McNamara v. Brauchler

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 1, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
JOHN McNAMARA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 13-1534
(D.C. No. 13-CV-01117-MSK-BNB)
GEORGE BRAUCHLER; (D. of Colo.)
CHRISTOPHER OPFER; FRANCINE
GONZALEZ; MITCHELL
MORRISEY; C. STEPHEN HOOPER;
JOHN GLEASON; WILLIAM
ROBERT LUCERO; APRIL
McMURREY; MONICA GOMEZ; and
LAWRENCE BOWLING,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. **
John McNamara initiated an action in federal district court against
numerous state officials, alleging violations of his constitutional rights in
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
connection with attorney disciplinary proceedings brought against him by the
Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC), an administrative body
appointed by the Colorado Supreme Court. After rejecting McNamara’s initial
complaint, the United States magistrate judge recommended that McNamara’s
amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice because it did not contain “a
short and plain statement” of the claim or a demand for relief, as required by Rule
8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and as a sanction for McNamara’s
failure to follow court orders. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation, dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.
The OARC brought a disciplinary prosecution against McNamara for his
failure to pay court-ordered spousal and child support. The presiding disciplinary
judge suspended McNamara’s law license for three months. McNamara appealed
the decision to the Colorado Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal.
McNamara sought redress in federal court. His initial complaint contained
169 pages and covered a wide variety of unrelated subjects—including an alleged
conspiracy among Colorado judges and district attorneys to prevent litigants from
obtaining discoverable material, complaints about the prosecution and
adjudication of his traffic tickets, and allegations that he was being improperly
investigated and prosecuted by the state bar’s Attorney Regulation Counsel. The
magistrate judge found that the complaint “includes inappropriate legal and
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factual arguments, conclusory allegations of wrongdoing, irrelevant and
immaterial statements, and ad hominem attacks against the defendants and
others.” R. at 10. The judge further held that, because the complaint fails to
articulate precisely McNamara’s claims or identify the actions or inactions of
each defendant, the complaint “utterly fails to provide notice of the plaintiff’s
causes of action as required by Rule 8.” Id. at 11. He ordered McNamara to
submit an amended complaint along with instructions to help McNamara avoid
having his complaint dismissed. Specifically, the judge instructed McNamara to
state separately each claim, identify the defendant against whom the claim is
brought, and avoid conclusory allegations, irrelevant statements, and ad hominem
attacks.
McNamara subsequently tendered his amended complaint, which was 132
pages in length and riddled with the same problems as the initial complaint. After
McNamara responded to an order to show cause, the magistrate judge
recommended that McNamara’s complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, local court rules, and the judge’s orders.
McNamara objected to the recommendation, and the district court conducted a de
novo review of the magistrate judge’s recommendation. The court overruled
McNamara’s objections and dismissed his claims with prejudice.
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On appeal, McNamara argues the district court should not have dismissed
his complaint as a sanction and that his complaint complied with the pleading
requirements of Rule 8. 1
We review a district court’s decision to impose the sanction of dismissal
for abuse of discretion. Davis v. Miller, 571 F.3d 1058, 1060–61 (10th Cir.
2009). “It is within a court’s discretion to dismiss a case if, after considering all
the relevant factors, it concludes that dismissal alone would satisfy the interests
of justice.” Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 918 (10th Cir. 1992).
Although McNamara proceeds pro se, he is not entitled to have his filings
liberally construed because he is a trained attorney. See Mann v. Boatright, 477
F.3d 1140, 1148 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007). 2
1
McNamara also alleges the district court should have accepted his second
amended complaint. Because McNamara did not amend his complaint “as a
matter of course” within 21 days of serving the initial complaint nor obtain the
court’s leave to file a second amended complaint, the court was not required to
accept his second amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). McNamara also
takes issue with the fact that the district court initially accepted the second
amended complaint for filing before revoking its status as “filed.” But, because a
court may correct its own clerical mistakes, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a), there was no
error in the court’s actions.
2
Mann and other cases from this circuit concern licensed attorneys
proceeding pro se. Of course, McNamara is no longer a licensed attorney, as he
was disbarred in 2013. Nevertheless, the purpose behind affording a liberal
construction to pro se filings—which is to assure adequate review of claims
brought by non-legally trained individuals—would not be furthered by construing
McNamara’s filings liberally. We see no reason to hold McNamara to a less
stringent standard than other legally trained individuals.
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Before choosing dismissal as a sanction, a court must consider several
factors, including
(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; (2)
the amount of interference with the judicial process; (3)
the culpability of the litigant; (4) whether the court
warned the party in advance that dismissal of the action
would be a likely sanction for noncompliance; and (5)
the efficacy of lesser sanctions.
Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 921 (alterations and citations omitted). “These factors do
not constitute a rigid test; rather, they represent criteria for the district court to
consider prior to imposing dismissal as a sanction.” Id.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in dismissing the complaint. As to the first factor, we find that
McNamara’s failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure—which requires a “short and plain statement” of the plaintiff’s
claim—actually prejudiced the defendants. The purpose behind Rule 8 is to “give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“It is not the role of either the court or the defendant to sort through a lengthy,
poorly drafted complaint and voluminous exhibits in order to construct plaintiff’s
causes of action.” See Schupper v. Edie, 193 F. App’x 744, 746 (10th Cir. 2006).
We agree with the district court that the amended complaint contains much
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“distracting and irrelevant detail” and “would force the Defendants to carefully
comb through more than a hundred pages to ascertain which of the several
hundred paragraphs contain pertinent allegations to which a response is
warranted.” R. at 1001.
We agree that the remaining Ehrenhaus factors favor sanctioning
McNamara by dismissing his complaint. McNamara’s submission of an amended
complaint in violation of the applicable procedural and court rules and the
magistrate judge’s direct orders interfered with the judicial process. McNamara’s
submission of a 132-page amended complaint that contained the same problems
cited by the magistrate judge also demonstrates that McNamara did not make a
good faith attempt to comply with the magistrate judge’s order. Further, the
magistrate judge warned McNamara on two occasions that failure to comply with
his orders would result in dismissal. Finally, the magistrate judge attempted to
assist McNamara in complying with pleading requirements and court rules before
recommending dismissal as a sanction. McNamara does not ask for a lesser
sanction, and we see no abuse of discretion in sanctioning McNamara by
dismissing this action.
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of McNamara’s objections and the
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dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. We DENY McNamara’s request to
proceed in forma pauperis.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Per Curiam
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