United States v. Benitez-Diaz

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 8, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 08-3000
CAMILO BENITEZ-DIAZ, also (D.C. No. 6:07-CR-10084-WEB-1)
known as Orlando Sausedo-Ramoz, (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, BALDOCK and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Camilo Benitez-Diaz pled guilty to distributing methamphetamine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c). He now appeals,
alleging various errors committed by the district court at his plea colloquy and
sentencing hearing, as well as the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. In
response, the Government requests that we enforce a waiver of appeal included in
Defendant’s plea agreement. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
enforce the waiver in part and remand for resentencing.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
I.
In April 2007, Defendant was charged with four counts of distributing
methamphetamine. In exchange for Defendant’s guilty plea, the Government agreed
to drop the first count in the indictment. In so doing, Defendant admitted to
knowingly distributing approximately 28 grams of methamphetamine to an
undercover FBI agent on three separate occasions in 2006.
On August 28, 2007, the district court conducted Defendant’s plea colloquy.
During the colloquy, the district court erroneously described the charges against
Defendant as “possesse[ing]” methamphetamine “with the intent to distribute.”
(emphasis added). In fact, each count in the indictment charged Defendant with
“knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully distribut[ing] approximately 28 grams of
. . . methamphetamine.” (emphasis added). Neither the Government nor defense
counsel corrected the district court’s mistake. Also at the colloquy, the district court
asked Defendant: “Do you understand by entering a free and voluntary plea of guilty
you may be giving up any right to challenge your conviction upon appeal?”
(emphasis added). Defendant answered “yes” to the district court’s inquiry. In fact,
the waiver in the plea agreement was much broader than the district court’s
description—providing that Defendant waived his “right to appeal or collaterally
attack any matter in connection with [his] prosecution, conviction and sentence.”
(emphasis added). Again, neither the Government nor defense counsel corrected the
2
district court’s misstatement. At the conclusion of the colloquy, the district court
accepted Defendant’s guilty plea. On November 9, 2007, the district court sentenced
Defendant to 108 months imprisonment.
Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the plea agreement is invalid because the
district court misstated the elements of the charged offenses during the plea
colloquy, (2) the district court erred by not allowing allocution for Defendant during
sentencing, (3) the district court erred by failing to verify that Defendant and his
counsel read and discussed the Presentence Report prior to the sentencing hearing,
and (4) his trial counsel was ineffective. Following Defendant’s appeal, the
Government filed a motion before this Court to enforce Defendant’s appellate
waiver. See Fed. R. App. P. 27 and 10th Cir. Rule 27.2(A)(1)(d). We first hold that
the district court’s comments during the colloquy narrowed the scope of the waiver.
We then grant in part the Government’s motion to enforce the appellate waiver.
Finally, we remand for proper allocution.
II.
A defendant can forfeit the right of appeal if he waives that right in an
enforceable plea agreement. See United States v. Smith, 500 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th
Cir. 2007). We assess the validity of such appellate waivers under the three-pronged
analysis set forth in United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en
banc). Accordingly, we must determine (1) whether the disputed appeal falls within
the scope of the appeal waiver, (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
3
waived his right to appeal, and (3) whether enforcement of the waiver would result
in a miscarriage of justice. See id.A.
Under the first prong articulated in Hahn, we strictly construe appellate
waivers—resolving any ambiguity in scope in favor of a defendant’s appellate rights.
See id. Moreover, we interpret the waiver according to contract principles and what
the defendant would have reasonably understood when he entered the plea
agreement. See United States v. Arevalo-Jimenez, 372 F.3d 1204, 1206 (10th Cir.
2004).
Here, Defendant agreed to a very broad waiver of his appellate rights. The
plea agreement states:
Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to appeal
or collaterally attack any matter in connection with this
prosecution, conviction and sentence. . . . By entering into this
agreement, the defendant knowingly waives any right to file and
pursue an appeal of a sentence imposed which is within the
guideline range determined appropriate by the court. The
defendant also waives any right to challenge a sentence or
otherwise attempt to modify or change his sentence in a manner
in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but
not limited to, a motion brought under Title 28, U.S.C. § 2255
[except as limited by United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179,
1187 (10th Cir. 2001)], a motion brought under Title 18, U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) and a motion brought under Fed. Rule of Civ. Pro.
60(b).
Defendant seemingly recognizes that his entire appeal falls within the scope of the
plain language of the plea agreement. He argues, however, that the district court
4
narrowed the scope of the waiver at the plea colloquy in stating: “Do you understand
by entering a free and voluntary plea of guilty you may be giving up any right to
challenge your conviction upon appeal?” (emphasis added). Specifically, Defendant
contends that because the district court only mentioned the right to appeal his
conviction, he is entitled to appeal his sentence.
