Aman v. Dillon Companies, Inc.

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 15, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MOE AMAN, f/k/a Mohamed Aman,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. Nos. 14-1461 & 15-1054
(D.C. No. 1:11-CV-02973-JLK)
DILLON COMPANIES, INC., a Kansas (D. Colo.)
corporation, d/b/a King Soopers,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Moe Aman filed suit against his former employer, Dillon Companies, Inc.
d/b/a King Soopers (“King Soopers”), advancing numerous discrimination and
retaliation claims. The district court granted King Soopers summary judgment as to
some claims and judgment as a matter of law as to the remainder. Aman appeals.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I
Aman began working as a produce clerk at King Soopers store #5 in 2006.
Jack Ruby was the store manager, Don Gordy was the produce manager, and Chris
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Bateson was the assistant produce manager. On May 7, 2007, Gordy deliberately
slammed a produce cart into Aman, injuring his back. Gordy was terminated because
of the incident. Aman was out of work for several weeks, during which time he
received workers’ compensation benefits.
After returning from the injury, Aman continued to work in the produce
department subject to medical restrictions. In October 2007, a physician concluded
that Aman had reached maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) and imposed
permanent restrictions. An independent medical examination likewise suggested a
permanent restriction of no lifting greater than thirty pounds.
In April 2008, King Soopers determined that Aman’s permanent restriction
rendered him unable to continue working as produce clerk. Effective May 11, it
reclassified him to the service desk, a position with a substantially lower rate of pay.
In response, Aman requested a leave of absence, but was informed he was ineligible
for leave because King Soopers had a position he could fill despite his restrictions.
After learning of the reclassification and his ineligibility for leave, Aman reported
that he had been harassed and discriminated against throughout his time working at
the store.
Aman was scheduled to work at the service desk from May 13 through May
17, 2008. He called in sick for each of those days, but did not speak to any of his
direct supervisors. Aman also called into the store on May 17 to report that he would
be out sick for the entire next week, when he was scheduled to work from May 20 to
2
23. Ruby terminated Aman on May 27 for being absent without leave. Additional
facts relevant to particular issues raised on appeal will be discussed infra.
Aman filed suit against King Soopers on November 15, 2011, advancing
numerous claims. The district court granted King Soopers’ motion for summary
judgment on several claims. The remaining claims proceeded to trial. At the close of
all evidence, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of King
Soopers and dismissed the case. Aman timely appealed.
II
Aman appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy claim. We review the grant of summary
judgment de novo. Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th
Cir. 2009). A party is entitled to summary judgment only if, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Id.Aman claims that King Soopers violated Colorado law by terminating him in
retaliation for exercising his workers’ compensation rights. Although it was not the
basis for the district court’s decision, King Soopers argues that Aman’s claim is time-
barred. A claim for wrongful discharge accrues upon termination and is subject to a
two-year limitations period. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a); Williams v.
Crop Prod. Servs., Inc., 361 P.3d 1075, 1077 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied, No.
15SC445, 2015 WL 7423588 (Colo. Nov. 23, 2015). Aman was terminated on May
27, 2008. He filed suit on November 15, 2011, more than two years later.
3
Aman does not substantively respond to the timeliness argument. Instead, he
contends King Soopers waived this affirmative defense by failing to raise it in a
motion for summary judgment. A statute of limitations defense may be waived if it
is not pled. Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 2003). But
King Soopers pled that Aman’s claims were time-barred in its answer. And the fact
that King Soopers did not rely on the statute of limitations in its motion for summary
judgment is not dispositive. Rather, “[w]e may affirm on any ground adequately
presented to the district court, or on a ground not raised in the district court provided
that the record is sufficiently clear [and] both parties had an adequate opportunity to
develop the record on the issue.” Griffith v. Colo., Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d
1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 1994). Whether to do so is committed to our discretion.
