United States v. Jordan

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 15, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 11-1108
v. (D.C. Nos. 1:04-CR-00229-LTB-1
and 1:08-CV-02447-LTB)
MARK JORDAN, (D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
AND DISMISSING APPEAL *
Before KELLY, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and
MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
Mark Jordan, a federal prisoner, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA)
to challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny the COA and dismiss the appeal.
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Jordan was convicted of the stabbing death of fellow inmate David
Stone in the yard of the federal penitentiary in Florence, Colorado, and sentenced
to 420 months’ imprisonment. We affirmed his conviction and sentence. See
United States v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007). As we recounted, two
eyewitnesses testified at trial that Mr. Jordan stabbed Mr. Stone then chased him
across the prison yard. Id. at 1216. Other witnesses observed Mr. Jordan
throwing an object, which turned out to be a knife, on the roof of a housing unit.
Id. at 1217. Additional evidence linking Mr. Jordan to the attack included his
DNA on the knife and a video recording of him approaching Mr. Stone
immediately before the attack and then chasing Mr. Stone (the attack itself
occurred outside the camera’s view). Id. Nonetheless, Mr. Jordan’s defense was
that another inmate, Sean Riker, stabbed Mr. Stone and forced the knife on
Mr. Jordan. Id. at 1220. Mr. Jordan then panicked, ran, and threw the knife on
the roof. Id. Neither Mr. Jordan nor Mr. Riker testified at trial.
As part of his direct appeal, Mr. Jordan petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court denied on November 13,
2007. Mr. Jordan consequently had one year from that date (until November 13,
2008) to file his § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). 1
1
Section 2255(f) provides several alternate triggers for the running of a
(continued...)
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On February 5, 2008, the district court appointed counsel to assist
Mr. Jordan with filing a petition for habeas corpus relief. On August 5, 2008,
appointed counsel filed a motion in the criminal case for a writ of habeas corpus
and for a new trial. On October 28, 2008, the district court denied the motion for
a new trial as untimely under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2) and determined that to the
extent Mr. Jordan sought to challenge his conviction on constitutional grounds
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, it had to be filed in a separate, collateral proceeding.
Appointed counsel then allegedly informed Mr. Jordan that counsel would not
represent him in a § 2255 proceeding. Cognizant that the one-year period for
filing a § 2255 motion would soon end, Mr. Jordan filed a pro se, sixty-five page
§ 2255 motion. On May 13, 2009, he filed an amended pro se § 2255 motion that,
by the district court’s count, contained seven claims with a total of 102 subclaims.
The district court issued a detailed, 124-page order denying the § 2255
motions, finding many of the subclaims untimely or procedurally defaulted and
the rest meritless. The district court later denied Mr. Jordan’s motion for relief
from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and denied his application for a COA.
Mr. Jordan retained counsel and has renewed his request for a COA in this court.
1
(...continued)
one-year limitations period, but, with one exception discussed below, Mr. Jordan
has not argued that any others apply in this case.
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DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal from the denial of a
§ 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 336 (2003). A COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). For those claims the district court denied on the merits, Mr. Jordan
“must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For those claims the district court denied on a
procedural ground, Mr. Jordan must show “that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and . . . whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.Because Mr. Jordan proceeded pro se in the district court, we construe his filings
in that court liberally, but we do not act as his advocate. See Yang v. Archuleta,
525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
B. Equitable Tolling
In his application for a COA, Mr. Jordan first argues the district court
should have applied equitable tolling to subclaims in his amended motion that did
not relate back to his original motion because appointed counsel abandoned him
less than two weeks before the one-year deadline (November 13, 2008) to file his
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§ 2255 motion. The court concluded that Mr. Jordan was not entitled to equitable
tolling because he “failed to vigilantly oversee appointed counsel’s actions” and
had not acted with “reasonable diligence.” Aplt. App. at 1183. The court also
found that Mr. Jordan had not established an exception to § 2255(f)’s one-year
limitations period by making a showing of factual innocence. See id. at 1184.
We acknowledge Mr. Jordan’s argument that the conduct of his appointed
counsel satisfies the requirements for equitable tolling laid out by the Supreme
Court in Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010); however, Holland left
equitable tolling to the discretion of district courts. Having considered the record
and Mr. Jordan’s arguments, we cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion by refusing to find that Mr. Jordan’s appointed counsel’s conduct was
so egregious as to warrant equitable tolling. Mr. Jordan was able to file his initial
§ 2255 motion within the deadline followed by an amended motion in May 2009.
