Freeman v. Gunter

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
JAN 8 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RUSSELL EUGENE FREEMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 97-1232
v. D. Colorado
FRANK O. GUNTER, LOU HESSE, (D.C. No. 92-M-1698)
JOE PAOLINO, GEORGE E.
SULLIVAN, DENNIS BURBANK,
TOM MISEL, GREG BODAKIAN,
and John Does, all in their official and
individual capacities, severally and
jointly,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Russell Freeman, an inmate in the Fremont Correctional Facility in Canon
City, Colorado, brought this action against several prison officials pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed the action and we reversed. Freeman
v. Gunter, No. 93-1355, 1993 WL 537743 (10th Cir. Dec 28, 1993). On March
24, 1995, the district court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion
for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to defendants on
the remaining claim on July 2, 1996. After two defective appeals, Mr. Freeman
filed in the district court a motion for award of costs, fees, and expenses, which
the district court denied on June 9, 1997.
Mr. Freeman argues that because his suit was nonfrivolous and because he
prevailed on part of his claim under the March 24, 1995, order, he is a prevailing
party. Therefore, he argues that he, like a nonprisoner prevailing party, is entitled
to costs, fees, and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As a pro se plaintiff, Mr. Freeman is not entitled to attorney’s fees for time
spent on this case. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991); Turman v.
Tuttle, 711 F.2d 148, 149 (10th Cir. 1983). Mr. Freeman is also not entitled to
fees, costs, and expenses because he errs in his assertion that he is a prevailing
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party. A “plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his claim
materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar v.
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992); see also Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755,
759-61 (1987); Phelps v. Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126, 1130 (10th Cir. 1997). A
party may also prevail if he or she achieves “comparable relief through a consent
decree or settlement.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111. Mr. Freeman did not obtain actual
relief on any of his claims, nor was there a settlement in this case.
Therefore, Mr. Freeman is not a prevailing party, and the district court’s
denial of his motion for award of costs, fees, and expenses is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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