Crabtree v. State of Oklahoma

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 25, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
CHARLES E. CRABTREE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 13-5153
(D.C. No. 4:13-CV-00688-JED-TLW)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA; (N.D. Okla.)
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES; PAMELA BEARD;
DEBBIE ANN FLEAK; KATHLEEN
MRASEK; TULSA COUNTY POLICE
DEPARTMENT, Detective’s Division;
JOHN PRIDDY; DANA BOGIE;
TULSA COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before GORSUCH, MURPHY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
After his conviction for sexually abusing two children Charles Crabtree
brought this federal civil rights suit against Oklahoma and several of its officials.
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, all in
violation of his constitutionally protected civil rights, Mr. Crabtree asked the
district court to release him from prison, award $15 million in compensatory
damages, and provide punitive damages besides. The district court saw no claim
on which relief could be granted and dismissed his case. After careful review, we
find no legal error lurking in that disposition.
The first difficulty Mr. Crabtree faces is that the statute he invokes, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, doesn’t provide the first remedy he seeks. Hastened release from
state prison can be secured in court only through a writ of habeas corpus, not
through a civil rights action. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973);
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). Because Mr. Crabtree’s complaint
did not make any claim for habeas relief, the district court rightly found itself
powerless to order his immediate release from custody. The court was also right
not to construe Mr. Crabtree’s complaint as a habeas petition. Even though courts
owe a liberal construction to pro se pleadings like Mr. Crabtree’s, that obligation
generally doesn’t require courts to characterize civil rights claims as habeas
claims. In fact, courts possess only limited authority to reinterpret civil rights
claims that way. See Davis v. Roberts, 425 F.3d 830, 834-35 (10th Cir. 2005).
Neither does Mr. Crabtree ask us in this appeal to read his complaint as raising
anything other than civil rights claims.
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That brings us to Mr. Crabtree’s second problem. Under Heck v.
Humphrey, courts cannot award monetary damages for § 1983 civil rights
violations when doing so “would necessarily imply the invalidity of [a prisoner’s]
conviction or sentence” and the prisoner has not demonstrated “that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).
In this case, the district court thought granting Mr. Crabtree’s requested damages
would do just that. After all, the crux of Mr. Crabtree’s claims is that prosecutors
and other state officials unlawfully conspired to introduce false testimony and
secure a guilty verdict in his criminal case. This court has routinely said false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims along these lines implicate Heck
by implying the claimant’s conviction is unlawful. See, e.g., Wilkins v. DeReyes,
528 F.3d 790, 801 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2008); Gradle v. Oklahoma, 203 F. App’x
179, 183 (10th Cir. 2006). The reason for that, of course, is that “a conviction
obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and
must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony
could have affected the judgment of the jury.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 103 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
It’s true though that successful false arrest claims don’t always imply the
invalidity of the claimant’s conviction. Many unlawfully arrested defendants still
can be duly convicted of their crimes — even when their unlawful arrests lead to
illegally obtained inculpatory evidence used at trial. See Beck v. City of
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Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 558 (10th Cir. 1999). But although Mr.
Crabtree nominally raises a false arrest claim, his complaint doesn’t seem to make
any allegations beyond those that underlie his false imprisonment and malicious
prosecution claims. Indeed, his false arrest claim is premised on the same
accusations as these others: principally, that state officials knowingly relied on
perjured testimony to convict him of a crime he insists never happened. As we
have seen, if that’s true his conviction cannot stand. The district court was
therefore right to find Mr. Crabtree’s claims all barred by Heck. Cf. Jackson v.
Loftis, 189 F. App’x 775, 779 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006) (suggesting, without holding,
that a false arrest claim alleging “arrest was improper because [the prisoner] had
not committed the alleged offenses . . . may be the exceptional false arrest case
that satisfies the ‘necessarily called into doubt’ condition for invoking Heck”).
Mr. Crabtree doesn’t venture any argument that the district court erred in
finding his claims barred by Heck. He doesn’t insist, for example, that any of his
claims fall outside Heck’s restrictions because he could succeed on them without
implying his conviction’s invalidity. He doesn’t purport to be excepted from the
Heck doctrine because he’s had no real opportunity to pursue habeas relief. Cf.
Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1317 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[A] petitioner who
has no available remedy in habeas, through no lack of diligence on his part, is not
barred by Heck from pursuing a § 1983 claim.”). Neither does he maintain that
his conviction and sentence in fact have been “reversed on direct appeal,
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expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . . , or called
into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512
U.S. at 487. Before us, he doesn’t mention the district court’s Heck holding at
all.
Instead, Mr. Crabtree tells us the district court erred in a different way.
Aside from dismissing his claims without prejudice because of Heck, the district
court additionally dismissed his claims against a couple of the defendants with
prejudice because, as prosecutors, they stand immune from tort liability arising
from their performance of the prosecutorial role. Mr. Crabtree argues these
defendants’ immunity should be held forfeit because they knew they were
violating his rights. But the authorities he cites to support his position address
qualified immunity, and the immunity enjoyed by prosecutors who’ve knowingly
put on perjured testimony remains absolute. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 430-31 & n.34 (1976); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484-87 (1991). As a
result, the district court was right to hold the prosecutors in this case immune
from civil suit.
Separately, Mr. Crabtree argues that he received inadequate process in this
case because the district court dismissed his complaint without waiting for a
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (despite the fact that the district
court docket indicates the case was referred to one), and more generally because
the district court afforded him insufficient opportunity to make his case. But a
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civil rights claimant is not entitled to process before a magistrate judge when,
taking his factual allegations as true, his complaint still raises no legal claim that
would support relief. To the contrary, district courts are required by statute to
screen prisoner claims against governmental employees and to dismiss any such
claims that aren’t a sound basis for legal relief — “before docketing, if feasible
or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),
(b); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 213-16 (2007). That’s exactly what the
district court did here. And because Mr. Crabtree indeed cannot obtain relief on
the claims he has brought even if his factual allegations should prove true, the
district court was right to do as it did.
Because the district court ultimately dismissed Mr. Crabtree’s complaint
for failing to state a claim on which relief could be granted, that dismissal counts
as a strike for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g); Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1177 (10th Cir.
2011). Because Mr. Crabtree’s arguments for reversal are wholly meritless and
don’t even address much of the district court’s reasoning, we dismiss his appeal
as frivolous and assess a second strike. See Jennings v. Natrona Cnty. Det. Ctr.
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Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Standifird, 400 F.
App’x 369, 371 (10th Cir. 2010). We further deny Mr. Crabtree’s motion to
proceed in this appeal without prepayment of fees and direct him to pay the
unpaid balance of the filing fee.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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