As noted, the plain language of the plea agreement is quite clear that the
waiver includes Defendant’s right to appeal his sentence. District courts, however,
are required to “inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant
understands . . . the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to
appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N). The
district court’s description of the appellate waiver at the colloquy is decidedly
narrower than the waiver in the plea agreement. The question before us, therefore,
is whether the district court’s mistake created an ambiguity in the waiver’s scope.
Generally, an ambiguity which might negate a defendant’s prior written waiver
will not arise when a district court’s comments follow the signing and entry of a plea
agreement. See Smith, 500 F.3d at 1211; United States v. Wilken, 498 F.3d 1160,
1167 (10th Cir. 2007); Arevalo-Jimenez, 372 F.3d at 1206. In Wilken, however, we
concluded that an ambiguity may be sufficient to invalidate a waiver if the district
court’s mischaracterization occurs just prior to signing the plea agreement. 498 F.3d
at 1168. In that case, the district court’s description of the waiver at the
colloquy—immediately before the defendant signed the plea agreement and entered
5
his plea—was narrower than the extent to which the defendant waived the right to
appeal his sentence in the plea agreement. See id. We reasoned the defendant
“could not be faulted for relying upon the court’s explanation, rather than his own
understanding, as the definitive construction of the agreement he would almost
immediately sign.” Id. Because no clarification was provided for the defendant, nor
an opportunity for defense counsel to clear up the mistake, we held that the waiver
was ambiguous at the time of signing. Id. Ultimately, we resolved the ambiguity in
favor of the defendant and allowed him to appeal his sentence. See id. at 1169.
Defendant signed the plea agreement the same day as the colloquy, but we
cannot discern from the record whether it was signed immediately before or after the
colloquy. We must, therefore, give Defendant the benefit of the doubt and assume
the agreement was signed just after the colloquy. See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325(noting any ambiguities in determining the waiver’s scope must be resolved in favor
of the defendant). As in Wilken, we are left with the broad language in the
agreement on the one hand, and the later, narrowing language of the district court on
the other hand. As a result, we must strictly construe the scope of the waiver and
resolve the resulting ambiguity in favor of Defendant. Wilken, 498 F.3d at 1168-69;
Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. Accordingly, we conclude that challenges to Defendant’s
conviction are within the scope of the waiver, but not those matters concerning his
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sentence. 1 Before we address the merits of Defendant’s sentencing appeal, however,
we must return to our Hahn inquiry and determine whether to enforce the waiver in
connection with Defendant’s remaining two arguments, i.e., (1) the plea agreement
is invalid because the district court misstated the elements of the charged offenses
during the plea colloquy, and (2) Defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective. 2
B.
Under the second prong of Hahn, we are required to “ascertain whether the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights.” Id. Two factors
are central to this analysis: (1) the language of the plea agreement, and (2) an
adequate colloquy under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. See id. Defendant
bears the burden of demonstrating that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary.
See United States v. Ibarra-Coronel, 517 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2008).
As previously noted, the language of the plea agreement is very clear
regarding Defendant’s waiver. In the agreement, Defendant swears that he “had
sufficient time to discuss the case, the evidence, and this agreement with [his]
1
We emphasize the scope of the waiver must be determined on a case-by-
case basis and is heavily dependent on the particular facts found in the record.
We also note that if the Government or defense counsel clarified the waiver’s
scope at the colloquy or sometime prior to the signing of the agreement, any
potential ambiguity would have been removed. See Wilken, 498 F.3d at 1168.
2
Our remaining analysis—the knowing and voluntary nature of the waiver
(Hahn’s second prong) and whether the waiver would result in a miscarriage of
justice (Hahn’s third prong)—only pertains to the waiver of Defendant’s right to
appeal matters in connection with his conviction.
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attorney and [he] is fully satisfied with the advice and representation provided by
[his] counsel.” Moreover, Defendant “acknowledge[d] that he has read the plea
agreement, understands it and agrees it is true and accurate” and that he “enter[ed]
into this agreement and is pleading guilty because [he] is guilty and is doing so
freely and voluntarily.” Thus, the language of the agreement itself does not raise any
concerns about the knowing and voluntary nature of Defendant’s waiver.
