United States v. Miles

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 11, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 06-6187
v. (W.D. Okla.)
(D.Ct. No. 06-CR-096-HE)
ALEXANDER CHRISTIAN MILES,
Defendant - Appellant.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before O’BRIEN, HOLLOWAY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
In a one-count indictment, Alexander Christian Miles, age 44, was charged
with violating the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), by transporting a
fifteen-year-old girl into Oklahoma for sexual activity in violation of Oklahoma
law. (Case No. 05-CR-213). The indictment did not specify the Oklahoma law(s)
Miles allegedly violated.
After the jury was sworn but before any evidence was presented or
arguments made, Miles moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of specificity.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Citation
to orders and judgments is not prohibited. Fed. R. App. 32.1. But it is discouraged,
except when related to law of the case, issue preclusion or claim preclusion. Any citation
to an order and judgment must be accompanied by an appropriate parenthetical notation
—(unpublished). 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
The district court granted the motion. Almost immediately Miles was re-indicted
under the Mann Act in this case (Case No. 06-CR-96) for the same interstate
transportation, but the new indictment contained a citation to the Oklahoma
statutes Miles allegedly violated. Miles again moved to dismiss, this time on
double jeopardy grounds. The district court denied his motion.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that no
person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. It prevents a person from being prosecuted for a
crime of which he has once been acquitted.
The rationale for barring a retrial after an acquittal has been
explained as follows: “the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety, and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.”
United States v. Wood, 958 F.2d 963, 971 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)). See also Burks v. United States, 437
U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the
purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence
which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.”).
On the other hand:
The double-jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment . . . does not
mean that every time a defendant is put to trial before a competent
tribunal he is entitled to go free if the trial fails to end in a final
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judgment. Such a rule would create an insuperable obstacle to the
administration of justice in many cases in which there is no
semblance of the type of oppressive practices at which the double-
jeopardy prohibition is aimed.
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1949). In other words, the government is
entitled to one fair opportunity to present its evidence and make its case for
conviction. See Burks, 437 U.S. at 16-17.
The jury had no opportunity to decide anything in this case—it heard
neither evidence nor argument. Nevertheless, if there was an event equivalent to
an acquittal, which terminated jeopardy in the original proceeding, a second trial
is barred. The dismissal of the first indictment for failure to state an offense was
not such an event. Because the government has yet to have its one opportunity to
obtain a conviction, the district court properly denied Miles’ motion to dismiss. 1
I. BACKGROUND
In 2001, Miles, an anesthesiology resident in New York, traveled to
Cambodia, where he met a fourteen-year-old girl, S.K., to whom he proposed
marriage. The girl’s family agreed to the proposal and the two were married in a
traditional Cambodian wedding ceremony. Two months later, after Miles
obtained a passport for S.K., allegedly based on a misrepresentation of her age,
Miles and S.K. traveled together to New York. The two were married in a
1
Our jurisdiction arises from the collateral order exception to the bar against
interlocutory appeals in criminal cases. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659
(1977) (denial of defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy
grounds is appealable as a collateral order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
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ceremony there, again allegedly based on a misrepresentation of S.K.’s age. In
June 2002, Miles accepted employment as an anesthesiologist at the Jackson
County Memorial Hospital in Altus, Oklahoma. Miles and S.K. traveled to
Oklahoma together where they lived as husband and wife.
In an indictment filed on November 16, 2005, Miles was charged with one
count of violating the Mann Act, which prohibits the knowing transportation of a
minor in interstate commerce “with intent that the individual engage in . . . any
sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense under
the laws of [any state] . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). The indictment charged:
In or about July of 2002, in the Western District of Oklahoma and
elsewhere, ALEXANDER CHRISTIAN MILES, knowingly
transported a girl who had not attained the age of 18 years in
interstate commerce with the intent that the girl engage in sexual
activity for which the defendant could be charged with a criminal
offense, in that, the defendant transported a 15-year old Cambodian
girl from New York City to Altus, Oklahoma, with the intent to
engage in sexual intercourse with the girl for which acts the
defendant could be charged with a criminal offense under the laws of
the State of Oklahoma.
(Appellant’s App. at 8.) Despite its lack of specificity as to the assimilated
Oklahoma statute(s) Miles neither moved to dismiss the indictment nor requested
a bill of particulars during the four months the indictment was pending. 2
2
An indictment must contain “a plain, concise, and definite written statement of
the essential facts constituting the offense charged . . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). As the
Supreme Court has explained, an indictment must “first, contain[ ] the elements of the
offense charged and fairly inform[ ] a defendant of the charge against which he must
defend, and, second, enable[ ] him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future
prosecutions for the same offense.” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974).
