Carroll Ex Rel. AKC v. Lawton Independent School District No. 8

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS November 10, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
TED CARROLL and BELLA CARROLL,
individually and as parents and next friends
of AKC, a minor,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 14-6245
LAWTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 8; VICKIE CANTRELL,
individually; LYNN FITZ, individually;
JOHN WHITTINGTON, individually,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 5:13-CV-00407-M)
_________________________________
Courtney D. Powell, Lester, Loving & Davies, P.C., Edmond, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
Jerry A. Richardson, Rosenstein, Fist & Ringold, Tulsa, Oklahoma (Kent B. Rainey and
Staci L. Roberds, Rosenstein, Fist & Ringold, Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Charles E. Wade,
Wade & Mackey, Lawton, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), for Lawton Independent
School District No. 8, Defendant-Appellee.
Mark S. Rains, Mark Rains Attorney at Law PLLC, Jenks, Oklahoma, for Vickie
Cantrell, Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
McHUGH, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal arises from allegations that AKC, a child with autism, suffered
abuse at school by her special-education teacher, Vickie Cantrell. AKC’s parents,
Ted and Bella Carroll, filed suit in federal district court against Ms. Cantrell, the
school district, and others, seeking damages under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (the ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a
variety of state-law theories. The district court dismissed the Carrolls’ federal claims,
concluding the Carrolls had not exhausted their administrative remedies before filing
suit as required by section 1415(l) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(the IDEA). The district court then dismissed the Carrolls’ complaint, declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims. The Carrolls appeal.
The single issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in determining the
Carrolls’ federal claims were subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. Because
we conclude the Carrolls’ complaint alleges educational injuries that could be
redressed to some degree by the IDEA’s administrative remedies, we agree with the
district court that exhaustion of those remedies was required before the Carrolls could
file suit. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Carrolls’ complaint.
2
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
AKC is a minor child and a student at Pat Henry Elementary School, a public
school in Oklahoma’s Lawton Independent School District No. 8 (the School
District).1 Ms. Cantrell was AKC’s third-grade teacher at Pat Henry. AKC is autistic
and her autism impairs her ability to verbally communicate. She received education
assistance under the IDEA through an Individualized Education Program, or IEP.
In May 2012, the Carrolls discovered AKC had been injured at school. Upon
further inquiry, the Carrolls learned that Ms. Cantrell had “‘punished’ AKC by
pulling her undergarments so hard into a ‘wedgie’ that AKC’s underwear was torn”
and that AKC “had been placed in a dark closet on previous occasions.” The Carrolls
were never previously informed of disciplinary issues involving AKC or told that
AKC had been disciplined.
As a result of the “punishments,” AKC now refuses to get out of the car to go
into the school building and becomes upset and agitated when she enters the school.
Once inside, she does not want to leave her parents’ side. The incident “damaged
AKC’s overall academic progress as well as her emotional health” and “[t]he impact
of these punishments, coupled with AKC’s autism, significantly altered AKC and her
ability to attend and participate in the educational process.” AKC’s academic
achievement has also been negatively impacted, and she will require tutoring to
1
Because this appeal is taken from the grant of a motion to dismiss, we recite
the facts as alleged in the Carrolls’ complaint and in the light most favorable to them.
Albers v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 771 F.3d 697, 699 n.1 (10th Cir. 2014).
3
return to her previous academic level. Since the incident, AKC has regularly acted
out against others and cannot participate in normal children’s activities like summer
day camp. AKC’s behavioral problems are so severe Mr. Carroll had to leave his job
to stay home and care for AKC.
B. Procedural History
The Carrolls filed suit, naming as defendants Ms. Cantrell, the School District,
and two other School District employees. The Carrolls asserted a range of state-law
claims against the defendants, including negligence, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, assault, battery, conspiracy, and violation of due process under
the Oklahoma Constitution. The Carrolls brought their federal claims under the ADA,
Rehabilitation Act, and § 1983 only against the School District. The Carrolls
requested compensatory damages including medical expenses and damages for pain
and suffering, punitive damages, and costs and expenses, including reasonable
attorney fees.
