United States v. Young

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 16, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS A. Shumaker
Elisabeth
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 11-7049
v. (D.C. No. 6:10-CR-00081-JHP-1)
(E. Dist. Okla.)
TERRI AUSTIN YOUNG,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Terri Austin Young pled guilty to one count of possession of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2). The district
court sentenced Mr. Young to seventy-eight months’ imprisonment and a lifetime
term of supervised release. On appeal, Mr. Young contends the length of his
supervised release is substantively unreasonable. We disagree and affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
“Reasonableness review is a two-step process comprising a procedural and a
substantive component.” United States v. Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Procedural reasonableness involves
using the proper method to calculate the sentence.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[S]ubstantive reasonableness review broadly looks to whether the
district court abused its discretion in weighing permissible [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)
factors in light of the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” Id. at 1118 (quoting Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Mr. Young challenges only the
substantive reasonableness of his supervised release term.
Under the governing abuse of discretion standard, “a district court’s
sentence is substantively unreasonable only if it is arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Sayad, 589 F.3d at 1116 (internal
quotation marks omitted). As Mr. Young recognizes, this court has held that “a
sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness.” United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054
(10th Cir. 2006); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (holding
“a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court
sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines”).
The sentencing guidelines applicable here provide that the term of
supervised release for a sex offense may be up to life, USSG § 5D1.2(b)(2), and
further state that where “the instant offense of conviction is a sex offense, . . . the
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statutory maximum term of supervised release is recommended.” USSG §
5D1.2(b), p.s. (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (authorizing
supervised release of five years to life for sex offense). We therefore presume the
lifetime term of supervised release given to Mr. Young is reasonable. Mr. Young
has the burden to convince us to the contrary.
In sentencing Mr. Young, the district court explained its reasons for
applying the lengthy term of supervised release:
[S]upervised release for life is not meant to be punishment, it’s meant
to be of help to you. That means the probation office will be
available to you for counseling, and that could be, on their
recommendation, shortened if there is – I’m not sure the
ramifications. You will be the first person I put on supervised release
for life. I look at supervised release as a time when you have access
to trained probation officers and who will give you additional
treatment, counseling, as long as need be. You’re a young person. I
don’t want to limit it to five years for that reason . . . .
Supervised release is not going to be anything but something that I
anticipate will help you . . . . [O]ne of the reasons I’m inclined for the
life supervised release is nobody is ever terminated from treatment
with any assurance that it’s worked. I mean, we’re just not there yet.
And when I mean worked or whether the treatment has been valid or
not, there’s just no way to validate. Hopefully, in your lifetime, there
will be a validation and there will be – if healing is the correct word,
there will be an opportunity for you to be healed of this problem.
That’s the hope. You are a young person. I know that the sentence
perhaps seems harsh. It’s not intended to be. And life supervised
release is designed to assist you, hopefully, in your future as you live
through this experience.
Rec., Vol. 2 at 55-56. In so doing, the court clearly communicated its recognition
of the difficulty of treating and curing this type of sex offender and its conclusion
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that a lifetime term of supervised release would promote Mr. Young’s
rehabilitation. 1
In an attempt to rebut the presumption of reasonableness, Mr. Young first
contends the district court’s explanation did not demonstrate how the sentence
imposed would also “further the statutory goals of reflecting the seriousness of the
offense, promoting respect for the law, providing just punishment, affording
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and protecting the public from further
crimes.” Aplt. Br. at 4. While Mr. Young’s counsel was arguing at the sentencing
hearing for a downward variance from the guideline term of imprisonment,
however, he pointed out the following about supervised release:
[W]e have these trained officers that will go out and make sure
there’s no computer, will go out and make sure there’s no access to
children, or go out and make sure there’s no Internet connection.
That, Judge, serves the [statutory goals of] providing respect for the
law and . . . protect[ing] the public.
1
The court also acknowledged that it has authority to shorten the term in
the future on the recommendation of the probation office. See id. at 55 (“[T]he
probation office will be available to you for counseling, and [supervised release
for life] could be, on their recommendation, shortened . . . .”); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(1) (“The court may, after considering the factors set forth in section
3553 . . . terminate a term of supervised release . . . if it is satisfied that such
action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of
justice.”).
