Oklahoma Corrections Professional Ass'n v. Doerflinger

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 25, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
OKLAHOMA CORRECTIONS
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION INC.,
a not for profit corporation;
DAVID RAMSEY, individually;
GLEN COLEMAN,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. No. 12-6238
(D.C. No. 5:10-CV-01369-R)
PRESTON DOERFLINGER, Finance (W.D. Okla.)
Secretary and Director, Oklahoma
Department of Human Services,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
The Oklahoma Corrections Professional Association Inc. and two of its
members (collectively, the OCPA), brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to challenge
two statutory conditions that together barred OCPA’s participation in a voluntary
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
payroll-deduction program for public employees: participating organizations must
consist solely of current public employees (exclusivity requirement) and have at least
2,000 members (numerosity requirement). OCPA filed suit against the Director of
the Oklahoma Department of Human Services in his official capacity, seeking
equitable and declaratory relief forestalling enforcement of these conditions as well
as a preliminary injunction to block its imminent removal from the program. The
Director moved for summary judgment on the merits. In a single order the district
court denied the Director’s motion and granted OCPA a preliminary injunction
precluding the Director’s enforcement of the numerosity requirement and reinstating
OCPA in the program from which it had by then been removed. The Director now
appeals from the grant of the preliminary injunction. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we reverse for the reasons explained below.
BACKGROUND, SCOPE OF APPEAL, AND DECISION UNDER REVIEW
Oklahoma currently enables its employees to use voluntary payroll deductions
(VPDs) to pay dues to “the Oklahoma Public Employees Association . . . or any other
statewide association limited to state employee membership with a minimum
membership of two thousand (2,000) dues-paying members.” Okla. Stat. tit. 62,
§ 34.70(B)(5). The Director reads this provision to exempt the Oklahoma Public
Employees Association (OPEA) from the exclusivity and numerosity conditions
imposed on “any other statewide association.” In addition, the statute grandfathers in
“[a]ny statewide association granted a payroll deduction prior to January 1, 2008,”
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id., § 34.70(D), when the numerosity threshold was only 1,000 employees, see id.,
§ 7.10(B)(5) (2008).1 This provision preserved participation in the VPD program by
the Oklahoma State Troopers Association and the Communication Workers of
America/State Employees, both of which have fewer than 2,000 members. But it
does not apply to OCPA, which qualified for the VPD program in late 2009 and
began participating in 2010, when its membership temporarily exceeded the
2,000-member threshold.
OCPA challenged the VPD program on three grounds: (1) the numerosity and
exclusivity conditions precluding OCPA’s use of the program burdened its ability to
secure funding for political activities compared to associations allowed to participate,
resulting in discrimination on speech in violation of the First Amendment; (2) the
exclusivity condition restricting the makeup of OCPA’s membership (but not that of
the exempt OPEA) is a violation of OCPA’s associational rights under the First
Amendment; and (3) the operative legislative amendments to the VPD program were
enacted in violation of the single-subject rule in Article 5, § 57 of the Oklahoma
Constitution. The scope of this appeal, however, is more limited in light of the
nature and basis for the preliminary injunction under review. The district court did
not enjoin enforcement of the exclusivity condition, so the associational-rights claim
triggered by that restriction is not before us. Nor is the state constitutional claim,
over which the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The
1
The statute was renumbered from § 7.10 to § 34.70 in 2009.
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preliminary injunction relates solely to the numerosity requirement and the alleged
speech discrimination it effects.
The district court applied the traditional test for a preliminary injunction,
requiring the movant to show “(1) it is substantially likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) it will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) its threatened injury
outweighs the injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) the
injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Beltronics USA, Inc. v.
Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009).2 The district
court did not directly assess the first factor, but tacitly relied on its preceding analysis
of the Director’s summary judgment motion on the merits.
2
The district court correctly left this test unmodified by collateral rules we have
developed to heighten or relax the movant’s burden under certain circumstances. In
particular, the district court properly deemed this a case of preserving rather than
disturbing the status quo, so that critical consideration did not require enhancement
of the standard. See generally O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v.
Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 977 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“[A] movant seeking a
preliminary injunction which upsets the status quo must satisfy a heightened
burden”), aff’d and remanded, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). “An injunction disturbs the
status quo when it changes the last peaceable uncontested status existing between the
parties before the dispute developed.” Beltronics, 562 F.3d at 1070-71 (internal
quotation marks omitted). When the present dispute developed, OCPA had been an
ongoing participant in the VPD program since early 2010, although it was terminated
from the program before its motion for preliminary injunction was finally resolved.
Thus, the injunction at issue simply returned the parties to the pre-litigation status
quo. On the other hand, OCPA concedes it is not entitled to any relaxation of the
preliminary injunction standard, because it is seeking to enjoin governmental action
taken pursuant to a statutory scheme. See Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101,
1115 (10th Cir. 2006).
