Warner v. Trammell

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT April 1, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CHARLES FREDERICK WARNER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 11-6236
v. (D. Ct. No. 5:07-CV-00807-C)
(W.D. Okla.)
ANITA TRAMMELL, Interim Warden,
Oklahoma State Penitentiary,*
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT†
Before LUCERO, O’BRIEN, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
In 2003, an Oklahoma jury found Charles Warner guilty of the rape and murder of
an 11-month-old child. The jury returned a death sentence for the murder conviction.
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Anita Trammell, the Interim Warden of
Oklahoma State Penitentiary, is automatically substituted for Randall G. Workman as
Respondent in this case.
†
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
After unsuccessfully seeking state appellate and post-conviction relief, Mr. Warner filed
an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The United
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied his § 2254 application.
Mr. Warner pursues only one issue on appeal: whether the Oklahoma trial court
violated his due process rights by failing to clarify, in response to a jury question, the
meaning of life without parole. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm the district court’s denial of relief on this issue.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Trial Court Proceedings
In 1997, Mr. Warner was charged with the first degree rape and murder of an 11-
month-old girl.1 He was tried and convicted in Oklahoma state court on both counts and
sentenced to death. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) reversed his
conviction and sentence because of juror bias and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Warner v. State, 29 P.3d 569, 572-74, 575 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001).
In June 2003, Mr. Warner was retried on the first degree rape and murder charges.
The jury found him guilty of both crimes. The jury sentenced Mr. Warner to 75 years of
imprisonment for the rape conviction. The trial proceeded to a penalty phase to
determine Mr. Warner’s sentence for the murder conviction.
1
The facts of the murder are recounted in Warner v. State, 144 P.3d 838, 856-57
(Okla. Crim. App. 2006). This appeal does not turn on the facts supporting Mr. Warner’s
conviction, so we need not repeat them here.
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At the penalty phase, the State sought to prove beyond a reasonable doubt two
statutory aggravating circumstances that would qualify Mr. Warner for the death penalty:
(1) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” Okla. Stat. tit. 21,
§ 701.12(4); and (2) “[t]he existence of a probability that [Mr. Warner] would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society,” id.
§ 701.12(7); see also id. § 701.11 (stating that the death penalty cannot be imposed unless
the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one statutory
aggravating circumstance). The State incorporated evidence from the trial’s guilt phase
as proof that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The majority of the
State’s penalty phase evidence sought to prove that Mr. Warner posed a continuing threat
to society.
At the close of the penalty phase, the defense proposed the following instruction
about the jury’s sentencing options under Oklahoma law:
You are instructed that these sentences mean what they say. That
is[,] if you sentence the Defendant to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, he will actually be sentenced to imprisonment in the
State Penitentiary for the balance of his natural life without the possibility
of parole.
Under the Constitution of this State, the Parole Board cannot
recommend parole nor can the Governor grant parole to a person sentenced
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
If, on the other hand, you sentence the Defendant to life
imprisonment, he actually will be sentenced to imprisonment in the State
Penitentiary for life. He may or may not at some point in time become
eligible for parole.
In your deliberations, you are not to speculate that these sentences
mean anything other than what I have just told you . . . .
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OCCA Original Record, Vol. VI at 1023.
Concerned that this proposed instruction was legally incorrect, the trial court
refused to give it. Instead, it instructed the jury that it had three sentencing options:
“Under the law of the State of Oklahoma, every person found guilty of Murder in The
First Degree shall be punished by death, or imprisonment for life without the possibility
of parole, or imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole.” Id. at 1066.
During deliberations, the jury sent the trial court the following question: “Is there
ANY WAY or chance for [Mr. Warner] to get out of prison if he is sentenced to life
without parole? EVER?” ROA, Vol. 1, Pt. 2 at 314. Defense counsel asked the court to
tell the jurors “that these sentences mean what they say” and to give the previously
proposed instruction explaining the sentencing options. Trial Transcript, June 25-26,
2003, Vol. VIII at 1550. The State argued that the OCCA’s precedent endorsed “not
giving an explanation of what [life without parole] means or might mean some day.” Id.
The trial court responded to the jury as follows: “You have all of the law and evidence
necessary to reach a verdict.” ROA, Vol. 1, Pt. 2 at 313.