Likewise, the Rule 11 colloquy was adequate. First, Defendant stated that he
understood by entering a guilty plea he would be giving up the right to challenge his
conviction on appeal. Second, Defendant informed the district court that his guilty
plea was the result of the plea agreement, and he swore that he read, understood, and
discussed the plea agreement with his attorney. Finally, Defendant’s counsel
confirmed at the colloquy that Defendant “understands he is waiving his right to
appeal and collateral attack by entering into this plea.” Defendant, nevertheless,
argues the waiver was not knowing and voluntary because the district court misstated
the elements of the charged offenses. We disagree.
First, the district court’s misstatement regarding the charges against Defendant
does not, by itself, invalidate the waiver. See Smith, 500 F.3d at 1213 (noting that
a separate aspect of the proceeding in which the district court commits legal error
does not invalidate a waiver). Thus, allowing the district court’s error in describing
the charged offenses to “render [the] waiver unlawful would nullify the waiver based
on the very sort of claim it was intended to waive.” Id. “The essence of plea
8
agreements . . . is that they represent a bargained-for understanding between the
government and criminal defendants in which each side forgoes certain rights and
assumes certain risks in exchange for a degree of certainty as to the outcome of
criminal matters.” United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2005);
see also Ibarra-Coronel, 517 F.3d at 1220, 1223 (holding the district court’s
misstatement that the defendant’s maximum penalty was 120 months incarceration,
when in fact her minimum penalty was 120 months, did not make the waiver
unknowing and involuntary).
Second, even if the district court’s description of the charges applied to
Defendant’s waiver, the mistake did not render the waiver unknowing and
involuntary. Defendant relies on Hicks v. Franklin, 546 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2008),
for the proposition that we must invalidate the entire plea agreement, including the
waiver. In Hicks, we granted habeas relief to a defendant who previously pled guilty
to second degree murder. Because the trial court failed to explain to the defendant
that a “depraved mind” was an element of murder in the second degree, we held the
defendant’s guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. Id. at 1287. Hicks,
however, is readily distinguishable from this case.
In Hicks, our ruling was premised on the “clearly established . . . rule that a
defendant must receive notice of all critical elements of the charge to which he
pleads guilty.” Id. at 1284. This rule was particularly significant in Hicks because
the State orally amended the charged offense from first degree to second degree
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murder at the plea hearing. Id. at 1281. Thus, the only notice available to the
defendant regarding the new charge against him was the trial court’s description—a
description which “entirely omitt[ed] the fact that Oklahoma’s second degree murder
statute contain[ed] a mens rea element.” Id. at 1286.
In contrast, the charges against Defendant here were spelled out in the
indictment and the plea agreement. Both of these documents gave adequate written
notice of all the critical elements of the charged offenses. Additionally, prior to the
colloquy, Defendant signed a petition offering his “plea of ‘GUILTY’ with full
understanding of all the matters set forth in the Indictment and in this petition.”
Finally, Defendant attested at the colloquy that he understood all the charges set
forth against him in the indictment. Thus, unlike in Hicks, Defendant clearly had
notice of the elements of the charges against him. Accordingly, we conclude
Defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.
C.
The third prong of the Hahn analysis requires us to determine whether
enforcement of the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. 359 F.3d at 1327.
A miscarriage of justice occurs in one of four scenarios: (1) when the district court
relies on an impermissible factor such as race; (2) when ineffective assistance of
counsel underlies the negotiation of the waiver; (3) when the sentence exceeds the
statutory maximum; or (4) when the waiver is otherwise unlawful. See id. at 1327.
A waiver is otherwise unlawful when it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
10
public reputation of judicial proceedings. See id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
The district court did not rely on an impermissible factor and the sentence does
not exceed the statutory maximum. Defendant argues, however, that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating the appellate waiver. The rule is well
established, however, that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be raised
in a collateral proceeding. Porter, 405 F.3d at 1144; United States v. Galloway, 56
F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“Ineffective assistance of counsel
claims should be brought in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal.”). This
general “rule applies even where a defendant seeks to invalidate an appellate waiver
based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Porter, 405 F.3d at 1144. Thus, only
in rare instances will we address an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.
United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 869 (10th Cir. 2003). Neither the record, nor
Defendant’s brief, provide any reason to suggest this case qualifies as one of those
rare exceptions. Accordingly, we conclude Defendant must raise his ineffective
assistance claim in a collateral proceeding.
Defendant also argues the waiver is otherwise unlawful for the same reasons
discussed supra in Part II.B. Specifically, Defendant contends the district court’s
misstatement of the charged offenses seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and
reputation of judicial proceedings. We disagree. As already noted, the error did not
impact Defendant in any material way. Accordingly, we conclude the waiver would
11
not result in a miscarriage of justice. The Government’s motion to enforce the
waiver is, therefore, granted so far as it pertains to Defendant’s conviction.
