drug trafficking organization.
We disagree, concluding that both arguments are exhausted because the
Board of Immigration Appeals has addressed these arguments on the
merits.
The two arguments were presented in the motions to reopen and
reconsider, and the Board rejected both arguments on the merits. R. (Case
No. 13-9605) at 4, 25-26, 123, 159-64. “If the [Board of Immigration
Appeals] deems an issue sufficiently presented to consider it on the merits,
15
such action by the BIA exhausts the issue as far as the agency is concerned
and that is all § 1252(d)(1) requires to confer our jurisdiction.” Sidabutar
v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1120 (10th Cir. 2007).
By submitting both arguments to the Board and obtaining decisions
on the merits, Mr. Mena Flores has exhausted his arguments on internal
inconsistency and misattribution of statements to Gary Smith. See Molina
v. Holder, 763 F.3d 1259, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 2014); cf. Sidabutar, 503
F.3d at 1122 (stating that two claims were unexhausted because they
“should have been brought before the BIA in the first instance through a
motion to reconsider or reopen”).
B. Merits
The Board denied Mr. Mena Flores’s request for adjustment in status,
concluding that his participation in drug trafficking made him ineligible to
become a permanent resident. On review, we evaluate if the Board’s
conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. Based on that review,
we conclude the agency did not err in denying Mr. Mena Flores’s
application for an adjustment in status.
1. Burden of Proof
Like any alien applying for relief from removal, Mr. Mena Flores
bears the burden to prove his eligibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4). Thus,
Mr. Mena Flores must prove that he is eligible to become a permanent
resident.
16
The Department of Homeland Security denies eligibility based on
evidence of drug trafficking. To rebut that position, 8 Mr. Mena Flores
must prove that there is not a reason to believe that he had participated in
drug trafficking. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(C), 1229a(c)(2)(A),
1255(i)(2)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).
2. Standard of Review
The Board determined that the evidence supported a belief that
Mr. Mena Flores had participated in drug trafficking. In reviewing the
Board’s decision, we engage in de novo review of constitutional and other
legal questions. Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir.
2007). Factual determinations, including credibility determinations, are
reviewed only for substantial evidence. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.
478, 481 (1992); see Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir.
2004) (holding that credibility determinations are reviewed under the
substantial evidence test in the asylum context). Under this standard, we
uphold the Board’s finding only if the evidence was “reasonable,
8
After the immigration judge found that Mr. Mena Flores deserved
discretionary relief, the Department of Homeland Security appealed to the
Board. In deciding that appeal, the Board stated that the burden of proof
shifted to the government to establish that there was a reason to believe
that Mr. Mena Flores had been involved in drug trafficking. R. (Case No.
13-9584) at 932. That statement conflicts with our precedent, which puts
the burden on the alien to prove that a mandatory ground for denial of
relief does not apply. Garcia v. Holder, 584 F.3d 1288, 1289-90 (10th Cir.
2009).
17
substantial and probative.” Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1150. 9 Applying this
standard, we can reverse the Board’s findings of fact only if “any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Although we are reviewing the decision of the Board, we can consult
the immigration judge’s opinion to the extent that it was relied upon by the
Board. Sarr v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 783, 790 (10th Cir. 2007). In this case,
the Board adopted all of the immigration judge’s findings, so we will refer
to opinions of both the Board and the immigration judge when evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence. R. (Case No. 13-9532) at 3.
3. The Evidence of Trafficking
Authorities suspected that Mr. Mena Flores had participated in a drug
trafficking organization led by his brother, Santiago. This suspicion led to
drug charges against Mr. Mena Flores. Though Mr. Mena Flores was
acquitted, the Department of Homeland Security used the trial evidence to
prevent Mr. Mena Flores from adjusting his status to permanent residency.
In denying Mr. Mena Flores’s request for adjustment in status, the
immigration judge and the Board relied on three types of evidence:
9
The requirement of “reasonable, substantial, and probative” evidence
applies in two contexts. We define “substantial evidence” as evidence that
is “reasonable, substantial, and probative.” Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d at
1150. And, in applying 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C), the Board of
Immigration Appeals interprets the phrase “reason to believe” to require
proof by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.” Matter of
Rico, 16 I. & N. Dec. 181, 185 (BIA 1977).
18
1. witness statements,
2. an affidavit from a special agent, and
3. Mr. Mena Flores’s testimony.
a. The Witness Statements
In police reports and sworn statements, four participants in the drug
trafficking organization (Mr. Donald Skinner, Mr. Kenneth Fuqua, Mr.