Thus, Mr. Jordan is not entitled to a COA on this issue. 2
2
While this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided
Maples v. Thomas, — S. Ct. —, No. 10-63, 2012 WL 125438 (Jan. 18, 2012), a
case discussing attorney abandonment and excuse for procedural default.
However, that case is distinguishable. The petitioner in Maples thought he was
being actively represented by counsel until after the pertinent deadline passed
(though he was not) and had no notice of his pending deadline, whereas
Mr. Jordan (1) knew his counsel would not file a § 2255 motion on his behalf,
(2) knew the deadline for his motion, and (3) filed a timely (and lengthy) § 2255
motion by that deadline. See id., 2012 WL 125438, at *11 (extraordinary
circumstances may be present when lawyer abandons client and client fails to act
on his own behalf).
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C. Relation Back
Mr. Jordan next claims the district court erred in concluding that a number
of subclaims raised in his amended motion did not relate back to his original
motion. “An amended habeas petition . . . does not relate back . . . when it asserts
a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from
those the original pleading set forth.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 (2005).
A district court’s findings as to whether an amended claim relates back to an
original § 2255 motion are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d 501, 505 (10th Cir. 2000).
Mr. Jordan first argues that his amended subclaim that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to affirmatively invoke his Fifth Amendment right to present
a defense and his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process (Claim 3.a.)
relates back to one of his original claims, which he characterizes in the same
terms. However, Mr. Jordan initially contended only that “it was unreasonable
for trial counsel to present no evidence to explain why prisoner witnesses were
not cooperating with the defense,” Aplt. App. at 79, 3 and later contended that, but
for counsel’s failure to preserve an objection to the district court’s denial of a
proffer regarding the alternate perpetrator (Mr. Riker), the standard of review on
appeal would have been de novo, not an abuse of discretion, id. at 302. Clearly,
3
Mr. Jordan handprinted his district court filings in all capital letters. We
omit the capitalization in this and all other quotations from those filings.
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the supporting facts for the amended subclaim were different in type than the
original claim, and the amended subclaim therefore did not relate back. See
Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650.
Mr. Jordan next contests the district court’s finding that two amended
subclaims regarding trial counsel’s failure to interview Rudy Sablan and Frankie
Quinata and call them as witnesses (Claims 3.bb. and 3.cc.) did not relate back to
the original motion. As Mr. Jordan points out, the district court rendered a
decision on the merits of a different subclaim (Claim 3.ll.) that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to investigate witnesses generally. In so doing, the court
referred to Mr. Sablan and Mr. Quinata specifically, notwithstanding the court’s
ruling earlier in its decision that the amended subclaims specifically regarding
them did not relate back. Compare Aplt. App. at 1249-50 with id. at 1267-68.
Accordingly, we will instead consider whether to grant a COA on the district
court’s merits decision regarding trial counsel’s failure to investigate or call
Mr. Sablan and Mr. Quinata rather than Mr. Jordan’s request for a COA on the
relation-back issue.
As the district court concluded, Mr. Jordan did not show that counsel’s
failure to investigate Mr. Sablan or Mr. Quinata constituted ineffective assistance
under the standard announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
In the specific context of an uncalled witness, he must also show “that the
testimony of an uncalled witness would have been favorable” and that “the
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witness would have testified at trial.” Snow v. Sirmons, 474 F.3d 693, 731 n.42
(10th Cir. 2007) (brackets omitted) (quotation omitted).
As to Mr. Quinata, Mr. Jordan provided only his own allegations of the
proposed testimony, not an affidavit or other competent evidence regarding the
content of Mr. Quinata’s proposed testimony or his willingness to testify.
Accordingly, he failed to meet his burden under Snow and therefore is not entitled
to a COA with regard to trial counsel’s failure to investigate or call Mr. Quinata.
In contrast, Mr. Jordan provided a declaration from Mr. Sablan stating he
was willing to testify that he did not hear or see any person other than one
lieutenant visit Mr. Jordan in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) where Mr. Jordan
was placed after the attack on Stone. See Aplt. App. at 459-60. Mr. Jordan
contends this testimony would impeach that of a physician’s assistant,
Mr. Erzouki, who testified at trial that he examined Mr. Jordan in the SHU and
observed him flash a “V” sign with his hand to another inmate and state “Guy, I
get him out of your way.” Id. at 2419:21-23. However, at best, Mr. Sablan’s
proposed testimony would have impeached Mr. Erzouki as to the location of his
observation (which was one subject of defense counsel’s cross-examination of
Mr. Erzouki at trial), but any effect on the credibility of what Mr. Erzouki
observed would have been minimal; certainly not enough for us to conclude, in
light of the other evidence that Mr. Jordan stabbed Mr. Stone, that there is a
reasonable probability the outcome would have been different had trial counsel
-8-
investigated Mr. Sablan and called him to testify. Accordingly, Mr. Jordan is not
entitled to a COA regarding trial counsel’s failure to investigate or call
Mr. Sablan.
