United States v. Flores-Lopez

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 11, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 12-5196
(D.C. No. 4:12-CR-00041-JHP-3)
SAUL ANTONIO FLORES-LOPEZ, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, TYMKOVICH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
Following a second trial, Saul Antonio Flores-Lopez was convicted of
conspiracy and possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and he was
sentenced to 121-months’ imprisonment. He now appeals from district court orders
that denied his motions for a new trial, to dismiss the indictment, and for judgment of
acquittal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
BACKGROUND
Shortly after his arrest for selling crystallized methamphetamine, Kevin
Gonzalez revealed that he had obtained the meth from a house rented by
Flores-Lopez. According to Gonzalez, the meth was supplied by a man known as
Hugo. Officers from the Tulsa County Drug Task Force searched Flores-Lopez’s
home and a detached garage pursuant to a warrant, finding a meth cutting agent,
plastic vacuum sealer bags, and digital scales. When officers searched a truck that
was parked in the driveway and insured by Flores-Lopez, they found multiple plastic
bags containing over 1,000 grams of meth.
Flores-Lopez returned home during the search, accompanied by the two other
occupants of the house, Mr. and Mrs. Munoz-DeLuna. After receiving Miranda
warnings, Flores-Lopez admitted that he knew some type of illegal activity was being
conducted from the truck. Further, he indicated that the owner of the truck, Hugo,
paid his (Flores-Lopez’s) rent in exchange for keeping the truck in the driveway.
A federal grand jury indicted Flores-Lopez, Hugo, and Gonzalez for
(1) possessing more than 500 grams of meth with intent to distribute; and
(2) conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams
of meth. Gonzalez pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against Flores-Lopez.
At Flores-Lopez’s first trial, Gonzalez testified that Hugo had directed him to
deliver drugs to Flores-Lopez at least twice: once at a gas station and once at a
church. Mr. Munoz-DeLuna testified initially that he had not heard Flores-Lopez
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ever discuss drugs, but when later recalled to the stand by the government, he
changed his testimony, revealing that he had heard a drug-related conversation.
Mr. Munoz-DeLuna explained that he falsely denied hearing a drug-related
conversation because he had received a threatening text. Flores-Lopez moved for a
mistrial, and the district court granted the motion.
Flores-Lopez’s second trial began two months later. Police officers involved
in the search again testified, recounting Flores-Lopez’s admissions that he was aware
of illegal activity being conducted from the truck and that Hugo paid his rent to keep
the truck there. Gonzalez again testified for the government, stating that he had been
to Flores-Lopez’s house three or four times to pick up drugs or give money to Hugo.
On one occasion, Hugo instructed Gonzalez to put drugs in Flores-Lopez’s bedroom.
Additionally, Hugo gave Gonzalez two cell phones on which he received calls from
both Hugo and Flores-Lopez. Gonzalez stated that “most of the time,” the calls with
Flores-Lopez were “about drugs.” R., Vol. III at 551. Additionally, Gonzalez kept a
drug ledger, which referenced a drug transaction with Flores-Lopez.
Consistent with his testimony at the first trial, Gonzalez recounted drug
deliveries to Flores-Lopez at a gas station and a church. But unlike his testimony at
the first trial, Gonzalez testified that he made two or three deliveries to Flores-Lopez
at the church instead of just the one delivery. On cross-examination, defense counsel
pointed out that Gonzalez had at the second trial increased the number of deliveries
to the church and that Gonzalez had not mentioned placing drugs in Flores-Lopez’s
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bedroom during the first trial. Gonzalez insisted that he was “not making up
anything,” id. at 522, and that he had given the government the new information
during a trial-preparation meeting the prior week. Gonzalez then went on to
increase the number of gas-station deliveries to “at least two,” with the remainder
of the deliveries occurring at the church. Id. at 532. When questioned on
cross-examination about the discrepancies, Gonzalez stated that he could not
“really . . . remember.” Id. at 533. Finally, while Gonzalez testified on
cross-examination that there was no agreement to distribute meth, on redirect he
clarified that there was no written agreement.
FBI agent Matthew Ferguson testified that the items found in Flores-Lopez’s
house indicated drug distribution. On cross-examination, agent Ferguson stated that
he had learned a week earlier that Gonzalez had changed his recollection concerning
the number of drug deliveries.
Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, arguing that the government had
failed to disclose “Giglio materials.” Id. at 582.1 Specifically, defense counsel
argued that while the government had notified him the prior day that Gonzalez would
testify that Hugo directed him to place drugs in Flores-Lopez’s bedroom, the
government did not reveal the other changes in Gonzalez’s testimony. The
prosecutor responded that “Gonzalez[’s] testi[mony] . . . regarding multiple meetings
1
In Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court held that “[a] new trial is
required if . . . false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected
the judgment of the jury.” 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (second ellipsis in original).
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at [the gas station] and multiple meetings at the church . . . was new to us.” Id. at
594. Further, the prosecutor asserted that “[n]o government official, no sheriff’s
deputy, no police officer, no assistant U.S. attorney knew that information prior to
[Gonzalez’s] testimony today.” Id. Regarding Agent Ferguson’s testimony that
Gonzalez had in fact identified more drug deliveries the prior week, the prosecutor
indicated she had spoken to the agent, and “he simply did not understand [defense
counsel’s] questions fully[,] and [he] answered inaccurately.” Id. at 609.
The district court declined to grant a mistrial, noting that such a remedy had
already been imposed once in the case and that defense counsel had effectively
cross-examined both Gonzalez and Agent Ferguson. But the court announced it
would continue the trial to the following week to allow defense counsel to recall “any
witnesses that he wish[ed] to call” regarding the “increased activities at the church
and increased activities at [the gas station],” id. at 613, 614. Prior to adjourning,
however, the prosecutor and defense counsel were permitted to question Agent
Ferguson and Gonzalez outside the jury’s presence. Agent Ferguson testified that the
only new information Gonzalez revealed during the meeting a week earlier, in which
the prosecutor was present, concerned placing drugs in Flores-Lopez’s bedroom.
Gonzalez testified, however, that at the meeting he had discussed multiple deliveries
at the church, but he did not remember saying anything at the meeting about multiple
deliveries to the gas station. He also admitted that “[m]aybe” he was confusing
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conversations, id. at 649, and that he was “maybe 75 percent sure” that he mentioned
multiple church deliveries at the meeting, id. at 651.
Prior to the trial resuming, Flores-Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment,
arguing that Gonzalez’s “memory [was] wholly unreliable, [and that] the [c]ourt
should not allow this matter to continue.” R., Vol. I at 94. The court denied the
motion, stating that the trial continuance had “cure[d] the problem,” R., Vol. III at
670, and that “the jury will have to make th[e] ultimate decision,” id. at 671.
Trial resumed with Agent Ferguson on the stand under cross-examination. He
testified that he believed Gonzalez was “confused” when he claimed to have told the
government about additional deliveries to the church. Id. at 686. The government
then rested its case.
Flores-Lopez then moved for judgment of acquittal on both counts under
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. He argued that there was no evidence of an agreement to
possess or distribute methamphetamine and that there was no evidence showing that
he possessed or distributed methamphetamine. The court denied the motion, and the
defense began its case in chief.
Mr. Munoz-DeLuna testified that he did not know Gonzalez, and when he
(Mr. Munoz-DeLuna) worked with Flores-Lopez at the church “for three or four
days,” he never saw Gonzalez there. Id. at 714. Two builders testified that
Flores-Lopez set tile for them and that they trusted Flores-Lopez.
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Finally, Flores-Lopez testified. He stated that he did not know that Hugo and
Gonzalez were involved with drugs. He claimed that Hugo worked for him and that
he insured Hugo’s truck because Hugo was in the country illegally and needed help.
Further, he disagreed with statements police officers attributed to him concerning his
knowledge of drugs in the truck and Hugo paying his rent in exchange for keeping
the truck in his driveway. Finally, Flores-Lopez denied ever meeting Gonzalez to
receive drugs at either the church or the gas station.
After deliberating, the jury found Flores-Lopez guilty on both counts.
Flores-Lopez filed a renewed Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, which the
district court denied before sentencing him to 121-months’ imprisonment.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion for a Mistrial
“We review a district court’s refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Meridyth, 364 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 2004). “In
determining whether a mistrial should have been granted, we focus on whether the
defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial was impaired.” United States v. Ivory,
532 F.3d 1095, 1099 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Flores-Lopez argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying a
mistrial in the second trial on the basis that it had already imposed that remedy in the
first trial. Aplt. Opening Br. at 18. Our reading of the trial transcript shows,
however, that the district court’s reluctance to grant another mistrial was merely a
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recognition that a mistrial is a drastic remedy, see United States v. Klinginsmith,
25 F.3d 1507, 1511 (10th Cir. 1994). But more importantly, in addition to citing the
prior mistrial, the court indicated that another mistrial was unwarranted given defense
counsel’s effective cross-examination of Gonzalez and Agent Ferguson. Indeed,
defense counsel successfully pointed out the discrepancies in Gonzalez’s testimony
and forced him to concede that he could not “really . . . remember” how many
deliveries occurred at the church. R., Vol. III at 533.