-4-
On April 3, 2006, one week prior to jury selection, the government filed
proposed jury instructions which identified the specific Oklahoma statutes Miles
allegedly violated—the statutory rape statute, Okla Stat. tit. 21, §1111(A)(1)
(defining statutory rape as “an act of sexual intercourse . . . accomplished with a
male or female who is not the spouse of the perpetrator . . . [w]here the victim is
under sixteen (16) years of age . . .”), and the lewd acts statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 21,
§1123(A)(2) (making it a crime to “knowingly and intentionally . . . [l]ook upon,
touch, maul, or feel the body or private parts of any child under sixteen (16) years
of age in any lewd or lascivious manner . . .”). 3
One week later, on April 10, a jury was “empaneled and admonished” and
sent home with instructions to return a week later to begin the trial. No argument
or evidence was presented. Before the jury returned to hear the case, Miles
moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense, arguing the
government could not prove he committed statutory rape or lewd molestation
under Oklahoma law because marriage is a defense to both crimes. 4 In response
Miles could have moved to dismiss the indictment pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3)(B) for
failure to contain the required elements or could have requested a bill of particulars
pursuant to Rule 7(f). He did neither.
3
Under Oklahoma law, lewd molestation is a lesser included offense of statutory
rape. See Dill v. Okla., 122 P.3d 866, 869 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
4
To obtain a conviction for statutory rape or lewd molestation, the government
would have to prove Miles and S.K. were not legally married. That would be the case
whether marital status is considered an element of the offense or an affirmative defense.
See United States v. Scott, 901 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1990) (once raised by a
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the government argued the marriages were a sham and their validity was an issue
for the jury. In the alternative, the government argued the indictment did not
mention the violation of any specific Oklahoma statute and, based on recently
discovered evidence, it could prove Miles forcibly raped his putative wife (an
offense for which marriage is no defense) in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21,
§ 1111(B) (defining rape as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a
male or female who is the spouse of the perpetrator if force or violence is used or
threatened . . .”) (emphasis added).
The government submitted new jury instructions based on its forcible rape
theory, even though the indictment did not mention the use of force. Miles was
unaware of the government’s forcible rape theory and its evidence supporting that
theory. Understandably, he complained. 5 He filed a written response to the
government’s newly proposed jury instructions. It began: “The Indictment is void
on its face for failure to state a charge. By failing to specify which provision of
Oklahoma law Dr. Miles allegedly violated, the grand jury failed to charge an
offense as required by Rule 7, Fed. R. Crim. P., and the due process clause. The
United States has demonstrated the flaw in the charging process by changing
defendant, the government must disprove an affirmative defense beyond a reasonable
doubt).
5
Miles does not claim discovery abuse by the government. Miles and his wife
were separated and in the process of obtaining a divorce during the first criminal
proceeding. We presume the government was also surprised by the wife’s new
allegations.
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its theory of the case, from statutory rape to rape by force.” (W.D. Okla.
Doc. No. 47 at 1 - Am. Resp. to Government’s Supp. Br. Regarding Jury
Instructions) (emphasis in original). 6 Miles argued the indictment was deficient
because it failed to give fair notice of forcible rape and its lack of specificity
would not enable him to assert acquittal or conviction as a double jeopardy bar to
another prosecution, citing United States v. Poole, 929 F.2d 1476, 1479 (10th Cir.
1991). Miles complained: “If convicted of whatever charges the Government
ultimately settles on, Dr. Miles is facing a long period of incarceration . . . . The
United States cannot levy such grave accusations against a defendant in terms so
vague and indistinct. This error cannot be cured through a bill of particulars
since a bill of particular cannot save an invalid indictment. Russell [v. United
States, 369 U.S. 749, 769-70 (1962)].” (Id. at 3.) Miles requested a judgment of
acquittal.
The trial judge expressed general concern about the sufficiency of the
indictment because it failed to identify the Oklahoma statute(s) allegedly violated.
But he specifically decided the government could not proceed on the forcible rape
theory identified in its alternative proposed jury instructions because the
indictment contained no allegation of forcible sexual intercourse. Miles was thus
6
“We may take judicial notice of these documents from the public record.” State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1226 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008).
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deprived of proper notice of the alleged crime. 7 The judge explained: “The
government’s shifting theories for avoiding the impact of the marriage alleged in
this case either fall short as a matter of law [the marriages were at most voidable,
not void] or involve attempts to establish liability based on matters not alleged in
the indictment, contrary to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” (Appellant’s App.
at 15.) Accordingly he dismissed the indictment, concluding it “d[id] not state an
offense and [wa]s therefore fatally defective.” (Id.)
On April 18, 2006, while Miles was in the process of being released from
jail, he was arrested under a new indictment (this case). The second indictment
was the same as the first but for two changes. First, it contained an additional
7
The judge said:
In its most recent submissions to the court, the government asserts that it
can prove that the defendant coerced or threatened the alleged victim in this
case to engage in sexual intercourse and that this conduct constitutes a
crime under Oklahoma law notwithstanding the marriage relationship.
