Sperry v. Maes

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 17, 2014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSElisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
TODD SPERRY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 13-1336
(D.C. No. 1:10-CV-03171-RPM)
JASON T. MAES, individually, and in his (D. Colo.)
official capacity as a detective with the
Castle Rock Police Department;
GEORGE ELDER, individually, and in
his official capacity as an officer with the
Castle Rock Police Department; TOWN
OF CASTLE ROCK COLORADO, a
municipality,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, HARTZ and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Todd Sperry filed claims against Castle Rock police officers Jason Maes
and George Elder and the Town of Castle Rock, Colorado for malicious prosecution in
violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for the failure to
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
recognize and accommodate a disability under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. We affirm.
I.
This case arises out of a criminal theft investigation conducted by the Town of
Castle Rock Police Department. Todd Sperry contends that the investigation and his
subsequent arrest were (1) in retaliation for prior complaints made by Sperry regarding
how the department investigated the car crash that killed his son, and (2) without probable
cause because the officers knew he was mentally disabled and unable to form the mens
rea required for the type of theft charged.
A. Factual background
On November 13, 2007, Todd Sperry’s son died in a one-car crash investigated by
the Castle Rock Police Department. Sperry, who is cognitively disabled and has trouble
reading and adding simple numbers, was greatly upset by the crash and by the resulting
police investigation. On the night of the crash, then-Castle Rock Police Chief Tony Lane
went to Sperry’s house because officers said Sperry was “kind of out of control” and
expressed concern he might hurt himself or somebody else. Aplee. Supp. App. at 403.
Lane stated that he did not know about Sperry’s mental disability at the time and that
Sperry’s reactions were not “unexpected or out of the ordinary” for someone who had just
lost a son. Id. Lane said he later heard that Sperry was “different” and sometimes
“mildly irrational” (though he would not go so far as to say “retarded”), but he was
2
primarily concerned with Sperry as a “potential threat to officer safety.” Id. at 403-04.
In the days after the crash, Sperry said he called Corporal Ty Petersen, an officer
with the Castle Rock Police Department, approximately 20 times to make complaints
about the investigation. According to Sperry, Petersen “threatened to arrest [him] for
interfering with his investigation” and demanded to see photographs that Sperry had taken
of the scene. Id. at 391. Sperry said “a lot of police came over asking for the photos” and
threatened him following the crash, but he was not able to identify most of them. Id.Police officers also took Sperry to a mental health facility several days after the accident.
Lane said everyone in the department knew about the fatal crash, but said he was
unaware of what officers knew about Sperry’s mental health other than some circulated
safety information. Specifically, a police lieutenant emailed the entire department shortly
after the accident to tell officers that Sperry was taken in for a mental health evaluation
and to advise them that Sperry had displayed aggressive behavior in the past.1 Id. at 462.
Sperry stated that the unnamed officers he interacted with “knew” about his disability
because his “family told them and I told them,” and “they said I wasn’t talking right.”
Aplee. Supp. App. at 385.
1
Sperry provided other emails from police officials regarding Sperry, but none
were addressed to the named defendants or the entire police force, so it is unclear to what
extent that information reached the officers who later investigated Sperry for theft. Those
emails placed an alert on Sperry’s residence as a potential threat to officer safety and
indicated that Sperry “has mental health issues,” can be “extremely vocal and boisterous
in his expressions” when not on medication, “easily angers and is difficult to reason
with,” and was still “very confrontational” as of November 16, 2007. Aplee. Supp. App.
at 463-66.
3
In February 2008, Sperry was issued a debit card by H&R Block containing his tax
refund. On or shortly before April 14, 2008, the card’s balance was -$76.56. Between
April 14, 2008, and June 6, 2008, Sperry used the card 73 times at a particular gas station
and made a total of $5,109.78 in purchases. Each time the credit card reader declined the
card and displayed a message that a bank authorization code was required, and each time
Sperry used what he said was his personal identification number (PIN), 1932, to make the
purchase.2 It is unknown whether Sperry understood that his debit card had a finite
balance or that his PIN was not a valid bank authorization code, but after a clerk
contacted the issuing bank on June 6, 2008, and informed Sperry that the debit card had
no money on it, Sperry never returned to the store.
