Espinoza v. Arkansas Valley Adventures

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 5, 2016
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
JESUS ESPINOZA, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ARKANSAS VALLEY
ADVENTURES, LLC,
No. 14-1444
Defendant - Appellee.
-------------------------------------
COLORADO TRIAL LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION,
Amicus Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-01421-MSK-BNB)
William J. Hansen of McDermott & McDermott, LLP, Denver, CO (George E.
McLaughlin of Warshauer McLaughlin Law Group, P.C., Denver, CO, with him
on the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Alan Epstein (Ryan L. Winter and Conor P. Boyle, with him on the brief), of Hall
& Evans, L.L.C., Denver, CO, for Defendant-Appellee.
Russell R. Hatten and Evan P. Banker of Chalat Hatten Koupal & Banker PC,
Denver, CO, on the brief for amicus curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association,
in support of Plaintiff-Appellant.
Before KELLY, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
This case arises from a summer rafting trip gone tragically wrong. It began
when Sue Ann Apolinar hired a guide for a family adventure in the Colorado
Rockies: an overnight rafting and camping excursion on a popular stretch of the
Arkansas River running through Brown’s Canyon. After she arrived at the
outfitter’s office, Ms. Apolinar and the other rafters received the usual guidance,
made the usual preparations, and signed the usual release before heading down
river. The next day, while maneuvering around a rapid known locally as Seidel’s
Suck Hole, the raft capsized. Everyone else was fished out of the water soon
enough. But in a heartbreaking turn of events, the current swept Ms. Apolinar
into a logjam where, despite repeated efforts to save her, she drowned.
Eventually, Ms. Apolinar’s son, Jesus Espinoza, Jr., brought a lawsuit against the
rafting company alleging negligence per se and fraud (and other claims no longer
in dispute). In reply, the company sought summary judgment, arguing that the
release Ms. Apolinar signed shielded it from liability. With this the district court
agreed and proceeded to enter judgment for the company. It’s the propriety of
this ruling that we’re asked to assess in this appeal.
2
No one before us doubts that Ms. Apolinar signed a release. Or that the
release purported to absolve the rafting company from any claim of negligence.
The only question in this appeal is whether Colorado law permits private parties
to enforce a contract like this. Under Colorado common law, it’s long settled that
courts will not give effect to contracts purporting to release claims for intentional,
knowing, or reckless misconduct. See, e.g., Boles v. Sun Ergoline, Inc., 223 P.3d
724, 726 (Colo. 2010). But claims of negligence are a different matter. Colorado
common law does not categorically prohibit the enforcement of contracts seeking
to release claims of negligence. Instead, and at the most general level, the
Colorado Supreme Court has instructed courts to weigh four factors when
deciding whether to give effect to agreements along these lines: “(1) the existence
[or nonexistence] of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service performed;
(3) whether the contract was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the intention of
the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.” Jones v. Dressel,
623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981).
Even more specifically, the Colorado Supreme Court has explained that the
first two Jones factors focus on public policy questions — asking whether “[t]he
party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance
to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity [and] . . . [a]s a result
of the essential nature of the service . . . the party invoking exculpation possesses
a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who
3
seeks his services.” Id. (quoting Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441,
444 (Cal. 1963)). Meanwhile, the latter two factors focus on more party- and
contract-specific questions — asking whether the release was fairly obtained and
clearly and unambiguously expressed. Id. at 378. If the release satisfies both sets
of questions — the more general and the more particular — it may be enforced.
(Provided, of course, that it is otherwise a valid contract, involving, for example,
mutual assent and consideration, matters not in dispute here).
When it comes to the first two Jones factors, the Colorado Supreme Court
has offered even more specific guidance yet. Though some businesses perform
essential public services and owe special duties to the public, the court has held
that “businesses engaged in recreational activities” generally do not. Chadwick v.
Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465, 467 (Colo. 2004); see also Boles, 223
P.3d at 726 (“More than a quarter century ago, this court rejected the assertion
that any agreement purporting to shield a party from liability for its own tortious
conduct” in the provision of recreational services “would violate . . . public policy
. . . .”). So while businesses providing, say, water, electricity, or sanitary services
usually may not shield themselves from claims of negligence, recreational service
providers often can. Though, of course, they must still face and satisfy the latter
two case-specific Jones factors.