However, while such facts may be sufficient to establish a violation of
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1111(B), there is not the slightest hint of any such
conduct alleged in the indictment. As a result, the indictment does not put
the defendant on fair notice that he would have to defend against a charge
of intending the forcible rape of his spouse. See supra n.2, citing [United
States v. Hathaway, 318 F.3d 1001, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 2003)]. See also
United States v. Hied Van Tieu, 279 F.3d 917, 921 (10th Cir. 2002)
(constructive amendments to an indictment, prohibited by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, occur “when the Government, through evidence
presented at trial, or the district court, through instructions to the jury,
broadens the basis for a defendant’s conviction beyond acts charged in the
indictment”).
(Appellant’s App. at 14 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)).
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paragraph in the “INTRODUCTION”: “In New York and elsewhere, the
defendant engaged in acts of sexual intercourse with the girl through use of force
and threatened use of force.” 8 (Id. at 17.) Second, it specifically referenced two
particular statutes alleged to have been violated—Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §§1111(B)
and 1114. 9 Marriage is not a defense to those crimes.
8
The original indictment’s “INTRODUCTION” provided:
1. In 2001, the defendant ALEXANDER CHRISTIAN
MILES, M.D. was a resident in anesthesiology in a
hospital in New York City, New York. That year he
traveled to Cambodia where he met a 14-year old girl
and her family.
2. The defendant proposed marriage to the girl=s family
and sent money to the girl=s family. In or about
October of 2001, the defendant married the 14-year old
Cambodian girl in a Cambodian wedding ceremony.
The defendant was 43-years old at that time.
3. The defendant caused documents to be altered
indicating the girl was 18-years old and obtained a
Cambodian passport and visa for the girl to come to the
United States.
4. In or about December of 2001, the defendant
transported the 14-year old girl from Cambodia to New
York City where, with false documents indicating her
age as 18-years old, he married her in a ceremony in
New York.
5. In or about June of 2002, the defendant accepted
employment at the Jackson County Memorial Hospital
in Altus, Oklahoma.
(Appellant’s App. at 7-8.)
9
Section 1111(B) defines rape as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with
a male or female who is the spouse of the perpetrator if force or violence is used or
threatened . . . .” Section 1114(A)(3) defines rape in the first degree to include “rape
accomplished with any person by means of force, violence, or threats of force or violence
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Miles moved to dismiss the second indictment and acquit “due to want of
jurisdiction and double jeopardy.” (Id. at 23.) The court denied his motion,
concluding the dismissal of the first indictment was not “tantamount to an
acquittal,” and instead “amounted to a bare dismissal of the charge based on the
inadequacy of the indictment.” (Id. at 45-46.) Miles contends this was error.
II. DISCUSSION
“We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an
indictment on double jeopardy grounds.” United States v. McAleer, 138 F.3d 852,
855 (10th Cir. 1998). The defendant has the burden of establishing double
jeopardy. United States v. Jones, 816 F.2d 1483, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987).
The first question in a double jeopardy analysis is whether jeopardy has
attached. The government concedes jeopardy attached, as the jury was empaneled
and sworn before the first indictment was dismissed. See United States v. Bizzell,
921 F.2d 263, 266 (10th Cir. 1990).
The next, and critical, question is whether jeopardy terminated in a way
that prevents re-indictment and re-prosecution. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410
U.S. 458, 467 (1973) (“[T]he conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather
than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial.”). 10
accompanied by apparent power of execution regardless of the age of the person
committing the crime . . . .”
10
In Sanabria v. United States, the Supreme Court summarized the “limited
circumstances [when] a second trial on the same offense is constitutionally permissible”
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“[T]he protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there
has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original
jeopardy.” Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984). This rule has
been extended to apply to the functional equivalents of acquittals. See Smalis v.
Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 143 (1986) (concluding “a demurrer is not the
functional equivalent of an acquittal” and therefore double jeopardy is no bar to
an appeal); Burks, 437 U.S. at 16 (holding retrial barred where conviction
following jury trial reversed for insufficient evidence because that is the
functional equivalent of an acquittal); United States v. Marchese, 46 F.3d 1020,
1023 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding retrial not barred on double jeopardy grounds
because the court’s dismissal of the indictment “did not act as the functional
equivalent of an acquittal”). Since Miles was not acquitted this case turns on
saying:
A new trial is permitted, e.g., where the defendant successfully appeals his
conviction, United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672, 16 S. Ct. 1192, 41 L.
Ed. 300 (1896); where a mistrial is declared for a “manifest necessity,”
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 69 S. Ct. 834, 93 L. Ed. 974 (1949); where
the defendant requests a mistrial in the absence of prosecutorial or judicial
overreaching, United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 96 S. Ct. 1075, 47 L.
Ed.2d 267 (1976); or where an indictment is dismissed at the defendant’s
request in circumstances functionally equivalent to a mistrial, Lee v. United
States, 432 U.S. 23, 29-30, 97 S. Ct. 2141, 53 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1977). See also
Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 97 S. Ct. 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168(1977).
437 U.S. 54, 63 & 63 n.15 (1978). See also Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 369
(1961) (concluding defendant’s conviction in second trial did not violate the prohibition
against double jeopardy where first trial was terminated after judge sua sponte declared
mistrial with the interest of the defendant in mind).