Regarding the next amended subclaim on which he seeks a COA,
Mr. Jordan originally alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to allow
him to testify at trial. In his amended motion, he reiterated substantially the same
subclaim but added a new subclaim (Claim 4.a.) that the district court erred in
refusing defense counsel’s request for an advisement of his right to testify.
Mr. Jordan is not entitled to a COA on this ruling. While he mentioned the
district court’s refusal to give an advisement in his original subclaim, he claimed
error only in trial counsel’s actions, not those of the district court. Thus, the
amended subclaim’s supporting facts were different in type. Consequently the
amended subclaim did not relate back to the original motion. See Mayle,
545 U.S. at 650.
The final relation-back issue on which Mr. Jordan seeks a COA consists of
four subclaims concerning the government’s failure to disclose exculpatory or
impeachment evidence, as required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
We will consider the first two amended Brady subclaims together before turning
to the other two.
In the first subclaim (Claim 1.j.), Mr. Jordan alleged the government should
have disclosed video recordings of the SHU entry and a lieutenant’s corridor. In
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the second subclaim (Claim 1.k.), he contended the government should have
disclosed Tyrone Davis’s agreement with the government for lenient treatment in
exchange for his testimony against Mr. Jordan. Mr. Davis testified that he was
selling items in the prison yard when he witnessed Mr. Jordan push or punch
Mr. Stone in the back or side and run after Mr. Stone. Id. at 2369-72. Mr. Jordan
alleged that Mr. Davis has since admitted his testimony was perjured. Id.
at 631-32.
Mr. Jordan does not argue that these amended subclaims relate back.
Instead, he contends that he only discovered this evidence in June 2008, less than
one year before he filed his amended § 2255 motion, and therefore the amended
subclaims were timely under § 2255(f)(4), which triggers a one-year period for
filing a § 2255 motion from “the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.” However, Mr. Jordan has not satisfied the “due diligence” portion of
the § 2255(f)(4) inquiry. Concerning the video recordings, he alleged only that he
did not discover them until June 2008 “through investigations of staff and other
prisoners.” Aplt. App. at 630-31. Regarding Mr. Davis, he maintained that,
“following the trial in this case,” which took place in August 2005, Mr. Davis
contacted him to apologize for testifying falsely against him and revealed the
agreement with the government. Id. at 268. Mr. Jordan added, in his reply in
support of his amended § 2255 motion, that he “did not become aware of the
-10-
undisclosed Davis agreement or of Davis’ willingness to now admit his testimony
was perjured until June 2008.” Id. at 632. Because Mr. Jordan did not explain
why he could not have obtained any of this information at an earlier date through
diligent efforts, a COA is not warranted on these subclaims.
In the third amended Brady subclaim that Mr. Jordan claims relates back to
his original § 2255 motion (Claim 1.l.), he alleged the government should have
disclosed Mr. Davis’s work record because it would show that, at the time of the
attack, Mr. Davis was in the prison food service building, not in the yard, which
suggests he could not have witnessed the attack. Id. at 270. Mr. Jordan contends
this amended subclaim relates back to one paragraph in his original motion
supporting his claim of actual innocence, that “one witness states he was in food
service with Tyrone Davis at time of homicide and neither did [n]or could have
witnessed assault from their location.” Id. at 109, ¶ 281. We disagree. The
original subclaim centered on a different witness and did not raise a Brady issue
with regard to Mr. Davis’s work record. Accordingly, the factual basis for the
amended subclaim differed in type from the original claim, and the amended
subclaim therefore did not relate back to the original motion. See Mayle,
545 U.S. at 650. Thus, Mr. Jordan is not entitled to a COA on this subclaim.
The final amended Brady subclaim that Mr. Jordan claims relates back to
his original § 2255 motion (Claim 1.m.) concerns certain material subject to
protective orders that permitted disclosure to his trial counsel but barred
-11-
disclosure to him personally. He claims the government was required to disclose
the material to him personally under Brady and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150 (1972). 4 He argues this subclaim relates back to a claim in his original
motion that counsel was ineffective for agreeing to the protective orders without
informing or consulting with him. We again disagree. The amended subclaim is
based on facts that are different in type than those in the original claim. The
amended subclaim therefore does not relate back to the original motion, see
Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650, and Mr. Jordan is not entitled to a COA on it.