United States v. Damato, 672 F.3d 832, 844 (10th Cir. 2012). We have identified
several factors relevant in considering an alternative ground: “[1] whether the
ground was fully briefed and argued here and below; [2] whether the parties have had
a fair opportunity to develop the factual record; and [3] whether, in light of factual
findings to which we defer or uncontested facts, our decision would involve only
questions of law.” Id. (quotation omitted). Although the timeliness issue was not
briefed below, the other two factors counsel in favor of King Soopers. Accord id.(absence of first factor not conclusive). We exercise our discretion to affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment because Aman’s wrongful discharge
claim was untimely.
4
III
Aman challenges the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on
four claims: (1) hostile work environment; (2) termination on the basis of race; (3)
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) retaliation; and (4) Title VII retaliation.
We review a district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo. Murphy
Oil USA, Inc. v. Wood, 438 F.3d 1008, 1012 (10th Cir. 2006). Judgment as a matter
of law is granted “only if all of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, reveals no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the
nonmoving party.” Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir.
2012) (quotation omitted).
A
Aman claims he suffered a hostile work environment due to his race. To
succeed on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that “the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment
and create an abusive working environment.” Morris v. City of Colo. Springs, 666
F.3d 654, 664 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). We examine the “totality of the
circumstances, and consider such factors as the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.” Id. (quotation and alteration omitted).
5
Aman brings hostile work environment claims under both Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1981. Under Title VII, an employee must file a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 300 days of the
discriminatory conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).1 And he must file a civil
complaint under § 1981 within four years of the alleged conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1658;
Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1152 (10th Cir. 2008). The parties
agree that Aman filed his EEOC charge on March 13, 2009, and thus he may
challenge conduct occurring on or after May 17, 2008, under Title VII. And he filed
his federal complaint on November 15, 2011, and thus he may challenge conduct
occurring on or after November 15, 2007, under § 1981.2
Under certain circumstances, hostile work environment claims may rely in part
on conduct that occurred outside the limitations period. “[A]s long as an act
contributing to a hostile work environment took place” within the limitations period,
“a court may consider the complete history of acts comprising that hostile work
environment.” Duncan v. Manager, Dep’t of Safety, 397 F.3d 1300, 1308 (10th Cir.
2005) (quotation omitted). But to consider pre-limitations period conduct, those acts
1
The parties agree that Aman filed a complaint with a state agency as required
to trigger the 300-day limitations period under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
2
Aman argues that King Soopers waived any timeliness argument as to the
hostile work environment claim because it failed to cross appeal the district court’s
summary judgment ruling indicating that the claim was timely. But King Soopers
obtained judgment in its favor on Aman’s hostile work environment claims, and
“seeks no relief which was not granted it in the court below and properly may raise
any issue which was there considered even though it asserts that the court was in
error.” Emerson v. Labor Inv. Corp., 284 F.2d 946, 949 (10th Cir. 1960).
6
must comprise “part of the same actionable hostile work environment practice” that
continued into the limitations period. Id. (quotation omitted). “[A] series of alleged
events comprises the same hostile environment where the pre- and post-limitations
period incidents involved the same type of employment actions, occurred relatively
frequently, and were perpetrated by the same managers.” Id. at 1309 (quotation and
alteration omitted).
Aman cites to three instances in which racial slurs were used against him. He
testified that Gordy called him an “African monkey” and an “African lion,” and that
Bateson called him a “lazy African.” He also asserts that one of his co-workers heard
Gordy state that he did not like black people. Aman also relies heavily on the Gordy
assault. All of these incidents occurred before November 15, 2007, and thus fall
outside of the limitations periods.
Aman further cites to a litany of facially neutral conduct that occurred after he
returned to work following his injury—some of which occurred within the limitations
periods. “[F]acially neutral abusive conduct can support a finding of racial animus
sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim when that conduct is viewed in
the context of other, overtly racially-discriminatory conduct.” Hernandez v. Valley
View Hosp. Ass’n, 684 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation and alterations
omitted). Such conduct may support a hostile work environment claim if “a jury,
viewing the evidence in context, reasonably could view all of the allegedly harassing
conduct as the product of racial hostility.” Id. (quotation and alterations omitted).