All defendants moved to dismiss. The district court first considered whether
the Carrolls’ federal claims were subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. The
district court concluded the Carrolls’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims alleged
educational injuries and that exhaustion was therefore necessary. But the district
court concluded the Carrolls’ § 1983 claim was premised only on the physical
injuries suffered by AKC and that exhaustion was not required as to that claim. Thus,
the district court dismissed the Carrolls’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against
the School District for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, concluding it
4
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the unexhausted claims. The district court
then dismissed the remainder of the Carrolls’ claims for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, with the exception of an unchallenged negligence
claim against the School District. But the district court gave the Carrolls leave to
amend their § 1983 and Oklahoma Constitutional claims against the School District
and their assault, battery, and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims
against Ms. Cantrell.2
The Carrolls amended their complaint to allege additional facts in support of
their claims against the School District and Ms. Cantrell, and the defendants again
moved to dismiss. The district court reevaluated the Carrolls’ § 1983 claim in light of
the amendments to the complaint, concluding that “even though generally alleged,
plaintiffs have alleged educational harms requiring plaintiffs to exhaust their
administrative remedies under the IDEA.” The district court therefore dismissed the
Carrolls’ amended § 1983 claim for failure to exhaust. Having dismissed the last of
the Carrolls’ federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over their state-law claims and dismissed the Carrolls’ complaint.
III. DISCUSSION
The Carrolls argue the district court erred in dismissing their federal claims for
failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. They contend their claims as alleged
are not subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements or, in the alternative, that the
2
The district court did not give the Carrolls leave to amend their claims
against the School District employees other than Ms. Cantrell, and the Carrolls have
not challenged on appeal the dismissal of their claims against those defendants.
5
district court abused its discretion in denying them leave to allege additional facts
showing exhaustion or the futility of pursuing administrative relief.
A. The Carrolls’ Federal Claims Are Subject to the IDEA’s Exhaustion
Requirement.
“We review the denial or grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, applying the
same standard used by the district court.” Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
233 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). We accept
all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and view those
allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sutton v. Utah State
Sch. for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999).
1. Exhaustion Under the IDEA
The Carrolls first argue the district court erred in concluding that their ADA,
Rehabilitation Act, and § 1983 claims are subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion
requirement. The IDEA is a federal statute that “imposes obligations on the states to
provide certain benefits in exchange for federal funds.” Ellenberg v. N.M. Military
Inst., 478 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir. 2007). A state accepting such funding must
“ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate
public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to
meet their unique needs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Educational services must be
provided in accordance with the child’s IEP, which “sets forth the child’s present
performance level, goals and objectives, specific services that will enable the child to
meet those goals, and evaluation criteria and procedures to determine whether the
6
child has met the goals.” Ass’n for Cmty. Living in Colo. v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040,
1043 (10th Cir. 1993).
The IDEA also creates a mandatory administrative framework for resolution of
disputes over the education of children with disabilities: If a parent has a complaint
“with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such
child,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A), the IDEA entitles the parent to an “impartial due
process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the
local educational agency, as determined by State law or by the State educational
agency,” id. § 1415(f)(1)(A). If the parent is unsatisfied with the outcome of the due
process hearing, he or she “may appeal such findings and decision to the State
educational agency.” Id. § 1415(g)(1). These administrative remedies must be
exhausted before a civil action may be filed in district court under the ADA,
Rehabilitation Act, or “other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with
disabilities,” if the plaintiff “seek[s] relief that is also available under [the IDEA].”
Id. § 1415(l).
In interpreting § 1415(l), this court has read “available” relief to mean “relief
for the events, condition, or consequences of which the person complains, not
necessarily relief of the kind the person prefers or specifically seeks.” Padilla, 233
F.3d at 1274 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Our exhaustion inquiry
therefore focuses on “the source and nature of the alleged injuries for which he or she
seeks a remedy,” not the specific remedy sought. Id. Thus, “the dispositive question
7
generally is whether the plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be redressed to any
degree by the IDEA’s administrative procedures and remedies.” Id. “If so, exhaustion
of those remedies is required.” Id.; see also Cudjoe v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, 297
F.3d 1058, 1067 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[W]here the alleged injuries were educational in
nature and therefore presumptively redressable through the IDEA’s administrative
procedures . . . we would require exhaustion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
And “the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement will not be excused simply because,” as in
this case, “a plaintiff requests damages, which are ordinarily unavailable in
administrative hearings held pursuant to the statute, if his alleged injuries could be
redressed under the IDEA.” Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1066–67 (citations omitted). Finally,
we construe ambiguities in favor of exhaustion. In Padilla we explained, “Where the
IDEA’s ability to remedy a particular injury is unclear, exhaustion should be required
in order to give educational agencies an initial opportunity to ascertain and alleviate
the alleged problem.” 233 F.3d at 1274. By “focusing on whether there is any relief
available under the IDEA to remedy the injury, as opposed to the particular relief
sought by the plaintiff,” the IDEA process cannot be “short-circuited by a rush to
court seeking damages.” Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
2. The Carrolls’ Claims
We agree with the district court that the Carrolls have alleged educational
injuries that could be redressed to some degree by the IDEA’s administrative
remedies. The complaint alleges that Ms. Cantrell, AKC’s teacher, “‘punished’ AKC
8
by pulling her undergarments so hard into a ‘wedgie’ that AKC’s underwear was
torn” and that “in addition to the ‘wedgie’ punishment AKC had been placed in a
dark closet on previous occasions.” The complaint further alleges that, as a result of
these “punishments,” AKC “suffered and continues to suffer,” particularly with
respect to her education: AKC now refuses to get out of the car to go into the school
building and becomes upset and agitated as she enters the school. The punishments
“damaged AKC’s overall academic progress as well as her mental and emotional
health” and “[t]he impact of these punishments, coupled with AKC’s autism,
significantly altered AKC and her ability to attend and participate in the educational
process.” AKC’s academic achievement has also been negatively impacted and she
will require tutoring to return to her previous academic level. Finally, the complaint
alleges that “AKC was excluded from participating in and denied the benefits of the
educational programs offered by [the School] District.”
