United States v. Judd

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS September 12, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-4191
KIM A. JUDD, (D.C. No. 2:04-CR-00845-DS)
(D. Utah)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is, therefore,
submitted without oral argument.
Kim Judd pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and
ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to a 46 month term
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
of imprisonment, with an additional 36 month term of supervised release. Judd now
appeals, challenging the district court’s imposition of a two-point offense level
enhancement for obstruction of justice in the calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines
range. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM.
In late 2004, the Kane County, Utah sheriff’s department determined that Judd’s
residence had been the site of several methamphetamine sales. After a confidential
informant conducted a controlled buy at Judd’s home, officers obtained a search warrant
based, in part, on the informant’s report that Judd was in possession of several firearms,
despite having a prior felony conviction. The warrant, authorized by Utah Justice Court
Judge F. Kirk Heaton, was executed shortly thereafter, and several firearms were seized.
A federal grand jury returned an indictment alleging that Judd had illegally
possessed a firearm and ammunition. Judd initially moved to suppress the evidence
obtained during the execution of the warrant. However, on the day the motion was to be
argued, he withdrew the motion and entered a guilty plea. The district court sentenced
him to a 63 month term of imprisonment, which Judd then appealed. We vacated the
sentence and remanded for resentencing when Judd and the government informed us of
their shared belief that the district court had committed a procedural sentencing error.
Appellee Supp. App’x at 18-19.
At the resentencing hearing, Judd’s probation officer testified regarding the
possible imposition of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice for Judd’s
conduct during an exchange Judd had with Judge Heaton. After interviewing both Judd
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and Judge Heaton, as well as reviewing a police report from the incident, the probation
officer reported that several days before the scheduled trial date, Judd and his father went
to Judge Heaton’s home seeking to verify that the signature authorizing the warrant was
not forged. Judd and his father asked the judge to sign a blank piece of paper so that they
could compare the two signatures. Judge Heaton refused, but proposed instead that they
show him a copy of the warrant, and he would then tell them whether it was his signature
that appeared on the warrant. At this point, the interaction devolved into what was
described as a heated argument, with the judge asking the two men to leave and,
ultimately, calling the police. Judge Heaton indicated to the probation officer that while
he had been on good terms with both men prior to the incident, he was fearful during the
interaction.
The government argued that the exchange between Judd and Judge Heaton called
for the imposition of a two-point offense level enhancement under the Sentencing
Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (2004). Judd contested the enhancement, arguing that
Judge Heaton was unlikely to be called as a witness, and was therefore outside the class
of people towards whom obstructive conduct could be penalized under § 3C1.1. He also
claimed that his statements to Judge Heaton constituted protected First Amendment
speech. The district court disagreed with Judd and applied the obstruction enhancement,
resulting in a total offense level of 20. Combined with Judd’s criminal history category
of III, the Guidelines called for a sentencing range of 41-51 months. The court imposed a
within-Guidelines sentence of 46 months’ imprisonment followed by a 36 month term of
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supervised release. Judd now appeals the imposition of the obstruction enhancement.
The Guidelines call for a two-level enhancement where
(A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct
or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant’s
offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related
offense[.]
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The commentary to this provision provides an example of the types of
conduct to which this enhancement applies, “threatening, intimidating, or otherwise
unlawfully influencing a co-defendant, witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or
attempting to do so.” Id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(a).
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we review sentences for
reasonableness, “encompass[ing] both the reasonableness of the length of the sentence, as
well as the method by which the sentence was calculated.” United States v. Kristl, 437
F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006). In our review of the application of a specific
enhancement, we review a district court’s legal determinations de novo and any factual
findings for clear error. United States v. Zunie, 444 F.3d 1230, 1236 (10th Cir. 2006).
The evidence and any inferences that may be drawn from it are construed in the light
most favorable to the district court’s determination. United States v. Walters, 269 F.3d
1207, 1214 (10th Cir. 2001).
Judd first claims that the district court erred in applying an enhancement for
obstructing justice under § 3C1.1 because the evidence was not sufficient to establish that
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he “threaten[ed], intimidat[ed], or otherwise unlawfully influenc[ed]” Judge Heaton. In
the district court, the government had the burden to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that Judd’s conduct warranted a § 3C1.1 enhancement. United States v. Ivory,
532 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir. 2008). On appeal, we will only reverse the district court’s
factual finding that Judd’s actions “rose to the level of threatening, intimidating, or
otherwise unlawfully influencing” Judge Heaton if we deem it to be clearly
erroneous–that is, if “the district court’s finding was without factual support in the record
or we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United
States v. Dalton, 409 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2005).
The evidence presented was legally sufficient to support an obstruction
enhancement. Judd, a criminal defendant suspected of involvement in methamphetamine
distribution and under federal indictment for illegally possessing a firearm, went to a
judge’s private home and demanded a sample of the judge’s signature. When Judge
Heaton refused, the conversation resulted in Judge Heaton requesting police intervention.
The exchange was described as “heated,” and the Judge indicated he was “somewhat
fearful.” Aplt. App’x at 23. From this evidence, the district court could reasonably infer
either that Judd “threaten[ed], intimidat[ed], or otherwise unlawfully influenc[ed]” Judge
Heaton, or attempted to “threaten[], intimidat[e], or otherwise unlawfully influenc[e]”
Judge Heaton.
Judd suggests that because Judge Heaton knew Judd prior to the incident, and that
this incident took place in a small town where everyone knew each other, the seriousness
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of the encounter is mitigated. We reject this argument. The contextual facts Judd notes
do not leave this court “with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” Even accepting the existence of some sort of pre-existing relationship, the precise
nature of which is ambiguous from the record, nothing about those facts preclude the
district court’s finding regarding the character of the exchange. There was no need for
Judd to instigate this encounter. Judd could have just as easily requested verification of
Judge Heaton’s signature through formal legal channels, rather than taking the potentially
intimidating step of seeking such verification through an unannounced visit to the judge’s
home.