D. Procedural Default/Brady Claims
Mr. Jordan next seeks a COA regarding the district court’s conclusion that
eight Brady subclaims (Claim 1., subclaims b.-i.) were procedurally defaulted
under United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). Under Frady, the “failure to
raise an issue either at trial or on direct appeal imposes a procedural bar to habeas
review.” United States v. Barajas-Diaz, 313 F.3d 1242, 1245 (10th Cir. 2002). 5
A § 2255 movant may overcome procedural default by establishing cause and
actual prejudice, Frady, 456 U.S. at 167 (quotation omitted), or by showing that a
4
Giglio mandates disclosure of evidence, under Brady standards, that affects
the credibility of a witness whose testimony “may well be determinative of guilt
or innocence.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quotation omitted).
5
A noted exception to the application of Frady to § 2255 proceedings is for
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, see United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d
1239, 1240-41 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc), but Mr. Jordan has not claimed that
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise any of these Brady subclaims on direct
appeal.
-12-
constitutional error “has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent,” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). To show cause,
a petitioner must identify “some objective factor external to the defense [that]
impeded . . . efforts to comply with the [relevant] procedural rule.” Id. at 488.
The district court determined that Mr. Jordan had not shown cause under
the Murray standard for failing to raise these Brady claims on direct appeal. As
he argued in his Rule 59(e) motion in the district court, Mr. Jordan contends that
his Brady claims as a group are not subject to procedural default on collateral
review because he did not discover the factual bases of these claims until after his
trial (and, for some claims (he does not specify which) until after his direct
appeal). He concludes it would have been inappropriate or impossible to raise
these claims on direct appeal because there would have been no district court
record for review. Mr. Jordan also argues that the district court erred in
concluding that three specific Brady subclaims were procedurally defaulted.
We need not decide whether a Frady analysis is inapplicable in these
circumstances. The district court decided these subclaims on a procedural
ground, so Mr. Jordan must show “that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right
and . . . whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack,
529 U.S. at 484 (emphasis added). Under Brady, the failure to disclose evidence
favorable to a criminal defendant “violates due process where the evidence is
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material either to guilt or to punishment.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. “For the
evidence to be material, there must be ‘a reasonable probability that the result of
the trial would have been different if the suppressed documents had been
disclosed to the defense.’” United States v. Ford, 550 F.3d 975, 981 (10th Cir.
2008) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999)). Having reviewed
Mr. Jordan’s arguments regarding the materiality of the evidence allegedly
withheld in violation of Brady in light of the other evidence at trial, we conclude
he has not made a sufficient showing of Brady materiality. Thus, his petitions
fail to state “a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.” Slack, 529 U.S.
at 484. Accordingly, we deny a COA on these subclaims.
E. Procedural Default/Intrusion on Attorney-Client Relationship
Mr. Jordan next claims the district court erred in applying procedural
default to his subclaim that the government intruded on attorney-client privilege
by monitoring communications in non-contact visiting booths at the prison where
he was incarcerated without disclosing the monitoring (Claim 2.g.). He argues he
did not discover this alleged violation until sentencing and therefore could not
have raised it on direct appeal because there was no factual record to consider.
He also contends the issue requires further factual development to determine
whether there is constitutional error.
To the extent Mr. Jordan is renewing his contention that Frady’s procedural
default rule does not apply when there is an insufficient record for consideration
-14-
of an issue on direct appeal (other than ineffective assistance of counsel), we
again decline to consider it because he has not shown “that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right.” Id. at 484. Thus, we deny a COA on this subclaim.
F. Merits of one Brady Subclaim
Finally, Mr. Jordan contends the district court erred in ruling on the merits
of one Brady subclaim relating to a lieutenant’s log book (Claim 1.a.). As with
his subclaim regarding trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present
Mr. Sablan’s testimony, Mr. Jordan contends that the log book would show that
the physician’s assistant, Mr. Erzouki, was mistaken about the time and location
of his examination of Mr. Jordan.
The district court concluded that the lieutenant’s log book was not material
under Brady for two reasons. First, defense counsel used other evidence at trial
to impeach Mr. Erzouki regarding the time and location of the examination, and
second, nothing in the undisclosed log book suggested Mr. Jordan could not have
made the “V” sign or stated to the other inmate, “Guy, I get him out of your
way.” We agree with the district court’s analysis and therefore deny a COA on
this subclaim.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. Jordan’s application for a
certificate of appealability and DISMISS his appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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