Blackfeather v. Wheeler

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 21, 2015
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MICAH BLACKFEATHER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHRISTY WHEELER; JASON
KORN; DAVID KENNEDY; JOHN
LEWELLYNG; WILLIAM No. 15-1094
RAYMOND MILLER; MIGUEL (D.C. No. 1:14-CV-02566-LTB)
FLORES; KELLY ADAMS; KEVIN (D. Colo.)
BERNARD HILLIARD; CARRIE
LOUISE ADAMS; TYLER ADAMS;
EMILIA NORIEGA; ABLE
JIMENEZ; HILARIA JIMENEZ;
VALERIE HEALD,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HOLMES, MATHESON, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
decided unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
Pro se prisoner Micah Blackfeather appeals from the district court’s
dismissal of his § 1983 civil-rights claim. 1 In his underlying complaint, Mr.
Blackfeather alleged that police officers and private citizens filed falsified reports
stating that he was responsible for stealing two bicycles, and that, as a result, he
has been falsely imprisoned. Prior to the defendants being served with the
complaint, the district court reviewed the complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and dismissed it as frivolous.
We dismiss Mr. Blackfeather’s appeal as frivolous and deny him leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal. Further, because Mr. Blackfeather
is subject to the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), we impose two strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
I
Mr. Blackfeather was arrested in August 2013 for bicycle theft. Private
citizens apprehended him and managed to “wrestle him to the ground” after
chasing him. R. at 57 (Wheeler Police Report, dated Aug. 21, 2013). When
police officers arrived at the scene, they found two men “sitting on top of” Mr.
Blackfeather to prevent him from getting away. Id. at 54 (Kennedy Police
Report, dated Aug. 21, 2013). Because Mr. Blackfeather had a cut on his leg, was
1
As explicated further, infra, we liberally construe Mr. Blackfeather’s
pro se filings, see Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 543 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010), but
we do not assume the role of his advocate, see Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925,
927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
2
complaining of pain, and appeared to be confused, he was transported to the
Longmont University Hospital for treatment before being taken to the Boulder
County Jail.
Three police officers—Chrystie Wheeler, David Kennedy, and Jason
Korn—each filed reports detailing the incident, and several individuals provided
statements claiming that they had witnessed Mr. Blackfeather steal a bicycle from
Mr. Miguel Flores. Mr. Blackfeather is currently detained at the Colorado Mental
Health Institute in Pueblo, Colorado, and had criminal charges pending against
him in Colorado state court at the time the district court dismissed this lawsuit. 2
In September 2014, Mr. Blackfeather filed the present § 1983 lawsuit
against the three police officers as well as eleven private individuals. His
amended complaint 3 asserted that the police officers falsified their reports, that
the witnesses lied about his conduct, and that, as a result, he has been falsely
imprisoned. However, before the defendants had been served, the district court
dismissed the amended complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 4 The court found that Mr. Blackfeather could not assert
2
The record does not contain sufficient information for us to ascertain
whether the charges have since been resolved.
3
A magistrate judge found his initial complaint to be deficient because
it consisted primarily of conclusory allegations, and directed him to file an
amended complaint.
4
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) provides that “the court shall dismiss the case
(continued...)
3
§ 1983 claims against the private citizens because he had failed to allege facts
demonstrating that they were acting under color of state law. Moreover,
according to the district court, his claims against the police officers also failed
because he did not allege sufficient facts to support a constitutional claim against
them. Finally, the court held that he had not demonstrated that “any of the named
Defendants are responsible for his continuing confinement.” R. at 116 (Order of
Dismissal, filed Feb. 13, 2015). In addition to dismissing the amended complaint,
the district court noted that “any appeal . . . would not be taken in good faith” and
therefore denied Mr. Blackfeather IFP status on appeal. Id. at 119.
II
On appeal, Mr. Blackfeather reasserts his allegation that the police officers
“falsified police reports to make an arrest” and “support[ed] their claims with
fake witnesses and victims.” Aplt Opening Br. at 3. He further claims that he
was “chased down, shot at and beat[en] up and then strangled” when he was
apprehended, and that the police “kidnapp[ed] [him] into a waiting [a]mbulance,”
where he was “shot up until [he] passed out” and mistreated at the hospital. Id.
He also seeks leave to proceed IFP.
