Fuller v. State of Kansas

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 22, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JOE FLOYD FULLER, SR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 08-3296
(D.C. No. 5:08-CV-03204-SAC)
STATE OF KANSAS; JOHNSON (D. Kan.)
COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE; JOHNSON COUNTY
DISTRICT COURT,
Respondents-Appellees.
JOE FLOYD FULLER, SR.;
EUGENE KELTNER,
Petitioners-Appellants,
and
JOHN WILSON, No. 08-3305
(D.C. No. 5:08-CV-03172-RDR)
Petitioner, (D. Kan.)
v.
FRANK DENNING,
Respondent-Appellee.
JOE FLOYD FULLER, SR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
No. 08-3322
STATE OF KANSAS; JOHN (D.C. No. 5:08-CV-03155-SAC)
ANDERSON, III, Judge; S. TATUM, (D. Kan.)
Judge; P. RUDDICK, Judge,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before TACHA, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges. **
This case involves three pro se appeals that we consolidate for procedural
purposes only. In each appeal, Joe Floyd Fuller, Sr., a pretrial detainee in El
Dorado Correctional Facility in Kansas, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA)
to challenge the district court’s dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867, 869
(10th Cir. 2000). Because “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling[s],” in any of the
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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three appeals, we deny Mr. Fuller’s requests for a COA and dismiss all three
appeals. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
BACKGROUND
In the § 2241 petition underlying appeal number 08-3296, Mr. Fuller claims
his pretrial detention on pending Kansas state criminal charges violates the
Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial. Specifically, in
his August 2008 petition, he asserts that he has been awaiting trial since his
December 24, 2007, arrest. The district court dismissed the petition without
prejudice based on the doctrine enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54
(1971). The court also concluded that Mr. Fuller had failed to exhaust his state
remedies. He now seeks a COA from this court, contending that he is still
awaiting trial, that the federal district court is “protecting Johnson County
Kansas,” and that he has tried to exhaust his state remedies. Appeal No. 08-3296,
Application for COA at 3.
In the § 2241 petition underlying appeal number 08-3305, Mr. Fuller, on
behalf of himself and two other pretrial detainees (“petitioners”), challenges the
conditions of petitioners’ pretrial confinement, alleging that they have not
violated any rules but are housed in administrative segregation and/or solitary
confinement, and that they are denied access to television, media, games, and
communication. He submits that these conditions constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment and violate petitioners’ Fourteenth
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Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the petition without
prejudice, concluding that petitioners’ allegations should be raised pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 by each individual in separate actions. Mr. Fuller now seeks a
COA from this court (apparently on behalf of himself and the two other pretrial
detainees identified in his § 2241 petition). In his application for a COA he
maintains that petitioners’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights are being
violated, takes issue with the district court’s determination that petitioners’ claims
sound in civil rights not in habeas, and asserts that the federal district court is
“protecting Johnson county Kansas’s Judicial System as well as the Sheriff’s
Department.” Appeal No. 08-3305, Application for COA at 3.
In the § 2241 petition underlying appeal number 08-3322, Mr. Fuller claims
his pretrial detention on pending Kansas state criminal charges violates the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, in his June 2008 petition, he asserts
that he has been in state custody since December 24, 2007, but has not been
afforded a “probable cause or preliminary hearing.” Appeal No. 08-3322, R.,
Doc. 1 at 3. His pretrial detention, he further explains, “has imperiled [his]
Social Security Benefits, Physical Rehabilitation, other source[s] of income, and
impaired family relationships.” Id. The district court dismissed the petition
without prejudice, concluding that Mr. Fuller’s pursuit of federal habeas relief
was premature because he had neither exhausted his state remedies nor
demonstrated that state remedies were unavailable or ineffective to address his
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claims. Mr. Fuller then filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration,
contending that he tried to exhaust available state court remedies, which the
district court denied. Mr. Fuller now seeks a COA from this court, asserting that
his First Amendment rights have been violated, that his Fourth Amendment rights
are being violated, that “[t]he [federal] district [court] should have intervened
once [the Rule] (60)(b) was filed,” and that “the District Court of Kansas has
some kind [of] tie with Johnson County Kansas” and “protect[s] them [sic].”
Appeal No. 08-3322, Application for COA at 3. 1
DISCUSSION
A COA may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where, as here, the
district court resolves a habeas petition on procedural grounds, “a COA should
issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
1
Mr. Fuller’s allegation that his First Amendment rights have been violated
is raised for the first time on appeal. Although we have “discretion to consider
arguments raised for the first time on appeal, we decline to do so in this case.”
Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d
1045, 1051 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Likewise, we will not consider
the district court’s denial of Mr. Fuller’s Rule 60(b) motion because, even though
he mentions it in his application for a COA and appellate brief, he “does not
address the issue, so we consider it waived.” Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ.,
975 F.2d 1555, 1558 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992), modified on other grounds on reh’g,
995 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104
(10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are
. . . inadequately presented[] in an appellant’s opening brief.”).
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right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. We review de novo
a district court’s decision to abstain pursuant to Younger. Roe No. 2 v. Ogden,
253 F.3d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 2001). Based on our independent review of
Mr. Fuller’s COA applications and appellate briefs, the district court’s orders, and
the records on appeal, and affording solicitous construction to Mr. Fuller’s pro se
filings, see Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007), we
conclude that he has not demonstrated “that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling[s].”
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Specifically, with respect to the § 2241 petition underlying appeal number
08-3296, reasonable jurists could not debate the federal district court’s
determination that Younger mandates abstention. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 46(explaining that federal courts should ordinarily refrain from interfering in
ongoing state criminal proceedings, absent “irreparable injury” that “is both great
and immediate”).
Likewise, with respect to the § 2241 petition underlying appeal number
08-3305, reasonable jurists could not debate the federal district court’s
determination that petitioners’ allegations should be raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 by each individual in separate actions. See Rael v. Williams, 223 F.3d
1153, 1154 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the Supreme Court “has
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distinguished between habeas actions and those challenging conditions of
confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” leading us to recognize that “federal claims
challenging . . . conditions of . . . confinement generally do not arise under
§ 2241”); Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir.
2000) (observing that “[a] litigant may bring his own claims to federal court
without counsel, but not the claims of others”).
Finally, with respect to the § 2241 petition underlying appeal number
08-3322, reasonable jurists could not debate the federal district court’s
determination that Mr. Fuller’s petition should be dismissed for failure to satisfy
the exhaustion requirement. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)
(“[A] state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies
before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”); Capps v.
Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 354 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (“No statutory exhaustion
requirement applies to § 2241, but case law holds . . . [that] federal courts should
abstain from the exercise of . . . jurisdiction if the issues raised in the petition
may be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state court or by other state
procedures available to the petitioner.” (quotation omitted)).
CONCLUSION
Mr. Fuller’s requests for certificates of appealability are DENIED and
appeal numbers 08-3296, 08-3305, and 08-3322, are DISMISSED. His motion for
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leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees, in appeal number
08-3322, is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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