Ali v. Franklin

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 4, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MURTAZA ALI,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 13-6065
(D.C. No. 5:12-CV-00736-C)
ERIC FRANKLIN, Warden, (W.D. Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Murtaza Ali, an Oklahoma state prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of
his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Ali signed a letter with a number of other prisoners complaining about the
conditions of the prison in which they were housed. The letter was addressed to
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
various state officials and was sent by another prisoner. After prison officials were
informed of the letter, they determined that Mr. Ali had violated a provision of
Oklahoma prison policy OP-030117 regarding prisoner correspondence. That
provision states that “[o]utgoing correspondence may only contain mail from the
offender whose name appears on the envelope. Letters . . . from other parties to be
forwarded is prohibited.” OP-030117 § I(A)(4). But in lieu of bringing a formal
misconduct charge, a prison unit classification committee decided to demote
Mr. Ali’s credit-earning level pursuant to prison policy OP 060107. See OP 060107
§ I(A)(2)(a)(4) (stating that at the “discretion of staff” an offender must be assigned
level one status in place of filing misconduct charges). Mr. Ali thus went from a
credit-earning classification level four, earning 60 days per month of good time
credits, to level one, earning zero credits.1
After his grievances were denied, Mr. Ali filed a § 2241 petition in federal
court alleging that his demotion without a hearing violated his due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. He contended that the decision to demote his
credit-earning classification, in which he allegedly held a liberty interest, was
arbitrary and came only as retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. The
district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, which
determined that Mr. Ali did not hold a liberty interest in his credit-earning
1
Under Oklahoma law, the accrual of good time credits may result in the
prisoner’s early release.
-2-
classification level because the prison officials’ demotion was discretionary.
See Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007) (inmate’s
credit-earning classification implicates a liberty interest only if the demotion was
mandatory). The district court thus concluded there was no due process violation and
denied Mr. Ali’s petition.
Mr. Ali filed an application for a certificate of appealability, which this court
granted. We now review the merits of his appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Ali’s § 2241 petition de novo.
Abernathy v. Wandes, 713 F.3d 538, 544 (10th Cir. 2013). “The Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits states from depriving citizens of liberty without due process of
law.” Wilson v. Jones, 430 F.3d 1113, 1117 (10th Cir. 2005). In Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court held that prisoners are entitled to due
process before being subjected to disciplinary conduct that inevitably affects the
duration of their sentence. Id. at 484, 487.
To make a claim that he was entitled to due process before having his
credit-earning classification level reduced, Mr. Ali “must assert the infringement of a
protected liberty interest.” Fristoe v. Thompson, 144 F.3d 627, 630 (10th Cir. 1998).
“A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees
implicit in the word ‘liberty,’ or it may arise from an expectation or interest created
by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); see also
-3-
Ky. Dep’t. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989) (“[S]tate law may create
enforceable liberty interests in the prison setting.”). Mr. Ali argues that he had a
liberty interest in his credit-earning classification level in this case. We disagree.
In Wilson and Cardoso, we emphasized that the liberty-interest question in
cases involving prisoner credit-earning-level demotions turns on whether the
demotion itself was discretionary. In fact, we recently remanded a case involving
this petitioner after concluding his demotion implicated a liberty interest because the
demotion was mandatory, even though the underlying decision that triggered the
demotion was discretionary. See Ali v. Taylor, 528 F. App’x 918, 921 (10th Cir.
2013). But unlike the cases above, and despite contradictory language in the prison
policy that uses the words “mandatory” and “discretionary” in the same provision,2
the demotion itself was discretionary in this case. Mr. Ali’s demotion was not a
mandatory consequence of a prison policy, but was purely within the discretionary
decision-making authority of the unit classification committee. Thus, unlike in
Wilson and Ali, prison officials retained the discretion to allow Mr. Ali to avoid the
demotion. We therefore conclude that Mr. Ali did not have a liberty interest in his
credit-earning classification.
2
The provision reads: “Level 1 assignment is mandatory . . . at the discretion of
staff when an offender fails to address a deficiency (i.e. failure to maintain personal
hygiene or maintain living area, refusal or failure of a program, in lieu of a
misconduct).” OP 060107 § I(A)(2)(a)(4). Such tangled language creates
complications because the liberty-interest question depends on whether the demotion
is mandatory or discretionary.
-4-
To the extent Mr. Ali claims his First Amendment rights were violated, we
conclude he has failed to carry his burden of showing that the demotion was a result
of retaliation and not, as the prison claims and the evidence shows, because he
violated a policy that prohibits mail forwarding. See Beeler v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 783,
783 (10th Cir. 1964) (“Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding and the burden is upon the
petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to relief.”).
Mr. Ali fares no better with his request for an evidentiary hearing. A habeas
petitioner must show good cause for discovery by setting forth good reasons to
believe he can demonstrate entitlement to relief. Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540,
548 (10th Cir. 2010). But Mr. Ali has not suggested—must less demonstrated—that
an evidentiary hearing “would reveal anything the district court did not consider.”
See id.
Finally, to the extent that Mr. Ali argues prison officials violated Oklahoma
prison policy when they demoted him, we note that a § 2241 habeas petition is not
the proper mechanism for such a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (habeas relief is
available to state prisoners only for violations of the federal Constitution, a federal
statute, or a federal treaty).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
-5-