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Rec., Vol. 2 at 26 (emphasis added). In addition, after imposing the sentence,
including the supervised release term and all of its conditions, the district court
concluded by stating:
This sentence is imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a). . . .
The sentence prescribed by this Court reflects the seriousness of the
offense, promotes respect for the law, and provides just punishment
for the offense. This sentence affords adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct, protects the public from further crimes of this defendant, and
provides correctional treatment for the defendant in the most effective
manner. The Court has further determined that this sentence is
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet the objectives set
forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a).
Id. at 58-59.
Our review of the record convinces us that the district court considered the
guidelines and the statutory bases for imposing supervised release, in light of the
evidence, when it set the lifetime term. The court “set forth enough to satisfy [us]
that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. at 356; see also id. (“[W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines
to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.”).
Mr. Young submitted United States v. Inman, 666 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir.
2012), as supplemental authority supporting his argument that his sentence to a
life term of supervised release is unreasonable. However, in contrast to the instant
matter, the record did not demonstrate in Inman that the district court considered
any of the pertinent § 3553(a) factors in sentencing the defendant. Furthermore,
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the court failed to explain its reasons for sentencing the defendant to a life term of
supervised release over both parties’ recommendation for a ten-year term. Id. at
1004. As discussed above, the district court here both explicitly considered the
factors enumerated in § 3553(a) and explained why in its judgment a life term of
supervised release was necessary.
While not dispositive, it is instructive that several of our sister circuits have
upheld as substantively reasonable a lifetime of supervision for a defendant
convicted of possessing child pornography. See United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d
915, 923 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding lifetime of supervision for possession of child
pornography in part because the policy statement accompanying U.S.S.G. §
5D1.2(b)(2) “reflects the judgment of Congress and the Sentencing Commission
that a lifetime term of supervised release is appropriate for sex offenders in order
to protect the public”); United States v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 2007)
(upholding life term of supervised release as reasonable sentence for conviction of
possession of child pornography); United States v. Presto, 498 F.3d 415, 420 (6th
Cir. 2007) (same); see also United States v. Williams, 636 F.3d 1229, 1234-35 (9th
Cir. 2011) (same for defendant convicted of receipt of child pornography); United
States v. Kennedy, 499 F.3d 547, 553 (6th Cir. 2007) (same for distribution of
child pornography stating, “Congress insists that lifetime supervision be available
to courts in sentencing sexual offenders . . . [because such] criminal conduct may
reflect deep-seated aberrant sexual disorders that are not likely to disappear within
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a few years of release from prison”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United
States v. Hayes, 445 F.3d 536, 537 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that for a defendant
convicted of knowingly transporting child pornography in interstate commerce,
“[t]he district court’s imposition of lifetime supervised release was not
unreasonable and, in fact, is expressly recommended under the Sentencing
Guidelines.”); United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1024-25 (11th Cir. 2005)
(upholding lifetime supervision for defendant who was twenty-one years old at the
time he committed several child pornography-related crimes and who had himself
been sexually abused).
Mr. Young contends further that a lifetime term of supervised release is
excessive in his case given that his sentence to seventy-eight months’
imprisonment was at the bottom end of the guidelines. But “[s]upervised release
fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration,” United
States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000), and the district court made clear it
viewed supervised release as a vehicle to promote Mr. Young’s rehabilitation.
Mr. Young points out that the district court, by its own admission, had never
before imposed a lifetime term of supervised release, arguing that this disparity in
sentencing and Mr. Young’s young age – he was just twenty-seven years old at the
time of his sentencing – supports a shorter sentence. Although the district court
could have relied on those factors as rationales for imposing a shorter term of
supervised release, neither of those facts rebuts the presumption of reasonableness
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attached to Mr. Young’s within-guidelines sentence. Moreover, the court was
presented with evidence that Mr. Young had engaged in online chats with young
boys about meeting for sex. Although Mr. Young said no meetings ever occurred
and there is no evidence that they did, it is apparent that he had progressed beyond
just viewing child pornography. Given our standard of review, we cannot
conclude that Mr. Young’s life term of supervised release is substantively
unreasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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