United States v. Hernandez

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 17, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 17-6021
(D.C. Nos. 5:16-CV-00604-F &
ALEX JOE HERNANDEZ, 5:08-CR-00048-F-1)
(W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, HOLMES, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Alex Hernandez appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to vacate
his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We affirm.
I. Background
Hernandez pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). The government filed a notice (and supplemental notice) that Hernandez
was subject to an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA),
18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which sets a fifteen-year minimum term for those convicted
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
under § 922(g) who have three prior convictions for violent felonies, § 924(e)(1).
According to the government’s notice, Hernandez had four ACCA-qualifying
offenses: (1) a 2004 conviction for second degree burglary under Okla. Stat. tit. 21,
§ 1435; (2) a 1989 conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon under
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 801; (3) a 1996 conviction for deadly conduct under Tex. Penal
Code § 22.05 (case number 96-053); and (4) a second 1996 conviction for deadly
conduct under the same statute (case number 96-052).
Hernandez argued the ACCA enhancement did not apply because his deadly
conduct convictions were not violent felonies, but he did not challenge the
government’s contention that his second degree burglary and attempted robbery
convictions were. The sentencing court concluded one of Hernandez’s deadly
conduct convictions was a violent felony (namely, his conviction in case number
96-052). It therefore sentenced Hernandez to fifteen years in prison, the minimum
mandatory term under the ACCA.
Hernandez appealed, again arguing that neither of his deadly conduct
convictions were violent felonies. Like the sentencing court, we concluded his
conviction in case number 96-052 satisfied the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony”
because deadly conduct under Tex. Penal Code § 22.05(b)(1) “has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
United States v. Hernandez, 568 F.3d 827, 829-30 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We therefore affirmed Hernandez’s sentence. Id. at 832.
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Several years later, the Supreme Court invalidated part of the ACCA’s
definition of “violent felony.” The ACCA defines the term as:
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . that—
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another [the elements clause]; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives [the
enumerated offense clause], or otherwise involves conduct that presents
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another [the residual
clause].
§ 924(e)(2)(B). In Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557, 2563 (2015), the
Supreme Court held the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. The Court
later applied Johnson’s holding retroactively to cases on collateral review. Welch v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016).
Less than a year after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson, Hernandez
moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on grounds that, after Johnson,
he no longer qualified for an enhanced sentence under the ACCA. The district court
denied relief and denied a Certificate of Appealability (COA).
We granted a COA on two issues: (1) whether Hernandez’s § 2255 motion
was timely and (2) whether the district court properly denied it on the merits.
II. Timeliness & Procedural Default
As relevant here, a § 2255 motion must be filed within a year after “the date on
which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right
has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable
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to cases on collateral review.” § 2255(f)(3). As noted above, Hernandez filed his
§ 2255 motion less than a year after Johnson and argued that, after Johnson, he no
longer qualified for an enhanced sentence under the ACCA. Because Hernandez
asserted the right established in Johnson within a year after it was decided, his
motion was timely. See United States v. Snyder, 871 F.3d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir.
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1696 (2018).
In general, “claims not raised on direct appeal cannot be raised on collateral
review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice.” Id. at 1126 (internal
quotation marks omitted). But Hernandez’s “Johnson claim was not reasonably
available . . . at the time of his direct appeal,” id. at 1127, and there is no doubt the
alleged error influenced his sentence, see id. at 1128. So Hernandez has shown
sufficient cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default.
III. Merits
To determine whether the district court erred by denying Hernandez’s § 2255
motion, we review its “findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law
de novo.” Id. at 1125 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hernandez argues he is entitled to relief under § 2255 because his convictions
for second degree burglary and attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon are no
longer violent felonies under the ACCA. The Court’s decision in Johnson did not
affect the validity of the ACCA’s elements clause or enumerated offense clause.
See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. So to prevail, Hernandez must show the sentencing
court “more likely than not[] relied on the residual clause to enhance his sentence.”
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United States v. Driscoll, 892 F.3d 1127, 1135 (10th Cir. 2018). We resolve this
question by reviewing the sentencing record to see whether the transcripts, pleadings,
or presentence report (PSR) identify which clause the court relied on. Id. at 1132. If
the record is ambiguous, we “examine[] the relevant background legal environment at
the time of sentencing to determine whether the [sentencing] court would have
needed to rely on the residual clause.” Id. at 1132 & n.2.