III.
Having determined the appellate waiver does not cover challenges to
Defendant’s sentence, see supra Part II.A, we now turn to Defendant’s sentencing
appeal. Defendant contends the district court erred (1) by failing to provide an
opportunity for allocution at sentencing, and (2) by failing to verify that Defendant
and his counsel read and discussed the Presentence Report (PSR) prior to the
sentencing hearing.
A.
District courts are required to “address the defendant personally in order to
permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). This rule codifies the common law right of
allocution. See United States v. Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008). A
district court’s failure to comply with this rule is per se prejudicial and requires
remand. See id. at 1262. Defendant argues the district court did not provide an
opportunity for allocution. In response, the Government argues that the following
discourse at sentencing satisfied Rule 32:
THE COURT: Any Objection to the proposed sentence by
the Government?
THE GOVERNMENT: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: By the Defendant?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, sir.
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THE COURT: Did [Defendant] get the word, Ms. Rivera?
Any objection to the sentence?
DEFENDANT: No.
We agree with Defendant that this exchange does not meet Rule 32 requirements.
The district court merely asked Defendant whether he had any objection to the
proposed sentence. This question easily could have been interpreted as purely legal
in nature, or requiring a simple yes or no answer. Nowhere did the district court ask
Defendant to make a statement on his own behalf. 3 We acknowledge the district
court addressed Defendant personally (through his translator), as required by Rule
32. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). Moreover, we recognize a Defendant’s
right to allocution is not without limits. See United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018,
1025 (10th Cir. 1993). That said, for us to infer that Defendant realized this limited
inquiry also meant he was permitted to present information for the purpose of
mitigating his sentence requires a significant leap. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(i)(4)(A)(ii); see also Jarvi, 537 F.3d at 1261 (citing Green v. United States, 365
3
The Government argues this case is similar to Johnston v. United States,
303 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962), in which the district court asked the defendants:
“Is there any reason why sentence should not be imposed at this time that either
one of you have to present?” Id. at 344. While not a model allocution procedure,
the district court’s question in Johnston likely alerted the defendants of their
opportunity to say something on their behalf about the proposed sentences. In
contrast, the district court’s terse question here—“Any Objection to the proposed
sentence?”—leaves serious doubt as to whether Defendant understood his right to
allocution. See United States v. Gerrow, 232 F.3d 831, 833 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“The district court must clearly inform the defendant of his allocution rights,
leaving no room for doubt that the defendant has been issued a personal invitation
to speak prior to sentencing.”).
13
U.S. 301, 304 (1961)). Accordingly, we conclude Defendant was denied proper
allocution and we remand for resentencing. See id.B.
Defendant’s final argument is the district court erred by failing to verify that
he and his counsel read and discussed the PSR prior to the sentencing hearing, as
required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(A). See United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d
1173, 1179 (10th Cir. 2007). The Government concedes the district court did not
inquire whether Defendant and his attorney discussed the PSR. Because Defendant
did not object at sentencing, however, we review only for plain error. See United
States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 2008). To meet this standard,
Defendant must demonstrate (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) which affects Defendant’s
substantial rights, and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. See id.Defendant submits no argument that the district court’s error prejudiced him.
Under normal circumstances, that would be the end of the matter. See Romero, 491
F.3d at 1180 (noting remand will not be granted when a district court “fail[s] to
verify that the defendant had the opportunity to read and discuss the PSR” unless the
defendant can “demonstrate prejudice resulting from [the] . . . error”). Because we
are remanding for proper allocution, however, we will allow the district court to
address this issue on remand in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 32(i)(1)(A).
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IV.
We grant the Government’s motion to enforce the appellate waiver in part, and
DISMISS Defendant’s appeal as to his conviction. 4 However, because (1) the district
court narrowed the scope of Defendant’s waiver at the plea colloquy, and (2) the
district court committed prejudicial error during sentencing, we REMAND for
further proceedings consistent with this Order and Judgment. 5
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
United States Circuit Judge
4
We provide no opinion on the merit of Defendant’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, but note that he may pursue such a claim in a collateral
proceeding.
5
Following oral argument, Defendant filed an Unopposed Motion to
Correct His Briefs and Modify His Request for Relief. Specifically, Defendant
requested that—if we determined the district court committed reversible error
during the plea colloquy—we vacate the judgment against Defendant and allow
him the opportunity to withdraw his plea on remand. Because we only remand for
the limited purpose of correcting the district court’s sentencing error, and not for
reversible error at the plea colloquy, we deny Defendant’s motion as moot.
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