This relatively permissive public policy toward recreational releases may
not be unique to Colorado common law but it does seem to be one of its
4
distinguishing features. We don’t doubt other states may rationally choose to
pursue different lines when it comes to recreational releases: certainly the parties
before us cite an array of cases from other jurisdictions taking an array of views.
But in our federal system, states are usually permitted (and encouraged) to pursue
their own paths on policy matters like these. And it’s clear enough that Colorado
allows private parties to assume some of the risks associated with their
recreational pursuits. It’s a policy choice that, no doubt, means some losses go
uncompensated but one that also promotes the output and diversity of recreational
services consumers may enjoy. Of course, the Colorado Supreme Court and the
Colorado General Assembly may change their judgment on this score at any time.
And maybe someday they will prefer a policy that shifts the burden of loss to the
service provider, ensuring compensation in cases like this even if also impairing
to some degree individual choice and output. But that decision is their decision to
make, not ours, and their current policy is clear. Indeed, following the Colorado
Supreme Court’s guidance in this area, this court and many Colorado courts have
upheld many releases in many recreational activities over many years. Only some
examples of which we include in the margin. 1
1
See, e.g., Lahey v. Covington, 964 F. Supp. 1440, 1444-46 (D. Colo.
1996) (whitewater rafting), aff’d sub nom. Lahey v. Twin Lakes Expeditions, Inc.,
113 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1997); Forman v. Brown, 944 P.2d 559, 563-64 (Colo.
App. 1996) (same); Robinette v. Aspen Skiing Co., No. 08-cv-00052-MSK-MJW,
2009 WL 1108093, at *3-5 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2009) (skiing), aff’d, 363 F. App’x
547 (10th Cir. 2010); Fullick v. Breckenridge Ski Corp., No. 90-1377, 1992 WL
5
 Still, Mr. Espinoza submits, his case is categorically different. Yes, Ms.
Apolinar signed a document purporting to release the rafting company from all
claims of negligence. Yes, Colorado public policy generally permits the release
of claims of negligence in recreational pursuits like the one here. But, Mr.
Espinoza argues, the release Ms. Apolinar signed should still be held to violate
state public policy — it should still be held to run afoul of the first two Jones
factors — because his claim is one for negligence per se rather than common law
negligence. He observes that the Colorado River Outfitters Act (CROA) makes it
a misdemeanor for rafting companies to operate any raft in a “careless or
imprudent manner.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-32-107(2)(b). And from this, he
reasons, negligence by rafting companies has become a matter of public concern
and a public service within the meaning of the first two Jones factors.
95421, at *3 (10th Cir. Apr. 29, 1992) (same); Potter v. Nat’l. Handicapped
Sports, 849 F. Supp. 1407, 1409-11 (D. Colo. 1994) (same); Bauer v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 F. Supp. 472, 474-75 (D. Colo. 1992) (same);
Mincin v. Vail Holdings, Inc., 308 F.3d 1105, 1113 (10th Cir. 2002) (mountain
biking); Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 468-70 (horseback riding); B & B Livery, Inc. v.
Riehl, 960 P.2d 134, 137-38 (Colo. 1998) (same); see also William R. Rapson &
Stephen A. Bain, Recreational Waivers in Colorado: Playing at Your Own Risk,
32 Colo. Law. 77, 77 (2003) (noting that “Colorado law generally supports
waivers of liability in connection with recreational activities”); James H. Chalat,
Colorado Ski Law, 27 Colo. Law. 5, 14 (1998) (noting that “courts generally hold
[ski racing] waivers to be enforceable”); Jordan Lipp, Horse Law — A Look at the
Equine Statute and Liability Law, 41 Colo. Law. 95, 99 (2012) (“Releases have
been upheld in a number of horseback riding cases.”).
6
We find ourselves unable to agree for a number of related reasons.
First, we think this argument mistakes the nature of the inquiry called for
by the first two Jones factors. By their terms, those factors don’t ask whether the
activity in question is the subject of some sort of state regulation. Instead, they
ask whether the service provided is of “great importance to the public,” a matter
of “practical necessity” as opposed to (among other things) a “recreational” one.