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whether the dismissal of the first indictment was the functional equivalent of an
acquittal.
On April 11, 2006, after the jury was sworn and sent home, Miles made an
oral motion to dismiss the indictment but in subsequent written materials
requested a judgment of acquittal. 11 Significantly, a judgment of acquittal was
not forthcoming. 12 Instead, being sensitive to Miles expressed Constitutional
arguments about fair notice, the judge dismissed the indictment for failure to state
an offense. He later characterized the dismissal order as not “tantamount to an
acquittal,” but rather, “a bare dismissal of the charge.” (Appellant’s App. at 46.)
“[W]hat constitutes an ‘acquittal’ is not to be controlled by the form of the
judge’s action.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571
(1977). “Rather, [the reviewing court] must determine whether the ruling of the
judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some
or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Id.; see, e.g., United States
v. Appawoo, 553 F.2d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 1988) (concluding a “judgment of
11
W.D. Okla. Doc. No. 41 (Resp. to Government’s 2nd Supp. Br. Regarding Jury
Instructions; Doc. No. 45 (Defendant’s 2nd Resp. to Government’s 2nd Supp. Br.
Regarding Jury Instructions; and Doc. No. 47 (Amended Response to Government’s
Supplemental Brief Regarding Jury Instructions).
12
A motion for judgment of acquittal prior to the introduction of any evidence is
premature. Such a motion can only be made “[a]fter the government closes its evidence
or after the close of all the evidence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). The sufficiency of the
government’s evidence is not subject to judicial scrutiny until the government has been
afforded its one full opportunity to make its case for conviction.
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acquittal” was in fact a dismissal because it was based on legal issues raised
before trial, not on facts developed at trial). While the form of the judge’s ruling
is not controlling, it does inform the debate. See Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 66(“While form is not to be exalted over substance in determining the double
jeopardy consequences of a ruling terminating a prosecution, neither is it
appropriate entirely to ignore the form of order entered by the trial court.”)
(citations omitted). In Sanabria the trial court’s denomination of its decision as a
“judgment of acquittal” was significant. See id. at 66-69. Likewise here, the
form of the dismissal order (“a bare dismissal of the charge” not “tantamount to
an acquittal”) as well as the judge’s expressed rationale for doing so (the
indictment failed to give fair warning of forcible rape) are significant. The
judge’s ruling was consistent with the long-standing rule that the dismissal of a
defective indictment corrects a trial error and does not bar retrial.
In Ball v. United States, two of three co-defendants were convicted by a
jury but their convictions were reversed on a motion by the defendants due to a
fatal defect in the indictment. 163 U.S. 662, 664-65 (1896). The Supreme Court
held the reversal was no bar to retrial because “it is quite clear that a defendant
who procures a judgment against him upon an indictment to be set aside may be
tried anew upon the same indictment, or upon another indictment, for the same
offense of which he had been convicted.” Id. at 671. In Burks, the Supreme
Court explained “[t]he reversal in Ball was . . . based not on insufficiency of
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evidence but rather on trial error, i.e., failure to dismiss a faulty indictment.” 437
U.S. at 14. The Burks Court clarified that a reversal due to insufficient evidence
bars retrial but a reversal due to trial error does not. See id. at 15-16.
The circumstances here are admittedly different—Ball and his co-defendant
were convicted, Miles was not even tried. Nevertheless, the Burks Court was
clear in characterizing the dismissal of a faulty indictment as a trial error which
presents no bar to a subsequent prosecution. Id. at 15; accord Somerville, 410
U.S. at 459.
But Miles has a different twist. He argues the dismissal of the first
indictment is the functional equivalent of an acquittal because the court made a
“factual resolution that the government could not prove a necessary element that
an unlawful sexual act under Oklahoma law had occurred.” (Appellant’s Br. at
17.)
The details of Miles’ argument are intricate. He first claims, because of its
introductory language, the first indictment can only be read to charge rape in the
second degree, which exempts a spouse from its reach. But the introductory
language makes no difference. We recently explained: “An indictment need not
contain introductory or prefatory matter at all . . . so if it does such matter is
perforce superfluous unless expressly incorporated into one of the counts.”
United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 735 (10th Cir. 2008). Next he claims
that in acknowledging the marriage defense the court made a factual finding—
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Miles and the alleged victim were married. According to Miles, the fact of his
marriage, regardless of how it came to be known by the court, is a “finding”
triggering the double jeopardy bar. Specifically he argues,
[I]n United States v. Martin Linen, 430 U.S. 564, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51
L.Ed. 2d 642 (1977), the test is put that a defendant is acquitted
when the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a
resolution [in the defendant’s favor], correct or not, of some or all of
the factual elements of the offense charged . . . . Thus, applying
substance over form to a district judge’s judgement of acquittal,
appeal is barred if the court evaluated the Government’s evidence
and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a
conviction.
(Appellant’s Br. at 10) (emphasis omitted). We are not persuaded.
