Cole v. Everett

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 6, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
WADE COLE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 12-1316
(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-00677-LTB)
VANCE EVERETT, Warden, Kit Carson (D. Colo.)
Correctional Center; THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
COLORADO,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
Before MURPHY, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Wade Cole seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to obtain
review of a district court order dismissing his most recent habeas application as an
unauthorized second or successive application that it lacked jurisdiction to hear under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). We may grant a COA only if reasonable jurists could debate
whether (1) the district court’s jurisdictional ruling was correct and (2) the
allegations in the habeas application are sufficient to state a valid constitutional
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
claim. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). As explained below,
Mr. Cole cannot satisfy the first requirement. We therefore deny a COA and dismiss
this appeal.
Mr. Cole was convicted after a jury trial in 2001 of enticement of a child,
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-305, and given an enhanced indeterminate sentence of ten
years to life pursuant to Colorado’s Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998
(SOLSA), id. § 18-1.3-1002 et seq. After a prior unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. § 2254application, he filed the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the
constitutionality of SOLSA and seeking his immediate release. The district court
directed him to amend his application to specify that it was brought under § 2254,
and ultimately determined that it was subject to dismissal as second or successive.
Mr. Cole argued against dismissal on two bases: (1) he should be allowed to
proceed under § 2241 without § 2244(b)(3) authorization, because he is not attacking
his conviction but only challenging the constitutionality of SOLSA and his resultant
sentence; and (2) his claim did not become ripe until recently, after he served the
minimum ten years of his sentence, because the Colorado courts would not have
entertained a challenge to his SOLSA sentence before that time, when he could not
claim a right to immediate release. The district court properly rejected the first
contention, noting that while Mr. Cole was challenging the constitutionality of
SOLSA, he was doing so in order to invalidate his sentence and thereby obtain his
immediate release—relief that is clearly appropriate to a habeas application under
-2-
§ 2254, see, e.g., Davis v. Roberts, 425 F.3d 830, 834 (10th Cir. 2005) (“To the
extent [a state prisoner] is challenging the validity or legality of the sentence he is
currently serving, his claim should be brought under § 2254.”)1 The court properly
rejected the second contention, noting that challenges to SOLSA sentences may be
brought as early as direct appeal, see, e.g., People v. Clark, 214 P.3d 531, 543-44
(Colo. App. 2009), aff’d, 232 P.3d 1287 (Colo. 2010), and, more specifically, that
post-conviction relief from illegal, illegally-imposed, or constitutionally invalid
SOLSA sentences may be sought under Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(a) and (c) without
regard to whether immediate release will result (indeed, given specified time limits,
some of these challenges must be brought well before release would result). See
People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 672 (Colo. App. 2006) (discussing application of
Rule 35(a) and (c) to various constitutional and statutory challenges to SOLSA
sentence); see also People v. Firth, 205 P.3d 445, 447-48, 452 (Colo. App. 2008)
(reviewing constitutional challenges to SOLSA under Rule 35(c) before defendant
had served minimum six-year term of his indeterminate sentence).2
1
In this same vein, Mr. Cole contends he is not challenging the imposition of
his sentence, but its execution, and thus should have been allowed to proceed under
§ 2241. He misunderstands the imposition/execution distinction. Everything that he
currently objects to about his SOLSA sentence was extant, enforceable, and subject
to challenge when the sentence was imposed; none of his claims concern subsequent
independent unconstitutional actions taken by those charged with its execution.
2
Mr. Cole cites cases holding that actions filed under the state habeas statute
challenging the lawfulness of continued confinement, such as actions involving good
time credits or certain parole matters, cannot be brought until immediate release
would result. As the above authorities reflect, such cases are inapposite in
(continued)
-3-
On appeal, Mr. Cole raises procedural objections to certain post-conviction
decisions of the Colorado courts. These matters are not properly before us. He also
contends that the district court should not have directed him to name his current
warden as the respondent in his amended application under § 2254, because he is
confined in a private prison facility. Given that his habeas action was properly
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, we need not resolve who would have qualified as
the proper respondent.
The request for COA is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED. The pending
motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
circumstances governed by Rule 35. See generally People v. Wirsching, 30 P.3d 227,
229 (Colo. App. 2000).
-4-