The jury determined that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence
of both aggravating circumstances. It sentenced Mr. Warner to death.
B. Post-Trial Proceedings
Mr. Warner appealed to the OCCA. Among other claims, he argued that the trial
court violated his constitutional rights by failing “to define ‘life without parole’ to the
jury” in response to its question. Warner v. State, 144 P.3d 838, 885 (Okla. Crim. App.
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2006). The OCCA held that the trial court’s response was appropriate under the OCCA’s
precedent. Id. at 886. It denied Mr. Warner’s appeal, and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari review. Warner v. Oklahoma, 550 U.S. 942 (2007). Mr. Warner sought state
post-conviction relief, which the OCCA also denied.
On April 3, 2008, Mr. Warner filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court. He asserted 17 grounds for relief. In Ground II,
Mr. Warner argued that the trial court’s failure to explain to the jury the meaning of life
without the possibility of parole violated his constitutional rights. The district court
denied his § 2254 application.
The district court granted Mr. Warner a certificate of appealability (“COA”) for
three issues raised in his § 2254 application. This court granted a COA for three
additional issues, including the following: “Did the trial court’s response to the jury’s
request for information regarding the meaning of life without parole properly clarify the
jury’s confusion?” Case Management Order at 1 (November 8, 2011). The appeal before
us concerns only this issue.
II. DISCUSSION
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs
our review of § 2254 claims that a state court resolved on the merits. In enacting
AEDPA, Congress created a “difficult to meet and highly deferential standard for
evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the
benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (citations
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omitted) (quotations omitted).
If a state court adjudicated the petitioner’s claim on the merits, we may grant
habeas relief on that claim only if the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).2 Our review of the federal
district court’s legal analysis of the state court decision is de novo, Bland v. Sirmons, 459
F.3d 999, 1009 (10th Cir. 2006), and is confined “to the record that was before the state
court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398.
Mr. Warner argues that, in response to the jury’s question asking whether he could
be released if sentenced to life without parole, the trial court gave an answer that violated
his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He contends that the OCCA’s
denial of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Supreme
Court’s holding in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
We first discuss Simmons and this court’s precedent interpreting that decision.3
We then address Mr. Warner’s arguments on appeal.
2
We may also grant relief if the state court decision “was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Mr. Warner does not argue that the OCCA’s
ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
3
We recognize that this “circuit[’s] precedent does not constitute ‘clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’” and thus “cannot form
the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.” Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155
(2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). But we may consult our case law “to ascertain
Continued . . .
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A. Simmons
In Simmons, the petitioner was convicted of the murder of an elderly woman. 512
U.S. at 156. The conviction resulted in sentencing options of death or life imprisonment.
Id. at 157, 165. The life imprisonment option did not mention parole eligibility, though
in fact the petitioner would not have been eligible for parole. Id. at 158, 162.
During the trial’s penalty phase, the prosecution argued the petitioner would pose
a continuing threat to others. Id. at 157. Because the prosecution put the petitioner’s
future dangerousness at issue, defense counsel argued to the trial court that jurors might
be concerned whether the petitioner could be paroled if sentenced to life imprisonment.
Defense counsel urged the court to explain to the jury that the petitioner would be
ineligible for parole. Id. at 159-60. The trial court refused to give the defense’s proposed
instruction that if the jury “recommend[ed] that [the petitioner] be sentenced to life
imprisonment, he actually will be sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for
the balance of his natural life.” Id. at 160.
During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court whether “the imposition of a
life sentence carr[ied] with it the possibility of parole?” Id. The court responded, over
the petitioner’s objection, as follows: “You are instructed not to consider parole or parole
eligibility in reaching your verdict. . . . That is not a proper issue for your consideration.
______________________________________
Cont.
the contours of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.” Littlejohn v. Trammell,
704 F.3d 817, 828 n.3 (10th Cir. 2013).
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The terms life imprisonment and death sentence are to be understood in their [plain] and
ordinary meaning.” Id. The jury sentenced the petitioner to death, and the South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Id. at 161.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. It said that “[w]here the State puts the
defendant’s future dangerousness in issue, and the only available alternative sentence to
death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the
defendant to inform the capital sentencing jury—by either argument or instruction—that
he is parole ineligible.” Id. at 178 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1280 n.15 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence reflects the Court’s holding in Simmons). The Court has since
reinforced this holding. See Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 51 (2001) (“We
therefore hold that whenever future dangerousness is at issue in a capital sentencing
proceeding under South Carolina’s new scheme, due process requires that the jury be
informed that a life sentence carries no possibility of parole.”); see also Kelly v. South
Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 248 (2002).