In responding to Miles’ motion to dismiss the first indictment because of
the marriage defense the government presented two arguments: (1) the marriages
were a sham and the validity of the New York marriage was a factual issue the
jury should decide; (2) the forcible rape theory rendered the marriage issue
irrelevant.
The judge rejected the government’s first argument, concluding the New
York marriage was voidable, not void. The fact of the marriage was never at
issue—its legal significance was the tipping point. Thus, he did not consider the
validity of the marriage to be a fact the jury should decide. The judge took no
evidence and refused to make, or even consider making, a factual determination
on the issue. But the marriage is beside the point with respect to the
government’s second argument.
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The government argued the first indictment was worded broadly enough to
encompass forcible rape and it could prove forcible rape if permitted to proceed
to trial. The trial judge rejected that argument, but not because the forcible rape
theory was untenable or unprovable. Instead, he agreed with Miles that the first
indictment failed to state an offense, requiring Miles to go to trial on the forcible
rape theory would violate his Constitutional rights, and the deficiencies in the
first indictment could not be remedied by a bill of particulars. 13 See supra at 7.
Contrary to Miles’ argument, which the dissent adopts as its central thesis,
the first indictment was not dismissed based on the “fact” (stipulated or
otherwise) of marriage. It was based on the failure of the indictment to provide
fair warning to Miles that he must defend against forcible rape allegations. There
was no adjudication of any fact going to the merits of the charge against Miles,
which is an essential ingredient of a claim of double jeopardy. See Martin Linen,
430 U.S. at 571.
The lynchpin of Miles’ argument is that the first indictment charged a
violation of the Mann Act premised on, and only on, a violation of Oklahoma’s
statutory rape law. He had good reason to assume that was the case because of
the government’s posture, but that is not what the indictment charged. It did not
13
Implicit in this conclusion is the conclusion that the indictment could not be
amended to permit the case to go to the jury on the forcible rape charge because doing so
would amount to the forbidden practice of allowing “an additional or different offense” to
be charged by amendment (rather than indictment). Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(e).
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specify any particular Oklahoma statute. Miles could have timely forced the
government to be more precise, but he did not. Nevertheless, he was justifiably
distressed with the government’s eleventh hour change in tactics. And he was
entitled to appropriate relief. Such relief might have included a postponement of
the trial to give him an opportunity to meet the unanticipated theory and evidence.
But that is not the relief he requested. The trial judge was sympathetic to his
situation and, in accord with his arguments, imposed a stiff (and appropriate)
sanction against the government—dismissal of the indictment. Appropriate relief
did not, and does not, include immunity from trial.
This case is much like Lee v. United States, where the Supreme Court held
a second prosecution was not barred if the first proceeding was terminated at the
defendant’s request after jeopardy had attached. 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
Immediately prior to the attachment of jeopardy, Lee’s counsel moved to dismiss
the information for failure to charge knowledge or intent. Id. at 25. The court
tentatively denied the motion due to its late timing and proceeded with a bench
trial. Id. at 26. At the conclusion of the trial, the court had no question about the
defendant’s guilt, but nonetheless dismissed the information for failure to charge
knowledge or intent. Id. In deciding whether double jeopardy barred a second
prosecution, the Supreme Court explained “[t]he critical question is whether the
order contemplates an end to all prosecution of the defendant for the offense
charged.” Id. at 30. The Court answered that question in the negative:
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The dismissal clearly was not predicated on any judgment that Lee
could never be prosecuted for or convicted of the [crime charged].
To the contrary, the District Court stressed that the only obstacle to a
conviction was the fact that the information had been drawn
improperly. The error, like any prosecutorial or judicial error that
necessitates a mistrial, was one that could be avoided–absent any
double jeopardy bar–by beginning anew the prosecution of the
defendant. And there can be little doubt that the court granted the
motion to dismiss in this case in contemplation of just such a second
prosecution.
Id. at 30-31.
Like in Lee, the district court here did not intend for its dismissal of the
first indictment to bar re-indictment and re-prosecution of Miles. The court stated
in its order of dismissal that it took “no pleasure in this disposition.”
(Appellant’s App. at 15.) Miles “plainly deserves substantial exposure to the
criminal justice system.” (Id.) The error in the indictment—whether described as
failure to state an offense or insufficient specificity—was one that could have
been avoided and thus, a second prosecution is not barred. See United States v.
Bowline, 593 F.2d 944, 949 (10th Cir. 1979) (re-indictment not barred where
indictment is dismissed based on validity of charge, not merits of the case,
because such dismissal “is not distinguishable from a motion for a mistrial made
by the defendant”).
The case of Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), is even more
telling. After the jury was sworn but before evidence was presented, the
prosecutor realized the indictment was fatally defective because it failed to allege
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intent. Id. at 459. The prosecutor moved for a mistrial, which was granted over
the defendant’s objection. The case was retried in spite of the defendant’s claim
of double jeopardy and the defendant was convicted. The case arrived at the
Supreme Court on federal habeas. The Court saw no double jeopardy bar to the
second trial: “[T]he trial judge terminated the proceeding because a defect was
found to exist in the indictment that was, as a matter of Illinois law, not curable
by amendment.” Id. at 468. Here the indictment was dismissed at Miles’ urging,
not over his objection.