Richard Lee Clark, and Mr. Benito Garcia) said that Mr. Mena Flores had
been involved in the drug operation. Mr. Mena Flores questions their
credibility based on their criminal records, content of their testimony, and
bias resulting from their incentives to provide incriminating information.
The first witness was Mr. Donald Skinner, who identified Mr. Mena
Flores from a picture, stating that he was Santiago’s “brother and one of
his runners.” R. (Case No. 13-9532) at 2003 (“I called [Santiago] and tell
[sic] him what I needed and [Santiago] called me back telling me that I’m
going to meet [Mr. Mena Flores].”). Mr. Skinner testified inconsistently
regarding the number 10 and locations 11 of these transactions.
Mr. Skinner was subject to impeachment in three ways:
10
R. (Case No. 13-9532) at 926 (over 30); id. at 929-30 (approximately
24); id. at 1034 (at least 20).
11
R. (Case No. 13-9532) at 930 (stating that the deals occurred only in
public places); id. at 2003-04 (stating that he sometimes picked up drugs at
Mr. Mena Flores’s house).
19
1. He admitted that his memory was poor because of “a lot of
stuff in [his] head.” 12
2. He had prior arrests for making false reports. 13
3. He admitted that he could not distinguish between Mr. Mena
Flores and one of his brothers (Martin), who was also involved
in drug activity. 14
The second witness was Mr. Kenneth Fuqua, who identified
Mr. Mena Flores as one of Santiago’s brothers involved in the drug
business. Id. at 1051 (Incident Rep., Dec. 16, 2005), 2234 (Statement of
Kenneth Fuqua, Feb. 7, 2006). Mr. Fuqua could not provide details about
dates or the amount of drugs provided by Mr. Mena Flores. Id. at 2260-67.
The third witness was Mr. Richard Lee Clark. When shown a picture
of Mr. Mena Flores, Mr. Clark said that he recognized the individual from
a drug transaction. Id. at 394 (Incident Rep., Dec. 7, 2005). This account
had two problems:
1. Mr. Clark said the individual’s name was “Chico,” and
Mr. Mena Flores’s nickname was “Tavo.” 15
2. Mr. Clark elsewhere confused Mr. Mena Flores with one of his
brothers (Martin). 16
12
R. (Case No. 13-9532) at 2086; see also id. at 2073 (stating that he
had “a lot in [his] head”).
13
R. (Case No. 13-9532) at 1176.
14
R. (Case No. 13-9532) at 2012.
15
R. (Case No. 13-9532) at 394.
16
R. (Case No. 13-9532) at 2353-55.
20
The fourth witness was Mr. Benito Garcia, who said that Mr. Mena
Flores had been the “main person” helping Santiago. Id. at 4340 (Incident
Rep., March 25, 2007). But, Mr. Garcia admitted that he had never
conducted any deliveries with Mr. Mena Flores or seen him at any
deliveries. Id.
b. Special Agent McVey’s Affidavit
Special Agent Jeffrey McVey submitted an affidavit stating that two
more participants in the drug operation had identified Mr. Mena Flores:
Ms. Kyla Weisberg and Ms. Lucinda Allen.
According to the affidavit, Ms. Weisberg said “that she had gone
with [Mr. Skinner] to pick up [drugs] from [Santiago] Mena Flores and his
brothers.” Id. at 1325. But, in a related interview, Ms. Weisberg
acknowledged that she “did not know the brothers[’] names” and that she
believed that the men were Santiago’s brothers because Mr. Skinner had
told her they were. Id. at 942. Ms. Weisberg was also unable to identify
Mr. Mena Flores when shown his picture. Id.
In the affidavit, Special Agent McVey also referred to a statement by
Ms. Lucinda Allen. Ms. Allen said that on one occasion, she had “met
[with Santiago Mena Flores] at his brother’s residence located at 372 North
18th Ct., Brighton, Colorado.” Id. at 1326. But, this address was not Mr.
Mena Flores’s address; it was his brother Martin’s. Id. at 1033. On a
21
separate occasion, Ms. Allen was unable to identify a photograph of Mr.
Mena Flores. Id. at 2551-52.
c. Mr. Mena Flores’s Testimony
Mr. Mena Flores testified, denying any involvement in drug crimes or
knowledge of his brother’s participation in drug crimes. The immigration
judge found that Mr. Mena Flores was not credible “regarding his lack of
knowledge of [sic] brother’s criminal activity,” finding instead that the
evidence against Mr. Mena Flores was “internally consistent and
17
probative.” Id. at 30.