In Simmons, the jury was given a choice between two sentences, death or life
imprisonment. And because the jury might have been led to believe incorrectly that the
defendant could be paroled if sentenced to life imprisonment, jurors were faced with “a
false choice between sentencing petitioner to death and sentencing him to a limited
period of incarceration.” Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 938 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations
omitted); see also Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1166 (10th Cir. 2001). In contrast
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to South Carolina’s sentencing scheme in Simmons and Shafer, Oklahoma law provides
capital juries with three sentencing options: (1) death, (2) life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, or (3) life imprisonment. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.9(A); Hamilton v.
Mullin, 436 F.3d 1181, 1191 (10th Cir. 2006). We have held that Oklahoma’s three-
option sentencing scheme is consistent with Simmons because “the options do not create
a false choice between sentencing [a] petitioner to death and sentencing him to a limited
period of incarceration.” Id. (quoting Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1294 (10th Cir.
2000)).
Although Oklahoma’s sentencing scheme is consistent with Simmons, “we have
held that a due process violation can be created by the trial court, which in some
instances may engender juror confusion, thereby creating a ‘false choice,’ even in light of
instructions that may correctly state the law.” Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 827
(10th Cir. 2013).4 We therefore interpret Simmons to permit habeas relief where
(1) the prosecution [sought] the death penalty; (2) the prosecution place[d]
the defendant’s future dangerousness at issue; (3) the jury ask[ed] for
clarification of the meaning of life imprisonment, or a synonymous
statutory term; and (4) the judge’s response threaten[ed] to cause a jury’s
misunderstanding so the jury [could] perceive a false choice of
incarceration when future dangerousness [wa]s at issue.
Id. at 828 (quotations omitted).
4
We discuss here the OCCA’s decision in Littlejohn v. State, 85 P.3d 287 (Okla.
Crim. App. 2004), and this circuit’s habeas decision in Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d
817 (10th Cir. 2013). For clarity, we refer to these decisions by their full names
throughout this opinion.
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Many Simmons claims in this court have focused on the fourth showing: whether
the trial judge’s response to a jury question about life without parole threatened to create
misunderstanding such that jurors could falsely conclude their sentencing options were
death or a limited period of incarceration. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d at
828-29; Welch v. Workman, 639 F.3d 980, 1005 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
292 (2011); Mollett, 348 F.3d at 915-916; Johnson, 254 F.3d at 1165. If the jury asked
for clarification about the meaning of life without parole under Oklahoma’s sentencing
scheme, we have held the trial court does not violate the defendant’s due process rights
by failing to provide further explanation. See McCracken v. Gibson, 268 F.3d 970, 980-
81 (10th Cir. 2001). We also have held the trial court may refer the jury back to the
instructions. See Welch, 639 F.3d at 1005; McCracken, 268 F.3d at 980-81 & n.3;
McGregor v. Gibson, 219 F.3d 1245, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000), overruled en banc on other
grounds by 248 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2001); Mayes, 210 F.3d at 1287, 1294. Further, we
have said that a trial court’s statement that it cannot answer the jury’s question is “non-
responsive” and properly refers the jury back to the instructions, creating no “false
choice” under Simmons. Welch, 639 F.3d at 1005 (holding no Simmons violation where
the trial court said it was “not allowed to answer” the jury’s parole question); see also
Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 P.3d at 829.
But we have found Simmons due process violations where, in response to a jury’s
life-without-parole question, an Oklahoma trial judge explicitly instructed the jury it was
not to consider the defendant’s parole eligibility. See Mollett, 348 F.3d at 915-16
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(granting habeas relief where the trial court “affirmatively instruct[ed] the jury” that
“[m]atters of parole are beyond the [purview] of the jury or the court to consider”);
Johnson, 254 F.3d at 1164-67 (granting habeas relief where the jury asked, “Is life
without parole firm—Does it mean [the petitioner] can never be paroled[?]” and the trial
court responded, “It is inappropriate for you to consider the question asked”).