Clifton Porter, an employee of the oil company affiliated with the gas station who
was familiar with the credit card system, investigated Sperry’s debit card charges for the
company and filed a police report with the Castle Rock Police Department on July 8,
2008. Officer George Elder took Porter’s statement that day, which detailed the charges
and Porter’s belief that the funds had been obtained illegally by Sperry “duping” the gas
station employees into letting him use an unauthorized code. Id. at 68, 78. Elder passed
the information he received from Porter on to a supervisor and did not conduct any
2
Clifton Porter, an employee of the oil company affiliated with the gas station,
stated that any combination of four numbers would work to “force” a sale through the
system, which assumes that the numbers come from the clerk calling a bank for
authorization.
4
further investigation into the matter.3 Elder said he did not know at any point that Sperry
was cognitively disabled.
Detective Jason Maes was assigned to follow up on Elder’s initial police report.
Maes said he had never met Sperry and did not know he had a mental disability. Sperry
disputed this in his deposition. Sperry identified Maes as someone who had previously
spoken with Sperry after the death of his son regarding a different arrest warrant and said,
“We know there’s something wrong with you. . . . You’re different. Did your mom drop
you when you were a baby.” Id. at 296. Sperry identified Maes not by his name tag, but
by appearance (“holes in his face”) and by the officer saying his name was “Maes” to
another person. Id.In performing his investigation, Maes reviewed the credit card receipts and
conducted a photo line-up with the two gas station clerks, both of whom identified Todd
Sperry as the suspect. Maes interviewed the clerks and said neither indicated Sperry
might have a mental disability, with both describing the debit card misuse as intentional.
After reviewing the receipts and records from H&R Block, Maes said he noticed multiple
days with multiple charges at the same place, which he believed based on his experience
to be “uncommon and highly suspect.” Id. at 301. Maes also said he considered it
3
Elder had conducted one prior investigation into Todd Sperry and his wife for
illegal dumping, but stated that he had never met either person and only made one phone
call to the house. He said he did not remember Sperry’s name when Porter filed his
report. Elder was reportedly the only African American officer in the Castle Rock Police
Department at the time, and Sperry stated that he never interacted with an officer of that
description.
5
“suspicious” that Sperry never returned to the gas station after June 6, 2008, despite being
a frequent customer for the previous two months. Id.Maes filed an arrest affidavit on September 4, 2008, and stated in a later affidavit
that he based his probable cause determination for the theft charge4 on the “totality of the
circumstances,” and that Sperry’s use of a code “was not as important as the fact that he
did in fact override the system and knowingly overcharge his account with a significant
sum.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 301-02, 324. However, his arrest affidavit does state that
Sperry “somehow obtained a pre-authorization code” to override the credit card system,
which Sperry disputes. Id. at 323. Maes said he did not uncover any information during
his investigation about Sperry having a mental disability or how that disability would
have influenced Sperry’s actions. Commander Tim Gorman stated that at the time of
Sperry’s arrest, the Castle Rock Police Department did not have formal policies for
dealing with suspects with particular disabilities other than deafness, but that the manual
was updated in or before 2010 to reflect the department’s requirement that patrol officers
4
The relevant Colorado theft statute reads:
(1) A person commits theft when he or she knowingly obtains, retains, or
exercises control over anything of value of another without authorization or
by threat or deception; or receives, loans money by pawn or pledge on, or
disposes of anything of value or belonging to another that he or she knows
or believes to have been stolen, and:
(a) Intends to deprive the other person permanently of the use or benefit of
the thing of value.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-401.
6
undergo crisis intervention training for interacting with individuals with mental health
disorders.5
Upon receipt of Maes’ arrest affidavit, the district attorney’s office filed a
complaint against Sperry and a motion for an arrest warrant, which the court granted.
Three separate prosecutors who worked on the case indicated that they believed that
probable cause existed to arrest Sperry for theft based on Maes’ arrest affidavit. Deputy
District Attorney Brittany Martin, who was working on the case in 2010 when the district
attorney’s office made the decision to dismiss the charges against Sperry, stated the
dismissal was due to “new information that led us to conclude that we might have some
difficulty in successfully proving the case to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt,” as well as
an agreement by Sperry to reimburse the gas station. Id. at 336.
B. Procedural history
After an initial timely complaint, Sperry filed a Third Amended Complaint on
September 19, 2011. That complaint named George Elder, Jason Maes, and the Town of
Castle Rock as defendants (the first two parties in their individual and official capacities).