623 P.2d at 376-77. And the distinction the Jones factors draw between essential
and recreational services would break down pretty quickly if the presence of some
state regulation were enough to convert an otherwise obviously “recreational”
service into a “practically necessary” one. After all, state law imposes various
rules and regulations on service providers in most every field these days —
including on service providers who operate in a variety of clearly recreational
fields. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-14-116 (snowmobiling); id. § 33-44-104(2)
(skiing); id. § 13-21-119(4)(b)(I) (equine activities).
Second, Mr. Espinoza’s argument suggests a firmer analytical line can be
drawn between claims of negligence and negligence per se than we think the
circumstances here will fairly allow. As we’ve seen, Colorado law has long
permitted parties to contract away negligence claims in the recreational context.
And negligence per se claims often differ very little from their common law
cousins: they usually just substitute a common law duty or standard of care with
one prescribed by statute and all other elements remain the same. See Lombard v.
7
Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 573 (Colo. 2008). In fact, in the
case before us it’s not even clear what duty of care CROA adds to the common
law. Mr. Espinoza says the rafting company violated the statutory duty to avoid
operating a raft in a “careless or imprudent manner.” Mr. Espinoza points as well
to implementing regulations that suggest a company should offer things like a
“basic orientation” for rafters and help when accidents occur. But Mr. Espinoza
does not suggest how these provisions create any distinctly new duty of care.
Indeed, they appear to be more or less coextensive with the preexisting common
law standard of care, which requires parties to act with “reasonable care . . . i.e.,
that which a person of common prudence would use under the circumstances.”
Christensen v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525, 529 (Colo. 1982). And given this it seems
hard to see a rational basis on which the law might treat such similar (identical?)
claims so differently based merely on how they are pleaded, rewarding the crafty
but penalizing the pedestrian pleader. 2
Third, Mr. Espinoza’s interpretation of CROA would require us to read into
that statute a good deal more than it says. CROA imposes criminal misdemeanor
sanctions for violating the duties it prescribes. It does not speak, one way or the
other, to the question of civil liability — let alone suggest that private parties are
2
Though we do not rely on the fact in our analysis above, Colorado
authorities did conduct an investigation of the accident in this case pursuant to
CROA and ultimately decided not to pursue any sanction.
8
forbidden from contractually releasing potential negligence claims. Neither is it
obviously irrational that the General Assembly might choose to pass legislation
about public (criminal) liability but leave private (civil) liability to preexisting
common law principles. Indeed, courts generally will not assume that the General
Assembly means to displace background common law principles absent some
clear legislative expression of that intent. See Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384,
387 (Colo. 2005). The General Assembly, too, has shown that — when it wishes
— it well knows how to displace background common law norms and preclude
the release of civil claims. See, e.g., Stanley v. Creighton Co., 911 P.2d 705, 707-
09 (Colo. App. 1996). Given all this, we do not think it our place to adorn the
General Assembly’s handiwork with revisions to the common law that it easily
could have but declined to undertake for itself.
Finally, we find it noteworthy that Colorado courts faced with similar
challenges seem to have resolved them much as we resolve this one today. For
example, the General Assembly has adopted a statute holding that “equine
professional[s]” may not be held civilly liable for “the inherent risks of equine
activities.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-119(3). But that statute goes on to state that
the immunity it provides does not extinguish civil liability in cases where the
equine professional supplied equipment or tack it should have known was faulty
or failed to make reasonable efforts to determine the ability of the rider before the
excursion began. Id. § 13-21-119(4)(b)(I). And despite the General Assembly’s
9
express solicitude toward these latter classes of claims, the Colorado Supreme
Court has allowed private parties to contract away claims of negligence on both
fronts. B & B Livery, 960 P.2d at 135, 137-38. Maybe even more pointedly still,
since the enactment of CROA and its misdemeanor criminal penalties, various
Colorado courts have enforced releases of civil negligence claims obtained by
whitewater rafting companies. See, e.g., Lahey, 964 F. Supp. at 1444-46;
Forman, 944 P.2d at 563-64. This court has upheld, too, a release a snowboarder
gave to a ski area absolving its employees of negligence even when the area’s
employee allegedly operated a snowmobile in a negligent manner and a state
statute made that very behavior a misdemeanor. See Robinette, 2009 WL
1108093, at *3-5.
