Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 4, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
SAVANT HOMES, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-1115
DOUGLAS W. COLLINS; DOUGLAS
CONSULTING, LLC, d/b/a Collins
Custom Builders; STEWART KING, d/b/a
Kodiak Custom Design; TAMMIE
WAGNER; RON WAGNER,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-02049-WJM-MEH)
_________________________________
Alan F. Blakley (Tyler R. Rauert, with him on the briefs), Blakley Justice, LLC,
Longmont, Colorado, appearing for Appellant.
Jacob W. Paul, Coan Payton & Payne, LLC, Greeley, Colorado, appearing for Appellees
Douglas W. Collins and Douglas Consulting, LLC.
Thomas P. Howard (William C. Groh, III, with him on the brief), Thomas P. Howard,
LLC, Louisville, Colorado, appearing for Appellees Ron and Tammie Wagner.
Stewart King, pro se, Windsor, Colorado, filed a brief.
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, BALDOCK, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
Plaintiff Savant Home, Inc. (“Savant”) is a custom home designer and builder. It
holds a registered copyright to a floor plan of a three-bedroom ranch house (“Anders
Plan”). Savant built a model house embodying that plan in Windsor, Colorado (“Savant
house”). In June 2009, Ron and Tammie Wagner toured the Savant house and hired
builder Douglas Collins and his firm, Douglas Consulting, LLC (jointly, “Collins”) to
build a house. Collins, in turn, contracted with Stewart King to design the house. After
Collins and Mr. King completed the Wagners’ house, Ms. Wagner hired them to build a
second house.
Savant sued all of the foregoing parties for copyright infringement, contributory
copyright infringement, civil conspiracy, trade dress infringement, and other claims. It
alleged that Defendants copied the Anders Plan by building the two houses (“accused
houses”). The district court granted Defendants summary judgment, and Savant appeals.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
The Anders Plan, embodied by the Savant house, is a ranch house with two
bedrooms on one side and a master suite on the other, separated by a combined family
room, dining room, and kitchen. Savant has built and sold six Anders Plan houses.
On June 6, 2009, the Wagners hired Collins to build a house at 300 Madera Way,
Windsor, CO, in anticipation of their move from Arizona to Colorado. That same month,
the Wagners traveled to Colorado and toured the Savant house, where they obtained a
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brochure of the Anders Plan. The Wagners returned to the Savant house that August with
Collins and Mr. King, the designer Collins had hired.
Collins completed construction of the 300 Madera Way house in 2010. The
Wagners subsequently separated, after which Ms. Wagner hired Collins to build another
house at 8466 Blackwood Drive, Windsor, CO. The houses at 300 Madera Way and
8466 Blackwood Drive are both ranch houses with two bedrooms on one side and a
master suite on the other, separated by a combined family room, dining room, and
kitchen. We discuss additional facts as necessary below.
B. Procedural History
Savant sued the Wagners, Collins, and Mr. King, alleging copyright infringement,
contributory copyright infringement, civil conspiracy, trade dress infringement,
intentional interference with business advantage, civil theft, and deceptive trade practices.
The Wagners and Collins moved for summary judgment, offering an expert report
by architect Rob Fisher.1 Mr. Fisher stated that numerous aspects of the Anders Plan
were standard among three bedroom ranch houses, addressing functional concerns or
market demand. He provided four example floor plans from a third-party online plan
service company, monsterhouseplans, which included similar layouts.
In response, Savant offered an expert report by architect Justin Larson. Mr.
Larson opined that the accused houses and the Anders Plan exhibited “shocking
1
Mr. Fisher submitted a report, an amended report, and a rebuttal report. This
opinion refers to his amended report.
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similarities,” indicating that Defendants “very likely” intended to “replicate the Anders
Plan.” Aplt. App. at 404-05. He did not identify specific or overall aspects of the Anders
Plan that were a product of architectural creativity, nor did he respond to Mr. Fisher’s
analysis indicating that the Anders Plan consisted of standard content. On the contrary,
Mr. Larson acknowledged that “[m]any homes in this neighborhood, and many others,
likely share very similar programs.” Id. at 404.
The district court granted Defendants summary judgment on every claim.2 Savant
appeals the grant of summary judgment only as to the claims of copyright infringement,
contributory copyright infringement, civil conspiracy, and trade dress infringement.
On the copyright infringement claim, the district court decided Savant had failed
to carry its summary judgment burden. More specifically, the court concluded Savant
had not shown that the Anders Plan included any protectable content. The court ruled
this failure precluded a finding of substantial similarity—an essential element of
copyright infringement.3 The court also concluded the contributory copyright
infringement and civil conspiracy claims failed because they were dependent on the
copyright infringement claim. Finally, the court granted summary judgment on the trade
2
Mr. King, acting pro se, did not move for summary judgment. The district court
nevertheless granted him summary judgment sua sponte, finding that the grounds on
which Collins and the Wagners were entitled to summary judgment applied equally to
him.