Miles argued before the trial court that the flaws in the first indictment
(failure to allege force and failure to specify the Oklahoma statute(s) allegedly
violated) were of constitutional dimension and could not be cured by amendment
or a bill of particulars. The dismissal of the indictment was thus akin to the
mistrial declared in Somerville. Because it was done upon Miles’ request, not
over his objection, the circumstances favoring retrial are even more compelling
here. The Somerville Court stated: “The interests of the public in seeing that a
criminal prosecution proceed to verdict, either of acquittal or conviction, need not
be forsaken by the formulation or application of rigid rules that necessarily
preclude the vindication of that interest.” Id. at 463. In reaching its decision the
Somerville Court acknowledged “the interest of the defendant in having his fate
determined by the jury first impaneled is itself a weighty one.” Id. at 471. Miles
expressed no interest in having his fate determined by the jury first impaneled.
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In United States v. Kehoe, the Fifth Circuit considered “whether the double
jeopardy clause prohibits further prosecution of defendants who procure the mid-
trial dismissal of the indictment on the ground that it fails to state an offense.”
516 F.2d 78, 83 (5th Cir. 1975). The court held a second trial was not barred,
focusing in particular on the fact it was the defendants who challenged the
indictment, and they did so only after the jury was sworn. Id. at 86. Likewise
here, Miles moved for dismissal of the indictment after the jury was sworn,
despite the fact he had almost a week to review the government’s first proposed
jury instructions and make his motion before jeopardy attached. Had Miles
moved to dismiss the indictment before the jury was sworn there would be little
room for a double jeopardy argument. 14 And nothing changed in the intervening
period. Miles allowed himself to be placed in jeopardy by not moving to dismiss
the indictment prior to the attachment of jeopardy. It appears to have been a
calculated strategy.
In Wilkett v. United States, we considered a double jeopardy question
similar to the one presented here. 655 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1981). There, two of
14
If Miles was misled by the introductory materials in the first indictment or
unfairly surprised by the government’s new evidence and change of theory he could have
moved to dismiss on April 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9, before the jury was chosen. He was well
aware that jury selection was scheduled for April 10 and, upon his request, rescheduled
for April 11. A defendant ought not be permitted to lie behind the log hoping to exploit a
problem capable of being resolved before trial. See United States v. Spero, 331 F.3d 57,
61-62 (2d Cir. 2003) (a motion raising a constitutional challenge to an indictment must be
made prior to trial to deter gamesmanship, avoid wasting jurors’ time, and avoid complex
double jeopardy problems).
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three defendants charged with conspiracy in the Western District of Oklahoma
moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of venue at the end of the government’s
case. Id. at 1009. The court granted their motion and the defendants were then
indicted in the Eastern District for substantially the same conduct. We held
jeopardy had not terminated in the first proceeding in such a way as to prevent re-
indictment and re-prosecution because “[t]he termination of the case was not a
resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the federal elements of the offense
charged.” Id. at 1011-12 (quotations omitted). We noted the defendants “were
responsible for the dismissal” and “the dismissal was not predicated upon the
merits of the case, that is, the insufficiency of the evidence to convict.” Id. at
1011. The dismissal was instead predicated on the government’s failure to
establish venue, which “is a question of procedure, more than anything else, and .
. . does not either prove or disprove the guilt of the accused.” Id. Like the
defendants in Wilkett, Miles himself brought about the termination of the first
proceeding on a basis other than adjudication of his guilt or innocence.
Miles calls attention to two of our cases, claiming they support his position.
In both United States v. Hunt, 212 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. 2000), and United States v.
Fay, 553 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1977), the district judge found the evidence
insufficient to sustain the charges and entered judgments of acquittal. In both
cases we concluded the acquittals were not merely a matter of form, but of
substance. We fail to see how either Hunt or Fay appreciably advance Miles’
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argument since the judge here correctly referred to his order as a “bare
dismissal,” not an acquittal.
Miles also makes an “allowable unit of prosecution” argument citing
Sanabria, 437 U.S. 54, and an argument under Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299 (1932). In a single count indictment Sanabria was charged with illegal
gambling based upon allegations of numbers betting and horse race betting.
Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 57. After hearing evidence the trial judge dismissed the
numbers theory and later entered a judgment of acquittal as to horse betting. The
question before the Supreme Court was whether Sanabria could again be tried for
illegal gambling based upon his participation in numbers betting. In resolving the
issue the Court looked at the allowable unit of prosecution in deciding the second
trial was barred. Critical to the decision was the acquittal on the horse race
betting. Id. at 64-65. Until there has been an acquittal (or a conviction) the
allowable unit of prosecution question is not ripe. Since Miles was neither
convicted nor acquitted on the original indictment the allowable unit of
prosecution is not in play here. Miles is attempting to put the cart in front of the
horse. His Blockburger argument is of similar ilk.
