Satterfield v. Malloy

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 24, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
IN RE WILLIAM R. SATTERFIELD,
Doing Business As CLASSIC AUTOS,
Doing Business As CLASSIC AUTO
LEASING, No. 08-5185
Debtor.
WILLIAM R. SATTERFIELD, Appeal from
the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Appellant,
v. (N.D. of Okla.)
PATRICK J. MALLOY III, Trustee, (BAP No. 08-091-NO)
Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. **
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
William R. Satterfield, a debtor in Chapter 7 bankruptcy acting pro se, 1
appeals an order of the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) denying
his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The record is sparse and the appellate
briefs give little by way of background, but it appears Satterfield was recently
released from prison and has few assets, if any. He apparently owns a home, but
it is mortgaged to a substantial extent and is subject to a government lien in the
amount of $1.3 million.
On October 15, 2008, the bankruptcy court entered an order approving the
trustee’s final report and allowing distributions from the bankruptcy estate to pay
the trustee’s fees. On November 13, 2008, Satterfield filed a notice of appeal to
the BAP. Because it was filed more than ten days after entry of the bankruptcy
order, Satterfield’s notice of appeal was untimely. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001(a)
& 8002(a); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a)(1) (method for computing time for
bankruptcy deadlines).
The BAP subsequently ordered Satterfield to show cause why his untimely
appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Deyhimy v. Rupp (In
re Herwit), 970 F.2d 709, 710 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[F]ailure to file a timely notice
of appeal [is] a jurisdictional defect barring appellate review by the [Bankruptcy
1
Because he acts pro se, we construe Satterfield’s filings generously. See
generally Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Kuntz v.
Cray Computer Corp. (In re Cray Computer Corp.), No. 96-1067, 1997 WL
111264, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 13, 1997) (in a bankruptcy case, construing pro se
filings liberally).
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Appellate Panel].”); see also Lang v. Lang (In re Lang), 414 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir.
2005). Satterfield filed a response to the show cause order. With his response, he
also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
Rather than dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, the BAP entered an order
stating it could not grant Satterfield’s in forma pauperis application because under
the federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the BAP is not a “court of
the United States.” See Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd.), 40
F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that bankruptcy courts are not “courts
of the United States” and cannot impose sanctions under § 1927); In re Jeys, 202
B.R. 153, 154 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 1996) (“The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel is not an
Article III court, and therefore lacks the power to grant leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.”). 2 The BAP therefore ordered Satterfield to pay the required filing and
docketing fees or face dismissal.
Satterfield now appeals to this court, challenging the BAP’s denial of his in
forma pauperis motion. Because the BAP’s order disposes of Satterfield’s appeal
and leaves nothing for the bankruptcy court to resolve, it was a final order and we
therefore have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). See Strong v. W. United
2
See also Perroton v. Gray (In re Perroton), 958 F.2d 889, 896 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that bankruptcy courts do not have authority to waive fees under
§ 1915). Other circuits disagree with our jurisprudence on this matter. See, e.g.,
In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 105 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that a
bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court and thus falls within the definition
of “court of the United States”).
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Life Assurance Co. (In re Tri-Valley Distrib., Inc.), 533 F.3d 1209, 1214 (10th
Cir. 2008).
Though our precedent restricts bankruptcy courts and bankruptcy appellate
panels from granting relief under § 1915, in 2005 Congress granted bankruptcy
courts the authority to waive bankruptcy fees for some Chapter 7 debtors,
including fees relating to bankruptcy appeals. See 29 U.S.C. § 1930(f). Perhaps,
given Satterfield’s pro se status, the BAP should have construed his in forma
pauperis motion as a motion under § 1930(f), and should have referred the issue
to the bankruptcy court in the first instance. See In re Domenico, 364 B.R. 418,
420 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007) (noting that the 2005 amendments to § 1930 “permit
the Court to waive the filing fee for the most destitute of debtors”); see also
Wallin v. Martel (In re Martel), No. 08-1488, 2009 WL 1313915, at *1 (10th Cir.
May 13, 2009) (noting that only the bankruptcy court, and not the BAP, may
grant relief under § 1930(f)).
But even so, the outcome would not have changed. Satterfield’s untimely
notice of appeal to the BAP caused a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal. 3
See In re Herwit, 970 F.2d at 710. And Satterfield could not remedy the
jurisdictional problem—the time has long since past to file a motion to extend the
3
In bankruptcy cases, as in other contexts, we are free to affirm a lower
court’s decision on any grounds for which there is a sufficient record to make
legal conclusions. Jenkins v. Hodes (In re Hodes), 402 F.3d 1005, 1011 (10th
Cir. 2005).
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time for filing a notice of appeal. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(c) (a motion to
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal must be filed, at the latest, 20 days
after the expiration of the time for filing a notice of appeal).
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the BAP’s dismissal of Satterfield’s appeal.
Satterfield’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis in this court is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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