In saying this much, we take care to emphasize what we do not mean to
say. We do not mean to suggest that some future statute could not — or even that
some other current statute might not — preclude the enforcement of releases like
the one here. Neither do we mean to suggest that the Colorado Supreme Court
could not alter its common law policy with respect to recreational releases. In
particular, we do not pass on the question whether the General Assembly’s
enactment of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), Colo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 6-1-101 to 6-1-1001, might preclude the enforcement of recreational releases
when the plaintiff pleads a valid claim under that statute. See Rapson & Bain,
supra, at 77-78 (noting that while Colorado law “generally supports” recreational
10
waivers, it’s an open question whether a statutory CCPA claim can be waived).
In this case, we merely hold that the CROA provisions cited to us do not satisfy
and do not overrule the first two factors of the common law Jones test.
Of course, that takes us only half way. Having decided that the release
survives Jones’s public-policy factors, we must still consider its case-specific
factors. The third Jones factor requires us to ask whether “the circumstances and
the nature of the service involved indicate that the contract was fairly entered
into.” Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 467. Relatedly, the fourth Jones factor addresses
the terms of the contract itself, inviting us to “examine[] the actual language of
the [release] for legal jargon, length and complication” and any other evidence
that a party might not “recognize the full extent of the release provisions.” Id.
The district court held that the release before us satisfied both of these conditions
— that it was fairly entered into and clear in its terms. And in the end we find we
agree with its assessment on this score too.
Mr. Espinoza trains most of his attention on the third factor. He contends
that the rafting company misrepresented the nature of the trip to Ms. Apolinar.
He points for support to testimony suggesting that, when Ms. Apolinar first made
her reservation, she was told by company representatives and read on its website
that the trip was appropriate for beginners and involved at most only class III
rapids. He points as well to his expert witness who testified that Seidel’s Suck
Hole is really a class IV rapid, not a class III rapid, according to the
11
“International Scale of River Difficulty.” 3 But at the same time Mr. Espinoza
must acknowledge that another of his witnesses — a state ranger charged with
overseeing the stretch of river in question — testified that he believes the trip is
indeed appropriate for families with children. So the facts Mr. Espinoza himself
offers are mixed at best on whether the rafting company actually ever made a
material misstatement about the nature of the trip. 4
Still, even if we might assume (without deciding) that the facts here are
enough to create a material dispute of fact regarding whether the rafting company
initially misrepresented the nature of the trip, it’s still hard to see how we could
say the release was unfairly secured or unclear in its terms — at least within the
meaning Colorado law gives to the third and fourth Jones factors. That’s because
3
That scale describes class III rapids as requiring (among other things)
“[c]omplex maneuvers in fast current and good boat control in tight passages or
around ledges” and notes that “[i]njuries while swimming are rare.” The scale
describes class IV rapids as involving “[i]ntense, powerful but predictable rapids
requiring precise boat handling in turbulent water. . . . [and] fast maneuvers under
pressure” and notes that the “[r]isk of injury to swimmers is moderate to high.”
4
On appeal, Mr. Espinoza offers another theory why the circumstances
surrounding the release were unfair. He alleges that the rafting company refused
to reschedule the trip and might have refused to refund Ms. Apolinar’s deposit if
she declined to sign the release. And this, he says, imposed unfair pressure on
her to sign the release. But Mr. Espinoza’s argument along these lines before the
district court consisted of only two sentences so it’s not surprising or improper
that the district court declined to pass upon it. Neither will we pass on this
argument for the first time now, leaving its development instead to future cases
where it might prove relevant and more fully presented. See generally Adler v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998); Richison v. Ernest
Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 2011).
12
of what happened next. Whatever the rafting company said about the trip earlier
on, when Ms. Apolinar arrived at the outfitter’s office she received a vivid
description of the risks she could face. The rafting company provided — and Ms.
Apolinar signed — a document titled in part “RAFTING WARNING” explaining
that rafting can be “HAZARDOUS AND INVOLVES THE RISK OF PHYSICAL
INJURY AND/OR DEATH.” The document proceeded to offer a detailed picture
of the sorts of problems that could be (and sadly were) encountered: “cold water
immersion, hidden underwater obstacles, trees or other above water obstacles, . . .
changing and unpredictable currents, drowning, exposure, swimming, overturning,
. . . entrapment of feet or other body parts under rocks or other objects . . . .” It
added that “THE UNDERSIGNED ACKNOWLEDGE[S] AND
UNDERSTAND[S] THAT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE RISKS LISTED
ABOVE IS NOT COMPLETE AND THAT PARTICIPATING IN THE
ACTIVITY MAY BE DANGEROUS AND MAY INCLUDE OTHER RISKS.”