7
But Aman fails to provide evidence from which a reasonable juror could
conclude that the facially neutral events which occurred within the limitations period
were part of “the same actionable hostile work environment practice” that he claims
began prior to his injury. Duncan, 397 F.3d at 1308 (quotation omitted). Several of
the incidents Aman cites are wholly unrelated to his pre-limitations period work
environment. For example, many relate to claimed procedural irregularities that
occurred in connection with his termination. And several alleged actions happened
after Aman had been terminated and thus could not have contributed to a hostile work
environment. See Hirase-Doi v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 782 (10th
Cir. 1995), superseded on other grounds by Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998) (a plaintiff “may only rely on evidence relating to harassment of which
she was aware during the time that she was allegedly subject to a hostile work
environment”).
Similarly unfounded is Aman’s argument that his reclassification to the service
desk contributed to a hostile work environment. The same is true as to his claims
regarding management’s doubts about the severity of his pain and employees’
mockery of his injury. These allegations did not involve the same type of
employment actions as the pre-limitations period racial comments or Gordy assault.
Nor—with one exception discussed infra—did they involve the same employees as
the pre-limitations period conduct. And his reclassification occurred approximately
one year after the more serious incident involving Gordy. Thus, his reclassification
does not satisfy any of the relevant factors. See Duncan, 397 F.3d at 1309.
8
The only connection between pre- and post-limitations period conduct we can
discern is that Bateson allegedly refused to shake Aman’s hand on his first day of
work at store #5 and called Aman a “lazy African” on a single occasion outside the
limitations period, and was one of the employees who doubted the severity of
Aman’s pain within the limitations period. Even assuming that Bateson’s single
racial comment and handshake slight should be included in the analysis, we conclude
that the isolated Bateson incidents are not sufficient for a jury to find Aman was
subject to a hostile work environment. Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th
Cir. 1994) (“Instead of sporadic racial slurs, there must be a steady barrage of
opprobrious racial comments” to support a hostile work environment). Regardless,
this single incident of harassment occurring within the limitations period is
insufficient to tie the claim back to prior harassment by the same employee. See
Holmes v. Utah, Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 483 F.3d 1057, 1063-64 (10th Cir.
2007).
Focusing on the potentially timely actions, the vast majority of Aman’s
proffered evidence does not suggest racial discrimination generally, nor that his
reassignment and termination were motivated by race. Bolden, 43 F.3d at 551
(“General harassment if not racial or sexual is not actionable.”). He likewise fails to
demonstrate that his co-workers’ doubts about the severity of his injury were racially-
driven, or that they were severe or pervasive. Because Aman has not demonstrated a
workplace sufficiently “permeated with [racially] discriminatory intimidation,
9
ridicule, and insult,” Morris, 666 F.3d at 664 (quotation omitted), we affirm the
district court’s dismissal of Aman’s hostile work environment claim.
B
We consider Aman’s claim of termination on the basis of race under the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-06 (1973). Under this framework, Aman carries the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. EEOC v. PVNF, L.L.C., 487 F.3d
790, 800 (10th Cir. 2007). The burden then shifts to King Soopers to provide a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate him. Id. If it does
so, the burden shifts back to Aman to show that King Soopers’ stated reason is
pretextual. Id. The parties agree that Aman satisfied his prima facie obligation, and
King Soopers responded that it legitimately fired him for being absent without leave.
Thus, the parties’ sole dispute on this claim is whether Aman advanced sufficient
evidence of pretext.3
A plaintiff may establish pretext by showing “such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s
3
Aman briefly argues that he was not given an opportunity to respond to the
district court’s reliance on employee testimony suggesting that King Soopers does
not permit racial discrimination. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) (providing that a court
may enter judgment as a matter of law “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue
during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally
sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue”). In its oral ruling, the
district court references King Soopers’ stance on discrimination. But we do not read
the court’s decision as relying on this testimony. Instead, the court held that Aman
had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that race was a factor in his
termination—an issue that was fully litigated.
