Buck v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT March 6, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
EDWARD ALLAN BUCK,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v. No. 14-4063
AMERICAN QUARTER HORSE (D.C. No. 2:13-CV-00965-BSJ)
ASSOCIATION, (D. Utah)
Defendant – Appellee.
EDWARD ALLAN BUCK,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v. No. 14-4113
KENTUCKY HORSE RACING (D.C. No. 2:13-CV-00342-CW)
COMMISSION; ROBERT M. BECK, (D. Utah)
JR.; EDWARD S. BONNIE; F.
THOMAS CONWAY; TRACY
FARMER; WADE HOUSTON; NEIL
HOWARD; FRANK L. JONES, JR.;
FRANKLIN S. KLING, JR.; ALAN
LEAVITT; ELIZABETH S. LEVIN;
FOSTER NORTHROP; JOHN
PHILLIPS; MICHAEL PITINO; BURR
TRAVIS, JR.; JOHN T. WARD, JR.;
MARC A. GUILFOIL; SUSAN
SPECKERT,
Defendants – Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Edward Buck, a horse trainer and bridle producer, appeals the dismissal of two cases
he filed. In No. 14-4063, Buck sued the American Quarter Horse Association (AQHA),
alleging that AQHA violated the Sherman Act and various provisions of Texas law. The
district court granted AQHA’s motion to dismiss Buck’s amended complaint. In No. 14-
4113, Buck sued the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission and the members of the
Commission’s Board in their official and individual capacities, alleging that they
prohibited the use of bitless bridles—which Buck produces—without due process. The
district court dismissed Buck’s case after concluding (1) that it lacked subject-matter and
personal jurisdiction, (2) that Buck failed to state a claim, and (3) that the Eleventh
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibited suit against the Commission and its board
members in their official capacities.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination
of this case. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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On appeal, Buck contends that the district court erred in dismissing his lawsuits. As a
pro se litigant, we view Buck’s pleadings liberally. See United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d
972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). But this liberal treatment is not without limits. Pro se parties
must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants, Kay v. Bermis, 500
F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007), and we will not take on the responsibility of serving as
the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record, Garrett v. Selby
Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
We conclude below that Buck has not given us cause to question the district court’s
dismissals of these two cases. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291, we affirm.1
DISCUSSION
No. 14-4113
In this case, Buck sued the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission and the
Commission’s board members (collectively, Defendants) in their individual and official
capacities. Buck asserted that, in 2002, the executive director of the Commission
permitted the use of Buck’s bitless bridle in horse racing in Kentucky. But in 2012, Buck
learned that Kentucky racing regulations expressly prohibit bitless bridles from racing.
Buck tried to get the Commission to change the regulations, but his efforts failed. He
asserted that the Commission and the Defendants: (1) violated his due process rights by
1
For both cases, we note that the district court did not prepare a separate document
entering judgment in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). We consider judgment
entered in both cases as of 150 days from the orders in each case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c). In
any case, neither party raises concern about the district court’s failure to enter separate
judgments.
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failing to hold hearings before prohibiting the use of bitless bridles in racing; (2) engaged
in deceptive trade practices in violation of Kentucky law; (3) unlawfully misrepresented
the approval of Buck’s bitless bridle to the public—a common law claim; and (4)
interfered with Buck’s prospective economic advantage—another common law claim. In
his complaint, Buck contended that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1337, which provides jurisdiction for any civil action proceeding under any
Congressional act that regulates commerce or protects trade and commerce against
restraints and monopolies. The Commission and the Defendants moved to dismiss for (1)
a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) a lack of personal jurisdiction over the
Defendants in their individual capacities, (3) a sovereign immunity bar disallowing
Buck’s claims against the Commission and the Defendants in their official capacities, and
(4) a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, who recommended that the
district court dismiss Buck’s complaint in its entirety for a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. The magistrate concluded that § 1337 did not provide subject-matter
jurisdiction, because Buck’s complaint did not concern an “Act of Congress regulating
commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies.” 28
U.S.C. § 1337. The magistrate also recommended dismissal of claims against the
Commission and the Defendants in their official capacities because sovereign immunity
barred Buck’s lawsuit, and recommended dismissal for the Defendants in their individual
capacities because there was no personal jurisdiction and because Buck failed to state a
claim against them upon which relief could be granted. The district court adopted the
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magistrate’s recommendation to dismiss because of a lack of subject-matter and personal
jurisdiction and overruled Buck’s “internally contradictory, confused, and unavailing
objections.” R. at 275–77.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc’y v. Manganaro, 342 F.3d 1213, 1216
(10th Cir. 2003). We presume that a cause lies outside the district court’s limited
jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The
party asserting jurisdiction has the burden to establish jurisdiction. Id.