Count 1 of Sperry’s complaint alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of due process, deprivations of liberty, and excessive force, which the district
court interpreted as a malicious prosecution claim. The violation allegedly stemmed from
the creation of “false police reports” by the named defendants and from the arrest
5
Crisis intervention training may have been available earlier than 2010 as optional
training, according to Elder’s statements.
7
affidavit created by Maes containing false information to “justify the unlawful purpose of
the credit card case in order to harass, discredit and harm Mr. Sperry.” Aplt. App. at 191-
92. The alleged false information related to whether Sperry knowingly used “1932” as a
pre-authorization code rather than as a PIN.
Count 2 of the complaint alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and corresponding Colorado state law. Sperry’s complaint alleged that the named
defendants and other members of the Castle Rock Police Department knew about his
disability based on comments purportedly made by officers, as well as the officers’
involvement in taking Sperry in for a mental health evaluation shortly after the death of
his son. The complaint stated that police officers attributed to Sperry the “nefarious and
brilliant ability to obtain and use a secret authorization code to deceive” the gas station
clerks and credit card company despite the officers’ alleged knowledge of his cognitive
disability. Id. at 194. Count 2 also alleged that the town is liable for failing to train its
police officers on how to interact with disabled suspects such as Sperry.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims, which the
district court granted. The court disposed of Sperry’s § 1983 claim against Elder on the
ground that Sperry did not show that Elder “caused his prosecution” by “exert[ing]
improper pressure or influence over the prosecutor or conceal[ing] or misrepresent[ing]
material facts to the prosecutor.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 507. The court also concluded,
based upon Elder’s lack of interaction with the Sperry family and the limited information
about Sperry known to have been circulated throughout the police department, that there
8
was insufficient evidence to indicate that Elder knew Sperry had a cognitive disability
that made him incapable of engaging in theft involving a debit account.
The court disposed of Sperry’s § 1983 claim against Maes by concluding that
Maes had probable cause to charge Sperry with theft and that nothing in the record
indicated Maes had knowledge that Sperry was unable to perform basic math skills and
could not understand a debit account. With regard to Sperry’s accusation that Maes made
a false statement in his arrest affidavit pertaining to Sperry’s use of a special authorization
code, the court ruled that even without that statement, the manner in which Sperry used
the debit card supported probable cause. Because both § 1983 claims against the officers
failed, the court concluded that any claim against the town under a municipal liability
theory is also subject to dismissal.6
The court disposed of Sperry’s ADA claims by concluding that neither of the two
proposed theories of Title II liability was applicable. With regard to the wrongful arrest
theory, the court concluded the circumstances of Sperry’s disability were not known by
the officers at the time Sperry was investigated for theft and that Sperry’s actions thus
reasonably appeared to be unlawful. On the reasonable accommodation theory, the court
noted that no statute or case law imposed a duty on officers to investigate whether a
disability exists, particularly when a suspect’s course of conduct does not manifest a
6
It is not clear from the Third Amended Complaint that Sperry made a municipal
liability claim against the town under § 1983 with regard to the alleged malicious
prosecution, but both the defendants and the district court appeared to construe the
complaint broadly to include such a claim.
9
mental disability. Lastly, the court refused to consider Sperry’s failure-to-train claim
under the ADA because it was not sufficiently fleshed out.
II.
On appeal, Sperry contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment
because it ignored genuine issues of material fact and did not resolve factual issues in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sperry argues such improper judicial
determinations of fact led to incorrect rulings on his § 1983 and ADA claims. Aplt. Br. at
2, 15-28.
We review grants of summary judgment de novo and “apply the same legal
standard used by the district court.” Toomer v. City Cab, 443 F.3d 1191, 1194 (10th Cir.
2006). “Summary judgment is proper if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “An issue is ‘genuine’ if there is sufficient
evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way.”
Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “An issue of fact is ‘material’ if under
the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim.” Id.For cases involving qualified immunity, however, the court reviews summary
judgment orders deciding such issues differently. Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128
(10th Cir. 2001). In particular, when a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing first, “that the defendant’s actions violated a
10
constitutional or statutory right,” and second, “that the right at issue was clearly
established at the time of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.” Id. at 1128 (citing Albright
v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995)).7 “If the plaintiff fails to carry either
part of his two-part burden, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.” Albright, 51
F.3d at 1535. If the plaintiff succeeds in carrying his burden, then the burden shifts to
“the defendant to show that there are no disputes of material fact as to whether his
conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law and the information
known to the defendant at the time.” Felders ex rel. Smedley v. Malcom, 755 F.3d 870,
877 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1131 (10th Cir. 1996)).
A. Malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983Although the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the
merits, we analyze this case in the context of qualified immunity. The defendants raised
the defense of qualified immunity in both their response to Sperry’s complaint and their
motion for summary judgment. “Because qualified immunity protects government
officials from suit as well as from liability, it is essential that qualified immunity claims
be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,
233-34 (1991) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Thus, we must
determine whether the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to Sperry,
demonstrates that there was a violation of his clearly established constitutional rights.
7
The Supreme Court decided in Pearson v. Callahan that courts may conduct the
analysis in either order. 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
11
Sperry argues his constitutional rights were violated by (1) Maes making material
false statements in his arrest affidavit pertaining to Sperry, (2) Elder and Maes omitting
material information about his mental disability in their report and arrest affidavit,
respectively, that would negate probable cause, and (3) Elder and Maes’ retaliatory
motives for investigating Sperry. Sperry is correct that this court considers material false
statements and omissions negating probable cause in a warrant to be clearly established
violations of the Fourth Amendment. Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1562 (10th Cir.
1996) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); Stewart v. Donges, 915
F.2d 572, 581-83 (10th Cir. 1990)). The absence of probable cause in particular is what
gives a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim its constitutional character.
More factors can be considered, however. We “take[ ] the common law elements
of malicious prosecution as the ‘starting point’ for the analysis of a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim, but always reach[ ] the ultimate question, which [we] must, of whether
the plaintiff has proven a constitutional violation.” Taylor, 82 F.3d at 1561 (emphasis in
original). The five elements typically considered in a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim
are: “(1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued confinement or prosecution; (2)
the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) there was no probable cause to
support the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted
with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages.” Novitsky v. City Of Aurora, 491
F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007). We analyze how these factors apply to Officers Elder
and Maes, in turn, and conclude that neither officer committed a constitutional violation.
12
1. Officer Elder
The district court concluded that Sperry’s complaint against Officer Elder failed on
the first element of a malicious prosecution claim because Elder’s limited involvement in
the investigation was not sufficient to show he “caused” Sperry’s prosecution. Sperry
argues on appeal that the district court improperly believed Elder’s statement that he did
not know Sperry had a disability and that Elder should have included his knowledge of
Sperry’s disability in his report. Even if this court were to go further in its factual
inferences in Sperry’s favor, as he desires, and assume that Elder knew Sperry had some
type of cognitive disability, Elder’s assignment in this case was to memorialize a victim’s
statement, not to investigate the crime or absolve Sperry.
As this court stated in Taylor, generally for police officers, “the chain of causation
[for a malicious prosecution claim] is broken by an indictment, absent an allegation of
pressure or influence exerted by the police officers, or knowing misstatements made by
the officers to the prosecutor.” 82 F.3d at 1564 (quoting Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d
1049 (7th Cir. 1996)). Elder did not make any knowing misstatements because the report
memorialized the statements of a victim for further investigation; none of Elder’s
“statements” were Elder’s own observations, and none went to the prosecutor directly.
Thus, Elder did not commit a constitutional violation and is entitled to qualified
immunity.
2. Officer Maes
13
Perhaps more crucially, both Officer Maes and Officer Elder are entitled to
qualified immunity because there was probable cause to support Sperry’s arrest. Sperry
argues on appeal that Maes did not have probable cause because Maes made material
misstatements in and omissions from his arrest affidavit regarding Sperry’s cognitive
disability and capacity to have the mens rea for theft. On the issue of false statements
within or omitted information from arrest affidavits, this court has stated:
Where false statements have been included in an arrest warrant
affidavit, the existence of probable cause is determined by
setting aside the false information and reviewing the remaining
contents of the affidavit. In a case involving information omitted
from an affidavit, the existence of probable cause is determined
by examining the affidavit as if the omitted information had
been included and inquiring if the affidavit would still have
given rise to probable cause for the warrant.
Wolford v. Lasater, 78 F.3d 484, 489 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Federal law requires that Maes knowingly or recklessly made a false statement.
Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. The only statements in the arrest affidavit that Sperry points
to as false are (1) Maes’ characterization that Mark Bigler of H&R Block stated Sperry
“must have” provided a pre-authorization code to the gas station attendants and (2) Maes’
statement that Sperry “somehow obtained a pre-authorization code.” Aplee. Supp. App.
at 322-23. Given that Porter stated that Sperry “scammed” the gas station employees and
repeatedly used the same “1932” code to override the system, and that Porter represented
himself as someone who knew the company’s credit card system well, Maes’ statements
14
in the arrest affidavit were plausible, non-reckless characterizations of the information he
gleaned from his investigation. Id. at 78.
Thus, it is questionable whether this information could be considered knowingly
false, but even construing it in that light, it is not material. “Probable cause exists where
‘the facts and circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)) (parentheticals in original).
Setting aside the two challenged statements, the arrest affidavit offers ample
evidence to indicate Sperry had engaged in theft, including but not limited to the high
number of transactions in a relatively brief period of time, the consistency of the
encounters, the victim statements, the statement from Bigler that Sperry should not have
been able to spend more than his refund with the card, and that Sperry never returned to
the gas station after the clerk who first checked with the bank told Sperry that the card
had no money on it. Moreover, all of the district attorneys who provided affidavits
indicated their own assessments of probable cause were based on the totality of the
circumstances, not just the use of a pre-authorization code. Thus, the statements in
question are not material to the probable cause determination.
Maes’ alleged omission is a slightly more challenging question. However, even
considering the record in the light most favorable to Sperry, there is no evidence that
15
Maes knew Sperry was incapable of understanding a bank account. It is also not clear
that an officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s unspecified cognitive disability would negate
probable cause. We have found no case standing for the proposition that an officer must
take a suspect’s potential mental disability into account in determining probable cause.8
Even someone who cannot manage his finances is capable of forming the mens rea for
theft, and Sperry’s repeated use of the debit card at the very least indicated that Sperry
understood that the card represented money and that he was receiving goods and services
by using it.
While it is possible that Maes could have uncovered Sperry’s alleged inability to
maintain his finances prior to requesting an arrest warrant, a police officer who has
reasonably concluded that probable cause exists to arrest a suspect is not required to
further investigate all possible defenses or claims of innocence. See Romero v. Fay, 45
F.3d 1472, 1477-78 (10th Cir. 1995). As one circuit court noted, “the practical restraints
on police in the field are greater with respect to ascertaining intent and, therefore, the
latitude accorded to officers considering the probable cause issue in the context of mens
rea crimes must be correspondingly great.” Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir.
2004). All the evidence Maes uncovered in his investigation pointed to probable cause
8
This lack of cases also indicates an omission of this kind is not “clearly
established” as a constitutional violation for purposes of qualified immunity. Kerns v.
Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1183 (10th Cir. 2011) (requiring the well-defined right be
established “beyond debate” based on existing Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent
or a significant number of cases from outside the circuit). See also Cortez v. McCauley,
478 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2007).
16
that Sperry intentionally committed theft, and Maes was not required to investigate the
extent of Sperry’s cognitive disability to negate that. To the extent Maes omitted
information about Sperry potentially having a cognitive disability, it is therefore not
material.
Thus, the existence of probable cause defeats Sperry’s claims that Officers Maes
and Elder violated his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With no
constitutional violations at issue, both officers are entitled to qualified immunity. As for
the remaining claim against the town, the district court correctly concluded that because
the malicious prosecution claims against Elder and Maes fail, any resulting municipal
liability for the Town of Castle Rock also fails. Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 239 F.3d
1150, 1154-56 (10th Cir. 2001).
B. ADA claim
Sperry argues this court’s decision in Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir.
1999), supports his claim that the Castle Rock police wrongfully arrested him after
misperceiving his disability as unlawful conduct. There, this court confirmed that the test
to apply in evaluating an ADA claim against police officers under Title II9 requires a
plaintiff prove:
(1) that he [or she] is a qualified individual with a disability;
(2) that he [or she] was either excluded from participation in or
9
The statutory language reads: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
17
denied the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs,
or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the
public entity; and
(3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was
by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.
Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1219, quoting Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 849 F. Supp. 1429, 1439
(D. Kan. 1994).
In Gohier, we discussed, but did not expressly adopt, two theories regarding police
accommodation of disabilities that other courts had proposed as circumstances in which
an individual may demonstrate they were denied the benefit of police services due to their
disability.
The first is that police wrongly arrested someone with a
disability because they misperceived the effects of that disability
as criminal activity. The second is that, while police properly
investigated and arrested a person with a disability for a crime
unrelated to that disability, they failed to reasonably
accommodate the person’s disability in the course of
investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer greater injury
or indignity in that process than other arrestees.
