Meyers v. Hayssen Maufacturing

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 7 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DANNY MEYERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-5082
(D.C. No. 94-C-342-K)
HAYSSEN MANUFACTURING (N.D. Okla.)
COMPANY, also known as Hayssen Mfg.
Co., a corporation,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
FLUOR CONSTRUCTORS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., formerly
known as Fluor Constructors, Inc., a
corporation; FLUOR DANIEL, INC., a
corporation, formerly known as Fluor
Engineers, Inc.,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Danny Meyers brought a manufacturer’s products liability action for
injuries he sustained when his hand was pulled into a wrapping machine manufactured by
defendant Hayssen Manufacturing Co. Following a jury trial, the jury found in
defendant’s favor. Plaintiff appeals, claiming error in the jury instructions. He also
challenges the district court’s award of certain costs and fees to defendant. Federal
jurisdiction is based on the diversity of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Jury instructions
“In a diversity case the substance of a jury instruction is a matter of state law, but
its grant or denial is a procedural matter controlled by federal law.” Staley v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., No. 95-1265, 1997 WL 55944, at * 3 (10th Cir. Feb. 12,
1997). An appeal of a trial court’s jury instructions requires this court to consider
whether the instructions correctly stated the applicable law and provided the jury with a
sufficient understanding of the issues and standards involved in the case. Rios v. Bigler,
67 F.3d 1543, 1549 (10th Cir. 1995). “An error in jury instructions will mandate
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reversal . . . only if the error is determined to have been prejudicial after reviewing the
record as a whole.” King v. Unocal Corp., 58 F.3d 586, 587 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation
omitted).
In this case, the record provided does not include all of the instructions given to
the jury. Although we are unable to evaluate the instructions in the broad context of the
jury trial, we can determine whether the challenged instructions misstate the law.
Plaintiff first objects to the instruction titled “Unreasonably Dangerous - Defined”
because it permitted the jury to consider whether plaintiff was a “knowledgeable user” of
the machine, without defining “knowledgeable user.” Plaintiff alleges that the term
“knowledgeable user” introduced a confusing and misleading concept into the case which
unfairly prejudiced plaintiff. Under Oklahoma law, however, both the expertise of the
user of the product and the foreseeability of use are relevant. See Hutchins v. Silicone
Specialties, Inc., 881 P.2d 64, 67 (Okla. 1994) (manufacturer was not required to foresee
that professional users of product would fail to read warnings, and then use product in a
manner expressly warned against).
We next consider plaintiff’s objection to the instruction titled “Intervening
Cause - Definition.” Plaintiff concedes that an intervening cause instruction was
appropriate, but objects to the term “defendant’s act,” used in the instruction, instead of
“defect in a product.” Plaintiff points out that in a strict liability action, liability is based
on the defective product itself. While we agree that the reference to “defendant’s act”
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was imprecise, a minor imprecision in a single instruction does not necessarily establish
reversible error. See Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1103 (10th Cir. 1991)
(in context of instructions as a whole, no error in substituting the word “unsafe” for the
term “unreasonably dangerous”).
Plaintiff contends that the jury instruction titled “Foreseeability - definition” was
erroneous. He asserts that the instruction required the jury to find in defendant’s favor
unless defendant had anticipated the specific situation that resulted in plaintiff’s injuries.
He also claims that foreseeability is a concept pertinent only to negligence claims, not to
strict liability claims.
The instruction did not state that defendant must have anticipated the specific
situation that occurred here in order to be liable for a defective product. Furthermore,
foreseeability was relevant to this strict products liability action because under Oklahoma
products liability law, a manufacturer is required to anticipate all foreseeable uses of its
product. Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Co., 97 F.3d 1329, 1334 (10th Cir. 1996); Smith v.
United States Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251, 254 (Okla. 1980); see also Saupitty v. Yazoo
Mfg. Co., 726 F.2d 657, 659 (10th Cir. 1984) (under Oklahoma law, manufacturer is
liable if modification of its product was foreseeable).
Plaintiff next contends that the instruction titled “Substantial Change in Product”
should not have been given on the ground that it was superfluous to the instructions on
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causation. We cannot evaluate this argument because we do not have all of the
instructions given to the jury.
Plaintiff also objects to the instruction on substantial change in product on the
grounds that it relieved defendant of liability unless the modifications to the wrapping
machine were specifically foreseeable, and it did not instruct that the modifications must
have contributed to plaintiff’s injuries. The instruction did not state that the
modifications must have been specifically foreseeable. Moreover, foreseeability is
pertinent to whether a manufacturer will be held liable even though its product was
changed by the user. See Smith, 612 P.2d at 254 (manufacturer must anticipate all
foreseeable uses of product); cf. Fields v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 56-57
(Okla. 1976) (in products liability action, to determine whether plaintiff’s use of product
was abnormal, court must evaluate whether use was foreseeable by manufacturer). We
cannot evaluate the remaining challenge because we do not have all of the instructions the
jury received.
We find no error in the challenged jury instructions, based on the record provided.
Therefore, we decline to disturb the jury’s verdict.
Costs and fees taxed against plaintiff
Finally, plaintiff contests the district court’s order, entered pursuant to Rule 54(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, imposing on him certain costs incurred by
defendant. Of the total $4,761.95 awarded, plaintiff objects to $2,113.59 for copies of
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papers and $40.00 for a subpoena service fee, claiming the person served was a stranger
to the litigation.
Federal law, not Oklahoma state law, controls the assessment of costs in this
diversity case. Gobbo Farms & Orchards v. Poole Chem. Co., 81 F.3d 122, 123 (10th
Cir. 1996). The district court’s award of costs is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Merrick v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 911 F.2d 426, 434 (10th Cir. 1990). 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920(1) & (4) authorize recovery by the prevailing party of marshal’s fees and “copies
of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case.” Costs must be both “necessarily
obtained” and reasonable. U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1245
(10th Cir. 1988).
The district court reviewed de novo the clerk’s order for costs, affirming the
clerk’s order, except for the expense for daily transcripts, which was disallowed.
According to defendant, the challenged subpoena fee was for service on a representative
of plaintiff’s employer to obtain documents. We determine that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding the subpoena service fee.
Although the record does not make clear how the district court arrived at the total
for the cost of copies, the district court apparently determined that the allowed copying
costs were “reasonably necessary.” See Jones v. Unisys Corp., 54 F.3d 624, 633 (10th
Cir. 1995) (noting a preference for “more explanation” of copying costs, but affirming
district court’s order to disallow copying costs as not “reasonably necessary”).
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Accordingly, we apply “the presumption favoring award of statutorily authorized costs,”
id., and conclude that the district court’s costs award does not constitute an abuse of
discretion.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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