Mays v. State of Kansas

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 28, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL LEE MAYS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 09-3177
v. (D.C. No. 5:09-CV-03059-SAC)
(D. Kan.)
STATE OF KANSAS; J. SHELTON;
STEPHEN SIX, Kansas Attorney
General, WYANDOTTE COUNTY
COURTHOUSE,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Daniel Lee Mays, a state inmate appearing pro se,
seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) allowing him to appeal the denial of
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court
dismissed the action as untimely under the one-year limitation period contained in
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Mays v. Kansas, No. 09-3059-SAC, 2009 WL 1587124,
at *1 (D. Kan. June 5, 2009); Mays v. Kansas, No. 09-3059-SAC, 2009 WL
1033739, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 17, 2009). Because the district court’s conclusion
that Mr. Mays’ claims are time-barred is not reasonably debatable, we deny his
request for a COA and dismiss the appeal.
Mr. Mays was charged with theft in 1985 (Case No. 85 CR 0340) and
released on bond pending trial. Mays, 2009 WL 1033739, at *1. While on bond,
Mr. Mays committed other crimes and was subsequently charged with robbery
and aggravated robbery (Case No. 85 CR 0579). Id. He pled guilty to the theft
charge and was found guilty on the two robbery charges. R. Doc. 5 at 1. He was
sentenced in both cases on September 6, 1985 by a panel of three judges, referred
to as a “three judge probation board.” R. Doc. 1, Ex. 1 at 32. Although there
initially appeared to be some confusion as to the appropriate sentence, the
ultimate sentence pronounced by this tribunal was 1 to 5 years for the theft charge
and 5 to 20 years on the robbery charges to run consecutively to the sentence on
the theft charge. Id.
The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Mays’ robbery convictions and
sentence on June 12, 1987 (Case No. 85 CR 0579). State v. Mays, 761 P.2d 1254
(Table) (No. 59,895) (Kan. June 12, 1987) (unpublished). On direct appeal, Mr.
Mays did not challenge the designation that the sentences in the two cases be
served consecutively. He did not file a direct appeal in the theft case (Case No.
85 CR 0340). On January 16, 2007, Mr. Mays filed a Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3504, alleging “newly discovered”
evidence that the court erred in imposing consecutive sentences in the two cases.
R. Doc. 1, Ex. 1 at 18. The state district court denied the motion. R. Doc. 1, Ex.
-2-
1 at 27. The Kansas Court of Appeals dismissed Mr. Mays’ appeal, and the
Kansas Supreme Court denied review. R. Doc. 1, Ex. 1 at 29, 30.
On April 22, 2008, during the pendency of his state court appeal, he filed a
petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his sentence in the
theft case. The district court dismissed his application without prejudice for
failure to exhaust state court remedies. Mays v. Kansas, 2008 WL 2435561, at *3
(D. Kan. June 12, 2008). The district court also noted that Mr. Mays’ claims
appeared to be time-barred. Id. at n.6. On March 12, 2009, after exhausting state
court remedies, Mr. Mays filed another petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, again challenging his sentence in the theft case. R. Doc. 1. Essentially,
he alleges that 1985 sentences should be concurrent instead of consecutive. R.
Doc. 1 at 5-9. Without addressing Mr. Mays’ constitutional claims, the district
court dismissed his application as time-barred. Mays v. Kansas, No. 09-3059-
SAC, 2009 WL 1587124, at *1 (D. Kan. June 5, 2009).
In order for this court to grant a COA, Mr. Mays must make “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). On
appeal, Mr. Mays argues that the sentencing panel’s alteration of his sentence as
initially pronounced was unconstitutional and an ex post facto violation. Aplt.
Br. at 1-3. Mr. Mays also raises double jeopardy, although he did not raise this
below. Aplt. Br. at 3. Finally, Mr. Mays argues that the district court’s dismissal
of his application as time-barred denies him access to the courts and violates due
-3-
process. Aplt. Br. at 3-4.