As we explain below, Hernandez has not shown the sentencing court more
likely than not relied on the residual clause to find his convictions for second degree
burglary and attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon were violent felonies. We
therefore see no error in the district court’s decision to deny his § 2255 motion.
A. Sentencing Record
The sentencing record does not shed much light on Hernandez’s claim. The
sentencing court did not specify which clause or clauses it relied on to find
Hernandez’s convictions for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon and second
degree burglary were violent felonies. And neither the presentence briefs nor the
PSR answer this question. Because the record is ambiguous, we turn to the
background legal environment at the time of sentencing.
B. Background Legal Environment
The background legal environment is “a snapshot of what the controlling law
was at the time of sentencing.” Snyder, 871 F.3d at 1129 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Hernandez has not shown the controlling law when he was sentenced
would have required the court to rely on the residual clause to find his convictions for
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second degree burglary and attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon were violent
felonies.
i. Second Degree Burglary
Hernandez was convicted of second degree burglary under Okla. Stat. tit. 21,
§ 1435. That section provides:
Every person who breaks and enters any building or any part of any
building, room, booth, tent, railroad car, automobile, truck, trailer,
vessel or other structure or erection, in which any property is kept, or
breaks into or forcibly opens, any coin-operated or vending machine or
device with intent to steal any property therein or to commit any felony,
is guilty of burglary in the second degree.
Id.
Burglary is one of the crimes listed in the ACCA’s enumerated offense clause.
See § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). When Hernandez was sentenced, the Supreme Court had
defined “burglary” under the ACCA as any offense with the generic “elements of
unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with
intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990). The
Court adopted a categorical approach to the analysis, requiring courts to look only to
the statutory definition of the prior offense, rather than the particular facts underlying
the conviction. Id. at 602. If a particular statute defined burglary more broadly than
the generic definition, the court could “go beyond the mere fact of conviction” to
determine whether the “jury was actually required to find all the elements of generic
burglary.” Id. at 602. The Court later extended this reasoning to cases where the
prior conviction was the result of a plea. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 19
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(2005). It held that in the plea context a sentencing court may review the charging
document, plea agreement, plea transcript, or comparable judicial records to
determine whether a plea involving a broader statute “necessarily admitted [the]
elements of the generic offense.” Id. at 26.
Our decisions would have given the sentencing court even more guidance.
By 2008, we had long recognized that Oklahoma’s second degree burglary statute
was broader than generic burglary. See United States v. Hill, 53 F.3d 1151, 1153
(10th Cir. 1995) (en banc); United States v. Green, 55 F.3d 1513, 1516 (10th Cir.
1995). Following Taylor, we held that convictions under the statute satisfied the
enumerated offense clause when the charging document and judgment showed the
defendant pled guilty to the elements of generic burglary. Hill, 53 F.3d at 1155;
Green, 55 F.3d at 1516. When that was true, we found it unnecessary to determine
whether the conviction also satisfied the residual clause. See United States v. Amos,
984 F.2d 1067, 1071 (10th Cir. 1993).
In Hernandez’s case, the charging information alleged he committed second
degree burglary by “unlawfully . . . breaking and entering into a building located at
Wagner’s R.V. Sales . . . with the intent to commit burglary.” Aplt. Supp. R. at 32.
The judgment shows Hernandez was represented by counsel and pled guilty to the
charge. Because the charging document and judgment show Hernandez pled guilty to
the elements of generic burglary, the law when he was sentenced would have allowed
the court to rely on the enumerated offense clause to find his second degree burglary
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conviction was a violent felony under the ACCA. See Hill, 53 F.3d at 1155; Green,
55 F.3d at 1516.
ii. Attempted Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon
Hernandez was convicted of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon
under Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 801. Under that section,
[a]ny person or persons who, with the use of any firearms or any other
dangerous weapons, . . . attempts to rob or robs any person or persons,
or who robs or attempts to rob any place of business, residence or
banking institution or any other place inhabited or attended by any
person or persons . . . shall be guilty of a felony.
