United States v. Bustamante-Conchas

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 7, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-2003
(D.C. No. 1:13-CR-02028-JAP-2)
MIGUEL BUSTAMANTE-CONCHAS, (D. N.M.)
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before HARTZ, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
The government appeals the district court’s order releasing Miguel
Bustamante-Conchas (“Bustamante”) into the custody of a halfway house while he
awaits trial. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c),
and we affirm.
*
This panel has determined that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment
is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. BACKGROUND
Bustamante was arrested in June 2013 for conspiracy to distribute 100 grams
or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Following his arraignment, and
after gathering information about him, Pretrial Services recommended he be released
from pretrial detention to a halfway house under strict conditions. However,
applying the presumption in favor of detention, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A), the
magistrate judge decided against that recommendation and ordered Bustamante
detained.
Six months later, in December 2013, Bustamante appealed the magistrate
judge’s detention order to the district court. The court held a hearing, during which
the parties proffered their positions but no testimony was given. Following the
hearing, the district court granted Bustamante pretrial release to a halfway house with
several conditions, including being kept on lockdown, tracked by GPS, restricted to
no cell phone access, and limited to landline access for calls with his attorney only.
In its decision, the court first applied the statutory presumption in favor of
detention pursuant to § 3142(e)(3)(A). The court concluded that Bustamante
overcame this presumption, however, by finding: (1) he had no criminal history;
(2) he has lived in the United States since 2007 and attained permanent resident
status in 2012, which required careful vetting by the U.S. government; (3) he is
married to a U.S. citizen; (4) there is no indication he has used illegal drugs or is on
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prescription drugs; and (5) he operated an active business buying, repairing, and
selling cars, earning approximately $5,000 per month.
The court then proceeded to evaluate the four factors outlined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(g) to decide whether there were conditions of release that would reasonably
assure Bustamante’s appearance in court and the safety of the community: (1) the
nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the weight of evidence against the
defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (4) the nature and
seriousness of the danger the defendant would present to the community if released.
Under the first factor, the court found that the offense charged was conspiracy
to distribute large amounts of heroin, but that there was no evidence of violence or
that Bustamante possessed a weapon. Under the second factor, the court found there
was substantial circumstantial evidence, but no direct evidence, that Bustamante was
involved in the heroin distribution enterprise. Under the third factor, the court found
that Bustamante has no prior criminal history, has substantial family ties to the
United States, had continuous employment before his arrest, has resided in
Albuquerque for seven years, and has not abused drugs or alcohol. Finally, under the
fourth factor, the court took note of the government’s “understandable” concern that
Bustamante was allegedly the organizer and leader of the heroin distribution
enterprise, thus creating a danger to the community if released because he could
continue to direct the enterprise’s operations. Aplt. App. Vol. I at 25.
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Based on the record, the court found the government had established by a
preponderance of the evidence that Bustamante was a flight risk because of his ties to
Mexico, where his adult children live and where he traveled frequently in the year
prior to his arrest. The court also found the government had established by clear and
convincing evidence that Bustamante was a danger to the community if released “on
other than highly restrictive conditions” because of his alleged role in the criminal
enterprise. Id.; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 616 (10th Cir.
2003) (“[T]he government must prove risk of flight by a preponderance of the
evidence and it must prove dangerousness . . . by clear and convincing evidence.”).
However, the court was satisfied that the halfway house, combined with additional
conditions, would sufficiently alleviate the risk of flight or danger to the community.
Lastly, the district court discussed Bustamante’s length of detention as an
additional factor in its decision. The court expressed concern over the fact that he
will have been detained for over a year before his trial, and emphasized that the
government’s failure to produce discovery “in a useful, meaningful manner” was
largely to blame for the delay. Aplt. App. Vol. I at 26. This, the court found,
implicated potential due process concerns. The court therefore granted Bustamante
pretrial release to a halfway house with restrictive conditions. The government then
moved to stay Bustamante’s release, which we granted pending the outcome of this
appeal.
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II. DISCUSSION
We review mixed questions of law and fact de novo but review the district
court’s underlying findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Cisneros,
328 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 2003). The district court’s ultimate pretrial release
decision is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. Id.A defendant cannot be detained pending trial unless the court finds that no
conditions, or combination of conditions, will reasonably assure the appearance of
the person and the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142. Generally, courts
apply a presumption in favor of pretrial release. Id. § 3142(b). But there is a
presumption in favor of detention—i.e., that no conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the defendant and the safety of the community—when a defendant is
charged with a drug offense which the court finds is supported by probable cause and
for which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten years or more, as Bustamante
has been in this case. See id. § 3142(e)(3)(A).