4. Reason to Believe
Mr. Mena Flores could not obtain permanent residency if there was
“reason to believe” that he had participated in drug trafficking. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2)(C). 18 Thus, we ask: Did the Board err by concluding that Mr.
Mena Flores had failed to disprove a reason to believe he had engaged in
17
Mr. Mena Flores has not challenged the finding on his own
credibility.
18
The parties disagree on what this burden entails. Mr. Mena Flores
admits that the evidence need not have proven drug trafficking beyond a
reasonable doubt. But, what would suffice? The Board of Immigration
Appeals has stated that the “reason to believe” standard is met only if the
evidence is “reasonable, substantial and probative.” In re El-Abed, 2006
WL 1558763, at *2 (BIA 2006); see note 9, above. The Department of
Homeland Security concedes that the government had reason to believe the
drug-trafficking allegations only if the evidence was reasonable,
substantial, and probative. And, as discussed above, our standard of
review requires us to decide whether the evidence was reasonable,
substantial, and probative. See pp. 17-18 & note 9, above.
22
drug trafficking? Keeping in mind that Mr. Mena Flores bears the burden
of proof for adjustment in status, we conclude the Board did not err.
a. Credibility Issues
The immigration judge was entitled to give credence to the testimony
of Mr. Skinner, Mr. Fuqua, and Mr. Garcia 19 despite the credibility
challenges made by Mr. Mena Flores.
Though Mr. Skinner identified Mr. Mena Flores as a participant in
the drug ring, there were credibility issues. For the agency’s
determinations on these credibility issues, we apply the abuse-of-discretion
standard. See Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1150 n. 9 (10th Cir.
2004). Under this standard, the agency had the discretion to credit Mr.
Skinner’s testimony. The agency could have downplayed the
inconsistencies in light of Mr. Skinner’s consistent testimony that he had
met Mr. Mena Flores at least twenty times. Similarly, the agency could
have downplayed the problems in distinguishing Mr. Mena Flores from his
brother Martin because Mr. Skinner said that he knew that both Mr. Mena
Flores and Martin were active in the drug organization.
The fact-finder could also give weight to Mr. Fuqua’s testimony.
Mr. Fuqua remembered seeing Mr. Mena Flores’s car and a particular
19
As discussed above, Mr. Richard Lee Clark also stated that he had
recognized Mr. Mena Flores from a drug transaction. But, Mr. Clark had
elsewhere confused Mr. Mena Flores with his brother Martin. We may
assume, for the sake of argument, that Mr. Clark’s account added little to
the government’s proof. See pp. 24-25, below.
23
transaction. Though Mr. Mena Flores attacks Mr. Fuqua’s credibility, a
rational adjudicator could determine that Mr. Fuqua was credible.
The agency could also have relied on testimony by Mr. Garcia, who
identified Mr. Mena Flores as a participant in the organization. Though
Mr. Garcia never saw Mr. Mena Flores at a transaction, an adjudicator
could rely on hearsay testimony. N-A-M v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1052, 1057-
58 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the rules of evidence are relaxed in the
immigration setting and the judge may rely on hearsay evidence as long as
it is “probative and its use is fundamentally fair”).
Through the accounts of Mr. Fuqua, Mr. Skinner, and Mr. Garcia, the
immigration judge could reasonably find that the evidence supported a
finding of ineligibility based on Mr. Mena Flores’s criminal activity. See
United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 934-35 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the evidence was sufficient to convict beyond a reasonable
doubt when the evidence consisted mainly of testimony by other
participants in drug transactions, even though there were questions about
the reliability and consistency of the accounts).
Mr. Mena Flores points to questions surrounding the government’s
remaining witnesses. We need not consider these questions because a
reasonable adjudicator could have relied on the statements by Mr. Skinner,
Mr. Fuqua, and Mr. Garcia to find that Mr. Mena Flores had not satisfied
his burden of persuasion. With credibility findings lying in the province
24
of the immigration judge, he could reasonably find that the evidence
showed ineligibility for permanent residency because of criminal activity.
b. Mr. Mena Flores’s Arguments
Mr. Mena Flores makes six arguments in challenging the Board’s
finding of ineligibility for permanent residency:
1. The denial of the application to adjust status was a close call.
2. The evidence tainted by governmental misrepresentations was
not reasonable, substantial, or probative.
3. Law enforcement officers never saw Mr. Mena Flores commit a
crime despite months of surveillance.
