Yancey v. Bonner

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 21, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
CHRISTOPHER YANCEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-6220
(D.C. No. 5:08-CV-00539-C)
HONORABLE STEPHEN BONNER, (W.D. Okla.)
in his official capacity as Associate
District Judge of the 20th Judicial
District,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, BALDOCK, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Christopher Yancey appeals from a district court order applying
the Younger 1 abstention doctrine in dismissing his lawsuit against defendant
Stephen Bonner, an Oklahoma state court judge who presided over the contested
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
adoption of Yancey’s biological child. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and affirm.
Yancey, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Indian Nation of Oklahoma,
fathered a child out of wedlock with a non-Indian woman in 2002. Shortly after
the child was born, the mother relinquished her parental rights and placed the
child with non-Indian prospective adoptive parents. The mother requested a
judicial determination that the child was eligible for adoption by a non-Indian
family and without the consent of the father, Yancey. The state trial court
granted her request and terminated Yancey’s parental rights.
Yancey appealed this ruling, and, in December 2004, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court reversed the trial court. See In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099(Okla. 2004). The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the Indian Child Welfare
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (“ICWA”), 2 and its Oklahoma counterpart applied
to the adoption proceedings, and that there was insufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s finding that the child was eligible for adoption without Yancey’s
consent. 103 P.3d at 1108.
On remand, after a succession of petitions to terminate Yancey’s parental
2
The ICWA provides “minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian
children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or
adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.” 25 U.S.C.
§ 1902. Among other provisions, the ICWA gives preference, in the absence of
good cause shown, to members of the Indian child’s family, tribe, and other
Indian families in adoptive placement. Id. § 1915.
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rights and an intervening Oklahoma Supreme Court decision awarding the
prospective adoptive parents interim custody, the state trial court, on February 19,
2008, ruled the adoption could proceed without Yancey’s consent,
notwithstanding the mandates of the ICWA. On March 19, 2008, Yancey
appealed that decision to the Oklahoma Supreme Court and that appeal is still
pending. Yancey also filed this action in federal district court on May 20, 2008,
claiming the defendant’s rulings in the state adoption proceeding have deprived
him of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as the protections afforded by
the ICWA.
The defendant filed two motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6): the first motion was based on absolute immunity; the second, on
Younger abstention as the adoption proceeding was still ongoing. The district
court did not reach the immunity question, but rather concluded federal abstention
was appropriate in light of Yancey’s pending appeal before the Oklahoma
Supreme Court.
The district court applied the abstention standards set forth in Middlesex
County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982), 3 and
determined that the state appeal undoubtedly constituted an ongoing state judicial
3
Under Middlesex, “[b]efore a federal court abstains, it must determine that:
(1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the state proceedings implicate
important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate
opportunity to present the federal constitutional challenges.” Phelps v. Hamilton,
122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997).
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proceeding even though the state was not a party. It further explained that under
Tenth Circuit precedent, “‘adoption and child custody proceedings are an
especially delicate subject of state policy,’” even with respect to Indian children
whose placement is governed by the ICWA. Aplt. App’x at 100 (quoting Morrow
v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1393 (10th Cir. 1996)). Finally, the court concluded
Yancey had a sufficient opportunity to raise his federal claims in the state
proceeding, as evidenced by the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s explicit sanctioning
of his ICWA claim in his first appeal. Finding no applicable exception to the
Younger doctrine under the circumstances, the court concluded abstention was
warranted and dismissed Yancey’s action
Yancey raises one issue 4 on appeal: Whether the district court erred in
applying abstention when 25 U.S.C. § 1914 of the ICWA authorizes independent
federal review of state court decisions involving the ICWA. As regards the
question presented, the facts are not in dispute. This case turns on pure issues of
law, which we review de novo. Yellowbear v. Wyo. Atty. Gen., 525 F.3d 921,
923 (10th Cir. 2008)
Yancey appears to acknowledge that this case is governed by Morrow, but
he urges us to reject Morrow’s majority opinion in favor of the dissent, claiming
4
Yancey phrases this issue in three different ways: “1. Whether the Indian
Father has a right to have [a] state court adoption decision reviewed by the
federal court pursuant to Title 25 U.S.C. § 1914? 2. Whether the Trial Court
properly abstained? 3. Whether the Trial Court properly dismissed?” Aplt. Br.
at 1.
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it is particularly persuasive under the facts of his case. This we cannot do. “We
cannot overrule the judgment of another panel of this court. We are bound by the
precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary
decision by the Supreme Court.” In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam). In Morrow, a case with strikingly similar facts, we held that the
ICWA was not “intended to allow federal court interdiction of ongoing state
custody disputes involving Indian children.” 94 F.3d at 1395. Moreover, the
majority specifically rejected the dissent’s argument that § 1914 of the ICWA
authorizes federal court intervention in ongoing custody proceedings.
[W]e do not believe that preemptive federal collateral attacks, such
as Morrow’s, are what Congress intended to permit in § 1914.
Instead, we believe that § 1914 and related provisions of the ICWA
do not preclude our consideration of abstention.
Id. (footnote omitted).
This case is governed by Younger, Middlesex and Morrow, which mandate
abstention. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for substantially the
same reasons articulated in its memorandum opinion and order, dated
September 12, 2008.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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