Rodriguez-Rodriguez v. Holder, Jr.

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 13, 2009
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ERASMO RODRIGUEZ-
RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
No. 08-9566
v. (Board of Immigration Appeals)
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
Respondent. *
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before TACHA, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. ***
Petitioner Erasmo Rodriguez-Rodriguez seeks review of a decision by the
Board of Immigration Appeals denying his request for voluntary departure. We
*
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Respondent
requests that Eric H. Holder, Jr. be substituted for Michael Mukasey as the
respondent in this case.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
***
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
lack jurisdiction over each of Rodriguez’s claims and therefore DISMISS his
petition for review.
I. Background
Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we summarize only those
relevant to our disposition of this case.
Rodriguez is a national and citizen of Mexico, and he admits he illegally
entered the United States in February 1997. To gain entry, Rodriguez falsely
claimed to be a United States citizen and presented a phony birth certificate. In
June 2002, Rodriguez attempted to use the same birth certificate to procure an
American passport. Passport officials learned that the name listed on the birth
certificate belonged to a man who died in 1997, so federal agents arrested
Rodriguez for passport fraud. Rodriguez pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing
a stolen identification document in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(6) and was
sentenced to time served.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service subsequently served Rodriguez
with a Notice to Appear, thereby initiating removal proceedings against him.
Rodriguez conceded he was subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)
and (a)(6)(C)(ii), but sought cancellation of removal or, alternatively, voluntary
departure. After holding a removal hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied
Rodriguez the requested relief and ordered him removed. On appeal, the Board of
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Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a brief, non-summary order affirming the
decision of the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5). 1
Rodriguez now petitions this court for review, abandoning his request for
cancellation of removal and seeking only voluntary departure.
II. Analysis
Though we generally have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review
final BIA removal orders, this jurisdiction is significantly limited. Particularly
relevant here is 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f), which states, “[n]o court shall have
jurisdiction over an appeal from denial of a request for an order of voluntary
departure.” See also Ekasinta v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2005)
(“[W]e lack jurisdiction to review an immigration judge’s refusal to grant
voluntary departure.”). Despite this limitation, however, we may reach any
“constitutional claims or questions of law” raised by Rodriguez in his petition,
even if they relate to the BIA’s denial of his application for voluntary departure.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see Kechkar v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th
Cir. 2007).
In an attempt to place his appeal within § 1252(a)(2)(D) and thereby vest us
with jurisdiction, Rodriguez makes a litany of arguments purporting to implicate
1
In immigration cases, the scope of our review is usually limited to the
decision of the BIA. Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir.
2007). However, where the BIA issues a brief order affirming the decision of the
IJ—as occurred here—we may look to the IJ’s opinion for a more complete
understanding of the BIA’s order. Id.-3-
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Most of these arguments fall
under his general claim that the BIA’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence.
For example, Rodriguez argues (1) the IJ “accept[ed] as facts the innuendos
made by Government’s counsel”; (2) failed to consider “favorable factors”
relevant to his application for voluntary departure; (3) “unfairly” found Rodriguez
to be “disingenuous” in his testimony; (4) wrongly discredited Rodriguez’s
testimony regarding various allegedly improper tax returns he filed while living
and working illegally in the United States; and (5) “failed to balance equities”
regarding the relevance of Rodriguez’s past illegal conduct to his application for
voluntary departure. Pet’r Br. at 16, 20, 22, 23, 26. Each of these arguments is
merely “a challenge to the agency’s discretionary and fact-finding exercises
cloaked in constitutional garb.” Kechkar, 500 F.3d at 1084; see also Carcamo v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 498 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the mere
talismanic invocation of the Due Process Clause does not place a petitioner’s
claim within § 1252(a)(2)(D)). The arguments are therefore beyond the scope of
our jurisdiction and must be dismissed. Id.
Indeed, only one of Rodriguez’s arguments potentially implicates a question
of law cognizable under § 1252(a)(2)(D). Rodriguez asserts the IJ improperly
applied 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B), which sets forth one of the requirements of
voluntary departure. Under § 1229c(b)(1)(B), an alien is ineligible for voluntary
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departure unless “the alien is, and has been, a person of good moral character for
at least 5 years immediately preceding the alien’s application for voluntary
departure.” (emphasis added). Rodriguez claims the IJ improperly considered his
passport fraud, which occurred on June 4, 2002, as bearing on his “good moral
character.” Rodriguez asserts that he filed his application for voluntary departure
on October 22, 2007—the date of his removal hearing—and therefore the fraud
occurred outside the relevant statutory five-year window.
In its decision, the BIA found that “[a]t the time of the hearing before the
Immigration Judge, the respondent had been convicted of passport fraud within the
relevant 5-year period.” A.R. at 2. Rodriguez does not challenge that finding.
Instead, he asks us to examine the IJ’s decision, which he claims erroneously uses
the date of service of the Notice to Appear—December 2, 2002—rather than the
date Rodriguez actually committed passport fraud, in applying 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229c(b)(1)(B). This, Rodriguez claims, “resulted in an incorrect cut off date
being used to determine the required five years of good moral character.” Pet’r
Br. at 21.
Upon closer inspection, it is clear this claim merely challenges the BIA’s
endorsement of the IJ’s fact-finding. The BIA stated, “the record amply supports
the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent failed to demonstrate the
requisite good moral character.” A.R. at 2. As the government points out, the
record shows Rodriguez applied for voluntary departure long before October 22,
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2007. Although the precise date of his application is not clear, it could not have
been filed later than February 22, 2006, when Rodriguez’s counsel submitted a
legal brief to the IJ arguing he was eligible for voluntary departure. This suggests
the BIA’s conclusion that Rodriguez “had been convicted of passport fraud within
the relevant 5-year period,” A.R. at 2, was not erroneous. More importantly, it
means we lack jurisdiction. Rodriguez cannot “avoid[] the jurisdictional bar by
arguing that the evidence was incorrectly weighed, insufficiently considered, or
supports a different outcome.” Kechkar, 500 F.3d at 1084. This is precisely what
he seeks to do, and his claim is therefore barred.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Rodriguez’s petition is DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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