Under the Blockburger “same evidence” test, the double jeopardy bar
applies where a defendant is subjected to successive prosecutions for multiple
offenses “if the facts alleged in one would sustain a conviction if offered in
support of the other.” United States v. Mintz, 16 F.3d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir.
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1994) (quotations omitted). This problem only presents itself where jeopardy
terminated in the first prosecution in such a way as to prevent re-indictment and
re-prosecution. See Wood, 958 F.2d at 974 (“[T]he double jeopardy test for
subsequent prosecutions . . . is not applicable when the defendant has not been
convicted . . . . The Supreme Court has looked to whether the subsequent
prosecution was based on the same conduct of an earlier prosecution only when
the earlier prosecution resulted in a conviction or acquittal.”). Here, as
previously discussed, it did not.
Miles cites United States v. Genser, 710 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1983), in
support of his Blockburger argument, but that case is inapposite because the
charges in Genser were dismissed due to insufficiency of the evidence, the
equivalent of an acquittal. See Burks, 437 U.S. at 16. In Genser we said, “In the
case before us, the Government does not argue that the trial court’s dismissal of
the first action was on other than factual grounds.” 710 F.2d at 1428. “[T]he
government conceded . . . that although the case was ‘dismissed,’ it is clear from
the record that the decision was a factual one—a recognition that the government
was unable to prove that the defendant was a dispenser as defined by statute.” Id.(quotations omitted). The only issue in Genser was whether “the offense charged
and tried in the first prosecution is identical in law to that charged in the second.”
Id. Genser does not inform this debate—whether the dismissal here was
equivalent to an acquittal.
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AFFIRMED.
Entered by the Court:
Terrence L. O’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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No. 06-6187, United States v. Miles
HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I
I respectfully dissent. As the majority opinion states at p. 13, we “‘must
determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a
resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense
charged.’” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
Here clearly the reason that the district judge dismissed the first indictment was
the fact that the defendant and the alleged victim were married. This stipulated
fact, due to operation of Oklahoma law, meant there was not a violation, as
alleged, of the Mann Act. Thus a solid basis for a double jeopardy defense
against prosecution under the second indictment was clear. The denial of the
defendant’s timely and proper motion to dismiss, invoking his double jeopardy
defense, was error, and the ruling on the second indictment, with its new theory,
must be reversed in this Abney appeal.
Here, the second indictment’s shift to adopt a new theory does not free the
Government from the restrictions of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The second
indictment added a new paragraph. It was, nevertheless, predicated, on the same
basic circumstances. The new Introduction alleged, inter alia, that “the defendant
engaged in acts of sexual intercourse with the girl through the use of force and
threatened use of force . . .” citing Oklahoma Stat. tit. 21, §§ 1111 (B) and 1114
(A) (3). Double jeopardy based on the resolution against the Government of some
or all of the factual elements of the offense as first charged bars any later
prosecution under the Mann Act for the same sexual conduct “even if based on a
different theory . . . .” United States v. Hunt, 212 F.3d 539, 547 (10th Cir 2000).
II
If the fact of the marriage of Miles and S. K. had been contested and the
Government had put on evidence that the couple were not married, then a
determination by the judge that the Government’s evidence was insufficient on
the issue would stand as a bar to further prosecution under the basic principle of
double jeopardy jurisprudence. I am satisfied that it makes no difference that the
insufficiency of the Government’s evidence is established by a stipulated fact. In
United States v. Ogles, 440 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), the court
specifically rejected the contention that a factual determination which amounts to
an acquittal must be of a contested fact:
The government suggests that because Ogles did not contest his
licensed status, the district court’s ruling did not meet the Supreme
Court’s definition of acquittal – that “whatever its label, [it] actually
represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual
elements of the offense charged.” [United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571]. The Court’s double jeopardy decisions
do not, however, condition an acquittal under Rule 29(a) on the
district court’s examination of contested facts. Here, the district
court determined that a factual element of the offense had not been
proved by the government. What is this if not a “resolution”?
440 F.3d at 1104.
The Government here contends that the trial court’s ruling was not on any
-2-
matter of evidence but only on a legal issue. In Ogles the Government similarly
argued that the district court’s judgment of acquittal of a charge of selling
firearms without a license was based on a legal determination, specifically that
the term “licensed dealer” in the statute was not location specific. The defendant
was licensed in California but prosecuted for a sale he had made in Arizona.
Thus, in one sense, the district court’s judgment of acquittal was based on a legal
issue, the interpretation of the statute that a license to sell is not restricted to the
state of the licensee’s residence. But that legal ruling was simply preliminary, the
Ninth Circuit held, to the factual determination that the Government’s evidence
was insufficient for a conviction. 440 F.3d at 1103. So too, in this case, the
district court’s ruling dismissing the first indictment is best viewed, I conclude, as
a determination that the Government would be unable to prove an essential
element of the offense (that there was no marriage).