3
The court alternatively concluded that, even if the one element of the Anders
Plan that Mr. Fisher identified as potentially protectable were protectable, no jury could
find substantial similarity based on this element.
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dress infringement claim because Savant offered insufficient evidence of (1) inherent
distinctiveness or secondary meaning and (2) a likelihood of confusion. We affirm.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review and Summary Judgment Standard
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 798 F.3d 1260, 1266 (10th Cir. 2015). “The court shall grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is
genuine “if there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could
resolve the issue either way.” Becker v. Bateman, 709 F.3d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir. 2013)
(quotations omitted); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An
issue of fact is material “if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper
disposition of the claim.” Becker, 709 F.3d at 1022 (quotations omitted); see Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248.
“The movant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie demonstration of
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law.” Libertarian Party of N.M. v. Herrera, 506 F.3d 1303, 1309 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). A movant who does not bear the
burden of persuasion at trial may satisfy this burden “by pointing out to the court a lack
of evidence on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477
U.S. at 325).
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“If the movant meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
set forth specific facts from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant.”
Id. (quotations omitted) (citing, among others, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). To satisfy this
burden, the nonmovant must identify facts “by reference to affidavits, deposition
transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein.” Id. (citation omitted). These facts
“must establish, at a minimum, an inference of the presence of each element essential to
the case.” Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2001);
see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (explaining a movant is entitled to summary judgment
when “the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof”).
Finally, “[a]lthough our review of the record is de novo, we conduct that review
from the perspective of the district court at the time it made its ruling, ordinarily limiting
our review to the materials adequately brought to the attention of the district court by the
parties.” Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1223 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations
omitted). Like the district court, we have “discretion to go beyond the referenced
portions” of the evidence but are “not required to do so.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998).
B. Copyright Infringement Claim
We affirm the grant of summary judgment on Savant’s copyright infringement
claim. First, as the district court concluded, Savant failed to show the Anders Plan
included any protectable elements or arrangement of elements. Second, Savant’s
contentions that the district court erred lack merit.
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1. Legal Background
A plaintiff must prove two elements to establish copyright infringement:
“(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work
that are original.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991);
see Blehm v. Jacobs, 702 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2012). The parties do not dispute
that Savant owns a valid copyright in the Anders Plan.
The copying element consists of two components. First, a plaintiff must show a
defendant copied the plaintiff’s work “as a factual matter.” Blehm, 702 F.3d at 1199
(quotations omitted). Second, a plaintiff must demonstrate “substantial similarity
between the allegedly infringing work and the elements of the copyrighted work that are
legally protected.” Id. (quotations omitted). This second component “determines
whether a defendant’s factual copying constitutes infringement.” Id. Defendants do not
dispute that Savant demonstrated factual copying. Accordingly, only substantial
similarity is at issue.
To decide the substantial similarity issue, a court must determine (1) which
elements of the copyrighted work are protectable, and (2) whether these elements are
substantially similar to the accused work. Blehm, 702 F.3d at 1200. A court may address
either step first. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 833 (10th
Cir. 1993).
a. Protectable Elements
We begin with the general requirements of protectability and then address
protectable elements of architectural works.
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i. Protectability
The substantial similarity analysis requires us to “distill the protectable elements
of the copyrighted work—i.e., determine what aspects constitute protectable expression.”
Blehm, 702 F.3d at 1200.
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship.” 17
U.S.C. § 102(a). Originality exists where a “work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and . . . it possesses at least some
minimal degree of creativity.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. The required level of creativity is
“extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the
grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, no matter how crude, humble or
obvious it might be.” Id. (quotations omitted). This originality requirement separates
protectable from unprotectable elements of a copyrighted work. See id. at 348(“[C]opyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original
to the author.”).
Section 102(b) provides that in “no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea . . . regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” Taking § 102(a) and § 102(b)
together, courts describe the distinction between originality and non-originality as the
difference between expression and an idea. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (“The copyright is limited to those aspects of the
work—termed ‘expression’—that display the stamp of the author’s originality.”); Blehm,
702 F.3d at 1200 (explaining that § 102(b) “enshrines the fundamental tenet that
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copyright protection extends only to the author’s original expression and not to the ideas
embodied in that expression” (quotations omitted)).
The distinction between expression and ideas can be “difficult to apply in
practice,” Blehm, 702 F.3d at 1201 (quotations omitted), as the “test for infringement of a
copyright is of necessity vague,” id. (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner
Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)). We therefore follow a “case-by-case
approach,” which may “‘inevitably be ad hoc,’” id. (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d
at 489), mindful of the “primary objective of copyright,” which is “not to reward the
labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’” Feist, 499
U.S. at 349 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). See Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v.
Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[I]n differentiating between an idea and a
specific form of expression, it is important to remember that copyright law seeks to
achieve a proper balance between competition based on public ideas and incentive to
produce original work.”).
ii. Architectural Works
The Copyright Act expressly protects “architectural works,” 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(8), which it defines as follows:
An “architectural work” is the design of a building as embodied in any
tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or
drawings. The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement
and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include
individual standard features.
Id. § 101.
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Thus, individual standard elements of architectural works are not protected, but
original selections or arrangements of such elements may be protectable. See Blehm, 702
F.3d at 1201-02 (“[T]he combination of common architectural elements and use of
specific designs may constitute original expression that is protected.”); Zalewski v.
Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining that the
protectable elements of an architectural work include “original elements—or original
arrangements of elements”); Intervest Const., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554
F.3d 914, 919 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hile individual standard features and architectural
elements classifiable as ideas or concepts are not themselves copyrightable, an architect’s
original combination or arrangement of such elements may be.”); Sturdza v. United Arab
Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[P]rotectible expression may arise
through the ways in which artists combine even unprotectible elements. For example,
while color is not protectible, the manner in which an artist selects, coordinates, and
arranges color may be.” (quotations and alterations omitted).
b. Substantial Similarity of Accused Works to Protected Elements of Copyrighted
Works
In addition to identifying which elements of a work are protected, a court must
determine “whether the protected elements are substantially similar to the accused work.”
Blehm, 702 F.3d at 1202. Substantial similarity exists when “the accused work is so
similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the
defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s [protectable] expression by taking
material of substance and value.” Id. (quotations omitted); see also Country Kids, 77
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F.3d at 1288 (“The essence of this test is whether the ‘ordinary observer, unless he set out
to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic
appeal as the same.’” (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489)); Gates Rubber, 9
F.3d at 833 (“[T]he court must find that the defendant copied protectable elements of the
plaintiff’s program and that those protectable elements comprise a substantial part of the
plaintiff’s program when it is considered as a whole.”). A court may grant summary
judgment for a defendant only “if the protectable expression in the copyrighted work and
the allegedly infringing work is so dissimilar . . . that no reasonable jury could find for
the plaintiff on the question of substantial similarity.” Blehm, 702 F.3d at 1202-03
(quotations omitted).
2. District Court’s Ruling
The district court granted Defendants summary judgment on the copyright
infringement claim and presented its three-part analysis in the following order.
First, it concluded that Savant failed to show that any elements of the Anders Plan
were protectable based on evidence in the record. It reasoned that, although Savant
asserted in its opposition to summary judgment that nine elements of the Anders Plan are
original,4 Savant failed to conduct “any analysis of how these elements were designed, or
4
Savant’s statements of facts in its opposition memorandums asserted:
The original or unique elements of the Anders Plan includes, but is not
limited to: (1) the open floor plan with the master bedroom on one side of
the house with 2 bedrooms on the opposite side, (2) the plan’s flex space,
(3) the inviting entry into the open space, (4) the large stairway to the
basement with the large entry that allows natural light onto the stairs and
Continued . . .
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explain how they are original or unique to the Anders Plan.” Savant Homes, Inc. v.
Collins, No. 13-CV-2049-WJM-MEH, 2015 WL 899302, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2015).
The court noted Mr. Larson’s report only opined on similarities between the accused
houses and the Anders Plan and failed to address which elements were protected or why.
It concluded Savant’s briefing and evidence were insufficient to meet its summary
judgment burden.
Second, the district court noted that, in contrast to Savant’s expert report,
Defendants’ expert report did analyze individual elements of the Anders Plan. The court
said Mr. Fisher’s report indicated every element of the Anders Plan was unprotectable,
with the possible exception of one element that “might be protectable”: the “wrought
iron bars over the 3 center windows at the front of the garage.” Aplt. App. at 257.
The district court concluded that Savant failed to dispute Mr. Fisher’s report. It
assumed the iron bars element was protectable, but concluded Defendants were still
entitled to summary judgment. It determined that no reasonable jury could find
substantial similarity based on this element because the garage windows on the accused
houses had no iron bars.
the great room beyond, (5) the large master suite and master bath creating a
retreat including the fireplace at the foot of the tub and visible from the bed
on the opposite side of the wall, (6) the oversized walk-in closet, (7) direct
access to the laundry room from the master suite, (8) proximity of the
laundry room to the garage to allow garage access from the master suite,
and (9) side load garage with immediate access to the kitchen.
Aplt. App. at 276, 302-03.
