Escobar v. L. Reid

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 6, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
JOSE MEDINA ESCOBAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-1474
(D.C. No. 1:06-CV-01222-CMA-KLM)
L. REID; K. COOPER; E. CELLA; (D. Colo.)
T. HAUCKS; E. PERRY;
D. GALLAGHER; SGT. BINDER;
C/O VALDEZ; J. BROWN; J. SIMS;
E. DICLUSION; E. MORA;
A. LUNA; R. WENCL;
J. WERMERS; R. OLIVETT;
C/O JACKSON; L. MONTOYA;
C/O BALL; JOHN DOW;
LT. PAULINO; C/O RAYMOND;
C/O SANTOS; SGT. D. SMITH;
C/O WILLIAMS; CAPTAIN
MIKLICH; LT. MATHEWS;
SGT. OATES; C/O COLTON;
C/O HAMULA; C/O WOOLFOLK;
DR. CRANEY; NURSE RITA,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Before O’BRIEN, PORFILIO, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Jose Medina Escobar, a Colorado state prisoner, filed an interlocutory
appeal in connection with his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against Colorado prison
officials and employees. We affirm the district court’s denial of Escobar’s
motion for a preliminary injunction and dismiss the remainder of the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction.
I. Background
Escobar’s amended civil-rights complaint alleges that numerous individuals
in the Colorado prison system violated his constitutional rights in various ways.
His filing describes incidents of physical and mental abuse, harassment, excessive
force, threats, slander, discrimination, assault with human waste matter, denial of
adequate medical attention, retaliation for exercise of his legal rights, destruction
of his belongings, contamination of his food, interference with his legal mail and
materials, and confinement with inmate enemies.
In a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction and
a similar motion to compel, Escobar sought an order enjoining correctional
officials from engaging in the alleged behavior. He also asked for leave to
introduce an additional supplemental complaint. After holding an evidentiary
hearing, the magistrate judge recommended denial of Escobar’s motions. Escobar
objected to the recommendation. The district court conducted a de novo review
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of the issues and accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Escobar then
filed an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s decision. The underlying
litigation is proceeding in district court.
II. Discussion
Jurisdiction
Absent certain limited exceptions, “federal appellate courts have
jurisdiction solely over appeals from ‘final decisions of the district courts of the
United States.’” Rekstad v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 1259, 1261 (10th Cir.
2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291) (emphasis deleted). A final decision is one that
“ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted). The district court has not yet
entered a final decision regarding Escobar’s case.
We have jurisdiction, however, to review the denial of his request for a
preliminary injunction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (“[T]he courts of appeals
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from . . . [i]nterlocutory orders of the district
courts of the United States . . . refusing . . . injunctions”). But to the extent
Escobar seeks to challenge the district court’s denial of the motion to supplement
his complaint or any other interlocutory ruling, we lack jurisdiction over his
appeal.
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Preliminary Injunction
We review a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse
of discretion, which occurs when “it commits an error of law or makes clearly
erroneous factual findings.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, 500 F.3d
1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). “Our review of the district
court’s exercise of discretion is narrow and the merits . . . may be considered on
appeal only insofar as they bear on the issue of judicial discretion.” Id.(quotations and citation omitted).
“To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must show: (1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm to the movant
if the injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the
preliminary injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction, if
issued, will not adversely affect the public interest.” Id. “Because a preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief must be clear and
unequivocal.” Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256
(10th Cir. 2003).
In recommending denial of Escobar’s request, the magistrate judge first
noted that the mandatory relief sought by Mr. Escobar was disfavored in that it
attempted to alter the status quo and a grant of his motion would provide him
with “all the relief that [he] could recover at the conclusion of a full trial on the
merits” of his civil-rights action. Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1259
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(10th Cir. 2005) (listing “specifically disfavored preliminary injunctions” and
stating that requests for disfavored relief “must be more closely scrutinized to
assure that the exigencies of the case support the granting of a remedy that is
extraordinary even in the normal course”) (quotations omitted). The magistrate
judge also reiterated the well-established principle that “prison officials’
exercises of discretion should generally be respected, as federal courts ought to
afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a
volatile environment.” Wilson v. Jones, 430 F.3d 1113, 1123 (10th Cir. 2005)
(quotation omitted).
Although the magistrate judge acknowledged that Escobar’s allegations
were serious, she determined that, at the preliminary injunction stage, Escobar
had not shown that he was incarcerated under circumstances giving rise to a
substantial risk of serious harm. As a result, Escobar had not demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits of his civil-rights claims. Without evaluating
the remaining factors, the magistrate judge recommended denial of Escobar’s
request. In its review, the district court “concluded that the Magistrate Judge’s
thorough and comprehensive analyses and recommendations are correct.”
R., Vol. 1 at 471. It therefore accepted the recommendation and denied injunctive
relief.
After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Escobar’s request. Although Escobar’s allegations
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of mistreatment are serious, at this stage his conclusory statements do not
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his case.
The order of the district court denying Escobar’s request for preliminary
injunction is AFFIRMED. The remainder of his appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction. Escobar’s motion to introduce an affidavit regarding his present
status is DENIED, in that the affidavit is not part of the district-court record.
See Nulf v. Int’l Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553, 559 (10th Cir. 1981) (“Matters not
appearing in the record will not be considered by the court of appeals.”).
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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