10
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally
find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the
asserted non-discriminatory reasons.” Jones v. Okla. City Pub. Sch., 617 F.3d 1273,
1280 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
Aman suggests pretext because he adhered to King Soopers’ sick policy by
calling in sick for five consecutive scheduled shifts from May 13 to 17, 2008; and
again for the entire week of May 20 to 23 after a night crew foreman told him he did
not need to call every day. Because the absences were excused, he contends that they
could not support termination. But Aman conflates King Soopers’ call-in procedure
with its process for excusing absences. The evidence shows that although any
member of management can accept a sick call, only the store manager, or in his
absence, the assistant store manager, may excuse an absence. Aman did not contact
his direct supervisor, the store manager, or the assistant store manager between May
11 and June 2, 2008. Thus, evidence that Aman spoke to appropriate individuals
when calling in does not undermine King Soopers’ position that Aman was
terminated for unexcused absences.
Similarly, Aman argues that he was entitled to take leave for the time he was
absent and notes that Ruby was aware he was planning to see a doctor. But King
Soopers’ policy requires an employee to submit a written request for leave in excess
of five days. And, absent exceptional circumstances, the request must be approved
before the leave begins. Aman admitted that he was aware of these policies and
knew he had not been approved for leave.
11
Aman also identifies inconsistencies in King Soopers’ stated justifications for
his termination. He notes that on two occasions King Soopers mis-identified the
dates Aman did not call in sick, and suggests management wavered between stating
he was fired for “excessive absenteeism” and stating he “quit without notice.” But
neither of these observations undermines King Soopers’ consistent assertion that
Aman was terminated because he did not come to work between May 11 and the date
he was fired. In particular, the terms “excessive absenteeism” and “quit without
notice” are related—an employee explained that numerous consecutive unexcused
absences would be described as having quit without notice. The descriptive
variations are thus “simply too minor to give rise to an inference of pretext.” Hardy
v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd., 185 F.3d 1076, 1081 (10th Cir. 1999).
Finally, Aman argues that Ruby should have retroactively excused his
absences when Aman submitted a note from his doctor on June 2, 2008. He contends
that rejection of this note demonstrates pretext because Ruby testified both that he
did not expect Aman to bring in a note before June 2, and that Aman should have
brought the note in sooner. He also contends that Ruby did not provide any reason
for declining to excuse Aman’s absences. However, Aman ignores the portions of
Ruby’s testimony in which Ruby stated that Aman should have contacted him or the
assistant store manager sooner regardless of when Aman brought the doctor’s note in.
We do not discern any inconsistency in Ruby’s testimony on this point. And, as
noted supra, Ruby provided a legitimate reason for the termination: Aman did not
comply with the policy requiring prior approval for leave of more than five days.
12
Considering all of this evidence together, we agree with the district court that
Aman did not provide a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that King
Soopers’ stated reason for firing him was pretextual.4
C
Aman claims both ADA and race-based retaliation. If an employee cannot
provide direct evidence of retaliatory motive, he may rely on the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework described supra. See Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp.,
659 F.3d 987, 998 (10th Cir. 2011). Under the first step in this framework, the
employee must make out a prima facie case of retaliation by showing: “(1) she
engaged in protected [conduct], (2) a reasonable employee would have considered the
challenged employment action materially adverse, and (3) a causal connection
existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.” Daniels v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 638 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see
also Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999).5
4
Aman further claims that Ruby and Stephanie Bouknight offered different
accounts of the termination decision. In support of this argument he cites to evidence
from the summary judgment record. We cannot consider this evidence in our
analysis. See McEuin v. Crown Equip. Corp., 328 F.3d 1028, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Evidence not admitted at trial cannot be used in a review of the district court’s
[ruling on a motion for] judgment as a matter of law.”).
5
For a Title VII or § 1981 retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove that the
desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action. Univ.
of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013); Davis v. Unified Sch.