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Third, putting aside Savant’s failure to analyze the protectability of any of the nine
elements, the district court examined each element and concluded Defendants were still
entitled to summary judgment. Applying the abstraction-filtration-comparison (“AFC”)
test—one method for analyzing substantial similarity—the court filtered out the
unprotectable elements and then concluded that no reasonable juror could find substantial
similarity based on the remaining elements.5
3. Analysis
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Savant’s copyright
infringement claim. First, we agree that Savant failed to carry its summary judgment
burden. Second, Savant’s contentions that the district court erred are unpersuasive.
a. Savant Failed to Carry Its Summary Judgment Burden
Savant failed to show that the Anders Plan included any protectable element or
arrangement of elements. We arrive at this conclusion by analyzing the parties’
arguments and evidence within the burden-shifting framework for summary judgment.
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321-328.
i. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment
In their motions for summary judgment, Defendants submitted Mr. Fisher’s report
and argued the Anders Plan included no protectable element, except possibly one. Mr.
5
We note that the court’s analysis in step three was in tension with its initial
conclusion that Savant failed to show that any element or arrangement of elements was
protectable. As we explain in our analysis below, we agree with the court’s initial
conclusion.
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Fisher’s report stated the Anders Plan consisted almost exclusively of standard elements
arranged in a standard fashion. We highlight a few examples from the report:
1. The “overall layout, with the master suite located on one side, common
areas (kitchen, dining, family rooms) in the middle, and kids/guest
bedrooms on the other side is a standard layout used to provide more
privacy to the master suite.” Aplt. App. at 252. Such a layout is a response
to market demand for a “spacious master suite,” id., and is common
because it allows for “efficient and functional adjacencies to take place,
such as locating the laundry next to the master,” id. at 254.6
2. The “open floorplan consisting of the kitchen, dining room, and family
room” and the “adjacency of kitchen, dining, and family rooms to one
another” are “a common feature of houses today.” Id. at 253. Architects
frequently include these features due to market demand for a more
“capacious feel,” “family togetherness,” and “visibility of children by
adults in the kitchen,” id. at 253, as well as “less formal[ity]” and the ability
to “entertain larger numbers of guests,” id. at 254.7
3. The “incorporation of a master walk-in closet” is standard because “most
new homes probably would not sell” without them. Id. at 253. “Present-
day owners have much more clothing than owners from decades ago, and a
larger variety of clothes for everything from work-out clothes to formal
wear. To fit all of the clothes storage needs of present-day owners, walk-in
closets are the norm.” Id. at 254.
4. The “location of the laundry room next to the master closet and the
mudroom is also a widespread design feature” based on functional
considerations and market demand. Id. at 253. Specifically, it “allows the
laundry center to be next to where the majority of dirty clothes are
generated (the master closet and the outside in the case of kids and
gardening adults).” Id. Moreover, “[p]resent-day homeowners want the
laundry on the same floor as the bedrooms instead of in the basement.” Id.
at 256.
6
The report included floor plans of four example houses from an online plan
service company, all of which include this same element.
7
Three out of the four example houses he provided included this same feature.
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5. The “side load garage with immediate access to the kitchen” is “common”
because it “improve[s] the curb appeal by keeping the garage doors off of
the front facade.” Id. at 252. It is also common because it “provides the
benefit of not having to back out into the street when exiting the garage.
The drive turn is large enough to allow cars to be backed and turned in the
drive prior to exiting onto the street.” Id. at 254.
In sum, Mr. Fisher’s report showed the Anders Plan consisted of standard
elements and standard arrangements of elements. Because standard content receives no
copyright protection, see 17 U.S.C. § 101, this showing satisfied Defendants’ “initial
burden of making a prima facie demonstration of the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact” as to the unprotectability of this content in the Anders Plan. Adler, 144
F.3d at 670-71 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).
Mr. Fisher’s report included one exception to his general conclusion that all the
elements and arrangements of elements in the Anders Plan are standard. It briefly stated
the iron bars over the three center windows at the front of the garage were “original[]”
and therefore “might be protectable.” Aplt. App. at 257. As to this one element,
Defendants offered evidence that the garage windows of the accused houses were distinct
and far from substantially similar with the Anders Plan element in that they lacked any
metal bars.
ii. Savant’s Response
In its response motions, Savant identified nine elements and asserted they were
“original or unique.” See supra note 4. In support, it cited (1) an interrogatory response
it submitted to the Wagners and (2) the deposition testimony of Alan Strope, the
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president of Savant. Both sources recited that various elements were unique, original, or
distinct, but neither provided any facts or analysis supporting these assertions.
Savant then argued there were “triable disputes over the substantial similarity
between the protectable elements of the Anders Plan and the Accused Houses.” Aplt.
App. at 286, 312. But it failed to argue which aspects of the Anders Plan were
protectable or cite any supporting evidence.