4. His personal characteristics were inconsistent with criminal
behavior.
5. Most members of the drug operation were unable to identify
Mr. Mena Flores as a participant.
6. The government’s witnesses were unreliable.
His arguments do not affect our conclusion that there was sufficient
evidence for a reasonable adjudicator to conclude that Mr. Mena Flores had
trafficked in drugs. 20
20
Mr. Mena Flores argues that in the absence of a conviction, the
Board of Immigration Appeals has upheld findings of inadmissibility only
when there were other non-trafficking or controlled substance possession
convictions, trafficking-related arrests, admissions to authorities, detection
of drugs on the person, or observation by government officials. In support,
Mr. Mena Flores cites a number of cases upholding findings of
inadmissibility under these circumstances. But, Mr. Mena Flores does not
cite any cases in which the Board of Immigration Appeals has invalidated a
finding of inadmissibility without these kinds of proof. From Mr. Mena
Flores’s listing of cases, we might infer that the present case is unique.
25
i. Close Call
Mr. Mena Flores asserts that we should consider the closeness of the
issue. We assume, for the sake of argument, that the underlying factual
issue involves a close call. But, we must uphold the Board’s decision if
there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable adjudicator to conclude that
Mr. Mena Flores was involved in drug trafficking. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). Thus, even if we determine that the immigration judge or
the Board had inappropriately relied on certain evidence, we must uphold
the findings if the remaining evidence would permit a reasonable fact-
finder to conclude that Mr. Mena Flores had trafficked in drugs. Because
the evidence is sufficient, we reject Mr. Mena Flores’s argument.
In evaluating the evidence, we find little guidance from existing case
law. The case law involves a spectrum of facts on which circuit courts
have affirmed or reversed an agency’s finding regarding a reason to
believe that an alien had engaged in drug crimes. Mr. Mena Flores does
not fall neatly on either side of the spectrum.
On one side of the spectrum, there are cases in which courts have
found a “reason to believe” the alien was engaged in criminality. Circuit
courts have routinely upheld “reason-to-believe” findings when the alien
● admits to the relevant crime,
But, the listing of cases does not help us in deciding how to adjudicate this
unique case.
26
● is directly observed with drugs by police, immigration, or
government officials, or
● has a conviction for possession of a controlled substance or
another nontrafficking offense.
See, e.g., Fernandez-Bernal v. Att’y Gen., 257 F.3d 1304, 1310-11 (11th
Cir. 2001) (alien admitted to possessing cocaine, even though the
underlying conviction was expunged); Cuevas v. Holder, 737 F.3d 972, 973
(5th Cir. 2013) (car search revealed cocaine hidden in the rear panel);
Nunez-Payan v. INS, 811 F.2d 264, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1987) (pleaded guilty
to narcotics charge and received a probationary sentence of 32 months
under a deferred adjudication statute); see also Appellant’s Opening Br.
(Case No. 13-9532) at 27-34 (listing cases in which the Board of
Immigration Appeals or a court has upheld reason-to-believe findings).
On the other side of the spectrum are cases in which courts have
reversed the agency’s “reason to believe” findings. These cases involve
the Board’s reliance on
● the fact that an arrest had been made without analyzing the
underlying circumstances, or
● the presence of conclusory police reports that lack any
indication of criminality.
See, e.g., Garces v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 1337, 1350 (11th Cir. 2010)
(reversing a finding of reason to believe based only on a vacated plea and
some hearsay in police reports); Igwebuike v. Caterisano, 230 F. App’x
27
278, 283-85 (4th Cir. 2007) (reversing a finding of reason to believe that
had been based solely on insubstantial, non-probative evidence).
Our facts fall somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. Mr. Mena
Flores has not admitted trafficking, has never been observed by law
enforcement with drugs, and has no criminal record. On the other hand,
the evidence against him is stronger than other cases in which a court has
reversed the Board’s “reason to believe” findings. For example, the
evidence here includes the statements of at least three participants in the
trafficking organization. On balance, we conclude that the agency could
reasonably determine that the facts create a reason to believe criminality
despite the absence of circumstances frequently found in other cases.
Thus, the agency did not err in concluding that Mr. Mena Flores had failed
to meet his burden.
ii. The Government’s Erroneous Statement
Mr. Mena Flores argues that the agency’s decision is tainted by a
governmental misrepresentation. In its evidence, the Department of
Homeland Security mistakenly attributed part of Mr. Fuqua’s account to
Mr. Gary Smith. Based on this mistake, it appeared that Mr. Smith had
implicated Mr. Mena Flores when Mr. Smith had not. 21 Mr. Mena Flores
21
The Department of Homeland Security notified the immigration judge
of the mistake, but the judge still relied on the error. See R. (Case No. 13-
9605) at 1219.