In my view, the dismissal of the first indictment was based on a finding of
fact: the undisputed fact that the Defendant was married to the alleged victim.
This case is unusual, in that it is true the fact-based decision of the marriage was
made before any evidence had been taken. But no evidence was required to
establish that critical fact: it was stipulated. The legal consequences thus are the
same as if the government’s evidence had been heard. The district judge’s
decision was a determination that the Government’s evidence was insufficient to
prove the charged offense. If this be so, as I am convinced is the case, then the
-3-
ruling was the equivalent of an acquittal, and the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy unquestionably bars the Government’s second attempt to
prosecute the Defendant. 1 The Government had one full opportunity to prosecute
the defendant, 2 and the Double Jeopardy Clause protected him against such
further prosecution.
III
1
In my view, the two indictments charge a single violation of the Mann Act, even
though the kind of violation of state law, i.e., the specific type of rape alleged, differed.
See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 73 (1978) (prosecution had “charged only a
single gambling business” that was illegal under state law, although the state law could
have been violated by either a “numbers” game or by gambling on horse racing); United
States v. Hunt, 212 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. 2000) (acquittal of charge of theft from the mail
would prohibit second prosecution for same theft on different theory).
The government here does not argue that the second indictment stated a different
offense, so that prosecution under that indictment could proceed even if the dismissal of
the first indictment were determined to be an acquittal, as I would hold it was. Instead,
the Government argues, wrongly, that the dismissal of the first indictment was not an
acquittal. (Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 29-34.)
2
The majority invokes Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a), which provides that a motion for
judgment of acquittal may be made either after the prosecution has rested or at the close
of all evidence, to assert that the sufficiency of the government’s evidence is “not subject
to judicial scrutiny” at any earlier stage. I do not, of course, contend otherwise as a
matter of proper procedure. But this point provides no support whatsoever for the
majority’s holding because defendant’s double jeopardy rights are in no way dependent
upon the correctness of the district court’s judgment, nor on the correctness of any rulings
underlying that judgment. Instead, “[w]here a midtrial dismissal is granted on the ground,
correct or not, that the defendant simply cannot be convicted of the offense charged,
[United States v.] Jenkins[,420 U.S. 358 (1975)] establishes that further prosecution is
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 30 (1977). If
the trial court’s decision is in effect an acquittal, it would violate the Double Jeopardy
clause to bring the defendant to trial again even if the acquittal had been “‘based upon an
egregiously erroneous foundation.’” Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64 (1978)
(quoting Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962)).
-4-
In the second indictment, the Government shifted gears. It had lost on its
first attempt to convict the defendant due to the determination that marriage
barred conviction under the Oklahoma statutory rape statute, 21 Okla. Stat.§ 1111
(A) (1), and under Oklahoma’s lewd acts statute, 21 Okla. Stat. §1123. The
Government cannot rely on “shift[ing] theories for avoiding the impact of the
marriage”, App. at 13-14, Br. of the United States 16, ¶2, as the district judge
stated. I am convinced that the perception of the district judge points to the
proper analysis under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The shift to the new theory of forcible rape is barred by the analysis in
United States v. Hunt, 212 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. 2000). There prosecution for theft
from the mail was sought under 18 U.S.C. § 1708. During a bench trial the court
entered judgment which stated: “I find and conclude that the defendants are not
guilty under the indictment as charged.” The judge concluded that the indictment
alleged a theft from CTC distributor’s facility. It was further concluded that CTC
was not part of the mail as required for the charged offense, and the indictment
failed to allege any other theft from the mail, as suggested by the Government.
The defendants asserted that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the appeal, and
this court agreed.
In doing so we relied on Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978).
There the Government charged the defendant with conducting an illegal gambling
business in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 1955. The indictment had alleged two types
-5-
of illegal gambling activities: horse betting and numbers betting in violation of
Massachusetts law. After trial began, the defendant moved for acquittal, arguing
that there was no evidence of horse betting, a proper basis for the illegal gambling
charge, it having been determined that numbers betting was not prohibited by the
Massachusetts code. The Government conceded there could be no review of the
district court ruling that there was insufficient evidence of the defendant’s
involvement with horse betting. The Government argued it was entitled to a new
trial on the numbers betting charge. The Supreme Court disagreed. A judgment
of acquittal which had been entered barred further prosecution on any aspect of
the count and hence barred appellate review of any trial court error.
Although the Supreme Court held that the Government “could prove the
offense in more than one way (by demonstrating numbers betting, horse betting or
other betting), an acquittal of the offense of participation in illegal betting barred
prosecution for participation in illegal gambling even if based on a different
theory.” 437 U.S. at 69. Thus, Hunt correctly followed the holding of Sanabria.
From precedent of the Supreme Court and our court it is clear that the shift
to a new theory is impermissible as a basis for avoiding the protection of the
Double Jeopardy Clause for the defendant Miles, as for the defendants in other
cases.
Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
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