United States v. Webb

Appellate Case: 21-3091 Document: 010110756037 Date Filed: 10/20/2022 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 20, 2022
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 21-3091
(D.C. Nos. 5:11-CR-40078-JAR-1,
VIROK D. WEBB, 5:17-CV-04040-JAR-JPO &
2:19-CV-02491-JAR-JPO)
Defendant - Appellant. (D. Kan.)
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Virok D. Webb appeals the district court’s denial of leave to amend his
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. The district court concluded that Webb’s proposed claim
was untimely and that amendment was futile because he lacked standing to bring his
proposed claim. We granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on the timeliness
and standing issues. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(c),
we affirm the district court’s judgment on alternative grounds. Because we affirm on
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 21-3091 Document: 010110756037 Date Filed: 10/20/2022 Page: 2
alternative grounds, we do not consider or address the district court’s ruling that
Webb lacks standing to bring his proposed Sixth Amendment claim. We affirm the
district court’s denial of leave to amend as futile because Webb’s proposed Sixth
Amendment claim is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. This conclusion
obviates any need to consider whether Webb’s proposed claim was timely under
§ 2255(f)(4) or any question of standing.
I
Webb was charged in a three-count superseding indictment with conspiracy to
distribute crack cocaine, conspiracy to distribute powder cocaine, and murder to
prevent a person from providing information concerning a federal crime to a law
enforcement officer. He pleaded guilty to the crack-conspiracy count, and the
government dismissed the other conspiracy and murder counts. Webb later sought to
withdraw his guilty plea, but the district court denied his request. On August 27,
2015, the district court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Webb to 360
months in prison followed by 10 years of supervised release. Webb appealed the
denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and on June 2, 2016, we affirmed.
See United States v. Webb, 651 F. App’x 740, 741 (10th Cir. 2016).
Webb’s conviction became final 90 days later, on August 31, 2016, when the
time for him to seek certiorari review expired. See S. Ct. R. 13.1; United States v.
Prows, 448 F.3d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir. 2006). He had one year from that date, until
August 31, 2017, to file a § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). On June 5,
2
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2017, Webb timely filed a pro se § 2255 motion, claiming his trial and appellate
counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
Meanwhile, in separate judicial proceedings (“the Black litigation”), the
district court learned that the government had accessed recorded conversations
between attorneys and their clients confined at the same prison where Webb was
incarcerated. See United States v. Carter, 995 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2021). The
district court conducted an extensive investigation in the Black litigation and directed
the government to produce all recordings in its possession. See id. The court also
entered a standing order appointing the Federal Public Defender (FPD) to represent
any defendant from the District of Kansas with an alleged Sixth Amendment
violation stemming from government access to recordings of attorney-client
conversations. See Standing Order No. 18-3 (D. Kan. July 17, 2018).
On July 9, 2019—more than two years after he filed his pro se § 2255
motion—Webb moved to amend his § 2255 motion to add a Sixth Amendment claim
based on the government obtaining recordings of his calls with his attorney while at
the prison. See Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 1995)
(“[A]bsent a countervailing state interest,” “a prosecutor’s intentional intrusion into
the attorney-client-relationship constitutes . . . a per se violation of the Sixth
Amendment.”). He was represented by the FPD, and his original § 2255 motion was
still pending with the district court. After Webb renewed his motion to amend, the
district court consolidated his case with numerous other § 2255 motions raising
similar Sixth Amendment claims arising out of the government’s access to the
3
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recordings. Aplt. Suppl. R. at 1488-89; In re CCA Recordings 2255 Litig. v. United
States, No. 19-cv-2491-JAR-JPO (D. Kan. Aug. 21, 2019), ECF No. 1 at 3-4
(including Webb’s case in the consolidated § 2255 proceedings).1
The district court denied Webb leave to amend. The court concluded that his
proposed Sixth Amendment claim was untimely because it was filed beyond the
one-year deadline of § 2255(f)(1), and it did not relate back to his original filing date
because it asserted a new Sixth Amendment claim that was separate from and
unrelated to the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims presented in his initial
motion, see United States v. Roe, 913 F.3d 1285, 1297 (10th Cir. 2019) (explaining
that proposed amended claims may relate “back only when the claims added by
amendment arise from the same core facts as the timely filed claims, and not when
the new claims depend upon events separate in both time and type from the originally
raised episodes” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court also ruled that
amendment would be futile because the Sixth Amendment claim was subject to
dismissal for lack of standing. The court reasoned that Webb already had been
convicted and sentenced before the government obtained the recordings of his calls in
May 2016, so he could not establish that his confinement was caused by the alleged
1
The parties move to supplement the record on appeal with numerous public
court filings from the Black litigation, the consolidated § 2255 proceedings, and other
proceedings. We construe the motions as requesting that we take judicial notice of
the relevant material, and so construed, we grant the motions. For ease of reference,
we cite those documents as the parties have presented them to us in their respective
supplemental appendices.