28
argues this error is significant because of Mr. Smith’s role in the drug
trafficking organization.
The Board addresses this argument in Mr. Mena Flores’s subsequent
motion to reconsider, concluding that the error was harmless because the
evidence was cumulative. See pp. 39, 41, below. We agree with the
Board’s conclusion expressed in its denial of the motion to reconsider. As
we have stated, the remaining evidence permits the conclusion that Mr.
Mena Flores trafficked in drugs. Therefore, this mistake does not require
reversal of the Board’s denial of Mr. Mena Flores’s request for an
adjustment in status.
iii. No Eyewitness Testimony by Law Enforcement Officers
Mr. Mena Flores points out that no law enforcement officer ever saw
him commit a crime despite months of surveillance. But, eyewitness
testimony by law enforcement officers is not necessary to preclude
eligibility for an adjustment in status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)
(requiring only a “reason to believe”). The evidence need only be
reasonable, substantial, and probative for the Board to have a reason to
believe that Mr. Mena Flores was involved in drug-trafficking. See Matter
of Rico, 16 I. & N. Dec. 181, 185 (1977) (requiring reasonable, substantial,
29
and probative evidence when the burden was on the government). Because
that evidence exists, we reject Mr. Mena Flores’s argument. 22
iv. Personal Characteristics
Mr. Mena Flores emphasizes that the circumstances of his personal
life do not suggest criminality: He has no prior criminal record, did not
have multiple telephone numbers, and kept a steady job.
But, a reasonable adjudicator could find criminality notwithstanding
this evidence. Our question is whether the evidence supports the agency’s
determination that Mr. Mena Flores is ineligible for an adjustment in status
based on involvement in drug-trafficking. The commendable aspects of his
personal life do not preclude an agency from finding that Mr. Mena Flores
failed to satisfy his burden of persuasion on the evidence of drug
trafficking.
v. Not Identified by Most Members of the Drug Operation
Mr. Mena Flores notes that most members of the drug operation did
not identify him as a participant. But, some did, and their testimony
provides sufficient evidence for the immigration judge to conclude that Mr.
Mena Flores is not eligible to become a permanent resident.
22
Mr. Mena Flores argues that despite the lengthy investigation, he was
referenced in only a single set of surveillance notes and less than 0.02% of
all calls. This argument bears on credibility of the witnesses linking Mr.
Mena Flores to the drug ring. But, as discussed above, the agency could
credit the witness testimony despite the infrequent references to Mr. Mena
Flores.
30
vi. Unreliability of Witnesses
Mr. Mena Flores also argues that the government’s witnesses are
unreliable. By relying on the witnesses, the immigration judge implicitly
found that the testimony of the governmental witnesses was reliable. See
United States v. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d 819, 825 (recognizing the district
court’s implicit “resolution of credibility issues”).
We have already addressed the reliability of the statements made by
Mr. Fuqua, Mr. Skinner, and Mr. Garcia. For the sake of argument, we can
assume that solid reasons exist to question the credibility of the three men.
Despite these credibility issues, a reasonable fact-finder could rely on the
witnesses’ statements. As a result, these statements require us to uphold
the Board’s determination.
5. Summary
In summary, substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination
that Mr. Mena Flores was inadmissible based on involvement in a drug-
trafficking crime.
IV. Review of the Motion to Reopen and Reconsider
We deny the petitions on the Board’s decisions to deny reopening
and reconsideration.
A. Jurisdiction
We have subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board’s denial of
Mr. Mena Flores’s motion to reopen and reconsider because both are final
31
orders. Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 2004); see
also Khan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2007) (reviewing a motion
to reconsider). 23
B. Motion to Reopen
Through a motion to reopen, an alien can request the Board to reopen
his appeal in light of newly available evidence. Typically, “[a] motion to
reopen seeks to present evidence that ‘is material and was not available
and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.’”
Mahamat v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1281, 1283 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)). But, an alien can also base a motion to reopen on
available documents that had not been submitted because of counsel’s
ineffectiveness. See Akinwunmi v. INS, 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 & n.2 (10th
Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
Mr. Mena Flores bases his motion to reopen on evidence that was not
presented because of ineffective representation. The Board denied the
motion to reopen, and we conclude that the decision fell within the Board’s
discretion.