Savant cited Mr. Larson’s report, but that report opines only that the accused
houses and the Anders Plan are similar; it provides no facts or analysis supporting the
protectability of any element or arrangement of elements. On the contrary, Mr. Larson’s
report even supports Defendants’ assertion that the Anders Plan consists of standard
arrangements of individual elements, which copyright law does not protect. In discussing
the overall layout of the Anders Plan, Mr. Larson said that “[m]any homes in [the
Blackwood Drive] neighborhood, and many others, likely share very similar programs for
their main floor (3 car garage, master bedroom and supporting bathroom and walk in
closet, two other bedrooms that may share a bathroom, a kitchen, a mudroom, a laundry
room, and a great room).” Aplt. App. at 404. Later, he reiterated his opinion about the
common nature of this layout, stating, “many homes in Colorado likely share nearly
exactly the same programmatic requirements for the first floor.” Id. at 405.
Finally, Savant did not even acknowledge Mr. Fisher’s suggestion that the iron
bars on the garage windows might be protectable and therefore did not dispute
Defendants’ evidence indicating the garage windows of the accused houses lacked any
such bars.
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* * * *
We therefore agree with the district court’s conclusion that Savant failed to carry
its burden on summary judgment. Savant offered no evidence indicating (1) any
individual element or (2) any arrangement of elements was protectable. As to the one
element Mr. Fisher identified as potentially protectable—the iron bars on the garage
windows of the Anders Plan—Savant failed to dispute Defendants’ evidence that the
garage windows of the accused houses were entirely distinct, as they lacked any iron
bars.8 As to the arrangement of elements, Mr. Larson’s report supported rather than
disputed Defendants’ evidence indicating that the overall layout of the rooms was
standard in Colorado. Savant therefore failed to offer any basis for a finding of
substantial similarity. Because substantial similarity is an essential element of copyright
infringement, Defendants were entitled to summary judgment. See Bausman, 252 F.3d at
1115 (“To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must establish, at a minimum, an
inference of the presence of each element essential to the case.”).
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to
Savant’s copyright claim.
8
The district court concluded the garage windows of the accused houses were
entirely distinct because (1) each accused house had only one garage window and
(2) there were no iron bars on these windows. The record provides adequate support only
for the second fact. Based on this fact alone, we agree with the district court’s conclusion
that the garage windows of the accused houses were distinct from those of the Anders
Plan.
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b. Savant’s Arguments
We additionally affirm because Savant’s contentions that the district court erred
are not persuasive. First, Savant argues the district court erroneously analyzed substantial
similarity by applying the AFC test. Second, it contends the court improperly treated the
parties’ expert reports, adopting a legal conclusion in Mr. Fisher’s report and excluding
Mr. Larson’s report entirely.
i. The District Court’s Application of the AFC Test
Savant argues the district court should not have applied the AFC test because that
test is categorically inapplicable to architectural works. The AFC test derives its name
from its three steps. At the abstraction step, “we separate the ideas (and basic utilitarian
functions), which are not protectable, from the particular expression of the work.”
Country Kids, 77 F.3d at 1284-85. 9 Next, “we filter out the nonprotectable components
9
This step originates from the abstraction test articulated by Judge Learned Hand
in the context of a theatrical script:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident
is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general
statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its
title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no
longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of
his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended.
Autoskill Inc. v. Nat’l Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)), overruled
on other grounds by TW Telecom Holdings Inc. v. Carolina Internet Ltd., 661 F.3d 495,
496 (10th Cir. 2011).
Continued . . .
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of the product from the original expression.” Id. at 1285. Finally, “we compare the
remaining protected elements to the allegedly copied work to determine if the two works
are substantially similar.” Id. The district court did not err for two reasons.
First, to the extent the court even applied the AFC test,10 it did so only after
concluding Savant had failed to carry its summary judgment burden by failing to show
that any of the nine elements was protectable. The court’s use of the AFC test to
independently analyze the protectability of those elements was therefore unnecessary. It
was Savant’s burden, not the court’s, to identify what content was protectable under
copyright law.
Second, we reject Savant’s contention that our decision in Blehm recognized the
AFC test is categorically inapplicable to architectural works by “specifically affirm[ing]”
the D.C. Circuit’s approach to analyzing the substantial similarity of architectural works
in Sturdza. Aplt. Br. at 18. Sturdza emphasized that the “substantial similarity
determination requires comparison not only of the two works’ individual elements in
The abstraction step involves a more detailed series of steps when applied to
computer programs. Specifically, we examine “six levels of generally declining
abstraction: (i) the main purpose, (ii) the program structure or architecture, (iii) modules,
(iv) algorithms and data structures, (v) source code, and (vi) object code.” Gates Rubber,
9 F.3d at 835. The district court did not apply this more detailed form of the abstraction
step unique to computer programs; its applicability to architectural works is therefore not
at issue here.