Id. at 1220-21 (citations omitted).
We need not go further here than we did in Gohier in discussing these theories
because Sperry has failed to meet the first prong of the test, which requires him to
demonstrate that he is a “qualified individual with a disability.” The ADA requires that a
person establish that he has or is regarded as having “a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). In
particular, we have held that the “substantially limits” portion of a disability claim must
18
indicate how a person’s disability affects him as “compared to the average person in the
general population” and that “courts must take into account: (1) the nature and severity of
the impairment; (2) the expected duration of the impairment; and (3) the permanent or
long term impact resulting from the impairment.” Sanchez v. Vilsack, 695 F.3d 1174,
1178 (10th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
In this case, there is not sufficient evidence in the record regarding Sperry’s
impairment such that we could adequately conduct this analysis, nor is Sperry’s disability
so obvious from the facts that we may assume it substantially limits a major life activity.
The extent to which Sperry pleaded his disability include statements in his Third
Amended Complaint that “The United States Social Security Administration has
classified Mr. Sperry as a person with a mental disability (mild retardation),” and “Mr.
Sperry is a disabled person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 & 12102 and
C.R.S. §§27-10.5-101 &102 [sic].” Aplt. App. at 177, 194. Of the evidence that appears
to have been available to the district court in the motion for summary judgment, only the
affidavit of a family friend provides any additional insight into Sperry’s disability.10
Adam Devone stated in the affidavit that “Todd is mentally challenged, has trouble
reading and adding simple numbers. Todd receives federal funds from the Social
Security Administration as a mentally disabled person. Todd’s disability is evident to the
10
On appeal, Sperry provides further documentation of his disability from the
Social Security Administration, but such evidence does not appear to have been before
the district court. Aplt. App. at 283-91. “In reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, we
will not consider evidence that was not before the district court.” Wilburn v. Mid-South
Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1281 (10th Cir. 2003).
19
average person, because of the way he talks and acts.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 415. Such
broad, bare assertions do not establish that Sperry is a qualified individual with a
disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
Even if this court could assume that Sperry is a qualified individual with a
disability under the ADA, there is similarly insufficient evidence that the Castle Rock
police officers knew about his disability to the extent of knowing that they must provide
an accommodation. “Before a public entity can be required under the ADA to provide a
disabled individual an auxiliary aid or service, a public entity must have knowledge of the
individual’s disability and the individual’s need for an accommodation.” Robertson v.
Las Animas Sheriff’s Dept., 500 F.3d 1185, 1196 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). As
discussed above, the evidence in the record shows that Castle Rock police officers had, at
best, only some knowledge that Sperry had an unspecified cognitive disability or
emotional disorder. In the context of police investigations, such an amorphous level of
knowledge does not impose on police officers the duty to further investigate the extent of
a suspect’s disability, particularly when all of the evidence uncovered indicates the
suspect’s behavior was intentional.
Thus, we decline to apply either theory of ADA liability for police officers
discussed in Gohier. With regard to Sperry’s failure-to-train claim, it must be noted that
Gohier only briefly noted the possibility of such a claim. 186 F.3d at 1222 (“Gohier
might have argued that Title II required Colorado Springs to better train its police officers
to recognize reported disturbances that are likely to involve persons with mental
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disabilities, and to investigate and arrest such persons in a manner reasonably
accommodating their disability”). Nonetheless, we do not have to determine whether
such a claim exists because, even assuming it does, Sperry has not demonstrated the
“deliberate indifference” required to prove a failure-to-train claim by showing that the
Town of Castle Rock was “on notice” of the need for “more or different training.” City
of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 397 (1989). Given the dearth of case law
on police investigations of people with cognitive disabilities, much less claims against
this town in particular, Castle Rock can hardly be considered to have had such notice.
Moreover, Sperry does not address what type of training police could or should be
required to undergo to better recognize and consider mental disabilities when conducting
investigations. The only training that Sperry points to as being available is crisis
intervention training, which pertains to police interactions with mentally ill suspects in
high-intensity situations, not routine criminal investigations.
Thus, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Sperry’s ADA
claims against Maes, Elder, and the Town of Castle Rock must also fail.
III.
For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to Elder, Maes, and the Town of Castle Rock is AFFIRMED. Sperry’s motion
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to file a supplemental appendix is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
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