These allegations of injuries to AKC’s academic progress and access to
educational programs are unambiguously “educational in nature and therefore
presumptively redressable through the IDEA’s administrative procedures.” Cudjoe,
297 F.3d at 1067. Though not all of the injuries alleged in the complaint are
educational, the Carrolls have “alleged injuries that could be redressed to [some]
degree by the IDEA’s administrative procedures and remedies.” Padilla, 233 F.3d at
1274. The Carrolls therefore “seek[] relief that is also available under [the IDEA],”
and their federal claims are subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. 20 U.S.C.
9
§ 1415(l); Padilla, 233 F.3d at 1274. The Carrolls resist this conclusion in three
ways.
The Carrolls first argue “[e]xhaustion is not required where the complaint
alleges physical, non-educational injuries.” In Padilla, we concluded that, under the
“narrow circumstances” of that case, the plaintiff was not required to exhaust her
claims arising from a skull fracture she suffered while restrained in a windowless
closet without supervision. Id. at 1274. We noted the plaintiff sought “damages
solely to redress the fractured skull and other physical injuries she suffered” and
made “no complaints regarding her current educational situation.” Id. We also
observed “she expressly attests that her new school meets her educational needs and
that she presently receives the full benefits of a free and appropriate education in an
integrated, least restrictive educational environment.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Under these circumstances, we reasoned that the IDEA’s administrative
remedies, which are targeted at providing prospective educational benefits, could
provide no relief for the plaintiff’s “severe physical, and completely non-educational,
injuries.” Id.
Here, as discussed above, the Carrolls have alleged a number of “complaints
regarding [AKC’s] current educational situation.” Id. at 1274. The IDEA’s
prospective educational benefits are presumptively well suited to remedy the alleged
educational injuries. Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1067. Thus, unlike Padilla, this is not a case
involving solely “severe physical, and completely non-educational, injuries” for
which the IDEA can offer no remedy. Padilla, 233 F.3d at 1274. The allegation of
10
educational injuries removes this case from the “narrow circumstances” that we
concluded made exhaustion unnecessary in Padilla. Id. While the School District
may not ultimately succeed in remedying all of the injuries alleged through the
administrative process, it must be given “an initial opportunity to ascertain and
alleviate the alleged problem.” Id.
Next, the Carrolls argue that “[f]or the exhaustion requirements to be
triggered, there must be an ‘educational source’ and an ‘adverse education[al]
consequence.’” See Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1067 (observing that “courts consistently
have required exhaustion for alleged acts that both have an educational source and an
adverse educational consequence” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The IDEA
offers redress for claims whose genesis and manifestation . . . are educational.” Id.(omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Carrolls contend
exhaustion is not required here because their claims arise from Ms. Cantrell’s
conduct in “punish[ing]” AKC, rather than “from some allegation that the education
or services rendered by the [School] District are inadequate.”