Dist. 500, 750 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating that the “standards are the
same” for Title VII and § 1981 claims). It not clear whether an ADA retaliation
claim requires “but for” or “motivating factor” causation. See Doe v. Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs, 613 F. App’x 743, 747 n.3 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (noting that
13
Aman asserts that he participated in protected conduct by complaining of
discrimination. Specifically, when he was informed in early May 2008 that he was
ineligible for leave because King Soopers had a position available for him, Aman
complained both of previous racial harassment and argued that he was entitled to
leave due to his injury, which resulted from his co-worker’s assault. But Aman did
not provide evidence from which a jury could find causation. Aman asserts that a
jury could infer causation based on the temporal proximity between his complaints
and his termination. We have held that temporal proximity of approximately one
month can be sufficient to establish causation. See Trujillo v. PacifiCorp, 524 F.3d
1149, 1157 n.5 (10th Cir. 2008). And the district court accepted the temporal
proximity as sufficiently probative to demonstrate a prima facie case on these two
claims at the summary judgment stage.
But we have repeatedly “recognized that evidence of temporal proximity has
minimal probative value in a retaliation case where intervening events between the
employee’s protected conduct and the challenged employment action provide a
legitimate basis for the employer’s action.” Twigg, 659 F.3d at 1001-02; Maestas v.
Segura, 416 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[E]vidence of intervening events
tend[s] to undermine any inference of retaliatory motive and weaken the causal link.”
(citation omitted)). As discussed supra, after asserting his complaints Aman missed
____________________________
several courts have applied the “but for” causation standard in assessing ADA
claims); Wesley-Dickson v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 586 F. App’x 739, 745
n.3 (2d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (noting that the “but-for standard might apply to . . .
ADA retaliation claim[s]”). Because we conclude that Aman cannot prevail even
under the lower motivating factor standard, we will assume it applies.
14
numerous days of work without contacting the individuals authorized to excuse his
absences. And he offers no other basis on which to infer that his termination was
retaliation for his complaints. We thus conclude he fails to make out a prima facie
case that he was terminated in retaliation for his complaints regarding his disability
and race.6 Under these circumstances, his retaliation claims fail.7
IV
Aman also appeals the district court’s decision to exclude evidence related to
treatment of allegedly similarly situated employees. “We review evidentiary rulings
for an abuse of discretion, and pay deference to the trial court’s familiarity with the
case and experience in evidentiary matters.” Elm Ridge Expl. Co. v. Engle, 721 F.3d
1199, 1213 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). “We reverse only if the district
court’s conclusion is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or manifestly unreasonable or
when we are convinced that the district court made a clear error of judgment or
exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” Id. (quotation
omitted). To establish the relevance of the excluded evidence, Aman was required to
show that he was similarly situated to the comparable employees. McGowan v. City
of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 2006). Comparator employees must have
6
We conclude that Aman has not made out a prima facie case, and so do not
reach his argument regarding the pretext step in the McDonnell Douglas framework.
We note, however, that we have already concluded supra that Aman did not submit
evidence sufficient to conclude that King Soopers’ legitimate reason for his
termination was pretext.
7
Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Aman’s claims, we need
not consider his arguments regarding the availability of punitive damages. See
Stewart v. Adolph Coors Co., 217 F.3d 1285, 1289 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000).
15
engaged in “conduct of comparable seriousness in order for their disparate treatment
to be relevant.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Aman proffered evidence regarding three other employees who were
disciplined but not terminated for excessive absenteeism. It was within the district
court’s discretion to conclude that none of these employees’ misconduct was
comparable to Aman’s. Although the comparator employees were disciplined for
calling in sick too frequently over the course of their employment, none of the
employees were absent for a consecutive span of days approaching the bloc Aman
missed.
V
Finally, Aman challenges the district court order requiring that he post an
appeal bond. King Soopers did not move to enforce the bond, and thus argues the
issue is moot. An issue is moot unless “granting a present determination of the issues
offered will have some effect in the real world.” See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v.
Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1110 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation and
emphasis omitted). We agree that the issue is now moot because the appeal has been
decided without Aman posting the bond, and a decision from this court would have
no practical effect. Because mootness is a jurisdictional issue, see id. at 1109, we
dismiss Aman’s appeal of the bond order, which was assigned docket number 15-
1054.
16
VI
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Aman’s appeal as to the bond
order is DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
17