Document Info

DocketNumber: 15-3230

Citation Numbers: 657 F. App'x 793

Judges: Tymkovich, Bacharach, Moritz

Filed Date: 8/3/2016

Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024

  •                                                                                   FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           August 3, 2016
    _________________________________
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    JOSEPH R. TOMELLERI,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                          No. 15-3230
    (D.C. No. 2:14-CV-02113-JAR-GEB)
    MEDL MOBILE, INC.,                                            (D. Kan.)
    Defendant - Appellee,
    and
    JASON SINISCALCHI,
    Defendant.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    _________________________________
    Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BACHARACH and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Joseph R. Tomelleri appeals the district court’s order dismissing his claims
    against MEDL Mobile, Inc. for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
    except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
    may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    I. Background
    MEDL is a California company that develops software applications (“apps”)
    for mobile devices. With the help of Jason Siniscalchi, MEDL developed and
    marketed an app called FishID, which provides detailed profiles of U.S. fish species,
    as well as fishing information specific to each state.
    Tomelleri—a fish illustrator who lives in Kansas—sued MEDL and Siniscalchi
    in the District of Kansas for copyright infringement. Tomelleri alleged that MEDL
    and Siniscalchi incorporated a number of Tomelleri’s copyrighted fish illustrations in
    the FishID app without his permission. After giving the parties time to conduct
    jurisdictional discovery, the district court granted MEDL’s renewed motion to
    dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court found it did not have
    general personal jurisdiction over MEDL because the company did not have an office
    or agent in Kansas, had never sent an agent to Kansas for business purposes, did not
    advertise or have bank accounts in Kansas, and conducted only a small fraction of its
    business in Kansas. See Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 
    90 F.3d 1523
    , 1533 (10th Cir. 1996) (listing factors courts have considered in evaluating
    general jurisdiction).
    The district court also concluded it lacked specific personal
    jurisdiction. Applying the applicable two-part test, see Dudnikov v. Chalk &
    Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 
    514 F.3d 1063
    , 1071 (10th Cir. 2008), the court found
    (1) MEDL purposefully directed activities at residents of Kansas by including
    Kansas-specific features in the app (namely, maps of Kansas lakes and rivers and
    2
    links to Kansas fishing regulations); but (2) Tomelleri failed to show his injuries
    arose from those activities. Finally, the district court denied the parties’ alternative
    request to transfer the action to the Central District of California.
    II. Legal Standard
    Where, as here, a district court dismisses for lack of personal jurisdiction
    based only on the complaint and affidavits, we review its decision de novo. Shrader
    v. Biddinger, 
    633 F.3d 1235
    , 1239 (10th Cir. 2011). We assume all well-pled facts
    alleged in the complaint are true and resolve all factual disputes in the plaintiff’s
    favor. 
    Id. It is
    the plaintiff’s burden to establish personal jurisdiction. 
    Id. At this
    stage,
    he satisfies this burden by making a prima facie showing that jurisdiction is proper.
    
    Id. Serving a
    summons establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant when
    authorized by federal statute or when the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of
    courts in the state where the district court is located. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A),
    (C). Tomelleri sued MEDL under the Copyright Act, which does not provide for
    nationwide service of process. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332. The Kansas long-arm
    statute supports personal jurisdiction to the extent constitutionally permitted, Kan.
    Stat. Ann. § 60-308(b), so we must determine whether the exercise of personal
    jurisdiction comports with due process, 
    Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1239
    .
    To exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, due process requires the
    defendant to “have ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state, such that having to
    3
    defend a lawsuit there would not ‘offend traditional notions of fair play and
    substantial justice.’” 
    Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070
    (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
    Washington, 
    326 U.S. 310
    , 316 (1945)). The “minimum contacts” requirement can
    be met in one of two ways. First, a court can exercise general jurisdiction over an
    out-of-state company to hear any claim against it if the company’s “affiliations with
    the State are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the
    forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
    564 U.S. 915
    , 919
    (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, a court can assert specific
    jurisdiction if the plaintiff shows (1) the out-of-state company has “purposefully
    directed its activities at residents of the forum state,” and (2) the plaintiff’s injuries
    arose out of the company’s forum-related activities (known as the “nexus”
    requirement). 
    Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    III. Analysis
    Tomelleri does not dispute the district court’s determination that it lacked
    general jurisdiction, but he challenges the court’s finding that he failed to establish
    specific jurisdiction. In particular, Tomelleri argues the district court erred by
    reaching the nexus issue and concluding he failed to satisfy the nexus requirement.
    Tomelleri also claims the district court erred by denying his alternative request to
    transfer. We disagree.
    A. The district court did not err by reaching the nexus issue.
    Tomelleri claims the district court should not have considered whether his
    injuries arose out of MEDL’s Kansas-related activities because MEDL failed to argue
    4
    the issue in its renewed motion to dismiss. We agree with Tomelleri that courts, as
    neutral arbiters, rely on the parties to frame the issues. Greenlaw v. United States,
    