10
The district court’s ostensible application of the AFC test involved no more than
what every substantial similarity analysis must entail: identifying a work’s protectable
elements and determining whether there is substantial similarity between the accused
work and those elements.
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isolation, but also of their overall look and feel.” 281 F.3d at 1296 (quotations omitted).
Savant suggests that by focusing on discrete elements, the AFC test ignores the “overall
look and feel” of an architectural work and therefore contradicts Blehm and Sturdza. We
disagree for three reasons.
First, Blehm in no way suggested that the AFC test is categorically inapplicable to
architectural works. On the contrary, it explained that the test shares the goal of the
general substantial similarity analysis applied to any work: “separating unprotectable
ideas from protectable expression in [the] copyrighted works and comparing the
remaining protectable expression to the [allegedly infringing] images to determine
whether they are substantially similar.” Blehm, 702 F.3d at 1201 n.4. For this reason, we
have used the test to analyze content as diverse as computer programs, see Gates Rubber,
9 F.3d at 834-46 and wooden dolls, see Country Kids, 77 F.3d at 1284-87.
Second, Blehm did not affirm Sturdza; it only referred to Sturdza as an illustration
of the idea/expression dichotomy, Blehm, 702 F.3d at 1201-02, and Blehm was not an
architectural work case.
Third, even if we accepted Sturdza’s emphasis on the “overall look and feel” of a
work, that in no way suggests the categorical inapplicability of the AFC test to
architectural works. 281 F.3d at 1296. Sturdza emphasized the “overall look and feel” of
a work as following two general principles of substantial similarity: (1) that the
substantial similarity analysis must focus on “the overall similarities rather than the
minute differences between the two works,” 281 F.3d at 1296 (quoting Country Kids, 77
F.3d at 1288), and (2) that “protectible expression may arise through the ways in which
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artists combine even unprotectible elements,” id. Savant suggests the AFC test is at odds
with the second principle because its element-by-element approach precludes examining
original arrangements of individual elements. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 3-4. We disagree.
The abstraction step requires a court to examine a work at broad levels of generality—
levels that may involve protectable arrangements of individual elements, as opposed to
discrete elements themselves. See Country Kids, 77 F.3d at 1286.11
The district court therefore did not err in its application of the AFC test.
ii. The District Court’s Treatment of the Expert Opinions
Savant contends the district court committed two reversible errors in its treatment
of the expert reports. Both contentions fail.
First, Savant argues the district court improperly adopted a legal conclusion from
Mr. Fisher’s report. Savant failed to object to the Fisher report on this ground in its
opposition to summary judgment. It therefore forfeited this argument. Richison v. Ernest
Grp., 634 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f [a] theory simply wasn’t raised before
the district court, we usually hold it forfeited.”). Savant has failed to argue plain error,
which “surely marks the end of the road for [its] argument for reversal not first presented
to the district court.” Id. at 1131.
11
Savant additionally appears to suggest that, even if the AFC test does not
preclude a court from analyzing an arrangement of individual elements in an architectural
work case, the district court failed to conduct any such analysis in applying the test to
these facts. We reject this argument. The absence of this analysis in the district court’s
opinion is due to Savant’s own failure to identify even one selection or arrangement of
individual elements as protectable.
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Second, Savant argues the district court erroneously excluded Mr. Larson’s report
sua sponte without first analyzing whether it was admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Savant’s
argument is meritless. The district court clearly considered Mr. Larson’s report and
concluded it offered no evidence of the protectability of any element or arrangement of
elements.
C. Contributory Copyright Infringement and Civil Conspiracy Claims
The district court also granted Defendants summary judgment on the contributory
copyright infringement and civil conspiracy claims because they were derivative of
Savant’s failed copyright infringement claim. We affirm.
Contributory copyright infringement is derivative of direct copyright infringement.
It occurs “when the defendant causes or materially contributes to another’s infringing
activities and knows of the infringement.” Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1204
(10th Cir. 2013). Thus, “‘[t]here can be no contributory infringement without a direct
infringement.’” La Resolana Architects, PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1181 (10th Cir.
2009) (quoting Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 889 (6th
Cir. 2004)). Savant has failed to show direct copyright infringement for the reasons
explained above. As a result, its contributory infringement claim also fails.
Savant’s civil conspiracy claim also turns on Savant’s copyright infringement
claim. “To establish a civil conspiracy in Colorado, a plaintiff must show: (1) two or
more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object
or course of action; (4) an unlawful overt act; and (5) damages as to the proximate
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result.” Nelson v. Elway, 908 P.2d 102, 106 (Colo. 1995); accord Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d
897, 918 (10th Cir. 2000). Savant alleged that the unlawful act underlying the civil
conspiracy was copyright infringement. The failure of the copyright infringement claim
therefore defeats the civil conspiracy claim.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to
the contributory copyright infringement and civil conspiracy claims.