23
The Department of Homeland Security argues that we lack subject
matter jurisdiction over these motions because we lack jurisdiction over
the petition addressing adjustment in status. But, as discussed above, we
conclude we have jurisdiction over the agency’s decision to deny an
adjustment in status. Because we conclude that we have jurisdiction over
the petition addressing adjustment in status, we need not address the
Department’s related jurisdictional challenge to the petitions involving
reopening and reconsideration.
32
1. Burden to Show Ineffective Representation
The Board of Immigration Appeals could reopen the proceedings only
if Mr. Mena Flores showed that counsel was ineffective and the
circumstances were egregious. Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637,
638-39 (BIA 1988), overruled, Matter of Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710
(BIA 2009), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA 2009). The legal
representation was ineffective only if the attorney’s deficiencies were so
prejudicial that the proceedings became fundamentally unfair. Akinwunmi,
194 F.3d at 1341 n.2.
2. Abuse of Discretion
In rejecting Mr. Mena Flores’s claim of ineffective representation,
we consider whether the agency abused its discretion. Pineda v. Gonzales,
427 F.3d 833, 838 (10th Cir. 2003). The agency abused its discretion if it
failed to give a rational explanation, inexplicably deviated from past
policies, failed to supply any reasoning, or rested on summary or
conclusory statements. Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th
Cir. 2004).
3. Mr. Mena Flores’s Arguments
Mr. Mena Flores urges an abuse of discretion based on four aspects
of the Board’s decision:
1. summary dismissal of the argument involving the omission of
part of the criminal trial transcripts,
33
2. failure to explain why Mr. Mena Flores’s character references
could not rebut specific evidence considered by the
immigration judge,
3. a misstatement regarding the number of witnesses identifying
Mr. Mena Flores as a participant in the drug trafficking
organization, and
4. failure to address Mr. Mena Flores’s contention that the
particular circumstances should lessen his burden of proving
actual prejudice.
Under the abuse-of-the-discretion standard, our inquiry is whether the
Board provided a rational explanation or rested on conclusory statements.
We conclude the explanation was rational.
a. Trial Transcripts
Mr. Mena Flores bears the burden to prove that
● his counsel’s failure to introduce the trial transcripts rendered
the legal representation ineffective, and
● the ineffectiveness caused enough prejudice to make the
proceedings fundamentally unfair.
Tang v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2003). The
ineffectiveness prong requires “egregious circumstances,” 24 and the
prejudice prong requires a “reasonable likelihood” that the outcome would
have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance. 25
24
Osei v. INS, 305 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Stroe v.
INS, 256 F.3d 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2001)).
25
United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1208-09 (10th Cir.
2004).
34
The Board concluded that it was not egregious for Mr. Mena Flores’s
prior counsel to withhold the trial transcripts. Because the transcripts
include evidence damaging to Mr. Mena Flores, the Board determined that
Mr. Mena Flores’s prior counsel probably made a strategic decision on
which parts to offer. An attorney’s objectively reasonable tactical
decisions do not qualify as ineffective assistance. Hooper v. Mullin, 314
F.3d 1162, 1169-70 (10th Cir. 2002). So, the Board determined that Mr.
Mena Flores’s attorney was not ineffective by failing to submit the
transcripts.
Mr. Mena Flores argues that the Board abused its discretion,
claiming that his attorney could not have made a strategic decision because
he had not even read the transcripts. But, Mr. Mena Flores provides no
evidence that the attorney failed to read the transcripts.
In addition to concluding that Mr. Mena Flores’s attorney did not fail
to provide effective representation, the Board concluded that the failure to
submit the transcripts was not prejudicial. Mr. Mena Flores claims the
Board failed to analyze how the transcripts could have damaged the
credibility of the government’s witnesses. For example, Mr. Mena Flores’s
trial counsel testified that
● jurors stated after the trial that they had not believed the
prosecution’s witnesses because they testified inconsistently
and had strong reasons to lie,
35
● some witnesses had provided substantial help to the prosecution
and agreed to cooperate in exchange for reductions in their
sentences,
● an employer had testified that Mr. Mena Flores was a good
employee,
● Mr. Mena Flores’s brother (Santiago) had admittedly made the
telephone calls from Mr. Mena Flores’s telephone, and
● none of the surveillance showed activity by Mr. Mena Flores.
R. (Case No. 13-9605) at 1224-30, 1233.
Mr. Mena Flores overstates the significance of the trial transcripts.