4
(...continued)
at any time if the court determines that . . . [] the action or appeal [] is frivolous
or malicious.”
4
A
“We generally review a district court’s dismissal for frivolousness under
§ 1915 for abuse of discretion.” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir.
2006). “Abuse-of-discretion review ordinarily includes review of any legal
conclusions de novo and any factual findings for clear error.” United States v.
Ray, 704 F.3d 1307, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). A claim is frivolous “where it lacks
an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989). In determining whether a complaint is frivolous, we are not bound by the
usual rule that we must accept the allegations in the pleadings as true; however,
the allegations must still be “weighted in favor of the plaintiff.” Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (stating that
language, which is now codified in material respects in § 1915(e), gives courts
“the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations”).
B
Although we construe pro se pleadings liberally, see Garrett v. Selby
Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005), we have repeatedly
emphasized that “pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that
govern other litigants,” Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1249 n.9 (10th Cir.
2011); accord Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994). As relevant
here, we have held that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 “applies equally
to pro se litigants”; pursuant to this rule, a brief “must contain . . . more than a
5
generalized assertion of error, with citations to supporting authority.” Garrett,
425 F.3d at 841 (omission in original) (quoting Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d
544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001)). While we typically excuse a pro se plaintiff’s failure
“to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories . . . or his
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements,” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110
(10th Cir. 1991), we have nevertheless found that a pro se brief that consists of no
more than “mere conclusory allegations with no citations to the record or any
legal authority for support” does not preserve an issue for appellate review,
Garrett, 425 F.3d at 841 (emphases added).
Mr. Blackfeather’s brief is bereft of a statement of facts or any citations to
the record or legal authority. In both his statement of the issues and his
specification of the district court’s legal and factual errors, he simply reiterates
his amended complaint’s conclusory averments—namely, that the police reports
and witness statements contained therein are false and that he was mistreated
when he was apprehended. He does not address the district court’s conclusion
that his amended complaint was frivolous or attempt to demonstrate that his
claims do not meet the § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) standard for frivolity. Mr.
Blackfeather’s deficient briefing therefore waives any appellate review of the
district court’s decision. See Harsco Corp. v. Renner, 475 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th
Cir. 2007) (“[A] party waives those arguments that its opening brief inadequately
6
addresses.”); Garrett, 425 F.3d at 841 (“[T]he inadequacies of Plaintiff’s [pro se]
briefs disentitle him to review by this court.”).
C
Even if we were to exercise our discretion to overlook Mr. Blackfeather’s
waiver, see United States v. Montgomery, 550 F.3d 1229, 1231 n.1 (10th Cir.
2008), he would not prevail. Simply put, his conclusory and unfocused briefing,
construed liberally, does not provide an “arguable basis either in law or in fact”
for us to reverse the district court. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.
First, with respect to Mr. Blackfeather’s claim that the police officers
falsified their reports, his amended complaint and his appellate brief contain
largely bare allegations. See R. at 106 (Am. Compl., filed Jan. 6, 2015) (stating
that “the officers have forged a Police Report”); id. at 109 (stating that the
witnesses “either . . . did not lawfully give statements or . . . did not speak with
the Police Officers at all”); Aplt. Opening Br. at 3 (stating that the police
“falsified Police Reports,” that the alleged crime “never occurred,” and that
police “created” fake witnesses). Yet, in order to state a plausible claim, a
plaintiff must allege sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In the absence of any “well-pleaded
factual contentions” giving rise to the plausible inference that the police officers
falsified their reports, the district court was not required to accept Mr.
7
Blackfeather’s “conclusory allegations” as true, Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110, and did
not err in finding that the claim was “clearly baseless,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327;
see Reed v. Dunham, 893 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1990) (concluding that
allegations that were “unfocused, conclusory, and hopelessly deficient” were
appropriately dismissed as frivolous).
Second, Mr. Blackfeather argues that he was “shot at and beat up and then
strangled” during his apprehension. Aplt. Opening Br. at 3. It appears from the
record that Mr. Blackfeather was initially detained by private individuals who
chased after him. See R. at 54. A private citizen “can be held liable under § 1983
only if she was a ‘willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.’”
Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1071 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)); see Lee v. Town of Estes Park, 820 F.2d 1112,
1114 (10th Cir. 1987) (“[I]n order to hold a private individual liable under
§ 1983, it must be shown that the private person was jointly engaged with state
officials in the challenged action, or has obtained significant aid from state
officials, or that the private individual’s conduct is in some other way chargeable
to the State.”).
In Lee, we concluded that a private individual who effected a “citizen’s
arrest” and escorted the plaintiff to a police station was not a state actor or
engaged in joint action where there was no evidence “that there was any
prearrangement” and the police officer “made the decision as to whether [the
8
plaintiff] should be charged with any offense.” 820 F.2d at 1115. Neither Mr.
Blackfeather’s complaint nor his appellate brief contain any allegations that the
individuals who detained him were acting in concert with the police officers; thus,
his claim against the private citizens who apprehended him “lacks even an
arguable basis in law.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. 5
Finally, Mr. Blackfeather alleges that the police “helped kidnap[] [him] into
a waiting Ambulance” where he was “shot up until [he] passed out.” Aplt.
Opening Br. at 3. He further claims that when he woke up in the hospital he “was
being drained of blood” and there were “holes in [his] back from bullets and skin
grafting taken from [his] legs.” Id. As an initial matter, none of these allegations
appear in the complaints Mr. Blackfeather filed in the district court, and thus he
has waived any legal claim relating to this alleged conduct. See Ramirez v. Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 686 F.3d 1239, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[B]eing pro se
does not, by itself, excuse a failure to raise an argument below . . . .”). Moreover,
5
Before the district court, Mr. Blackfeather argued that various private
individuals gave false witness statements. On appeal, he does not press this
claim, but instead argues that the witnesses were simply “created” by the police
officers as part of their falsified reports. Aplt. Opening Br. at 3. Even if Mr.
Blackfeather had preserved his contention that the witnesses lied, he would not
have prevailed under § 1983 because there are no plausible allegations that there
was a “conspiracy, prearranged plan, customary procedure, or policy that
substituted the judgment of a private party for that of the police or allowed a
private party to exercise state power.” Carey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 823 F.2d
1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1987); see also Benavidez v. Gunnell, 722 F.2d 615, 618
(10th Cir. 1983) (“The mere furnishing of information to police officers does not
constitute joint action under color of state law . . . .”).
9
the Supreme Court has advised that such “fanciful factual” allegations, Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 325, which “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly
incredible,” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33, are appropriately treated as factually
frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Thus, we conclude that the district court appropriately deemed Mr.
Blackfeather’s claims to be frivolous.
D
The so-called three-strikes provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), states that after
a prisoner files three civil “action[s] or appeal[s]” that are dismissed as
“frivolous, malicious, or [for failure] to state a claim,” he is no longer entitled to
proceed IFP unless he is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Here,
the district court dismissed Mr. Blackfeather’s amended complaint as frivolous,
and, as we explain supra, it did not err in doing so.
Further, if we “dismiss as frivolous the appeal of an action the district court
dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), both dismissals count as strikes.”
Jennings v. Natrona Cty. Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir.
1999). Because Mr. Blackfeather’s appellate brief fails to address whether the
district court’s determination under § 1915(e)(2)(B) was erroneous, but instead
largely rehashes the inadequate allegations in his amended complaint, it does not
provide even an arguable basis in law or fact for reversal, and is thus frivolous.
10
Therefore, because we affirm the district court’s finding that Mr.
Blackfeather’s amended complaint was frivolous, and also conclude that his
appeal is frivolous, two strikes are warranted in this case. Moreover, because we
conclude that Mr. Blackfeather’s appeal is frivolous, we also deny him leave to
proceed IFP on appeal. See Rolland v. Primesource Staffing, LLC, 497 F.3d 1077,
1079 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that in order to proceed IFP on appeal, an appellant
must demonstrate “the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law
and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal”).
We caution Mr. Blackfeather that a third strike will preclude him from
bringing any civil action or an appeal from a judgment in a civil action without
prepaying the applicable filing fee unless he can demonstrate “imminent danger
of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
III
For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS Mr. Blackfeather’s appeal as
frivolous, DENY his motion for IFP status, and impose two strikes under the
PLRA. We remind Mr. Blackfeather of his obligation to pay the filing fee in full.
Entered for the Court
JEROME A. HOLMES
Circuit Judge
11