Where, as here, the district court’s denial of habeas relief is based on a
procedural ground, Mr. Mays must show that “jurists of reason would find it
debatable (1) whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling,” and
(2)“ whether the petition stated a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right.” Davis v. Roberts, 425 F.3d 830, 834 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000)). If he cannot make a threshold showing
on the procedural issue, we need not address the constitutional issues. Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), enacted on April 24, 1996, provides that a “1-year
period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” This limitation
period usually commences on “the date on which the judgment became final by . .
. the expiration of the time for seeking [direct] review.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A). However, a state prisoner whose conviction became final on or
before the effective date of § 2244(d)(1), i.e. April 24, 1996, must file his § 2254
petition on or before April 24, 1997. See Serrano v. Williams, 383 F.3d 1181,
1183 (10th Cir. 2004). Mr. May’s sentencing for these crimes occurred in 1985.
He did not file an appeal in the theft case, and his convictions and sentence in the
robbery case were affirmed in 1987. Accordingly, Mr. Mays had until April 24,
1997 to file his § 2254 petition in both the theft and robbery cases. He did not
file until March 12, 2009, well past the deadline.
-4-
The running of the limitations period is tolled during the pendency of any
post-conviction or other collateral proceeding filed during the one-year
limitations period. See Serrano, 383 F.3d at 1183. A petition for post-conviction
relief filed in state court after the limitations period has expired will not toll it.
See Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006). Thus, Mr. Mays’
2007 application for state post-conviction relief fails to toll the limitations period.
In addition, the limitations period may be equitably tolled “when an inmate
diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was
caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.” United States v.
Gabaldon, 522 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Marsh v. Soares, 223
F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Equitable
tolling is only
‘appropriate, for example, when a prisoner is actually innocent, when
an adversary’s conduct — or other uncontrollable circumstances —
prevents a prisoner from timely filing, or when a prisoner actively
pursues judicial remedies but files a defective pleading during the
statutory period. Simple excusable neglect is not sufficient.
Moreover, a petitioner must diligently pursue his federal habeas
claims; a claim of insufficient access to relevant law . . . is not
enough to support equitable tolling.’
Id. (quoting Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000)). Mr. Mays
has the burden of demonstrating that equitable tolling should apply. See Yang v.
Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 2008). We agree with the district court
that Mr. Mays’ claims for equitable tolling are unavailing.
-5-
Mr. Mays apparently asserts four grounds for equitable tolling. First, Mr.
Mays asserts that the sentencing issue is a new issue that could not have been
raised on direct appeal because he was unaware of it. R. Doc. 1, Ex. 1 at 4; R.
Doc. 6 at 9. Even if Mr. Mays was unable to review the record of his sentencing,
he was present during the events that give rise to his claim, undermining his claim
that the issue is new. Second, Mr. Mays states that “the courthouse” kept
documents and records from him and prevented him from making filings. R. Doc.
6 at 8-9. He does not present any evidence to support these assertions. While
Mr. Mays does provide a 2007 letter stating that transcripts from his criminal
cases could not be located, this does not show his diligence in pursuing his claim
during the relevant time period, i.e., from April 24, 1996 to April 24, 1997. R.
Doc. 1, Ex. 1 at 28. Third, Mr. Mays claims that because Kansas law permits
sentencing errors affecting constitutional rights to be raised at any time, his
federal habeas claim likewise can be raised at any time. R. Doc. 1, Ex. 1 at 12-
13; R. Doc. 6 at 7-8. Contrary to this assertion, the Kansas statute does not
extend the time limitation for filing federal claims. See Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d
1133, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that Ҥ 2244(d) will sometimes force a state
prisoner to act expeditiously to preserve his federal claims despite the procedural
lenience of state law, which may forgive substantial delay”). Finally, Mr. Mays
repeatedly argues that “he is factual innocence of sentence.” See, e.g., R. Doc. 6
at 6. While evidence of actual innocence may support equitable tolling,
-6-
Gabaldon, 522 F.3d at 1124 n.2, Mr. Mays does not dispute his guilt. Rather, he
merely objects to his sentence. Accordingly, the district court’s conclusion that
no extraordinary circumstances warrant equitable tolling is not reasonably
debatable.
We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
-7-