Landrith v. Gariglietti

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 7, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
BRET DAVID LANDRITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 12-3048
(D.C. No. 2:11-CV-02465-KHV-GLR)
JOHN C. GARIGLIETTI, Chief Judge of (D. Kan.)
the Eleventh Judicial District Crawford
County, Kansas, in his official capacity;
CAROL G. GREEN, Clerk of the
Appellate Courts, State of Kansas, in her
official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before GORSUCH, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Unhappy with the outcome of his divorce and child custody case in Kansas
state court, Bret Landrith sued the state judge and clerk of court in federal court. For
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
her part, the federal judge assigned to the matter dismissed the complaint as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Now before us, Mr. Landrith says the district judge
erred on the merits and, in any event, should have recused herself.
The district court’s dismissal, however, was surely correct. Mr. Landrith’s
complaint essentially seeks federal review of a state court custody decision. For
Mr. Landrith to prevail, a federal court would have to review and reject orders issued
by a state judge in state domestic relations proceedings. Federal courts, however,
lack the power to do any of this. As the district court correctly explained, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes as much and has long done so. See Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). That doctrine expressly prohibits “a party losing in state
court . . . from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state
judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the
state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d
1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Neither is this the end to the obstacles confronting Mr. Landrith. Federal
courts are not authorized to grant injunctive relief against judicial officers taking
actions in their judicial capacity, absent limited circumstances not present here.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
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unavailable.”). Yet there is no question that Mr. Landrith is seeking to sue judicial
officers for actions taken in their judicial capacity. See Lundahl v. Zimmer, 296 F.3d
936, 939 (10th Cir. 2002) (judges and court clerks are judicial officers). Neither
under the long-entrenched, if judge made, “domestic relations exception” are federal
courts entitled to issue “divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.” Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). Nor are attempts to “disguise the true nature of”
a domestic relations action in order to secure a federal forum sufficient to preclude
application of this rule. McLaughlin v. Cotner, 193 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1999).
Given all this, we have no question the district court correctly dismissed
Mr. Landrith’s case under § 1915(e)(2).
Turning his attention from the substance of the district court’s ruling to the
procedures it employed to arrive at it, Mr. Landrith argues he is entitled to default
judgment because the defendants responded to his complaint by filing a § 1915(e)(2)
motion to dismiss rather than an answer or a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The district court, however, quite correctly explained that a § 1915(e) motion is
effectively treated as a 12(b) motion and, accordingly, as an effort to “otherwise
defend” under the default judgment rule, Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Cf. Hise v. Phillip
Morris, Inc., No. 99-5113, 2000 WL 192892, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 17, 2000)
(unpublished order and judgment) (endorsing broad reading of “otherwise defend”).
Alternatively, Mr. Landrith argues the district court’s dismissal of his
complaint as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2) was improper because a magistrate judge
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had already granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and so must have found
some merit to his claims. Whatever other problems attend this argument, however,
Mr. Landrith’s assumption that the magistrate judge must have screened his case for
merit under § 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A is simply in error. The magistrate judge’s order
clearly states that Mr. Landrith’s in forma pauperis motion was granted solely based
on financial (in)ability, not based on an assessment of his lawsuit’s merit or lack of
merit. See Buchheit v. Green, Nos. 12-3154 & 12-3158, 2012 WL 5909036, at *3
(10th Cir. Nov. 27, 2012).
Finally, Mr. Landrith contends the district court judge should have recused
herself due to bias, an issue he raises for the first time on appeal. The untimeliness
of Mr. Landrith’s request for recusal is reason enough to reject this contention. See
United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1276 (10th Cir. 2000). But even if we
overlooked this problem, another would immediately emerge: the lack of any facts in
Mr. Landrith’s brief or the record suggesting bias on the part of the district judge.
For all these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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