B. Mr. Warner’s Simmons Claim
The parties agree that the first three requirements of a due process claim under
Simmons are satisfied in this case: (1) the prosecution sought the death penalty, (2) it
placed Mr. Warner’s future dangerousness at issue by arguing he was a continuing threat
to society, and (3) the jury asked for clarification about the possibility of Mr. Warner’s
release under a sentence of life without parole. The issue on appeal is whether the trial
court’s response to the jury threatened to create a misunderstanding such that jurors
perceived a false choice between a death sentence and a limited period of incarceration.
We first address Mr. Warner’s argument that the trial court violated his due
process rights under Simmons because it failed to clarify the meaning of life without
parole. Second, we analyze another argument Mr. Warner presses on appeal: that the
trial court’s response was “code” referring to a previous oral instruction, and that the
combination of the “code” and the oral instruction likely led jurors to think they should
not consider parole eligibility.
1. Failure to Clarify Life Without Parole
On direct appeal from his conviction, Mr. Warner argued that the trial court erred
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by “refusing to instruct the jury on the meaning of life without the possibility of parole”
after the jury asked about the possibility of his release. Br. of Aplt. at 90, Warner v.
State, D-2003-829 (Okla. Crim. App. July 26, 2004). The OCCA rejected his claim. It
reasoned that the district court’s response—“[y]ou have all of the law and evidence
necessary to reach a verdict”—was appropriate under its precedent, particularly its
decision in Littlejohn v. State, 85 P.3d 287 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004).
In Littlejohn v. State, the OCCA upheld a challenge to a nearly identical
response—that the jury had all the law and evidence it needed to reach a verdict—from
the same trial judge to a jury’s life-without-parole question. Referring to Tenth Circuit
precedent interpreting Simmons, the OCCA held that the trial court’s response “did not
have the effect of creating the false choice dilemma” between death and limited
incarceration and that Mr. Littlejohn’s case was distinguishable from cases in which trial
courts explicitly instructed jurors not to consider parole eligibility. Id. at 292.
In this case, the federal district court determined that the OCCA’s denial of Mr.
Warner’s claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the holding in
Simmons. The federal district court said “the trial judge’s response referred the jury back
to its instructions” and in doing so “did not threaten to create a misunderstanding within
the jury such that it would perceive a false choice between sentencing [Mr. Warner] to
death and sentencing him to a limited period of incarceration.” ROA, Vol. 1, Pt. 3 at 543.
We agree that the OCCA’s denial of Mr. Warner’s claim was not contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, the Supreme Court’s holding in Simmons. We have held
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that, under Oklahoma’s three-option sentencing scheme, trial courts do not violate a
defendant’s due process rights under Simmons by refusing to further clarify the meaning
of life without parole and instead referring the jury back to its instructions. See Welch,
639 F.3d at 1005; McCracken, 268 F.3d at 980-81 & n.3; McGregor, 219 F.3d at 1256;
Mayes, 210 F.3d at 1287, 1294. Here, the trial court did not violate Mr. Warner’s due
process rights by telling jurors they had everything in front of them to reach a verdict.
This response merely failed to “clarify the life without parole instruction[, which] cannot
be ‘taken to mean that parole was available but that the jury, for some unstated reason,
should be blind to this fact.’” Welch, 639 F.3d at 1005 (quotations omitted).
Moreover, our recent decision in Littlejohn v. Trammell forecloses Mr. Warner’s
claim. In that case, we reviewed the OCCA’s Littlejohn v. State decision as part of a
federal habeas proceeding. See Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d at 826-31. The trial
court’s response to Mr. Littlejohn’s jury was the same as the response given to Mr.
Warner’s jurors. We held it was not unreasonable for the OCCA to conclude that the
“trial judge’s response . . . was consistent with Simmons in that it was not ‘insufficient,
misleading or erroneous’ and did not suggest to the jury that it was forbidden to consider
parole.” Id. at 831 (quoting Littlejohn v. State, 85 P.3d at 292).
Recognizing that our decisions foreclose his due process claim, Mr. Warner asks
us to reexamine their holdings. However, we are bound by these prior panel decisions
absent en banc review or superseding Supreme Court authority. See Rezaq v. Nalley, 677
F.3d 1001, 1012 n.5 (10th Cir. 2012).