The document provided, too, that its representations and warnings about the trip
superseded any prior “communications or representations” on these subjects.
Neither can there be any question that the document clearly communicated that a
signature would release civil claims for liability. At the outset it directed Ms.
Apolinar to “PLEASE READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING. THIS IS A
RELEASE OF LIABILITY & WAIVER OF LEGAL RIGHTS.” And later it
provided that “THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY IRREVOCABLY AND
13
UNCONDITIONALLY RELEASE[S], FOREVER DISCHARGE[S], AND
AGREE[S] NOT TO SUE . . . with respect to any and all claims and causes of
action . . . which could be asserted [by] the Undersigned in connection with . . .
the Activity.”
This disclosure and release suffices to satisfy the third and fourth Jones
factors. To be sure, we can imagine other states might choose to hold
circumstances and printed forms like these insufficiently fair or clear. But
Colorado courts have repeatedly emphasized that individuals engaged in
recreational activities are generally expected to read materials like these, and
because recreational businesses do not provide “essential” services of “practical
necessity” individuals are generally free to walk away if they do not wish to
assume the risks described. See, e.g., Jones, 623 P.2d at 377-78. Particularly
where, as here, the person confronted with the release is competent and
reasonably educated. Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 469. Indeed, Colorado courts and
this court have consistently found releases provided at the outset of a recreational
activity and containing language very much like the one now before us sufficient
as a matter of law to supply a fair and full warning within the meaning of the
latter two Jones factors. See, e.g., Jones, 623 P.2d at 377-78; Brooks v.
Timberline Tours, Inc., 127 F.3d 1273, 1274-76 (10th Cir. 1997); Heil Valley
Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 782, 785 (Colo. 1989); Chadwick, 100 P.3d
at 468-69.
14
As the district court recognized, too, this resolution of the third and fourth
Jones factors also resolves Mr. Espinoza’s fraud claim. To make out a claim for
fraud in Colorado, a plaintiff must establish actual and reasonable reliance on a
false statement; a party cannot — as a matter of law — continue to rely on a
previously expressed false statement after the truth is aired. And, of course, we
have just found that the rafting company’s written warnings accomplished just
that — adequately airing the truth about the nature of the risks Ms. Apolinar
faced. Neither do we see how we might arrive at a different result just because
this claim is denominated in fraud rather than negligence. The inquiries
prescribed for us by law are virtually indistinguishable (was the truth fairly and
fully disclosed?), the facts are the same (the release’s warnings), and it follows
that the result should be the same. See Vinton v. Virzi, 269 P.3d 1242, 1247
(Colo. 2012) (holding if a party “has access to information” that “would have led
to the true facts, that party has no right to rely on a [prior] false representation”);
Morrison v. Goodspeed, 68 P.2d 458, 462 (Colo. 1937) (same).
Enduring the death of a close family member in tragic circumstances is
among life’s bitterest challenges. The loss Ms. Apolinar’s family has suffered is
15
beyond words. But our charge is to follow the law. And in this case the law is
just as the district court described it, permitting the enforcement of the release in
this case and requiring the entry of summary judgment.
Affirmed. 5
5
We decline Mr. Espinoza’s request for certification of his negligence per
se claim to the Colorado Supreme Court for decision. Not only is the request
fleetingly made (three sentences in the middle of a brief arguing state law
unambiguously supports his position), we generally do not trouble state supreme
courts where, as here, existing state law provides “a reasonably clear and
principled course” we may follow to resolve the case at hand. Pino v. United
States, 507 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007).
16
14-1444, Espinoza v. Arkansas Valley Adventures
HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:
I fully join all the opinion except the discussion of the third Jones factor. I
respectfully dissent, however, on that factor. In my view, a jury must resolve whether
Ms. Apolinar was misled about the danger of the rapids. Although the warning provided
to her at the outfitter’s office listed all the potential risks that she would face, the
description of the rapids is what would convey the probability of those risks. It is not
enough to list a risk if the customer has been misled about its probability.
1