Once the presumption is invoked, the burden of production shifts to the
defendant. United States v. Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1354-55 (10th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam). Nevertheless, the burden of persuasion always remains on the
government to establish that the defendant should be detained as a flight risk and a
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danger to the community. Id. In deciding whether this is so, the district court is
required to consider the four factors outlined in § 3142(g).1
Because the district court found there was probable cause to believe
Bustamante committed an offense for which a term of imprisonment of 10 or more
years is prescribed, a rebuttable presumption arises that no conditions assure his
appearance in court and the safety of the community. But Bustamante overcame this
presumption by producing evidence of his lack of criminal history, his permanent
resident status in the U.S., and his family ties to the U.S. See Stricklin, 932 F.2d
at 1355 (“The defendant’s burden of production is not heavy, but some evidence must
be produced.”).
The government contends, however, that contrary to the district court’s
conclusion there are no conditions that will reasonably assure Bustamante’s
appearance and the safety of the community. The government makes several
allegations that the conditions the district court imposed on Bustamante are
insufficient. For example, the government contends that Bustamante would remain a
danger to the community because he frequently used the telephone to direct the
activities of the heroin distribution enterprise. It claims the district court’s restriction
1
We note that our review is limited to the assertions alleged by each of the
parties without the benefit of testimony or evidence. A more fully developed record
would have made our task of assessing Bustamante’s risk of flight and danger to the
community under the conditions imposed far easier. In particular, testimony from
Pretrial Services regarding why it believed the arrangements at the halfway house
were adequate safeguards would have been especially useful to our review.
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on Bustamante using cell phones or a landline other than to call his attorney are
impractical and would allow him to continue his criminal operations. In support of
this claim, the government argues that other halfway house residents are allowed to
use cell phones and that the staff does not monitor their use. Thus, the government
asserts that Bustamante would be able to use other residents’ cell phones or employ
other residents to do his bidding.
We are not convinced by the government’s allegations that the conditions the
district court imposed on Bustamante will not reasonably assure the safety of the
community. The district court ordered, consistent with Pretrial Services’ previous
recommendation based on its investigation, that Bustamante be released with
considerable restrictions on his movement and communications. The district court
added further conditions—that Pretrial Services did not recommend—by absolutely
restricting Bustamante from using any kind of telephone except to call his attorney.
While each resident’s cell phone may not be monitored, there is no evidence the
halfway house is inadequately staffed with people to oversee Bustamante’s activities
in general. And the landline phone is indeed monitored. We thus conclude the
government has not demonstrated the need for pretrial detention in order to safeguard
the community.
Nor has the government shown that the conditions the district court imposed
on Bustamante will not alleviate his risk of flight. The government argues that
because the doors to the halfway house are often unlocked and are not guarded by
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armed security—though staff members are stationed there—the conditions of the
halfway house allow for an easy escape. The government also claims that the GPS
devices used at the halfway house are easily removed with scissors or a knife. It
further notes that five residents have absconded within the last year, though the
government did not say whether those absconders had GPS devices or were on
lockdown (or both). The government thus contends that given the ease with which
Bustamante could escape and the fact that the halfway house is only a four-hour drive
to Mexico, combined with the serious nature of the charges against him, the
conditions at the halfway house do not adequately protect against his risk of flight.
While we agree Bustamante presents a flight risk, the government supports its
claim that the restrictive conditions in the halfway house are insufficient by
identifying characteristics of the house and speculating on scenarios that could
conceivably occur. The government does not address the fact that if Bustamante
were to succeed in cutting off his GPS monitor, authorities would be notified
immediately. The government does not assert that anyone in the halfway house
under 24-hour lockdown with a GPS monitor has failed to appear for court. And yet
it is the government that bears the burden of persuasion to show that those conditions
cannot reasonably assure Bustamante’s appearance in court. Between the lockdown
and GPS monitoring, the conditions the district court imposed on Bustamante are
unquestionably rigorous to protect against his risk of flight. If effective, such
conditions would reasonably assure his appearance. We are not convinced the
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government’s proffers are enough to carry its burden of showing that those
conditions would be ineffective.
In sum, it is evident that the district court considered all of the factors relevant
to pretrial release decisions listed in § 3142(g), received proffers as to those factors
listed in § 3142(g)(3)(A), and appropriately weighed them against the remaining
factors in favor of Bustamante’s release, subject to various conditions. We conclude
the district court did not err in releasing Bustamante to a halfway house under the
restrictive conditions it imposed.
Accordingly, the district court’s pretrial release order is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam
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No. 14-2003, United States v. Bustamante-Conchas
HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I join the order and judgment. I add only one comment. Even if our review is
de novo, it is appropriate to defer to fact-finding by the district court. It is important
to me that the district court credited the expert opinion of Pretrial Services regarding
the adequacy of the conditions at the halfway house.
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