Montiel-Hernandez v. Holder

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 23, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
LUIS MANUEL MONTIEL-HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 14-9523
(Petition for Review)
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States
Attorney General,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before GORSUCH, O’BRIEN, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
Luis Manuel Montiel-Hernandez, a native and citizen of Mexico, was charged
as a removable alien unlawfully present in the United States. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). He conceded the charge, but at a hearing before an immigration
judge (IJ), he requested a continuance to see if the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) would favorably exercise its prosecutorial discretion to terminate his removal
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
proceedings. The IJ granted the continuance, but when the parties reconvened, DHS
indicated it had decided not to terminate the case. Montiel-Hernandez declined to
seek any relief from removal or voluntary departure, and thus the IJ summarily
ordered him removed to Mexico.
He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), raising two
arguments. He first claimed the IJ refused to exercise jurisdiction over DHS’s
decision not to terminate his case, thereby violating his due process rights. The BIA
rejected this claim, observing that Montiel-Hernandez did not seek to
administratively terminate his case or have the IJ review DHS’s refusal to do so; he
simply requested a continuance to wait for DHS’s decision. See Admin. R. at 76-77.
The BIA emphasized, however, that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to review DHS’s
decision not to terminate his removal proceedings, which was solely within the
prosecutorial discretion of DHS. He also claimed he was forced to waive voluntary
departure, but the BIA rejected that argument as well, because, as the record clearly
indicated, he did not seek voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed the appeal.
Montiel-Hernandez insists his due process rights were violated because DHS
refused to terminate his case and the agency refused to review that decision. He also
claims to have been forced to waive voluntary departure in order to preserve his
appeal rights. That is because, under the governing regulation, he was required to
abandon all appellate issues as a condition of seeking voluntary departure. See
Pet’r Br. at 24 (discussing 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(1)(i)).
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We will not consider Montiel-Hernandez’s voluntary departure argument
because he did not raise it before the IJ. See Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d
1013, 1022-23 (10th Cir. 2007) (upholding BIA’s waiver rule where alien failed to
raise argument before the IJ). Indeed, as the BIA observed, he did not even request
voluntary departure. In fact, he affirmatively declined it when the IJ asked if “he
[was] interested in voluntary departure,” stating, “No, Your Honor. Not at this time.”
Admin. R. at 81.1 Moreover, he never claimed he was being forced to choose
between his appeal rights and voluntary departure, nor did he cite any regulation
requiring that he waive his appellate issues. Instead, he simply elected to forgo
voluntary departure, just as he elected not to seek relief from removal, relying instead
on DHS’s prosecutorial discretion to close his case. As a consequence, the BIA did
not rule on the voluntary departure argument. Nor will we. See Torres de la Cruz,
483 F.3d at 1023.
He also contends the agency should have exercised jurisdiction over DHS’s
decision not to terminate his case. But he never asked the IJ to review that decision.
It would have been futile in any event. The BIA has here correctly emphasized “the
decision to exercise prosecutorial discretion remains within the sole discretion of the
DHS, and therefore, the [IJ] does not have jurisdiction to review the DHS’s decisions
on this matter.” Admin. R. at 3. We review this legal conclusion de novo, Dallakoti
1
Montiel-Hernandez had conditionally requested voluntary departure at his
previous hearing if DHS denied prosecutorial discretion, see Admin. R. at 76, but he
changed course at his final removal hearing.
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v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2010), and agree the agency lacked
jurisdiction to review DHS’s decision, see Cortez-Felipe v. INS, 245 F.3d 1054, 1057
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that IJ and BIA lack jurisdiction to review discretionary
decisions regarding when and whether to initiate removal proceedings (citing
Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 236 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2001))). Indeed, “[t]he
immigration judge is not empowered to review the wisdom of [DHS] in instituting
the proceedings.” Lopez-Telles v. INS, 564 F.2d 1302, 1304 (9th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam); see also Matter of Quintero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 348, 350 (BIA 1982)
(“Once deportation proceedings have been initiated by the District Director, the
immigration judge may not review the wisdom of the District Director’s action, but
must execute his duty to determine whether the deportation charge is sustained by the
requisite evidence in an expeditious manner.”). This is because DHS, as the federal
agency charged with enforcing the immigration laws, has the sole authority to
exercise prosecutorial discretion in immigration cases. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
Because the IJ and BIA had no authority to review DHS’s discretionary prosecutorial
decision to keep this case in removal proceedings, the BIA correctly rejected this
argument.2
2
To the extent Montiel-Hernandez contends DHS abused its discretion in
declining to terminate his removal proceedings, we lack jurisdiction to review this
claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause
or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this chapter.”); see also Reno v. American-Arab
(continued)
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The petition for review is denied.
Entered for the Court
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 485 n.9 (1999) (“Section 1252(g) was
directed against a particular evil: attempts to impose judicial constraints upon
prosecutorial discretion.”); Luevano v. Holder, 660 F.3d 1207, 1210 n.2 (10th Cir.
2011) (noting that court lacked jurisdiction to review discretionary decision to bring
removal proceedings against alien). Although § 1252(g) refers to the Attorney
General, it has been applied to the Secretary of DHS. See Ali v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d
145, 150 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2008).
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