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It began that analysis by acknowledging “[t]he First Amendment prohibits
government from abridging the freedom of speech; it does not confer an affirmative
right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for
expression.” Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1096
(2009) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). Ysursa held a ban on
payroll deductions for union political action committees did not infringe First
Amendment rights and hence was not subject to strict scrutiny. 129 S. Ct. at 1098.
But the district court noted the ban in Ysursa was applied evenhandedly to all unions,
see id. at 1099 n.3, while selective restrictions on speech implicate heightened
scrutiny under the First Amendment, see, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2653, 2663-64 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,
130 S. Ct. 876, 898-99 (2010); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 246-47 (2006). As
discussed above, Oklahoma’s VPD program is selectively denied to public-employee
associations based on size of membership. While it is true this numerosity
requirement generally applies to all associations, some are exempted by a grandfather
provision and OPEA is favored with its own particularized exemption. The district
court consequently held the program was subject to heightened scrutiny, which the
court went on to conclude was not satisfied by the justifications offered by the
Director for the numerosity requirement.3
3
The district court did not decide whether the appropriate level of scrutiny was
strict scrutiny—requiring a law to be “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling
(continued)
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The district court’s assessment of the other injunction factors followed largely
from this conclusion. The court found irreparable harm based on the presumption of
such harm when First Amendment rights have been infringed, see Pac. Frontier v.
Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 2005), bolstered by evidence
submitted by OCPA regarding the vital role VPDs play in raising association funds.
As for harm to the State, the court found the administrative burden of reinstating the
VPD program for OCPA would be de minimus and noted the Director had not offered
any evidence of other damage the injunction would occasion. Finally, the court
concluded the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest, particularly as
“it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional
rights.” Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
The merit of OCPA’s challenge to the numerosity requirement is the lynchpin
of this appeal. And the crux of that inquiry is the presence vel non of a cognizable
First Amendment interest and the attendant level of scrutiny applied to the legislative
interest”—applied in Citizens United to a ban on corporate expenditures for political
speech, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (internal quotation marks omitted), or the somewhat laxer
exacting scrutiny—requiring a law to be “closely drawn” to achieve a “sufficiently
important interest”—applied in Randall to limits on political campaign contributions,
548 U.S. at 247-48, or the intermediate scrutiny—requiring a law to be “drawn to
achieve” a “substantial government interest”—applied in Sorrell to restrictions on
commercial speech, 131 S. Ct. at 2667-68. The court concluded the VPD program
could not be justified under any of these heightened standards.
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judgment behind the requirement, i.e., if “the State has not infringed [OCPA’s] First
Amendment rights, the State need only demonstrate a rational basis to justify the ban
on [association] payroll deductions,” Ysursa, 129 S. Ct. at 1098.
The district court recognized the First Amendment inquiry is affected but not
controlled by Ysursa’s holding that a VPD program is effectively a subsidy for
participants’ activities (including speech), which the State has no constitutional
obligation to provide. In doing so, the court drew a salient distinction between VPD
benefits evenhandedly and selectively bestowed, citing precedent applying
heightened scrutiny to laws discriminately affecting speech. But there is a second
distinction—between differential treatment of speakers and discrimination based on
viewpoint—which moderates the force of the first in the context of speech subsidies.
That is, while viewpoint discrimination always implicates First Amendment
constraints, “speaker-based distinctions are permissible when the state subsidizes
speech.” Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 646 (7th Cir. 2013)
(emphasis added). As the Seventh Circuit explained in upholding a VPD program
much like the program at issue here:
Nothing in the Constitution requires the government to subsidize all
speech equally. A government subsidy “that discriminates among
speakers does not implicate the First Amendment unless it discriminates
on the basis of ideas.” Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 450 (1991);
see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 557-58
(1998) . . . . As Regan [v. Taxation with Representation of Wash.,
461 U.S. 540 (1983)] explained, legislative “selection of particular
entities or persons for entitlement to this sort of largesse is obviously a
matter of policy and discretion not [ordinarily] open to judicial
review[.]” 461 U.S. at 549 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, the
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speech subsidy upheld in Regan discriminated on the basis of speaker—
veterans’ groups who engaged in lobbying could claim [tax exempt]
status but other lobbying groups could not. Id. at 548-49; see also
[S. C. Educ. Ass’n v.] Campbell, 883 F.2d [1251,] 1255-56 [4th Cir.
(1989)] (no First Amendment implications to statute that discriminated
on the basis of speaker in authorizing payroll deductions for some
public employee organizations but not others). Thus, that the state gave
one category of public employees the benefit of payroll dues deduction
does not run afoul of the First Amendment.
