United States v. Wilfong

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 17, 2017
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 16-6342
v. (D.C. Nos. 5:16-CV-00217-F
and 5:11-CR-00192-F-1)
NEIL JASON WILFONG, (W.D. Oklahoma)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
_________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Neil Jason Wilfong, through counsel, appeals the district court’s order denying
his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), we deny Mr. Wilfong’s
application for a certificate of appealability (COA).1
BACKGROUND
On September 6, 2011, a federal grand jury charged Mr. Wilfong in a one-
count superseding indictment with possession of a firearm after a felony conviction
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Although Mr. Wilfong did not file an application for a COA in this court, we
construe his notice of appeal as a request for a COA. See 10th Cir. R. 22.1(A).
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On September 19, 2011, a jury found Mr.
Wilfong guilty of that charge.
Before sentencing, the United States notified Mr. Wilfong that it intended to
seek a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18
U.S.C. § 924(e). The ACCA sets a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for a
felon with three or more prior convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent
felony.” Id. The ACCA defines violent felony as a crime that is punishable by more
than one year in prison and that falls within one or more of the following categories:
(1) it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another” (the elements clause); (2) it “is burglary, arson, . . .
extortion, or involves use of explosives” (the enumerated-offenses clause); or (3) it
“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another” (the residual clause). Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).
The United States Probation Office determined Mr. Wilfong was subject to an
enhanced sentence based on a federal conviction for use of a telephone to make a
threat as to an explosive device, a state conviction for larceny from a person, and two
state convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon. Mr. Wilfong challenged the
use of the federal conviction and the state larceny conviction as bases for applying
the enhancement.
The court rejected Mr. Wilfong’s position and concluded that his federal
conviction for use of a telephone to make a threat as to an explosive device under 18
U.S.C. § 844(e) was a violent felony under the elements clause, and that his larceny
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conviction was a violent felony under the residual clause. The court then sentenced
Mr. Wilfong to 300 months’ imprisonment, followed by 5 years’ supervised release.
On direct appeal, we upheld his conviction and sentence. See United States v.
Wilfong, 528 F. App’x 814 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). Concerning whether a
sentencing enhancement was appropriate under the ACCA, Mr. Wilfong conceded on
appeal that his two convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon were violent
felonies. Id. at 820. Noting that only one additional violent-felony conviction was
needed to justify the enhancement, we held that Mr. Wilfong’s larceny conviction fell
within the ACCA’s residual clause. Id. at 820–21. We therefore did not address
whether Mr. Wilfong’s federal conviction under § 844(e) qualified as a violent felony
under the Act, leaving the district court’s conclusion undisturbed. We issued our
opinion on June 20, 2013, and our mandate on July 12, 2013, making Mr. Wilfong’s
conviction and sentence final.2
On March 4, 2016, Mr. Wilfong filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion based on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). In
Johnson, which issued on June 26, 2015, the Court held that imposing an enhanced
sentence under the ACCA’s residual clause violates the Due Process Clause because
the residual clause is impermissibly vague. Id. at 2557. The Court, however,
explicitly stated that its decision “does not call into question application of the
2
On September 17, 2015, Mr. Wilfong moved this court to recall the mandate
in view of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). We denied the motion
on September 25, 2015, concluding that Mr. Wilfong may only challenge the validity
of his sentence in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Mr. Wilfong then filed a petition for
writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied on February 28, 2016.
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[ACCA] to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act’s definition of a
violent felony.” Id. at 2563. The Court later made Johnson’s holding retroactive to
cases on collateral review in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016).
In its court-ordered response to Mr. Wilfong’s motion, the United States
conceded that Mr. Wilfong’s Johnson-based challenge to his larceny conviction was
timely under § 2255(f)(3). It also conceded that Mr. Wilfong’s larceny conviction is
no longer a violent felony after Johnson. But it maintained that Mr. Wilfong’s other
challenges to his convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon and his conviction
for using a telephone to make a threat as to an explosive device are time-barred
because they were brought more than one year after the date his judgment became
final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). The United States explained that Johnson did not
affect the elements or the enumerated clauses of the ACCA, and thus Mr. Wilfong
could not challenge his other three convictions under Johnson. And as a result, the
United States argued, Mr. Wilfong still had the three necessary predicate offenses to
justify an enhanced sentence under the ACCA. The United States also argued that,
even if the challenges were timely, Mr. Wilfong’s other convictions were violent
felonies under the ACCA.
