United States v. Madrid

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 12, 2015
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 15-2075
(D.C. Nos. 1:11-CV-01135-LH-KBM and
ERIC MADRID, 1:08-CR-00683-LH-1)
(D.N.M.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
_________________________________
Before KELLY, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Eric Madrid seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district
court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas motion. We deny a COA and dismiss
the appeal.
I
During an investigatory stop, officers discovered a rifle in the back seat of a
vehicle Madrid was driving. After the stop, Madrid moved to suppress evidence of
the rifle. The district court denied his motion to suppress. Subsequently, Madrid
pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
§ 922(g)(1). Madrid now alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
further impeach the officers during the suppression hearing.
Although we thoroughly recounted the facts underlying Madrid’s case in his
direct appeal, United States v. Madrid, 713 F.3d 1251, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2013), we
provide further detail about the suppression hearing to clarify the basis of the case at
bar. Madrid argued that probable cause to search his vehicle was absent because
Officer Darrell Sanchez, who discovered the rifle, did so only after Lieutenant Chris
Stoyell detained Madrid for twenty minutes outside the vehicle.
At the suppression hearing, Stoyell testified that he arrived at the apartment
complex about a minute after being dispatched, stopped the vehicle Madrid was
driving, pointed a spotlight at its driver-side window, and then awaited backup.
According to Stoyell, Sanchez arrived a minute or two later. The pair of officers
approached the vehicle and made contact with Madrid. Stoyell testified that while he
conversed with Madrid at the driver-side window, Sanchez observed a rifle case in
the back seat through the passenger-side window. At that point, Stoyell averred, he
asked Madrid to exit the vehicle and handcuffed him.
Sanchez similarly testified that he arrived at the apartment complex a few
minutes after being dispatched, and that by the time he arrived, Stoyell had already
stopped Madrid. According to Sanchez’s testimony, while Stoyell talked to Madrid
on the driver side of the vehicle, Sanchez approached the passenger side. There, he
observed a rifle case in the back seat and informed Stoyell about it, which prompted
Stoyell to order Madrid to exit the vehicle.
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Madrid described a different sequence of events. He testified that immediately
after he was stopped, Stoyell approached the vehicle, ordered Madrid to exit,
handcuffed him, forced him to remove his shirt, and told him to sit on a curb some
distance away from the vehicle. According to Madrid, Stoyell questioned him
outside of the vehicle for about twenty minutes before Sanchez arrived and noticed
the rifle case in the back seat.
At the suppression hearing, Madrid’s trial counsel, Cliff McIntyre, attempted
to impeach Stoyell and Sanchez based on discrepancies between their testimony and
a dispatch log. The log revealed that Stoyell was dispatched at 7:55 p.m. and
Sanchez was dispatched one minute later. According to the log, Stoyell reported he
was “on scene” two minutes later, at 7:57 p.m. But Sanchez did not report he was
“on scene” until more than twenty minutes later, at 8:20 p.m.
On direct examination, Sanchez explained that he forgot to report “on-scene”
when he initially arrived because he was concerned about officer safety. McIntyre
questioned Sanchez about this explanation on cross-examination, asking him how his
failure to report could be reconciled with the ability of every other officer, who
presumably faced similar concerns, to nonetheless report “on-scene” in a timely
fashion. During his cross-examination of Stoyell, McIntyre further probed into the
discrepancy between Stoyell’s claims regarding when Sanchez arrived and the timing
indicated by the dispatch log. Stoyell also admitted, under McIntyre’s questioning,
that it was “possible” that he asked Madrid to exit his vehicle before Sanchez arrived.
However, Stoyell remained adamant that he recalled Sanchez arriving and pointing
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out the rifle case before Madrid was asked to leave his vehicle. Additionally,
McIntyre cross-examined the police dispatcher, and elicited a concession from her
that the dispatch log indicated that Sanchez did not arrive on the scene until 8:20 p.m.
McIntyre confronted both Stoyell and Sanchez with an inconsistency between
their testimony and what they told McIntyre’s investigator, LeRoy Sandoval, during
an earlier interview. While confronting Stoyell with the inconsistency, McIntyre
stated: “when you talked to my investigator, and I’ve got the tape here if I need to
refresh your recollection, you told my investigator you weren’t around the vehicle
when the weapon was discovered. You were away from the vehicle talking to Mr.
Madrid.” However, McIntyre did not attempt to introduce the tape recording into the
record, play the relevant excerpt to the court, introduce a copy of Sandoval’s
memorandum documenting the interview, or call Sandoval as a witness.