Judd also makes the legal argument that because the commentary to § 3C1.1 limits
the provision’s scope to the threatening, intimidating, or influencing of “co-defendant[s],
witness[es], and juror[s],” the enhancement is inapplicable. He claims that Judge Heaton
was not, and could not have been, a witness. We affirm the district court’s rejection of
this argument.
The examples listed in the commentary to § 3C1.1 are in “a non-exhaustive list of
examples of the types of conduct to which this adjustment applies.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
cmt. n.4 (emphasis added). Recognizing that “[o]bstructive conduct can vary widely in
nature, degree of planning, and seriousness,” id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.3, we have no difficulty
in agreeing with the district court that this enhancement may be applied where an
individual confronts a judge at his or her home in order to solicit evidence undermining
the legitimacy of a search warrant. This conclusion is bolstered by the examples included
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in the commentary of instances where this enhancement would not be appropriate. See
id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.5. Confronting a judge who authorized a search warrant more closely
resembles the types of acts deemed sufficiently obstructive to warrant a § 3C1.1
enhancement, than those the commentary deems insufficient to warrant the two-level
increase. Compare id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4, with id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.5.
In addition, even were we to take the more stilted view that Judd proposes and
construe § 3C1.1 as only applying to traditional criminal trial witnesses, it is entirely
conceivable that a judge who authorized a search warrant could be called as a witness.
See, e.g.,United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1355-56 (10th Cir. 1982) (noting state
judge’s testimony at a hearing on a motion to suppress the warrant issued by that state
judge). While we recognize that such a step may be unusual, in certain instances it may
be entirely appropriate, including cases, such as this one, where the authenticity of a
judge’s signature on a warrant is at issue.
Judd contends that he could not have included any evidence of defects in the
search warrant as part of a motion to suppress because the time for filing pre-trial motions
had lapsed. He reasons that because this deadline had passed, any evidence obtained
from Judge Heaton related to the legitimacy of the warrant would not have been available
to him at trial, and Judge Heaton could therefore not have been a witness. This view
ignores that had he discovered such a defect, he could have requested leave to reopen the
pre-trial motion deadline. By no means was the legitimacy of the warrant beyond any
challenge at the time of his conversation with Judge Heaton.
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Judd’s final argument is that his statements to Judge Heaton were protected by the
First Amendment, and that the enhancement may not therefore be applied because the
provision “is not intended to punish a defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right.”
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.2. The district court rejected this argument, saying “there may
be protected speech here to some degree; but what I am saying is the totality of all that
occurred on that occasion and the judge’s action, it is the court’s finding that there – the
conduct was – rose to the level of threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully
influencing.” Aplt. App’x at 38-39.
“The protections afforded by the First Amendment . . . are not absolute,” Virginia
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003), and the government remains free to punish a “true
threat.” Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). “A ‘true threat’
means ‘a serious threat as distinguished from words as mere political argument, idle talk,
or jest.’” United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 395 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting United
States v. Leaverton, 835 F.2d 254, 257 (10th Cir. 1987)). “The speaker need not actually
intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats protects individuals
from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to
protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.” Black,
538 U.S. at 359-60. “[E]vidence of a recipient’s response is relevant to whether a true
threat exists.” United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1311 (10th Cir. 2001).
We agree that punishing Judd for his conduct at Judge Heaton’s home did not
violate the First Amendment. There is “no First Amendment right to make intimidating
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threats against government witnesses.” United States v. Jackson, 974 F.2d 104, 106 (9th
Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Shoulberg, 895 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990)).
Approaching a judge’s home demanding potentially exculpatory evidence has the clear
effects of intimidation and apprehension of violent reprisal. While it gives us pause that a
precise description of the exact words exchanged between Judd and Judge Heaton does
not appear in the record, the context of the discussion, Judge Heaton’s decision to seek
police intervention, and the fact that the conversation left him “somewhat fearful” leaves
us satisfied that Judd’s statements did not constitute protected First Amendment speech.
Judd’s First Amendment claim is further undermined by the fact the enhancement
related to a conversation that occurred on Judge Heaton’s private property after the judge
requested he leave. The First Amendment does not protect a person’s right to speak
whenever and wherever they please. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942). The Supreme Court “has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited
guest may exercise general rights of free speech on property privately owned and used
nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.” Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568
(1972). We have previously noted in a related situation that when determining whether a
limitation on speech is reasonable, “[t]he balancing of competing rights generally has
resulted in a determination that the privacy of the individual householder, even that of a
public official, is entitled to protection.” Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 544 (10th Cir.
1974). Judge Heaton’s home cannot reasonably be characterized as either a public forum
or private land generally open to the public. We therefore find dubious Judd’s claim that
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the First Amendment protects his expression at Judge Heaton’s private home against the
judge’s consent. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 n.4 (1980)
(Powell, J., concurring) (“[A] law that required homeowners to permit speakers to
congregate on their front lawns would be a massive and possibly unconstitutional
intrusion into personal privacy and freedom of belief.”); Rown v. Post Office Dep’t, 397
U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970) (declaring that the right to be free from unwanted mail at a
private home outweighs the right to send mail to a private home because “[t]o hold less
would tend to license a form of trespass”); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 202 (1961)
(The right to freedom of speech “would surely not encompass verbal expression in a
private home if the owner has not consented.”).
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the district court.
Entered for the Court,
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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