The district court largely agreed with the United States. Relying on United
States v. Mitchell, 653 F. App’x 639 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished), the court first
ruled that Mr. Wilfong’s convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon qualify as
violent felonies under the elements clause. Moving to Mr. Wilfong’s federal
conviction under § 844(e), the court held:
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Because the court concluded [at sentencing] that [Mr. Wilfong’s]
conviction fell under the elements clause, the court concludes that
Johnson is not implicated and [Mr. Wilfong] cannot challenge his
federal prior conviction under Johnson. Such challenge would be barred
by the one-year time limitation set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Because
Johnson does not call into question the elements clause, see Johnson,
135 S. Ct. at [2]563, the court finds its previous ruling stands and
defendant has three prior convictions which qualify as violent felonies.
Thus, [Mr. Wilfong] is not entitled to § 2255 relief.
The district court then denied Mr. Wilfong a COA. And Mr. Wilfong now appeals.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mr. Wilfong does not contest the district court’s conclusion that his
convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon qualify as violent felonies under the
ACCA’s elements clause. He instead argues that his conviction for using a telephone
to make a threat as to an explosive device under 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) is not a violent
felony, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal based
on his appellate counsel’s failure to argue the sentencing court erred when it relied on
the underlying facts in the presentence report to define the elements of the § 844(e)
conviction. Mr. Wilfong concedes that his arguments hinge on whether his challenge
to the § 844(e) conviction is timely.
A prisoner challenging a district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
must obtain a COA as a jurisdictional prerequisite to proceed with an appeal. 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). We will issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). “The
petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529
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U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Because the issue here is timing, we may issue a COA only if
Mr. Wilfong’s argument on timeliness is at least reasonably debatable. See United
States v. Eaton, 614 F. App’x 380, 380 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (citing
Laurson v. Leyba, 507 F.3d 1230, 1232 (10th Cir. 2007)).
Mr. Wilfong would ordinarily have only one year to file his motion from “the
date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1).
That window has, of course, come and gone. Mr. Wilfong thus relies on § 2255(f)(3),
under which the one-year period runs from “the date on which the right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by
the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”
Mr. Wilfong argues that Johnson supplies the “right asserted” allowing the
one-year period to run from June 26, 2015, the date Johnson was decided. But we
agree with the district court that Johnson is not implicated because the sentencing
court concluded that Mr. Wilfong’s § 844(e) conviction is a violent felony under the
elements clause, not the residual clause. And the Court in Johnson only held that the
residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, explicitly stating that its “decision d[id]
not call into question application of the [ACCA] to the four enumerated offenses, or
the remainder of the Act’s definition of a violent felony.” 135 S. Ct. at 2563. Thus,
Johnson does not afford Mr. Wilfong the relief he seeks. See United States v. Taylor,
No. 16-6223, 2016 WL 7093905, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2016) (unpublished); In re
Encinias, 821 F.3d 1224, 1225 n.2 (10th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); United States v.
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Cherry, 641 F. App’x 829, 833 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished); Traxler v. United
States, No. 1:16-cv-747, 2016 WL 4536329, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2016).
Mr. Wilfong insists that 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) allows a prisoner to bring a claim
that his sentence “was in excess of the maximum authorized by law,” and it was only
after Johnson that the allegedly improper characterization of his § 844(e) conviction
made his § 922(g) sentence “in excess of the maximum authorized by law.” But Mr.
Wilfong’s § 844(e) conviction was not found to be a violent felony under the residual
clause. And he therefore cannot rely on Johnson to collaterally attack his sentence, or
to extend the one-year time limitation on bringing a § 2255 motion. His claim, filed
more than one year after the date his judgment of conviction became final, is time
barred. We decline to issue a COA, and dismiss this matter.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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