Rhoten v. Apfel

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 24 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
GLORIA D. RHOTEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-3251
(D.C. No. 98-CV-4167)
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner (D. Kan.)
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY , McKAY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Gloria D. Rhoten appeals from an order of the district court
granting the Commissioner’s motion to remand this case to the agency for further
proceedings. We affirm.
“We review de novo the district court’s decision to reverse the
[Commissioner], applying the same standards as those employed by the district
court.” Nguyen v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1400, 1402 (10th Cir. 1994). We review the
Commissioner’s decision to determine whether his factual findings were
supported by substantial evidence in light of the entire record and to determine
whether he applied the correct legal standards. See Castellano v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). “Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotations omitted). In the course of our review,
we may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the
agency.” Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800
(10th Cir. 1991).
Ms. Rhoten alleged disability as of June 30, 1982, due to severe mental
impairments. She filed an application under Title II for both general disability
benefits and Childhood Disability Insurance Benefits. She also sought benefits
under Title XVI . The administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Ms. Rhoten
was not entitled to benefits under any of the programs.
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The Appeals Council held that the ALJ had incorrectly addressed the
Title XVI claims 2 and remanded that application to the ALJ. The Appeals
Council noted that the record did not support the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Rhoten’s
schizo-affective disorder had not lasted twelve months. The Appeals Council
denied review of the other applications.
Ms. Rhoten commenced this action in district court seeking review of the
Commissioner’s denial of her Title II applications. The Commissioner requested
a remand on the grounds that the ALJ had erred in not considering her claims past
step two and that further development of the record was necessary. The district
court issued a sentence four remand. 3
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Ms. Rhoten appeals arguing that the district court should not have ordered a
remand, but should have awarded immediate benefits. Ms. Rhoten claims she is
disabled at step three due to her mental impairments.
The record contains conflicting evidence. Some evaluators have stated that
Ms. Rhoten can hold a job. She apparently was a caretaker for the elderly,
although the record is not clear that she performed this job at a level that qualifies
2
The ALJ determined that Ms. Rhoten was not disabled under Title XVI
at step four of the five-step sequential process, see Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d
748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988), as Ms. Rhoten could return to her prior work as
caretaker for the elderly.
3
Because this remand was pursuant to sentence four, the order was final
and appealable and we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Sullivan v.
Finkelstein , 496 U.S. 617, 629 (1990).
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as substantial gainful activity. One evaluator stated that she was never employed
at a significant level and that she was a
severely emotionally ill individual experiencing a psychosis, high
level of severe anxiety and panics, fear of other people, fear of going
out, with paranoid symptoms, as well as severe depression from
which she sought relief through self medication whenever adequate
psychiatric treatment was not available, thus only compounding her
psychological difficulty with the addition of drugs that made her
life worse.
Appendix at 208. The evaluator concluded that Ms. Rhoten is psychologically
disabled and is impaired in every aspect of her life.
The evidence is conflicting and incomplete. It would be inappropriate
for us to usurp the role of the fact finder and make the initial determination
of whether Ms. Rhoten should be awarded benefits.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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