However, the Carrolls’ attempt to limit the IDEA’s reach to claims of
inadequate provision of educational services is inconsistent with our case law. We
have long recognized a “close relationship between the use of discipline and in-class
instruction in providing a child with a ‘free appropriate public education.’” Hayes ex
rel. Hayes v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 377, 877 F.2d 809, 813 (10th Cir. 1989). In
Hayes we rejected the argument that disciplinary measures did not involve the
provision of a “free appropriate public education” and that they thus fell outside the
11
scope of the IDEA’s predecessor, the Education of the Handicapped Act. Id. at 812–
13. We observed that the statute provides administrative remedies “‘with respect to
any matter relating to . . . the provision of a free appropriate public education.’” Id.
at 813 (emphasis in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E)). Concluding that
“[p]roper conduct and education are inextricably intertwined,” we held that
“discipline of a child in the classroom . . . is a matter that relates to the public
education of a handicapped child and that therefore falls within the scope of the
[IDEA].” See id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, we cannot agree the allegations of classroom discipline here—that AKC
was “punished” by her teacher, at school and during the school day—do not
constitute an “educational source” for AKC’s injuries.
Last, the Carrolls argue they are excepted or excused from the exhaustion
requirement under the facts of this case. Exhaustion under the IDEA is not required
“when administrative remedies would be futile, when they would fail to provide
relief, or when an agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general[]
applicability that is contrary to the law.” Urban ex rel. Urban v. Jefferson Cty. Sch.
Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 724 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). But
unless the case “falls within one of the three exceptions, [plaintiffs are] not entitled to
judicial review . . . absent exhaustion of [the IDEA’s] administrative remedies.” Id.The Carrolls contend “[e]xhaustion in this case not only fails to provide relief
but would be futile.” But in raising this argument they merely restate their position
that they are seeking damages for Ms. Cantrell’s conduct rather than “a failed or
12
flawed IEP.” As explained above, our interpretation of the IDEA is broad enough to
reach Ms. Cantrell’s conduct in this case, and the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is
not limited to challenges to a child’s IEP. Nor does the Carrolls’ request for only
damages render futile a consideration of AKC’s educational injuries in the
administrative process. While damages are normally unavailable through the
administrative process, Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1066, the School District may be able to
provide other relief for AKC’s educational injuries. And it is entitled to make that
effort before being exposed to a lawsuit for damages. Id. at 1065. The Carrolls do not
otherwise explain why it would be futile to request relief through the administrative
process for the injuries alleged in their complaint—injuries we have determined are,
for the most part, educational and therefore presumptively redressable through the
IDEA’s administrative process—or why no relief for these injuries could be obtained
through that process. We are therefore not convinced the Carrolls’ claims fall within
one of the enumerated exceptions to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements.
In summary, the Carrolls have alleged that AKC’s educational progress has
been impeded, that she has been excluded from access to educational programs, and
that she will require remedial education in the form of tutoring to return to her proper
academic level. Under the IDEA, the school is entitled to “at least the first crack at
formulating a plan to overcome the consequences of educational shortfalls.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Carrolls were required to exhaust their
13
administrative remedies before bringing their claims in the district court.3 The district
court therefore properly dismissed the Carrolls’ federal claims seeking relief “also
available” under the IDEA.4
Our disposition of this argument also resolves the Carrolls’ claim that the
district court erred in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
Carrolls’ state-law claims. That claim is premised upon a conclusion that the district
court’s dismissal of the Carrolls’ federal claims was erroneous, and the Carrolls
argue only that it would be error for the district court to decline supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims while adjudicating the federal claims. Because
we conclude the district court correctly dismissed the Carrolls’ federal claims, it did
not abuse its discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
3
The Carrolls also argue that requiring them to exhaust their administrative
remedies violates AKC’s right to equal protection. Specifically, they contend that
“[r]equiring exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative requirements when there is no
educational source to trigger the IDEA places additional burdens on AKC because of
her disability.” As discussed, the Carrolls have alleged educational injuries for which
relief is available under the IDEA. Thus, contrary to the Carrolls’ argument, there is
an “educational source to trigger the IDEA.” The Carrolls do not argue the broader
issue of whether the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is constitutional when otherwise
validly applied, and we therefore decline to address it.
4
The parties dispute whether the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is a
jurisdictional requisite or an affirmative defense. However, as we have previously
recognized, this characterization “is important . . . only when the defendant has
waived or forfeited the issue.” McQueen ex rel. McQueen v. Colo. Springs Sch. Dist.
