Hare v. Donahoe

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 4, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ROCHELLE Y. HARE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-5138
(D.C. No. 4:13-CV-00508-JED-FHM)
PATRICK R. DONAHOE, Postmaster (N.D. Okla.)
General, United States Postal Service,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, LUCERO and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Rochelle Y. Hare, pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of her suit
alleging several discrimination claims against her former employer, the United States
Postal Service (Postal Service). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Hare, who is African-American, worked for many years as a mail
processing clerk at a facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma. During her tenure, she was
disciplined and/or counseled for various infractions, including chronic tardiness,
being absent from her assigned work area while on the clock and failure to follow
protocol for requesting leave. Her employment was terminated in January 2011.
In 2013, Ms. Hare filed suit against the Postal Service, Patrick R. Donahoe
(the Postmaster General) and several of her former supervisors. The government
moved to dismiss. It contended first that the only proper defendant was
Mr. Donahoe. Second, it argued that the Postal Service was not subject to suit under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and to the extent that the complaint
sought relief under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the court lacked
jurisdiction over such claims. Last, it argued that the complaint failed to state
cognizable claims for relief against Mr. Donahoe under either Title VII or the
Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted the government’s motion.
Ms. Hare concedes that Mr. Donahoe is the only proper defendant. She also
fails to explain any legal error in the district court’s order concerning the ADA and
the NLRA claims. Ms. Hare, however, disagrees with the court’s conclusion that her
complaint fails to state claims under Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act.1
1
The district court did not read Ms. Hare’s complaint to state a claim for age
discrimination and her opening brief contains nothing more than a handful of
(continued)
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) de novo. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must
contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.’” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation
omitted). “[T]o withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain enough allegations of facts, taken as true, to state a claim that is plausible on
its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[P]lausibility refers to the scope of
the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide
swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then [Ms. Hare has] not nudged [her] claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 1191 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[I]n examining a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), we . . . disregard
conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations
plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Id.
“While the 12(b)(6) standard does not require that [Ms. Hare] establish a
prima facie case in her complaint, the elements of each alleged cause of action help
to determine whether [she] has set forth a plausible claim.” Id. at 1192. As such, we
examine the elements Ms. Hare must prove to establish claims under Title VII and
the Rehabilitation Act.
statements that she is over age forty. These “[s]cattered statements . . . are not
enough to preserve [the] issue for appeal.” Exum v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 389 F.3d
1130, 1133 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004).
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Because Ms. Hare is a pro se litigant, we liberally construe her complaint, as
well as her appellate briefs. Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836,
840 (10th Cir. 2005). But Ms. Hare must “follow the same rules of procedure that
govern other litigants.” Id.
TITLE VII
Under Title VII it is unlawful “to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Racial Discrimination
We liberally construe Ms. Hare’s complaint to attempt to state a claim for
racial discrimination. “A plaintiff proves a violation of Title VII either by direct
evidence of discrimination or by following the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp[oration] v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817,
36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).” Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192.
Because Ms. Hare’s complaint does not allege any direct evidence of
discrimination, her claims are subject to the three-step burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas. Step one requires Ms. Hare to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination. Id. To do so, Ms. Hare “must establish that (1) she is a member of a
protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she qualified for
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the position at issue, and (4) she was treated less favorably than others not in the
protected class.” Id.2
As the district court explained, and we agree, “[t]he bare allegations and
conclusory statements in [Ms. Hare’s] complaint do not raise any inference of
racial . . . discrimination on the part of her supervisor or anyone at [the Postal
Service].” R. at 129-30. Instead, “[Ms.] Hare’s allegations seem to merely allege
that she was disciplined for rule violations; not that she was discriminated against in
any way.” Id. at 130.
Retaliation
“Title VII . . . makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an
employee because she has opposed [an unlawful employment practice.]” Khalik,
671 F.3d at 1192 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ms. Hare can prove retaliation
“by relying on the three-part McDonnell Douglas framework.” Id. To establish a
prima facie case, Ms. Hare “must show (1) that she engaged in protected opposition
to discrimination, (2) that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged
action materially adverse, and (3) that a causal connection existed between the
protected activity and the materially adverse action.” See id. at 1193 (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted).
2
It is not necessary to discuss steps two and three because Ms. Hare’s claims
fail at step one for the lack of any factual allegations related the actions of the Postal
Service and her race.
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Once again, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the allegations in
Ms. Hare’s complaint fail to “raise an inference of retaliation.” R. at 130. There is
not a single factual averment linking her termination or any disciplinary action taken
against her to complaints she filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.
Racially Hostile Work Environment
We liberally construe Ms. Hare’s complaint to attempt to state a claim for a
racially hostile work environment. To prove such a claim, Ms. Hare “must show that
under the totality of the circumstances (1) the harassment was pervasive or severe
enough to alter the terms, conditions, or privilege of employment, and (2) the
harassment was racial or stemmed from racial animus.” Chavez v. New Mexico,
397 F.3d 826, 831-32 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A plaintiff cannot meet this burden by demonstrating a few isolated incidents of
racial enmity or sporadic racial slurs.” Id. at 832 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Instead, “there must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments.” Id.
Ms. Hare’s complaint is devoid of any allegations of severe or pervasive
harassment or any conduct that was racially motivated. What the complaint alleges is
that a supervisor looked through the window of her car, a co-worker bumped his
equipment into her work cart and an investigator asked her some questions. These
alleged facts do not plausibly show that Ms. Hare was subjected to a racially hostile
work environment.
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REHABILITATION ACT
“The Rehabilitation Act prohibits recipients of federal funding, like [the Postal
Service], from discriminating on the basis of disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).” Hwang
v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir. 2014). “One way a disabled
plaintiff can establish a claim for discrimination in the workplace is by showing that
she is qualified for her job; that she can perform the job’s essential functions with a
reasonable accommodation for her disability; and that her employer failed to provide
a reasonable accommodation despite her request for one.” Id.
In her complaint, Ms. Hare alleges that her supervisor asked her about her
asthma on two occasions, and that she “received a Letter of Warning for failure to
follow proper leave requesting procedures physical disability (asthma).” R. at 8.
Setting aside the fact that there is no evidence that her asthma was a disability, see
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), which defines a “disability” as a “physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” these
allegations fall short of pleading a plausible claim for relief. We agree with the
district court that “[t]he bare allegations and conclusory statements in [the] complaint
do not raise any inference of . . . disability-based discrimination.” R. at 129.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
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