United States v. Gabriele

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 27 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-1171
(D.C. No. 94-CB-2624)
SCOTT GABRIELE, (D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Defendant,
who was charged along with others in an eighty-one count indictment alleging
various actions intended to defraud the United States, pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two counts of making false
statements to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Defendant’s sentence included an order to pay
restitution of $100,000, which defendant challenged on direct appeal. We upheld
the restitution order in United States v. Gabriele, 24 F.3d 68 (10th Cir. 1994).
In his § 2255 motion, defendant contended that his trial counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance in four respects: (1) counsel failed to
inform defendant of, or to object to the fact that, the counts to which defendant
pled guilty were multiplicious; (2) counsel failed to inform defendant of, or to
object to the fact that, the two false statement counts were really a single offense;
(3) counsel failed to object to the loss calculation contained in the presentence
report (PSR); and (4) counsel failed to object to the district court entering what
amounted to an illegal restitution order. The district court denied relief and this
appeal followed. 1
1
In his opening brief on appeal, defendant attempts to incorporate by
reference everything he filed in the district court and to defer addressing the
(continued...)
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When reviewing the denial of a § 2255 motion, we review the district
court’s legal rulings de novo and its findings for clear error. United States v.
Cox, 83 F.3d 336, 338 (10th Cir. 1996). “A claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact which we review de novo.”
Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519, 1523 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
936 (1996). Because ineffective assistance claims are properly raised in collateral
proceedings, defendant’s failure to raise the claims on direct appeal does not bar
our consideration of them. See United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th
Cir. 1996).
To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must
demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and
that the deficient performance was prejudicial. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984). Counsel’s failure to raise issues that have no merit
“does not constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance.” United States v.
Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 393 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation and citation omitted).
1
(...continued)
issues in depth until his reply brief. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 2. Neither
practice is acceptable. See Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992)
(holding that pro se litigants must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern
other litigants”); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1430 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding that issues cannot be preserved by reference to documents filed in
the district court; issues must be argued to be preserved); Codner v. United States,
17 F.3d 1331, 1332 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that issues raised for first time
in reply brief will not be considered on merits).
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We agree with the district court that counsel’s failure to object to the
indictment, either on the ground that the conspiracy and false statement counts
were multiplicious, or on the ground that the two false statement counts
constituted a single offense, was not constitutionally deficient. One of the
functions of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to “protect[] against multiple
punishments for the same offense. . . . [M]ultiplicity occurs when more than one
count of an indictment cover the same criminal behavior. To support a claim for
double jeopardy, a defendant must show that the two offenses charged are in law
and in fact the same offense.” United States v. Richardson, 86 F.3d 1537, 1551-
52 (10th Cir.) (quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 588
(1996). “Whether conduct supports two offenses or only one turns on whether
each count requires proof of a fact or element not required by the other.” United
States v. Pace, 981 F.2d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted).
Because the § 371 conspiracy count and the § 1001 false statement counts each
required proof of an element not contained in the other, see, e.g., United States v.
Nall, 949 F.2d 301, 305 (10th Cir. 1991) (setting forth elements of § 371
conspiracy); United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 675-76 (10th Cir. 1981)
(setting forth elements of § 1001 false statement offense), the counts were not
multiplicious, and, therefore, any objection by counsel to this effect would have
been without merit.
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Likewise, an objection to the two false statement counts on the ground that
they constitute a single offense would have been without merit. Each count
related to a separate application that defendant submitted to HUD containing false
statements. That the two applications were mailed to HUD in the same envelope
does not prevent their being the subject of two separate § 1001 counts. “[T]he
statute aims at the making or using of each ‘false writing or document’ and
intends the wrong connected with each to be a separate offense,” even if the
documents are submitted to the agency at the same time. United States v.
Bettenhausen, 499 F.2d 1223, 1234 (10th Cir. 1974).
Although defendant’s trial counsel made a general objection to the
assessment of any restitution against defendant, he did not make either of the two
specific objections defendant now contends counsel should have made. First,
counsel did not object to the amount of actual loss set forth in the PSR, which
was based on the money HUD lost when it sold the properties on which it had
insured the loans. We have held that trial counsel’s failure to make a “dead-bang
winner” objection to a PSR may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance.
See United States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d 1048, 1056 (10th Cir. 1995). The objection
that defendant contends his counsel failed to advance here, however, is anything
but a “dead-bang winner.”
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Relying on our discussion in United States v. Haddock, 12 F.3d 950, 961
(10th Cir. 1993), about the proper assessment of loss to a lender that has been the
victim of bank fraud, defendant contends that, because the lenders who made the
HUD-insured loans at issue here were made whole once they foreclosed on the
properties securing the defaulted loans, turned those properties over to HUD, and
were paid the loan amounts insured by HUD, no actual loss resulted from
defendant’s conduct. Defendant’s argument, however, overlooks the crucial fact
that HUD was the ultimate victim of the offenses to which defendant pled guilty,
and that HUD suffered an actual loss when it sold the properties for less money
than it paid to the lenders who made the HUD-insured loans. See, e.g., United
States v. Miller, 962 F.2d 739, 743-44 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding sentence that
attributed to defendant amount of loss HUD suffered when money it recovered on
liquidation of property was less than what it paid lender that made HUD-insured
loan). Because defendant does not suggest that the loss calculation contained in
the PSR was otherwise in error, his counsel’s failure to object to the calculation
was not constitutionally ineffective.
Finally, defendant contends that the restitution order entered by the district
court was illegal in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hughey v. United
States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990), and, therefore, that counsel was constitutionally
ineffective in permitting the order to be entered. Defendant’s theory is as
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follows: The only losses that can be attributable to the conspiracy count are those
flowing from the specific acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy. The only
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy to which defendant pled guilty were the two
counts of making false statements. The PSR did not attribute any specific amount
of loss to the two admitted acts of making false statements. Therefore, no loss
can be attributed to the conspiracy count for purposes of ordering restitution.
Our opinion in United States v. Brewer, 983 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1993),
reveals the fallacy of defendant’s argument. In Brewer, we rejected the
defendants’ argument “that Hughey limit[ed] their restitution obligation to losses
caused by the specific conduct they contributed to the conspiracy” as follows:
Hughey stands solely for the proposition that restitution is limited to
losses caused by the conduct underlying the offense of conviction.
Here, the offense of conviction was a conspiracy and the underlying
conduct was Defendants’ agreement to participate in the plan to
defraud manufacturers with illegally redeemed coupons. When a
defendant is convicted of conspiracy, a district court’s restitution
order may encompass all losses resulting from the conspiracy.
983 F.2d at 184. As we noted on direct appeal of defendant’s sentence, the
district court’s order that defendant pay $100,000 in restitution on the conspiracy
count “represented a mere fraction of the victim’s loss.” United States v.
Gabriele, 24 F.3d at 73. Because defendant’s argument is without merit, his
counsel’s failure to raise the argument in district court was not constitutionally
deficient.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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