D. Trade Dress Infringement Claim
We also affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the trade dress
infringement claim. It concluded that Savant offered insufficient evidence of inherent
distinctiveness or secondary meaning—an essential element of trade dress infringement.
1. Legal Background
A trade dress is an object’s “total image and overall appearance,” and “may
include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or
even particular sales techniques.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
765 n.1 (1992) (quotations omitted); see Gen. Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, 500
F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007). The features of a building may constitute a trade dress.
See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 765 (discussing an alleged trade dress consisting of the
interior and exterior features of a restaurant).
“[T]he protection of trademarks and trade dress . . . serves the same statutory
purpose of preventing deception and unfair competition.” Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773.
More specifically,
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[p]rotection of trade dress, no less than of trademarks, serves the [Lanham]
Act’s purpose to “secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his
business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among
competing producers. National protection of trademarks is desirable,
Congress concluded, because trademarks foster competition and the
maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good
reputation.”
Id. at 774 (quoting Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198
(1985)).12
A party may register a trade dress with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office under § 2 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209-10 (2000). But the failure to register a trade dress does
not preclude its protectability. Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, a
plaintiff may obtain relief for the infringement of an unregistered trade dress. See Two
12
As the Seventh Circuit has similarly explained in a trademark case:
The purpose [of trademark law] is to reduce the cost of information to
consumers by making it easy for them to identify the products or producers
with which they have had either good experiences, so that they want to
keep buying the product (or buying from the producer), or bad experiences,
so that they want to avoid the product or the producer in the future. This
purpose is achieved by letting a producer pick an identifying name or
symbol for his brand, and forbidding competing producers to use the same
or a confusingly similar name or symbol on their brands.
W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338-39 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Publications
Int'l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 338 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Trade dress . . . serves the
same function as trademark, and is treated the same way by the Lanham Act and the
cases interpreting it.”); 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 8:1 (4th ed. 2015) (“Today, unregistered trade dress is protected under
federal Lanham Act § 43(a) under the same rules as are trademarks. Thus, the history of
American law throughout much of the 20th century is the gradual disappearance of
distinctions between the law of ‘trade dress’ and that of ‘trademarks.’”).
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Pesos, 505 U.S. at 767. Savant alleged its trade dress is unregistered and brought suit
under § 43(a).
To obtain relief under § 43(a), a plaintiff must show: “(1) The trade dress is
inherently distinctive or has become distinctive through secondary meaning; (2) There is
a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to the source of the competing products;
and (3) The trade dress is nonfunctional.” Gen. Motors, 500 F.3d at 1227.
Savant failed to satisfy the first requirement, which required it to show “either
(a) that [the] trade dress features (or feature) are inherently distinctive because their
intrinsic nature is such as to almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a
brand, or (b) that the trade dress has become distinctive through acquisition of secondary
meaning, so that its primary significance in the minds of potential consumers is no longer
as an indicator of something about the product itself but as an indicator of its source or
brand.” Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1502 (10th
Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted).
a. Inherent Distinctiveness
A trade dress is inherently distinctive if its “‘intrinsic nature serves to identify a
particular source.’” Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 977 (10th Cir.
2002) (quoting Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768). Trade dress, like trademarks, are classified
in the following categories of generally increasing distinctiveness: (1) generic, (2)
descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, or (5) fanciful. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768, 773(explaining that this five-category spectrum of distinctiveness, which originated in
trademark law, is equally applicable to trade dress law); Sally Beauty, 304 F.3d at 977.
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A generic trade dress or trademark “refe[rs] to the genus of which the particular
product is a species.” Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (quotations omitted). Because a
generic trade dress or trademark can never be source-identifying, it receives no
protection. Id. at 768.
A descriptive trade dress or trademark “identifies a characteristic or quality of an
article or service, . . . as, for example, its color, odor, function, dimensions, or
ingredients.” Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 939 (10th Cir.
1983) (quotations omitted). It is not inherently source-identifying and therefore receives
no protection, unless it “acquire[s] distinctiveness” over time, or develops secondary
meaning, which we explain below. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769.
A suggestive trade dress or trademark “subtly connote[s] something about the
product[].” Beer Nuts, 711 F.2d at 939 n.5 (quotations omitted). Finally, a trade dress or
trademark that is fanciful or arbitrary bears “no relationship to the product[s] or service[s]
with which [it is] associated.” Id. (quotations omitted). Of these five categories, only
suggestive, fanciful, or arbitrary trade dresses or trademarks are inherently distinctive.
