United States v. Bragg

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 13, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Nos. 13-6167 & 13-6168
(D.C. Nos. 5:12-CR-00065-D-1 &
JOHNNIE RAY BRAGG, JR., 5:13-CR-00032-D-1)
(W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before HARTZ, O’BRIEN, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
After entering into a plea agreement that included a waiver of his right to
appeal, Johnnie Ray Bragg, Jr. pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute and distribution of ecstasy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 846,
and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(h). Before his sentencing, he sent a threatening letter to a cooperating
*
This panel has determined that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment
is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
witness. As a result, he accepted another plea agreement with an appeal waiver and
pleaded guilty to one count of witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b)(1). At a joint sentencing, in the first case the district court ordered him to
serve 480 months of imprisonment. Then, in the second case, it imposed a
consecutive sentence of 46 months of imprisonment. Mr. Bragg appealed in both
cases. The government has moved to enforce both appeal waivers under United
States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325, 1328 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam).
Hahn sets forth three factors to evaluate an appeal waiver: “(1) whether the
disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether
the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether
enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1325.
Appeal No. 13-6167
Appeal No. 13-6167 arises from the first case, the drug-conspiracy and
money-laundering convictions that resulted in the 480-month sentence. In response
to the motion to enforce in this appeal, Mr. Bragg argues that none of the Hahn
factors are satisfied because his counsel was ineffective. He asserts that issues
regarding counsel’s performance are outside the scope of the appeal waiver; his
acceptance of the plea agreement was not knowing and voluntary because counsel did
not adequately explain the government’s case against him and made
misrepresentations to him; and ineffective assistance of counsel satisfies Hahn’s
definition of a miscarriage of justice.
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A defendant cannot waive “ineffective assistance of counsel claims
challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver.” United States v. Cockerham,
237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). The docketing statement filed in this appeal,
however, indicates that Mr. Bragg seeks to raise other issues, including challenges to
the Guidelines calculations and the district court’s sentencing decisions. These
issues fit within the broad scope of the appeal waiver, which provides that Mr. Bragg
will not “[a]ppeal . . . his guilty plea, sentence and restitution imposed, and any other
aspect of his conviction” or “[a]ppeal . . . his sentence as imposed by the Court and
the manner in which the sentence is determined, provided the sentence is within or
below the advisory guideline range determined by the Court to apply to this case.”
Mot. to Enforce, Attach. I-1 at 9.
Mr. Bragg also relies on his ineffective-assistance allegations in discussing the
other Hahn factors. He acknowledges that ineffective-assistance claims generally
should be brought in a collateral attack, rather than on direct appeal. See United
States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). This rule applies
even when a defendant seeks to invalidate an appeal waiver based on ineffective
assistance of counsel. See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.
2005); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 n.13. Mr. Bragg nevertheless asserts that this court
should hear his claim in this direct appeal because “the issue was raised to the district
court and was ruled upon by the district court and a sufficient factual record exists.”
Aplt. Resp. at 8; see United States v. Flood, 635 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2011)
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(“[T]his court has considered ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct
appeal in limited circumstances, but only where the issue was raised before and ruled
upon by the district court and a sufficient factual record exists.”). The record,
however, urges otherwise.
First, Mr. Bragg did not adequately assert an ineffective-assistance claim
before the district court. In moving to withdraw his guilty plea, Mr. Bragg made
assertions regarding his counsel’s performance, but he did not analyze the factors set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The court noted that
Mr. Bragg “suggest[ed], without stating expressly, that [counsel] provided ineffective
assistance,” but that he made few specific allegations, and he would be required to
satisfy Strickland’s two-factor test. R. Vol. 1 at 200. The district court then
explicitly found that “Defendant has failed to assert an ineffective assistance claim
against [counsel].” Id.Second, the factual record remains undeveloped. One of Mr. Bragg’s
complaints on appeal is that the district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on
his motion to withdraw his plea,
thereby denying Mr. Bragg the opportunity to cross examine his trial
counsel and the prosecutors on critical fact questions regarding
statements they made to him and which he asserts were the reasons that
caused him involuntarily to enter pleas of guilty and sign a plea
agreement waiving his statutory rights to appeal. Without a[n]
evidentiary hearing and the cross-examination of witnesses by
Mr. Bragg, the district court’s decision that the plea waiver was
enforceable was premature.
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Aplt. Resp. at 8-9. This argument confirms that, given the nature of Mr. Bragg’s
allegations, this appeal does not fit into the narrow exception for hearing
ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. “[A]ny ineffective assistance claim
would have to rely on extra-record exchanges between counsel and client that are
beyond our purview.” United States v. Novosel, 481 F.3d 1288, 1295 (10th Cir.
2007) (per curiam).
For these reasons, we decline to depart from the general rule that
ineffective-assistance claims should be heard in collateral proceedings rather than on
direct appeal. To pursue his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Bragg
will have to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The motion to enforce the appeal
waiver is granted and appeal No. 13-6167 is dismissed, without prejudice to
Mr. Bragg’s ability to bring a § 2255 motion claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel to the extent permitted by his collateral-attack waiver and applicable
precedent, including Cockerham.
Appeal No. 13-6168
Appeal No. 13-6168 arises from the witness-tampering conviction that carried
the consecutive 46-month sentence. In response to the government’s motion to
enforce the appeal waiver, Mr. Bragg asserts that the appeal is outside the scope of
the waiver because, by imposing a consecutive sentence for this conviction, the
district court upwardly deviated from the advisory Guidelines range of 46 to 57
months.
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Mr. Bragg’s plea agreement specifically reserves his “right to appeal a
sentence above the advisory sentencing guideline range determined by the Court to
apply to this case.” Mot. to Enforce, Attach. II-1 at 6. Mr. Bragg’s 46-month
sentence, however, was at the bottom end of the Guidelines range determined by the
district court to apply to this case. Mr. Bragg cites no authority for the proposition
that ordering this sentence to run consecutive to the 480-month sentence makes this
sentence an above-Guidelines sentence, and we are not persuaded. Even if the
district court erred under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), as Mr. Bragg asserts, the appeal is
within his broad waiver of his right to “[a]ppeal . . . his . . . sentence . . . and any
other aspect of his conviction” and to “[a]ppeal . . . his sentence as imposed by the
Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined.” Mot. to Enforce, Attach.
II-1 at 5-6.
Mr. Bragg makes no argument regarding the remaining Hahn factors in this
appeal, and we need not consider a Hahn factor that the defendant does not contest,
see Porter, 405 F.3d at 1143. The motion to enforce the appeal waiver is granted and
appeal No. 13-6168 is dismissed.
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Conclusion
The joint motion to enforce the appeal waivers in appeal Nos. 13-6167 and
13-6168 is granted and the appeals are dismissed.
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam
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