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Further, Mr. Warner notes that the OCCA has said that juror confusion about
parole eligibility continues to persist even under Oklahoma’s three-option scheme. See
Littlejohn v. State, 85 P.3d at 292-93. As a solution, the OCCA has instructed that
in future cases where the jury during deliberations asks, in some form or
fashion, whether an offender who is sentenced to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole is parole eligible, the trial court should either refer
the jury back to the instructions, tell the jury that the punishment options
are self[-]explanatory, or advise the jury that the punishment options are to
be understood in their plain and literal sense and that the defendant will not
be eligible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.
Id. (citations omitted).
But the OCCA’s suggestions do not constitute clearly established Supreme Court
precedent and therefore cannot warrant federal habeas relief. Moreover, the trial court’s
response here fits within the OCCA’s recommendation that courts refer jurors back to the
instructions. In addressing the same issue in Littlejohn v. Trammel, we concluded that
although there was “some appeal” to the argument that “a fair number of jurors [still] do
not [fully] comprehend the plain meaning of the life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole sentencing option [in Oklahoma], we are constrained to apply precedent that . . .
compels the denial of relief.” 704 F.3d at 831 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
We reach the same result here. The OCCA’s denial of Mr. Warner’s due process
claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Supreme Court’s
holding in Simmons, and we deny habeas relief on this issue.
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2. “The Code”
On appeal, Mr. Warner presents another argument for a due process violation
under Simmons. As previously noted, the trial court told jurors they “ha[d] all of the law
and evidence necessary to reach a verdict.” ROA, Vol. 1, Pt. 2 at 313. But two days
earlier, at the close of the trial’s guilt phase, the court gave jurors the following oral
instruction:
If you have a question, write it down. . . . I’ll answer what I can. A
lot of questions I can answer now that I could not until a few years ago, but
I’m going to give you the code.
If you ask me a question and you get an answer back that says you
have all the law and evidence necessary to reach a verdict, what that means
is [1] you’ve heard the evidence that you decide, okay, [2] you’ve got a
copy of the instructions and look at the instructions, or [3] you’re asking me
something that I’m not by law allowed to answer, okay.
I’ll answer what I can, but if you get an answer back that says that,
think about it. Is it in the evidence, is it in here, or should we be talking
about it. Okay?
Trial Transcript, June 23, 2003, Vol. VI at 1250 (emphases added).
From this, Mr. Warner contends that the trial court used “the code”—“[y]ou have
all of the law and evidence necessary to reach a verdict”—in response to the jury’s life-
without-parole question. He argues that the court’s earlier oral instruction explained that
“the code” meant any of three things: (1) the answer was in the evidence, (2) the answer
was in the instructions, or (3) “should we be talking about it[?]”5 In Mr. Warner’s view,
5
To be clear, Mr. Warner argues that the trial court responded to the jury’s life-
without-parole question with “the code” and that the earlier oral instruction informed the
jury of the various meanings of “the code.”
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there is a reasonable likelihood that jurors interpreted the trial court’s use of “the code” as
suggesting the third option and concluded they should not consider whether Mr. Warner
could be released if sentenced to life without parole. Therefore, Mr. Warner insists, his
case is “materially indistinguishable” from Simmons and cases where this court has found
due process violations. See Aplt. Br. at 38; see also Mollett, 348 F.3d at 916; Johnson,
254 F.3d at 1166-67.
This court granted Mr. Warner a COA on the issue of whether the “trial court’s
response to the jury’s request for information regarding the meaning of life without
parole properly clarif[ied] the jury’s confusion.” Case Management Order at 1 (Nov. 8,
2011). We view this COA grant as broad enough to encompass Mr. Warner’s “code”
argument.
But Mr. Warner’s argument presents procedural complications. The State
contends that Mr. Warner failed to exhaust the “code” argument in state court and waived
it in federal district court by failing to present it as part of his Simmons claim. Section
2254 requires applicants to exhaust all remedies available in state court before filing a
habeas corpus application. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). In addition, we have declined to
address arguments that a habeas petitioner failed to raise in the district court. See Parker
v. Scott, 394 F.3d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 2005).
Nevertheless, § 2254 allows us to deny Mr. Warner’s application on the merits
notwithstanding a failure to exhaust. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). And although we generally
do not consider arguments on appeal that were not raised in the district court, “[w]hether
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to address the argument despite the litigant’s failure to raise it below is subject to this
court’s discretion based on the circumstances of the individual case.” United States v.