Id. Oklahoma defines “robbery” as “a wrongful taking of personal property in the
possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.” Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 791.
The ACCA’s enumerated offense clause does not list attempted robbery, so we
turn to the elements clause. An offense satisfies the elements clause if it “has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
of another.” § 924(e)(2)(b)(i). Although we had not resolved the question in a
published decision, we held in an unpublished decision predating Hernandez’s
sentence that a conviction under § 801 was a violent felony under either the elements
clause or the residual clause. United States v. Gilbert, 1994 WL 242221, at *2
(10th Cir. June 7, 1994) (unpublished). This would have provided at least persuasive
authority for the sentencing court to reach the same conclusion. See 10th Cir. R.
32.1(A). Nevertheless, Hernandez argues his conviction under § 801 does not satisfy
the elements clause for three reasons.
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First, he argues the force required to satisfy the “force or fear” element is not
the violent force necessary to satisfy the elements clause. See Johnson v. United
States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (“[I]n the context of [the elements clause], the
phrase ‘physical force’ means violent force—that is, force capable of causing
physical pain or injury to another person.”). It is true that, under Oklahoma law,
“robbery by force” does not require any particular degree of force. See Okla. Stat.
tit. 21, § 793 (stating “the degree of force employed is immaterial”). But this does
not mean that, taken together, the elements of attempted robbery with a dangerous
weapon would not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force sufficient
to satisfy the elements clause. Cf. United States v. Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d 663, 670
(10th Cir. 2010) (concluding the elements of New Mexico’s “apprehension causing”
aggravated assault statute, considered together, include “the threatened use of force
capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Regardless, Hernandez cites no authority predating his sentence
that would have required any particular degree of force to satisfy the elements clause.
See Snyder, 871 F.3d at 1129 (“[T]he relevant background legal environment . . .
does not take into account post-sentencing decisions that may have clarified or
corrected pre-sentencing decisions.”).
Second, Hernandez argues the fear component of the “force or fear” element
can be accomplished by threats to property, rather than threats to “the person of
another,” which the elements clause requires. Indeed, under Oklahoma law, robbery
can be accomplished by “fear of an unlawful injury, immediate or future, to the
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person or property of the person robbed or of any relative of his, or member of his
family,” or by “fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to the person or property of
anyone in the company of the person robbed, at the time of the robbery.” Okla. Stat.
tit. 21, § 794. But the analysis does not end there. When faced with “a statute [that]
defines a particular offense in more than one way,” the law when Hernandez was
sentenced would have allowed the sentencing court to “consult the judicial records
approved in Shepard in order to ascertain which definition of [the] crime to
evaluate.” United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110, 1121 (10th Cir. 2008). The
charging information accused Hernandez of attempting to take money from a person
“by threatening her with a . . . knife, causing her to fear she was in immediate danger
of unlawful injury or death.” Aplt. Supp. R. at 23. The judgment shows Hernandez
was represented by counsel and informed of the nature of the charge before he pled
guilty. These records would have allowed the sentencing court to determine
Hernandez was convicted of threatening a person, not property.
Third, Hernandez argues attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon is not a
violent felony under the ACCA because it does not require an actual attempt to use
force. But again, the sentencing court could have reviewed the charging information
and judgment to determine which parts of the statutes defining the offense Hernandez
was convicted under. See Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d at 1121. These records would have
revealed he was convicted of using a dangerous weapon to attempt (§ 801) to take
personal property in another’s possession by means of (§ 791) fear of unlawful injury
to the person (§ 794). The sentencing court could have concluded this definition of
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attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon involved the “threatened use of physical
force against the person of another,” § 924(e)(2)(b)(i), so whether or not the
conviction involved an actual attempt to use force would have been irrelevant,
cf. United States v. Herron, 432 F.3d 1127, 1137 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The actual use of
force is not necessary to make a crime a violent felony; all that is required is the
threat of such force against another’s person.”).
In short, Hernandez has not shown the law when he was sentenced would have
required the court to rely on the residual clause to find his conviction for attempted
robbery with a dangerous weapon was a violent felony.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s order denying Hernandez’s § 2255 motion.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
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