Id. at 646-47 (parallel citations omitted) (third and fourth alterations in original).
The particular combination of differential treatment based on speaker (as opposed to
viewpoint) in connection with a subsidy for (as opposed to burden on) speech
activities was not considered by the district court. The Supreme Court decisions it
cited for heightened scrutiny involved burdens on speech,4 which of course trigger
such scrutiny—in pointed contrast to the Regan decision relied on by Walker, which
upheld a speech subsidy by applying rational-basis scrutiny.5 And, of course,
4
Citizens United involved a law prohibiting expenditures for political speech,
see 130 S. Ct. at 886, Randall addressed a law limiting campaign contributions,
548 U.S. at 236, 247-48, and Sorrell concerned a law restricting commercial speech,
131 S. Ct. at 2663-64.
5
Regan upheld a law selectively subsidizing political speech by veterans
organizations, whose tax-exempt status was preserved even if they engaged in
lobbying efforts that would disqualify other charitable organizations. 461 U.S. at
542, 550. The Court noted the permissibility of selective subsidies is “scarcely [a]
novel principle[]. We have held in several contexts that a legislature’s decision not
to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus
is not subject to strict scrutiny,” even if the subsidy is not uniformly denied. Id. at
549 (discussing cases rejecting constitutional challenges to other selective subsidies);
see also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003) (quoting
Regan and upholding law subsidizing provision of filtered internet access but not
unfiltered internet access to library patrons); Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S.
360, 368 (1988) (quoting Regan and upholding Congress’ refusal to extend food
(continued)
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“Ysursa requires us to analyze [VPD programs] under First Amendment cases
involving speech subsidies.” Walker, 705 F.3d at 648.
We find Walker, which is the only recent circuit case addressing a similar VPD
program,6 to be well-reasoned and persuasive on this point. The contrary district
court cases relied on by the district court here fail to consider the role of the
speaker/viewpoint distinction in the context of a speech subsidy.7 We follow
Walker’s guidance in this critical respect.
That is not, however, the end of the First Amendment inquiry. For one thing,
the speaker/viewpoint distinction may as a practical matter be illusory: “Speech
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to
control content.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899; cf. Walker, 705 F.3d at 649-52
(considering, but rejecting on the facts, contention that selectivity in allowing
public-safety employees’ union access to VPD program was façade for viewpoint
stamp benefits to workers who have lost income by striking, notwithstanding the
undeniable effect on associational rights involved).
6
The Fourth Circuit’s Campbell decision cited in the passage from Walker
quoted above, as well as the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Brown v. Alexander, 718 F.2d
1417, 1421-23 (6th Cir. 1983), also held somewhat similar VPD programs did not
violate the First Amendment rights of associations not allowed to participate, but
Walker’s thorough and contemporary discussion of the constitutional issues draws
our particular reliance.
7
Actually, one of the cases—the district court decision reversed by the Seventh
Circuit in Walker—did acknowledge this distinction and held it negated heightened
First Amendment scrutiny, but went on to invalidate the VPD program under rational
basis review. See Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856, 874-76
(W.D. Wis. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 705 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2013).
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discrimination). There is no indication of this in connection with the numerosity
requirement itself, which appears to be a facially neutral criterion—though given the
failure of the parties and district court to focus on the speaker/viewpoint distinction,
there may be evidence or argument on this point thus far not fairly aired. The same is
true of the grandfather exemption from the numerosity requirement. And while the
singular exemption granted specifically to OPEA is potentially more problematic,
viewpoint-discrimination-by-proxy has not been adequately explored in this regard
either. Thus, while we reverse the preliminary injunction improperly granted on the
basis of speaker selectivity alone, we do not foreclose the possibility of OCPA
justifying injunctive relief on the basis of viewpoint discrimination.
Furthermore, even if heightened scrutiny does not apply, the numerosity
requirement of the VPD program could be invalidated under rational-basis scrutiny.
But for that to happen, OCPA must satisfy a heavy burden: OCPA must “negative
any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
[selective] classification” effected by the challenged statute. Cohon ex rel. Bass v.
N.M. Dep’t of Health, 646 F.3d 717, 730 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The district court has not addressed this question. Rather, it concluded that
(1) the Director had not shown the numerosity requirement of the VPD program was
(2) supported by state interests substantial enough to satisfy heightened scrutiny and
(3) drawn to achieve such interests in a manner commensurate with such scrutiny.
Aplt. App. at 832-33. All three points differentiate the district court’s analysis from
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that directed by rational-basis scrutiny. We do not preemptively gainsay the
possibility of a successful rational-basis challenge to the VPD program, but an
affirmance of the existing injunction on this basis would be inappropriate. We leave
any further development of this potential rationale for injunctive relief to the district
court.
The preliminary injunction issued by the district court is reversed.
Entered for the Court
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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