In his complaint, Buck alleged that § 1337 provided jurisdiction. But Buck did not
assert how his claims arose under a Congressional act that regulates commerce or
protects trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies. On appeal, Buck
contends that 15 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq. is the Congressional act required for jurisdiction
under § 1337. In § 3001, Congress passed a law “to regulate interstate commerce with
respect to wagering on horseracing.” Buck also invokes the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1,
and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, as bases for subject-matter
jurisdiction. Buck did not raise these bases before the district court, thus waiving them on
appeal.2 See Anderson v. Commerce Constr. Servs., Inc., 531 F.3d 1190, 1198 (10th Cir.
2008) (“By not arguing this issue before the district court, [the plaintiff] waived it.”);
2
Even if Buck had asserted in the district court that 15 U.S.C. § 3001 was the
Congressional act providing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337, we would still reject his
claim that § 1337 provides subject-matter jurisdiction. His complaint focuses mainly on
the Commission’s decision to outlaw the bitless bridle from horse racing. Buck does not
challenge the validity, construction, or enforcement of a statute regulating commerce—a
prerequisite for jurisdiction under § 1337. Adams v. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Ship
Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers, & Helpers, 262 F.2d 835, 839 (10th Cir. 1958).
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Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1539 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that we have no
duty to consider waived arguments supporting subject-matter jurisdiction). To be sure, we
liberally construe Buck’s pleadings. But Buck’s pro se status “does not excuse the
obligation of any litigant to comply with the fundamental requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure.” Ogden v. San Juan Cnty., 32 F.3d 452, 455
(10th Cir. 1994). Because Buck fails to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, we affirm
the district court’s dismissal of this case.
No. 14-4063
In this case, Buck sued the American Quarter Horse Association (AQHA), apparently
dissatisfied with the AQHA’s failure to enforce its rules about showing and judging
quarter horses at AQHA competitions. The district court dismissed without prejudice
Buck’s complaint for a lack of jurisdiction, insufficient service, and a failure to state a
claim. In Buck’s amended complaint, he alleged that the AQHA permitted animal abuse
by its judges’ failure to enforce AQHA’s rules and regulations. Buck alleged that AQHA’s
actions violated (1) the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2; (2) some intentional tort
where AQHA breached its duty to comply with its rules; and (3) Texas law prohibiting
deceptive trade practices. Buck also alleged that AQHA’s actions constituted fraud and
intentional interference with his prospective economic advantage.
AQHA moved the district court to dismiss Buck’s amended complaint under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court granted AQHA’s motion
after hearing both parties’ arguments at a hearing. The district court’s order did not state
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the basis for its decision to grant AQHA’s motion to dismiss. At the hearing, the district
court stated that Buck “rapped on the wrong door” and needed “to make [his] point in
another location, not this one.” R. at 561–62.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. Albers v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs of Jefferson Cnty., Colo., 771 F.3d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 2014). In
reviewing the district court’s decision, we can affirm on any ground the record adequately
supports, so long as the parties have had a fair opportunity to address that ground.
Thomas v. City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1327 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008).
We agree with AQHA that Buck failed to state any claims in his amended complaint
upon which relief may be granted. While a plaintiff does not have to set forth a prima
facie case for each element of each claim, he must set forth plausible claims that animate
the elements of his causes of action. Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706
F.3d 1231, 1236 (10th Cir. 2013). Even after giving Buck wide latitude for his pleadings,
Buck’s amended complaint comes nowhere close to meeting this standard. Except for
bare, conclusory allegations, Buck’s amended complaint does not sufficiently allege a
claim upon which relief may be granted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). On appeal, Buck repeats many of the conclusory allegations
he raised in his amended complaint. He does not address why the district court erred in
granting AQHA’s motion to dismiss. After reviewing the record and Buck’s briefing, we
find no error in the district court’s dismissal.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s dismissals in No. 14-4063 and No. 14-4113.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Gregory A. Phillips
Circuit Judge
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