The Board and the immigration judge already knew about the prosecution’s
difficulty in obtaining the conviction and the impeachment of the
government’s witnesses.
The transcripts contain at least some information that could have
proven damaging to Mr. Mena Flores. At the criminal trial, the
prosecution presented testimony by Mr. Skinner and Mr. Fuqua. After
hearing their testimony on direct examination and cross examination, Mr.
Mena Flores’s attorney moved for a judgment of acquittal. R. (Case No.
13-9605) at 706-07. The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that “a
reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Mena Flores [was] guilty.” Id. at
708.
In the removal proceedings, the agency had not only the accounts by
Mr. Skinner and Mr. Fuqua, but also the account of Mr. Benito Garcia.
Unlike the district court, the agency did not have to decide whether
36
someone could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mena Flores was
guilty of distribution of a controlled substance, conspiracy, or possession
of a controlled substance. The question before the agency was merely
whether there was “reason to believe” Mr. Mena Flores had trafficked in
drugs.
The full transcripts might have allowed the agency to rely on the trial
judge’s assessment of the evidence. After hearing that evidence, the trial
judge stated that a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Mena Flores had committed the crimes. And, he drew that
conclusion with less evidence than the immigration judge had. Under these
circumstances, a full copy of the trial transcript might have strengthened
the immigration judge’s resolve to find a “reason to believe” that Mr.
Mena Flores was a drug trafficker.
The Board’s decision was supported by a clear rationale, did not
depart from established policies, and applied a correct interpretation of the
law. Thus, we hold that the Board did not abuse its discretion in declining
to reopen the proceedings based on counsel’s alleged failure to use the full
trial transcript.
b. Character References
Mr. Mena Flores claims that his attorney acted egregiously in failing
to present letters attesting to good character. In his brief to the Board, Mr.
Mena Flores claimed that the statements of his friends, family, and co-
37
workers would have rebutted the statements of the adverse witnesses. The
desired letters would have depicted Mr. Mena Flores as an honest,
hardworking man, whose family is his first priority.
The Board dedicated less than one sentence to the letters. But, in
that sentence, the Board concluded that the character references failed to
rebut the information considered by the immigration judge. The brevity of
this explanation does not establish an abuse of discretion. Infanzon v.
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th Cir. 2004).
The Board could reasonably conclude that the character evidence did
not rebut the evidence relied on by the immigration judge. 26 As a result,
the attorney’s failure to present character evidence did not require the
Board to grant the motion to reopen.
c. Statement of Gary Smith
As discussed previously, the Department of Homeland Security
misattributed a statement made by Mr. Fuqua to both Mr. Fuqua and Mr.
Smith. This error suggested that five witnesses had implicated Mr. Mena
26
Mr. Mena Flores argues that the evidence relied on by the
immigration judge was just as general as the evidence of good character.
We may assume, for the sake of argument, that he is correct. Nonetheless,
the Board of Immigration Appeals could reasonably conclude that the
character references did not rebut the evidence relied on by the
immigration judge.
38
Flores when only four witnesses had done so. 27 In ruling on Mr. Mena
Flores’s motion to reopen, the Board stated: “There were at least five
informants or witnesses who stated that [Mr. Mena Flores] served as a
‘runner’ for [Santiago], and the statements were consistent and
corroborative.” R. (Case No. 13-9605) at 123. Mr. Mena Flores argues
that the Board’s factual mistake entails an abuse of discretion. We
disagree.
When Mr. Mena Flores subsequently asked the Board to reconsider
its denial of the motion to reopen, he also argued that the Board’s factual
mistake was fatal. In denying the motion to reconsider, the Board
determined that the mistake was harmless because the erroneous evidence
was cumulative of other evidence. R. (Case No. 13-9605) at 4.
The Board was ideally suited to say how it would have decided if it
had known there were only four witnesses rather than five. After all, the
Board would have known how it would have ruled with the correct
information. Thus, the Board had the discretion to decline to reopen the
proceedings based on its earlier mistake.
27
Mr. Mena Flores also argues that Mr. Garcia never saw any alleged
acts of criminality by Mr. Mena Flores. But, as will be discussed below,
the Board did not say there were four eye-witnesses; the Board merely said
that there were four witnesses implicating Mr. Mena Flores in drug crimes.
