Valenzuela v. Medina

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 7, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
RODNEY R. VALENZUELA,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 11-1480
v. (D.C. No. 1:10-CV-02681-WJM)
(D. Colo.)
ANGEL MEDINA, Warden, L.C.F.;
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Rodney Valenzuela, a state inmate proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) so that he may appeal the district court’s
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. Because Mr. Valenzuela has not “made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2), we deny his request for a COA and dismiss his appeal.
Background
Mr. Valenzuela was convicted by a Colorado jury of first-degree murder,
kidnapping, attempted robbery, and controlled substance distribution, and was
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 1 R. 5. On direct appeal, the
convictions were affirmed. People v. Valenzuela, No. 05CA1992 (Colo. Ct. App.
April 24, 2008), 1 R. 133. The Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari review.
1 R. 174. He then sought state post-conviction relief which was rejected. People
v. Valenzuela, 09CA1983 (Colo. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010). In his federal petition,
Mr. Valenzuela advanced seven claims for relief, each of which the district court
rejected. Valenzuela v. Medina, No. 10-cv-02681-WJM, 2011 WL 4369206 (D.
Colo. Sept. 19, 2011). On appeal, he argues that the district court erred by
rejecting his claims concerning (1) the prosecution’s discussion of his brother’s
confession, (2) the prosecution’s use of various inflammatory and unproven
statements, (3) insufficient evidence on the kidnapping charge, and (4) ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel.
Discussion
The district court was required to defer to the state court proceedings on
these claims unless they “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” or “resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-
(2). Section 2254(d) is difficult to satisfy—a defendant must show that a state
court's ruling is “so lacking in justification that there was an error well
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understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786–87 (2011).
Factual findings made by state courts are presumed correct unless the
presumption is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1). Here, the district court’s ultimate resolution of these issues,
dependent upon state court opinions and records, is not reasonably debatable.
A. Discussion of Brother’s Guilty Plea
The Colorado Court of Appeals reasoned that a prompt curative instruction
corrected any prejudice from the improper discussion of the guilty plea; the
district court also noted that there was overwhelming evidence of guilt. 1 R. 137;
Valenzuela, 2011 WL 4369206, at *5. Mr. Valenzuela argues that no instruction
could effectively cure the reference to his brother’s plea, and that any error could
not be harmless because the jury was bound to speculate that his brother pled to
first-degree murder. Aplt. Br. 4(a)-(c). This presumes that jurors would ignore
express instructions to disregard the statement, which is not legally supportable.
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799 (2001) (appellate courts presume that jurors
follow instructions).
B. Broader Prosecutorial Misconduct
Mr. Valenzuela relies on the following as prosecutorial misconduct: (1)
discussion of his brother’s guilty plea, (2) discussion of allegations of threats
made to witnesses in violation of a ruling in limine, (3) use of the term
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“execution” in describing the killing, and (4) encouragement (explicitly or
implicitly) of the jury to protect the community and hold Mr. Valenzuela
accountable. Aplt. Br. 4(c)-(d). We have addressed Mr. Valenzuela’s argument
relating to the guilty plea. The state appellate court reasoned that any prejudice
from the improper discussion of alleged witness threats was mitigated by the trial
court’s curative instruction, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying a mistrial. 1 R. 138. It also concluded that the term “execution” was a
permissible comment on the evidence, and that the remaining comments did not
constitute plain error and did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. 1 R. 141.
These conclusions are supported by the record; hence, the district court’s
conclusion that deference is required is not reasonably debatable.
Mr. Valenzuela further argues that, taken together, these acts constitute
cumulative error sufficient to warrant vacating his conviction and remanding for a
new trial, and that the district court erred by concluding otherwise. Aplt. Br.
4(c)-(d). Cumulative error looks at alleged errors of constitutional dimension
found to be harmless, and aggregates them to assess whether they so permeated
the trial as to deny fundamental fairness. See Young v. Sirmons, 551 F.3d 942,
972 (10th Cir. 2008). Mr. Valenzuela contends that there are “minimally . . . two
clear errors,” Aplt. Br. 4(d), presumably referring to the discussions of his
brother’s guilty plea and the alleged witness threats. The district court erred by
refusing to consider those errors together; however, in light of the Colorado Court
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of Appeals’s strong rejection of the underlying claims on their merits, and against
a backdrop of the entire record, those errors did not render the trial fundamentally
unfair, even when considered together, in light of the prompt curative instructions
and overwhelming evidence of guilt.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Kidnapping Conviction
Mr. Valenzuela also argues that the district court erred by rejecting his
argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his kidnapping
conviction. Aplt. Br. 4(d)-(f). The state court applied a standard consistent with
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), by evaluating the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, and concluded that evidence supported the
verdict. Essentially, Mr. Valenzuela urges this court to evaluate the
circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to him—crediting his version
of events and concluding that he was not a joint participant. Aplt. Br. 4(e).
Nothing Mr. Valenzuela has argued suggests that the state court’s rejection of this
claim is an unreasonable application of federal law, or that the district court erred
by deferring to that rejection.
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, Mr. Valenzuela argues that the district court erred by rejecting his
argument that his state appellate counsel’s failure to raise an argument relating to
an involuntary intoxication defense instruction constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel. Aplt. Br. 4(f)-(g). The state appellate court rejected this claim on the
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basis that Mr. Valenzuela could not show deficient performance, as the jury
instructions as a whole correctly conveyed the law. 1 R. 248-51. Mr. Valenzuela
has not shown that this is an unreasonable application of federal law.
We DENY Mr. Valenzuela’s request for a COA and DISMISS his appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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