Jarvis, 499 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007); see also id. (“This court has characterized
its willingness to exercise its discretion to hear issues not raised below “only in the most
unusual circumstances.” (quoting Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 721
(10th Cir. 1993)). We exercise our discretion in the unusual circumstances of this death
penalty appeal to deny Mr. Warner’s argument on the merits.6
Mr. Warner argues the trial court’s use of “the code” likely led jurors to think they
should not consider parole eligibility, thus violating his due process rights under
Simmons. We disagree.
In response to the jury’s life-without-parole question, the trial court said the jury
had “all of the law and evidence necessary to reach a verdict.” ROA, Vol. 1, Pt. 2 at 313.
Its oral instruction two days earlier at a separate trial phase informed the jury that this
response was “the code” and meant (1) “you’ve heard the evidence that you [need to]
decide,” (2) “you’ve got a copy of the instructions and look at the instructions,” or (3)
“you’re asking me something I’m not by law allowed to answer.” Trial Transcript, June
23, 2008, Vol. VI at 1250.
In Littlejohn v. Trammell, the habeas petitioner asserted a nearly identical “code”
claim involving these three options. There, the trial judge responded to the jury’s
6
The State acknowledges that the “code” argument is “presumably stronger” than
Mr. Warner’s arguments in the district court. See Aplee. Br. at 16.
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question about parole by saying, “[Y]ou have all the law and evidence necessary to reach
a verdict,” and had separately informed jurors that this response meant the answer to their
question was (1) in the instructions, (2) in the evidence, or (3) something “that’s
inappropriate for [the court] to answer.” 704 F.3d at 829. We held that, even assuming
the jury interpreted the trial court’s use of “the code” to mean the third option, there was
no Simmons violation:
We believe . . . that the trial judge’s response simply reinforced the plain
meaning of the otherwise permissible instructions. The response said
nothing—by its precise terms or by its substance—about the removal from
the jury’s sentencing consideration of parole eligibility as a permissible
factor. At worst, it suggested that it may be inappropriate for the judge to
answer a question, which conceivably, in context, could be a question about
parole. The response did not reasonably suggest to the jury that the
question of parole eligibility rested elsewhere than in its hands, or that a
decision to recommend life without the possibility of parole would cause
the sentence to be placed in the hands of another, or otherwise permit Mr.
Littlejohn to be released. This does not bring Mr. Littlejohn’s case within
the stable of our decisions finding due process violations where “the trial
court informs the jury that it is not to consider the issue of whether the
defendant is parole ineligible.” Welch, 639 F.3d at 1005.
704 F.3d at 829 (citations omitted).
As in Littlejohn v. Trammell, we conclude that Mr. Warner’s due process rights
were not violated if the trial court’s use of “the code” may have led jurors to believe that
the answer to their question was in the evidence, in the instructions, or something the trial
court could not discuss.
Mr. Warner argues his “code” claim is distinguishable from the one in Littlejohn v.
Trammell. He focuses on a comment the trial court made after laying out the three
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possible meanings of “the code.” Shortly after telling jurors that “the code” meant any of
three things—the answer was in the evidence, in the instructions, or something the court
could not discuss—the trial court added that if jurors received “the code,” they should
ask, “Is it in the evidence, is it in [the instructions], or should we be talking about it[?]”
Trial Transcript, June 23, 2008, Vol. VI at 1250 (emphasis added). Mr. Warner focuses
on the last phrase and argues that the trial court’s use of “the code” likely led jurors to
think they should not be talking about parole.
The parties agree that the proper standard for this issue is whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury construed the trial court’s use of “the code” and its
explanation of “the code” in the earlier oral instruction in a way that violates Mr.
Warner’s due process rights under Simmons. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72
(1991) (“[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . we inquire whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that
violates the Constitution.” (quotations omitted)). Even assuming the jury remembered
the oral instruction made two days earlier at a separate phase of trial, we conclude there is
no such reasonable likelihood.