39
d. Unaddressed Evidentiary Burden
In his motion to reopen, Mr. Mena Flores argued his case should be
reopened even if he disputed only a few pieces of evidence relied on by the
immigration judge. He explained that his case contained less direct
evidence than others in which the Board had sustained “reason to believe”
findings. The Board did not address this argument, and Mr. Mena Flores
claims that the Board had a duty to explain why the typical evidentiary
burden would apply.
We disagree. The Board’s obligation is to “‘consider the issues
raised . . . and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a
reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely
reacted.’” Becerra-Jimenez v. INS, 829 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Osuchukwu v. INS, 744 F.3d 1136, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1984)). This
obligation does not require the Board to “‘expressly parse or refute on the
record’ each individual argument . . . offered by the petitioner.” Wang v.
BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Xian Ji Chen v. Dep’t of
Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 160 n.13 (2d Cir. 2006)). Thus, the Board had no
obligation to say why the typical standard applied and we decline to
reverse the Board’s decision on this ground.
C. Motion to Reconsider
“A motion to reconsider . . . is available to raise errors of fact or law
committed by the [Board] in its prior decision.” Mahamat v. Gonzales, 430
40
F.3d 1281, 1283 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Mr.
Mena Flores asked the Board to reconsider its denial of his motion to
reconsider, arguing that the Board had affirmed the immigration judge’s
findings based in part on a factual error.
The Board relied on the immigration judge’s statements that “[t]here
were at least five informants or witnesses” who implicated Mr. Mena
Flores in the trafficking organization. R. (Case No. 13-9605) at 3. In fact,
there were only four witnesses. The Board denied the motion to
reconsider, deciding that the evidence in error “was cumulative to other
consistent and corroborative evidence.” Id. at 4; see pp. 29, 39, above.
The Board then listed the other evidence, concluding that it was sufficient.
Mr. Mena Flores argues that the Board abused its discretion by
making new factual mistakes and by making impermissible factual
findings. We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion to reconsider.
1. Factual Errors
In denying the motion to reconsider, the Board made two statements
that Mr. Mena Flores characterizes as inaccurate:
1. There had been four witnesses to Mr. Mena Flores’s
criminality.
2. Mr. Richard Clark had identified a picture of Mr. Mena Flores.
41
Mr. Mena Flores argues the first statement constitutes error because
there were not four “eye-witnesses to his criminality.” Appellant’s
Opening Br. (Case Nos. 13-9584 & 13-9605) at 50 (emphasis added). This
argument is based on the fact that Mr. Garcia, one of the witnesses, never
saw Mr. Mena Flores participate in trafficking. But, the Board did not say
there were four eye-witnesses; it said merely that there were four witnesses
implicating Mr. Mena Flores in drug crimes. Mr. Garcia was a witness
because he had made statements indicating that he was aware of Mr. Mena
Flores’s participation in the drug trafficking organization. Thus, there
were four witnesses, even if not all of them were eye-witnesses, and the
Board did not err in saying there were four witnesses.
In addition, Mr. Mena Flores argues that he was never identified by
Mr. Clark. But, Mr. Clark identified Mr. Mena Flores through a
photograph as an individual who had been present at a drug transaction. R.
(Case No. 13-9532) at 394.
As Mr. Mena Flores argues, Mr. Clark gave the wrong nickname for
Mr. Mena Flores. Id. But, Mr. Clark’s mistake goes to the reliability of
the identification; it does not change the fact that Mr. Clark identified Mr.
Mena Flores (through a photograph) as someone involved in the drug
organization. Thus, the Board’s characterization of Mr. Clark’s account
was accurate.
42
Even if the Board had made factual errors, the record contains
sufficient evidence for a reasonable adjudicator to conclude that Mr. Mena
Flores participated in drug trafficking. Therefore, the alleged errors would
not have compelled the Board to grant the motion to reconsider.
2. Impermissible Fact-Finding
Mr. Mena Flores adds that the Board should have granted the motion
to reconsider and ordered a remand to the immigration judge once the
Board determined that there were not five witnesses. In Mr. Mena Flores’s
view, the Board’s analysis entailed impermissible fact-finding. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).
The Board did not err. It merely determined that the remaining facts
would have led to the same result even without the mistake over the
number of witnesses. Thus, we reject Mr. Mena Flores’s argument that the
Board engaged in impermissible fact-finding.
We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mr. Mena Flores’s motion to reconsider.
V. Conclusion
Mr. Mena Flores bears the burden to establish that there was no
reason to believe that he had been a drug trafficker and that the Board
abused its discretion by denying his motions to reopen and reconsider.
He has failed to satisfy his burdens. Thus, we deny the petitions for
review.
43