To the extent Flores-Lopez contends he would have made Gonzalez’s “ever
changing story” the focal part of the defense, Aplt. Opening Br. at 21, we note that
the district court allowed defense counsel to further question Gonzalez and Agent
Ferguson and it then continued the trial to the following week so defense counsel
could recall “any witnesses.” R., Vol. III at 613. When the trial resumed, defense
counsel recalled only Agent Ferguson, who conceded that Gonzalez must have been
confused about additional deliveries to the church.
Given Gonzalez’s difficulties remembering what he revealed at the pretrial
meeting and the testimony from both he and Agent Ferguson showing his recollection
problems to the jury, we conclude that Flores-Lopez’s right to a fair and impartial
trial was not impaired. Consequently, the district court acted within its discretion in
not declaring a mistrial.
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II. Motion to Dismiss
Flores-Lopez appears to contend that the district court should have dismissed
the indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct concerning Gonzalez’s
testimony. “We review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment
based on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion.” United States v.
Hillman, 642 F.3d 929, 933 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Flores-Lopez argues that it was “improper to allow [Gonzalez’s] testimony to
be used and argued by the government as reliable to the jury, and then behind closed
doors to allow that same government to argue that the witness’ recollection is
improper.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 24. Flores-Lopez is attempting to equate two
unrelated points. The government’s position at trial was that Gonzalez’s testimony
supported Flores-Lopez’s involvement in the methamphetamine-distribution
conspiracy. Outside the jury’s presence, the government did not take a contrary
position. Rather, it argued that Gonzalez was mistaken about remembering whether
he had told the government during the pretrial meeting about more deliveries. And in
regard to whether Gonzalez had in fact imparted that information to the government,
we note that Gonzalez was not sure he had, and both the prosecutor and (ultimately)
Agent Ferguson denied that Gonzalez had revealed the additional deliveries.
Significantly, as we explained earlier, defense counsel was granted a
continuance to further explore the matter and he was able on cross-examination to
expose the unreliability of Gonzalez’s testimony. As the district court recognized, it
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was then up to the jury to determine what weight, if any, to give Gonzalez’s
testimony. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Flores-Lopez’s
motion to dismiss.
III. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
“We review de novo a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.” United States
v. Franco-Lopez, 687 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2012). “Reversal is only
appropriate if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “When conducting this review, we must
consider the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the government.”
Id.
Flores-Lopez first attacks his conspiracy conviction, arguing that there was no
evidence of an agreement to distribute meth. “Because conspiracies are, by
definition, secretive, elements of the crime are often established through
circumstantial evidence. Proof of a tacit agreement to break the law is often
sufficient.” United States v. Dunmire, 403 F.3d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted).
Here, there was evidence that Gonzalez went to Flores-Lopez’s house to pick
up meth or give Hugo money. Hugo directed Gonzalez’s drug activities and once
instructed Gonzalez to place meth in Flores-Lopez’s bedroom. Gonzalez also
delivered meth to Flores-Lopez at a church and a gas station. And Flores-Lopez told
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police that he knew something illegal was going on with Hugo’s truck that he insured
and allowed to be parked in his driveway in exchange for Hugo paying his
(Flores-Lopez’s) rent. Inside Flores-Lopez’s house and garage, police found
materials consistent with meth distribution. Given this evidence, any rational trier of
fact could infer that Flores-Lopez was part of an agreement to distribute meth.
Flores-Lopez next contends that his conviction for possessing meth with intent
to distribute cannot stand because there was no evidence he took “any steps to
distribute.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 25. But “a defendant may be held responsible for
the crimes of his co-conspirators, if those crimes are committed to help advance the
conspiracy and are within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the conspiracy.”
United States v. Clark, 717 F.3d 790, 808 (10th Cir. 2013) (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted), petition for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3138 (Sept. 16, 2013)
(No. 13-358). And there was evidence showing that Flores-Lopez’s coconspirators
were distributing meth and that Flores-Lopez was aware that was occurring. Thus,
distribution can be imputed to Flores-Lopez based on the distribution activities of
Gonzalez and Hugo.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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