First, the trial court’s comment that the jury should ask itself, “Is it in the
evidence, is it in [the instructions], or should we be talking about it[?]” came immediately
after, and was parallel to, the court’s explanation of the meaning of “the code”: (1)
“you’ve heard the evidence that you [need to] decide,” (2) “you’ve got a copy of the
instructions and look at the instructions,” or (3) “you’re asking me something I’m not by
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law allowed to answer.” Trial Transcript, June 23, 2008, Vol. VI at 1250. Although Mr.
Warner insists that jurors likely took “should we be talking about it[?]” to mean that
parole was not for their consideration, this ignores the rest of the trial court’s oral
instruction. In context, “should we be talking about it[?]” appears to be shorthand for the
third meaning of “the code”—“you’re asking me something I’m not by law allowed to
answer.”
We conclude that the trial court’s “should we be talking about it[?]” comment was
a reference to its more explicit explanation that “the code” could mean that the court was
not by law allowed to answer the jury’s question. And as discussed earlier in this opinion
and in Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d at 829, a court’s response that it cannot answer
the jury’s life-without-parole question does not violate a defendant’s due process rights
under Simmons.
Second, Mr. Warner assumes that the jury did not take the court’s use of “the
code” to mean one of the other options, particularly that the answer was in the
instructions. He argues that “[t]he instructions contained only the list of three
punishment options that had produced the jury’s question in the first place, so the jury
could not reasonably have concluded that the answer was in the instructions.” Aplt.
Reply Br. at 10.
But it does not follow that, because jurors asked whether Mr. Warner could ever
be released if sentenced to life without parole, they could not have interpreted the court’s
use of “the code” as referring them back to the instructions. By its terms, “the code”
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referred jurors to “the law and evidence” before them. ROA, Vol. 1, Pt. 2 at 313
(emphasis added). The guilt phase oral instruction explaining “the code” twice told
jurors to look to the instructions before suggesting that they ask themselves “should we
be talking about it[?]” And although jurors may have been unsure whether Mr. Warner
could be released if sentenced to life without parole, it is reasonable to conclude that
further review of the instructions would have answered their question. Jurors were given
the option of sentencing Mr. Warner to (1) death, (2) “imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole,” or (3) “imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole.”
OCCA Original Record, Vol. VI at 1066 (emphases added). It is reasonable to conclude
that, upon further consulting the instructions, jurors recognized the differences between
the two life imprisonment options rather than believing their only sentencing options
were death or a limited period of incarceration.
Third, Mr. Warner compares the trial court’s use of “the code” to the trial courts’
responses in Simmons, Mollett, and Johnson, all of which found due process violations.
But in those cases, the trial courts explicitly informed jurors they were not to consider
parole eligibility.
In Simmons, the trial court responded to the jury’s question about parole eligibility
by saying, “You are instructed not to consider parole or parole eligibility in reaching your
verdict. Do not consider parole or parole eligibility. That is not a proper issue for your
consideration.” 512 U.S. at 160. In Mollett, this court found a due process violation
where the trial court told jurors that “[m]atters of parole are beyond the [purview] of the
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jury or the court to consider.” 348 F.3d at 908. Likewise, the trial court in Johnson
responded to the jury’s parole question by saying that “[i]t is inappropriate for you to
consider the question asked.” 254 F.3d at 1166.
In arguing that his claim resembles those in Simmons, Mollett, and Johnson, Mr.
Warner pieces together multiple inferences that his jury must have made. He argues that
(1) the trial court told the jury that it had all the law and evidence necessary to reach a
verdict; (2) the jury recalled that this response was “the code”; (3) the jury remembered
that “the code” meant one of three things and that the court commented they should ask
themselves “should we be talking about it[?]”; (4) the jury interpreted “the code” to mean
“should we be talking about it[?]” rather than any of the other options the trial court laid
out, including “you’re asking me something that I’m not by law allowed to answer” and
the answer is in the instructions; and (5) jurors interpreted “should we be talking about
it[?]” to mean they should not be talking about the possibility of Mr. Warner’s release.
This argument relies on a chain of inferences and is in stark contrast to the “stable of our
decisions,” Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d at 829, where jurors were told directly that
they should not consider the issue of parole. We cannot conclude that there is a
reasonable likelihood that Mr. Warner’s jury engaged in this chain of reasoning or that
the combination of the trial court’s use of “the code” and its earlier oral instruction
presented jurors with a false choice between sentencing Mr. Warner to death or a limited
period of incarceration.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Warner’s
§ 2254 application.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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