No. 11, 488 F.3d 868, 873 (10th Cir. 2007); accord Muskrat v. Deer Creek Pub. Sch.,
715 F.3d 775, 784 (10th Cir. 2013) (concluding “IDEA exhaustion’s status as a
jurisdictional prerequisite is not at issue” because the defendants raised IDEA
exhaustion below and on appeal). Because the School District here raised the
exhaustion requirement in its motion to dismiss and has renewed that argument on
appeal, we need not decide whether exhaustion is jurisdictional because the result is
the same in either case.
14
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The district court therefore did not err in
dismissing the Carrolls’ complaint.
B. The District Court Properly Denied the Carrolls’ Request for Leave to Amend.
Last, the Carrolls argue the district court abused its discretion by denying their
request for leave to amend their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. They assert that,
had they been given leave to amend, “additional facts would have been alleged
regarding meetings with numerous District officials regarding the abuse; a police
investigation into the abuse; and multiple meetings with various District employees
relating to AKC’s IEP after the abuse occurred.” Relying on Muskrat v. Deer Creek
Public Schools, 715 F.3d 775 (10th Cir. 2013), the Carrolls contend these allegations
would have supported a claim that the exhaustion requirement was satisfied or
excused despite their failure to request a due process hearing or otherwise comply
with IDEA’s specific procedures.
Leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(2). We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of leave to
amend. Albers v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Jefferson Cty., Colo., 771 F.3d 697, 700–01
(10th Cir. 2014). We conclude the Carrolls have failed to demonstrate an abuse of the
district court’s discretion for two reasons.
First, the Carrolls never moved for leave to amend their complaint but rather
asked for leave to amend as an alternative to dismissal in their opposition to the
School District’s motion to dismiss. “Rule 7 requires a request for relief to be made
by a motion that (1) is in writing, (2) ‘states with particularity the grounds for
15
seeking the order,’ and (3) specifies the relief sought.” Albers, 771 F.3d at 706
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)). “We have recognized the importance of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 7(b) and have held that normally a court need not grant leave to amend when
a party fails to file a formal motion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Second, and more fundamentally, the Carrolls failed to identify the specific
factual allegations they would allege in an amended complaint. “[A] bare request to
amend in response to a motion to dismiss is insufficient to place the court and
opposing parties on notice of the plaintiff’s request to amend and the particular
grounds upon which such a request would be based.” Id. Rather, the plaintiff must
“specify the new factual allegations that would correct the defects in their
[complaint].” Id. In seeking leave to amend below, the Carrolls stated, “If Plaintiffs
were granted . . . leave to amend, additional facts would be alleged regarding
meetings with numerous District officials regarding the abuse; a police investigation
into the abuse; and multiple meetings with various District employees relating to
AKC’s IEP after the abuse occurred.” The Carrolls present a functionally identical
assertion in their appellate briefing. But nowhere have they set forth the specific
factual allegations that would establish exhaustion or an exception thereto.
The Carrolls’ reliance on Muskrat to support their argument that they
effectively exhausted their administrative remedies is misplaced. In Muskrat, the
record demonstrated the plaintiffs had “worked through administrative channels to
obtain the relief they sought,” conferred with school staff, and obtained a favorable
modification to their child’s IEP as a result of their efforts. 715 F.3d at 786. The
16
court concluded that, “given the steps the Muskrats took and the relief they obtained,
it would have been futile to then force them to request a formal due process hearing
. . . simply to preserve their damages claim.” Id. Thus, in Muskrat, the plaintiffs had
already obtained all of the relief they could from the administrative process, and any
further administrative proceedings regarding their remaining damages claim would
be futile because damages are not available through the administrative process.
Here, the Carrolls merely set forth categories of allegations that could be
pleaded; they did not present the district court with any specific factual allegations
regarding the administrative steps already taken to obtain relief. Nor did they identify
any specific allegations to demonstrate that, like Muskrat, they had obtained all of the
educational relief available under the IDEA’s administrative regime and therefore
further exhaustion would be futile. Their appellate briefs fare no better on this score,
reciting the same assertions without detailing any factual allegations. Because the
Carrolls have “fail[ed] to specify the new factual allegations that would correct the
defects in their [complaint],” the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
their informal request for leave to amend contained in their opposition to the
District’s motion to dismiss. See Albers, 771 F.3d at 706.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Carrolls’ complaint alleges educational injuries that could be redressed to
some degree by pursuing the IDEA’s administrative remedies. The Carrolls’ federal
claims are therefore subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement, and the district
court did not err in dismissing those claims or abuse its discretion in declining
17
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Because the Carrolls
failed to identify the new allegations that would allegedly correct the defects in their
complaint, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion to
amend. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Carrolls’ complaint.
18