Some of McIntyre’s impeachment tactics were less successful. He convinced
the district court to listen to a dispatch tape, which he claimed included a
conversation between Stoyell and Sanchez that proved Sanchez did not arrive on-
scene immediately. However, when the district court listened to the tape, it heard no
such conversation. Rather, it found that the tape contained evidence corroborating
the testimony of Stoyell and Sanchez, specifically that after dispatch requested that
Sanchez investigate a reported prowler, Stoyell overrode the request because Sanchez
was otherwise occupied.
After the suppression hearing, the district court found that Stoyell and Sanchez
were credible, and that Madrid was not. It found that the officers’ version of events
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was correct, and discounted the allegedly contrary evidence from the dispatch log. It
found that Sanchez’s explanation that he simply forgot to immediately report on-
scene was corroborated by Stoyell overriding the request to have Sanchez respond to
the reported prowler, “indicating that Officer Sanchez was indeed on scene with Lt.
Stoyell.” Accordingly, the district court denied the motion to suppress. We
affirmed. Madrid, 713 F.3d at 1262.
After Madrid filed the amended § 2255 motion now at issue, his new counsel
deposed both McIntyre and Sandoval and subpoenaed their records. Neither had
possession of the tape and both had destroyed their records. A memorandum
Sandoval drafted for McIntyre summarized an interview in which Stoyell provided a
version of events that aligned with Madrid’s testimony at the suppression hearing.
The district court denied the § 2255 claim, Madrid’s request for an evidentiary
hearing, and a COA. Madrid timely appealed.
II
Madrid may not appeal the denial of § 2255 relief without a COA. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(B). We will issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To satisfy
this standard, Madrid must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether
(or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotation omitted).
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A
A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must establish “that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and that “the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). To establish prejudice, a “defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. at 694. “The assessment of prejudice should proceed
on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and
impartially applying the standards that govern the decision. It should not depend on
the idiosyncracies of the particular decisionmaker . . . .” Id. at 695. “In making this
determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of
the evidence before the judge or jury.” Id.
On appeal, Madrid argues that McIntyre rendered ineffective assistance
because he failed to cross-examine Stoyell in greater detail or to introduce evidence
of Sandoval’s interview to impeach Stoyell and Sanchez. Assuming arguendo that
McIntyre’s inactions constituted deficient performance under the first prong of
Strickland, we nevertheless conclude that Madrid was not prejudiced by McIntyre’s
inactions. McIntyre made strong arguments about the discrepancy between the
officers’ account of events and the timeline indicated by the dispatch log. He
extensively cross-examined Stoyell, Sanchez, and the dispatcher. It is unclear what
purpose additional cross-examination of Stoyell would have served, as McIntyre had
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already elicited a concession from Stoyell that it was “possible” that Madrid was
removed from the vehicle before Sanchez saw the rifle case. Moreover, McIntyre
confronted both Stoyell and Sanchez with the discrepancy between their testimony
and the account that Stoyell provided to Sandoval during the interview. We see no
reason why listening to, or reading an account of, Sandoval’s interview with Stoyell,
rather than hearing McIntyre recount the interview, would have caused the court to
reach a different decision.
After reading the parties’ briefs, hearing testimony, and listening to the
dispatch tape and log, the district court found the officers to be credible. It found
that the dispatch tape corroborated officer testimony that Sanchez forgot to report on-
scene immediately. Madrid has not shown “a reasonable probability that . . . the
result of the proceeding would have been different” but for inaction by McIntyre. Id.
at 694.
B
Madrid further argues that the district court erred by failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing. We review a district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Harms, 371 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2004).
A district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing if “the case record conclusively
shows the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” United States v. Marr, 856 F.2d 1471,
1472 (10th Cir. 1988).
The district court granted several of Madrid’s discovery requests during the
§ 2255 proceeding. Madrid had the opportunity to depose both McIntyre and
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Sanchez. He subpoenaed them to obtain any records they had failed to turn over.
That discovery revealed that neither had possession of the tape, and that both had
destroyed their records. It is therefore unclear what evidence missing from the record
could be elicited during an evidentiary hearing. Madrid specifically contends that a
hearing is necessary to demonstrate the accuracy of the information that Sandoval
gave to McIntyre, particularly in light of the government’s suggestion that McIntyre
may have been “bluffing” about the existence of the tape. But both McIntyre and
Sandoval already testified in their depositions about the existence of the tape. And
the accuracy of the information Sandoval gave to McIntyre can be verified through
the memorandum Sandoval wrote for McIntyre, which is already in the record.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Madrid’s
motion for an evidentiary hearing because the existing record shows conclusively that
Madrid is not entitled to relief. See Marr, 856 F.2d at 1472.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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