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768.
b. Secondary Meaning
To acquire secondary meaning, a trade dress “must have been used so long and so
exclusively by one producer with reference to his goods or articles that, in the trade and
to that branch of the purchasing public, the [trade dress] has come to mean that the article
is his product.” Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Sys., Inc., 726 F.3d 1136, 1154 (10th Cir. 2013)
(quotations omitted). Put differently, secondary meaning exists when “in the consumer’s
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mind the [trade dress] denotes a single thing coming from a single source.” Sally Beauty,
304 F.3d at 978 (quotations omitted).
Secondary meaning may be shown by “direct evidence, such as consumer surveys
or testimony from consumers.” Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1154 (quotations omitted).
Circumstantial evidence may also be used, such as (1) the length and manner of the trade
dress’s use, id.; (2) the nature and extent of advertising and promotion of the trade dress,
id.; (3) the efforts made in the direction of promoting a conscious connection, in the
public’s mind, between the trade dress and a particular product or venture, id.; (4) actual
consumer confusion, see Vail Assocs., Inc. v. Vend-Tel-Co., 516 F.3d 853, 866-67 (10th
Cir. 2008);13 (5) proof of intentional copying, see Sally Beauty, 304 F.3d at 978; or
(6) evidence of sales volume, see id. Sales volume, however, only suggests secondary
meaning “when presented in conjunction with other evidence;” “[s]tanding alone, sales
volume may not be indicative of secondary meaning because it could be related to factors
other than source identification.” Id.
2. Analysis
The district court granted Defendants summary judgment on two grounds:
(1) Savant failed to offer evidence of inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning and
13
See also 2 McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 15:11 (4th ed. 2015) (“If buyers are confused between two sources, then this also
means that they must have recognized plaintiff’s designation as a trademark and
associated it only with plaintiff.”).
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(2) no reasonable jury could find a likelihood of confusion. We agree as to the first
ground and therefore need not address the second.
Savant asserted in district court that it proved both inherent distinctiveness and
secondary meaning with evidence of actual consumer confusion, citing Mr. Strope’s
deposition testimony that at least one potential consumer and a realtor were confused as
to whether Savant had built one of the accused houses. Savant abandons this argument
on appeal, so we do not consider it. United States v. Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d 1275, 1280
(10th Cir. 2011) (“Under [Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28], where a defendant
raises an issue before the district court but does not pursue it on appeal, we ordinarily
consider the issue waived.”).
a. Inherent Distinctiveness
In moving for summary judgment, Defendants asserted Savant offered no
evidence of inherent distinctiveness. They also cited Mr. Fisher’s opinion that the
Anders Plan consisted of standard elements and standard arrangements of elements,
precluding a finding of inherent distinctiveness.
In response, Savant asserted and continues to assert on appeal that its trade dress
was inherently distinctive based on the nine elements it alleges are original or unique.
Merely reciting these nine elements does not create a genuine dispute of fact as to
inherent distinctiveness. Savant has not offered arguments or facts indicating that these
nine elements are original or unique so as to make the alleged trade dress inherently
source-identifying (meaning suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful). See Cole v. Ruidoso Mun.
Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1382 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory statements are insufficient to
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defeat a motion for summary judgment.”). It has also failed to dispute Mr. Fisher’s report
indicating the Anders Plan consisted of standard content, which precludes a finding of
inherent distinctiveness.
b. Secondary Meaning
Savant also failed to raise a fact issue as to secondary meaning. Savant suggested
in district court that its sales volume was probative of secondary meaning, citing its sale
of six Anders Plan homes. On appeal, it continues to cite this evidence of sales volume
and adds that proof of intentional copying also indicates secondary meaning.
We decline to consider Savant’s argument that proof of intentional copying
suggests secondary meaning. Although we review a grant of summary judgment de
novo, “we conduct that review from the perspective of the district court at the time it
made its ruling, ordinarily limiting our review to the materials adequately brought to the
attention of the district court by the parties.” Adler, 144 F.3d at 671. Moreover, we do
not consider arguments made for the first time on appeal where the party asserting the
argument has failed to argue plain error. Richison, 634 F.3d at 1131 (“[T]he failure to
argue for plain error and its application on appeal . . . marks the end of the road for an
argument for reversal not first presented to the district court.”).
Savant’s evidence of sales volume is therefore the only evidence of secondary
meaning properly before this court. “Standing alone, sales volume may not be indicative
of secondary meaning because it could be related to factors other than source
identification.” Sally Beauty, 304 F.3d at 978. Savant therefore has failed to create a fact
issue as to secondary meaning.
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* * * *
Because Savant failed to raise a fact issue as to inherent distinctiveness or
secondary meaning, it failed to satisfy its summary judgment burden on its trade dress
claim. See Bausman, 252 F.3d at 1115 (“[T]he nonmovant must establish, at a minimum,
an inference of the presence of each element essential to the case.”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment.
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