4
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Sixth Amendment violation, characterizing its holding as a lack of standing. The
district court denied a COA, and Webb sought to appeal.2
Webb filed an application in this court for a COA, which we granted as to two
issues: whether the proposed amendment was timely under § 2255(f)(4),3 and
whether Webb would have standing to raise his proposed amended claim.4
Having now carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the district court’s
decisions in both this case and in the Black litigation, as well as the relevant legal
authorities, we find it unnecessary to address either of the two issues upon which this
court granted a COA. Instead, for the reasons stated below, we affirm the denial of
Webb’s motion to amend on the alternative ground that it would have been futile to
allow him to amend because his proposed claim is not cognizable in a federal habeas
proceeding. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011)
2
The district court denied the balance of Webb’s § 2255 motion; those issues
are not before us.
3
Under § 2255(f)(4), the one-year limitation period for filing a § 2255 motion
runs from “the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”
4
We also granted a COA to consider whether the proposed amendment was
timely under § 2255(f)(2), which delays accrual of the one-year limitation period for
filing a § 2255 motion until “the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such
governmental action.” In his reply brief, Webb abandons any argument under
§ 2255(f)(2), see Reply Br. at 8 n.2, so we do not consider any issue related to a
government-imposed impediment to filing.
5
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(“[W]e may affirm on any basis supported by the record, even if it requires ruling on
arguments not reached by the district court or even presented to us on appeal.”).
II
“Pursuant to the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a movant may file an
amended § 2255 motion at any time during post-conviction proceedings with leave of
court.” Roe, 913 F.3d at 1296.5 However, “the district court may dismiss without
granting leave to amend when it would be futile to allow the plaintiff an opportunity
to amend his [motion].” Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219
(10th Cir. 2006).
Webb claims the government obtained the recordings of his calls on May 20,
May 24, and May 25, 2016. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 5; see also Aplt. Suppl. R. at
52-57 (emails with links to call recordings). A supplemental status report filed in the
Black litigation confirms that “no [other] calls or derivative materials were located
for Webb.” Aplt. Suppl. R. at 1665. And the FPD conceded that, after reviewing the
relevant evidence, it could not establish that anyone had accessed the recordings
before Webb was sentenced on August 27, 2015. See id. at 1283. Under these
circumstances, where the alleged Sixth Amendment violation is predicated on events
that occurred after he was convicted and sentenced, Webb’s claim is not cognizable
in a federal habeas proceeding. See Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1339 (10th Cir.
1998) (holding petitioner’s claim was not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding
5
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 applies to § 2255 motions. See Roe,
913 F.3d at 1296 n.14.
6
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because it did not focus on “the judgment which provides the basis for his
incarceration” or “revolve [around] trial error but about matters that occurred
subsequently”); see also United States v. Dago, 441 F.3d 1238, 1248-49 & n.5
(10th Cir. 2006) (holding claim based on delay in post-conviction proceedings did
not warrant relief in federal habeas, which is “limited to examining the events that
occurred in the proceedings leading up to the petitioner’s conviction”); Richie v.
Sirmons, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1298-99 (N.D. Okla. 2008) (holding claim alleging
constitutional violation that occurred during petitioner’s direct appeal was not
cognizable in federal habeas proceedings because it challenged the constitutionality
of the appellate court’s decision, not “the judgment which provides the basis for his
incarceration”). Webb had been convicted and sentenced by the time the alleged
Sixth Amendment violation occurred. As such, his proposed claim would not have
been cognizable in a habeas proceeding, it would have been subject to dismissal, and
thus amendment would have been futile. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of
Webb’s motion to amend on this alternative ground, and we do not reach any other
issues.
III
The district court’s judgment is affirmed. The parties’ motions to supplement
the record, which we construe as motions to take judicial notice, are granted.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
7