    554 U.S. 237
    , 243 (2008). But “[w]hen an issue or claim is properly before the court,
    the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties.”
    Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 
    500 U.S. 90
    , 99 (1991). Rather, the court “retains
    the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing
    law.” 
    Id. This allows
    the court to “consider an issue antecedent to and ultimately
    dispositive of the dispute before it, even an issue the parties fail to identify and
    brief.” U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 
    508 U.S. 439
    , 447
    (1993) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).
    MEDL argued in its renewed motion to dismiss that Tomelleri failed to
    establish specific jurisdiction. It also cited the controlling legal standard, which
    required Tomelleri to show that (1) MEDL purposefully directed activities at Kansas
    residents and (2) Tomelleri’s injuries arose out of those activities. MEDL focused its
    argument on the first requirement, but it did not concede the second (indeed, doing so
    would have been inconsistent with its argument that it did not direct activities at
    Kansas residents to begin with). Whether Tomelleri satisfied the requirements of
    specific jurisdiction was therefore properly before the court, and it was his burden to
    show that both requirements were satisfied, see 
    Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1069
    . The
    district court did not err by holding Tomelleri to that burden.
    5
    B. The district court did not err by finding that Tomelleri failed to show
    his injuries arose out of MEDL’s Kansas-related activities.
    Tomelleri argues that he satisfied his burden of showing that his injuries arose
    out of MEDL’s Kansas-related activities. Although we have not selected a test to
    determine when this requirement is met, we have considered two approaches used by
    other courts: but-for causation and proximate cause. 
    Id. at 1078.
    A plaintiff satisfies
    the but-for standard if he shows the defendant’s forum-related activities were an
    “event in the causal chain leading to the plaintiff’s injury.” 
    Id. The proximate
    cause
    standard, “by contrast, is considerably more restrictive and calls for courts to
    examine[] whether any of the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant to the
    merits of the plaintiff’s claim.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). The district
    court held that Tomelleri failed under either standard, and we agree.
    Tomelleri failed to show that MEDL’s Kansas-related activities—including
    maps of Kansas waters and links to Kansas fishing regulations in the app—led to his
    injury. The primary injury Tomelleri identifies in his complaint is lost licensing
    revenue. But Tomelleri does not explain how the app’s Kansas-specific features
    caused him to lose revenue. He does not claim his illustrations were used only in
    conjunction with the app’s Kansas-specific features, which are separate from the
    app’s profiles of fish species. Nor does Tomelleri allege that any Kansas residents
    bought or used the app. In short, it appears Tomelleri would be in no different
    position if MEDL eliminated the app’s Kansas-specific features entirely. Because
    6
    Tomelleri fails to satisfy the but-for standard, he necessarily fails the more restrictive
    proximate cause standard.
    C. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Tomelleri’s
    alternative request to transfer.
    Finally, Tomelleri argues the district court erred by denying his alternative
    request to transfer the case to the Central District of California, where MEDL’s
    offices are located. Courts have discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 to cure
    jurisdictional defects by transferring a case to a district where it could have been
    brought. Trujillo v. Williams, 
    465 F.3d 1210
    , 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2006). We review a
    transfer decision for abuse of discretion. 
    Id. at 1223.
    The district court denied Tomelleri’s transfer request because it found that
    while the Central District of California may have personal jurisdiction over MEDL,
    there was no assurance it had jurisdiction over Siniscalchi, who lived in Connecticut.
    As the district court noted, there is “a patent impediment” to transfer when there is
    “no single court to which the action could be transferred with any assurance that
    jurisdiction would [be] proper.” 
    Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1249
    . When this is true,
    transfer may not even be permitted, much less required. See 
    id. at 1249-50.
    Tomelleri argues the district court should have resolved this impediment by
    granting Siniscalchi’s then-pending motion to dismiss and transferring Tomelleri’s
    remaining claims against MEDL. But Tomelleri did not ask the court to do this, and
    effectively prevented it from doing so by obtaining leave to respond to Siniscalchi’s
    motion to dismiss after the court ruled on MEDL’s motion.
    7
    Because there was no assurance the Central District of California would have
    personal jurisdiction over both defendants, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion by denying Tomelleri’s transfer request.
    IV. Conclusion
    We affirm the district court’s order.
    Entered for the Court
    Timothy M. Tymkovich
    Chief Judge
    8