United States v. Collins

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 29, 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 15-6056
(D.C. Nos. 5:14-CV-00798-HE and
BRIAN HEATH COLLINS, 5:12-CR-00076-HE-1)
(W.D. of Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. **
Brian Collins pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of
manufacturing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to 168 months in prison. On direct appeal, we
affirmed and the Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari. Collins, pro se, then
sought habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asserting, as relevant here,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
ineffective assistance of counsel on two grounds. The district court granted a
certificate of appealability (COA) on one ground: that his attorney essentially
abandoned him and failed to correct errors in the presentence investigation report
(PSR), but ultimately denied the habeas motion on all grounds.
Collins appeals, arguing that he suffered prejudice as a result of his
attorney’s lack of communication. He also seeks a COA on the second ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, that his attorney misrepresented the consequences of
his guilty plea.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district
court’s denial of Collins’s § 2255 motion and decline to issue a COA.
I. BACKGROUND
Brian Collins was indicted on two counts of manufacturing and distributing
methamphetamine, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The court
appointed counsel to represent Collins because he was indigent. Collins was then
offered a plea deal by the government, and counsel later spent about thirty
minutes reviewing the plea agreement with Collins. Pursuant to the agreement,
Collins pleaded guilty to the manufacturing count and the distribution count was
dismissed.
The resulting PSR classified Collins as a career offender. This
enhancement affected his guidelines range in two ways. First, the offense level
was increased from 30 to 34, because the Guidelines, USSG § 4B1.1(b), directs
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the use of whichever offense level is higher between the normal computation and
the career offender enhancement. Second, the criminal history category was
increased from V to VI, because USSG § 4B1.1(b) specifies that a career
offender’s criminal history category is always VI. In the sentencing
memorandum, counsel wrote that the pre-enhancement range should have been 84
to 104 months. The post-enhancement sentencing range was 188 to 235 months
(though the PSR erroneously recommended 168 to 210 months).
At the sentencing hearing, counsel argued for a below-guidelines sentence.
The district court heard from Collins and then addressed the statutory factors. In
imposing the 168-month sentence, the court concluded:
The ultimate question here, of course, is how long he should be
incarcerated in the circumstances here. It does appear to me that
there needs to be a substantial sentence in this case, but I think
in terms of the overall circumstances, particularly, against the
backdrop of what, as I said earlier, were the unusual progression
of tragedies that appear to have triggered the most recent
activities by the defendant, I’m not persuaded that a sentence
fully within the guideline range is necessary, although I do think
there needs to be a substantial sentence here.
What I’m going to do is sentence the defendant to 168 months in
the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. That is a substantial
sentence, and is the bottom of the guideline range which would
have applied earlier had we not had the career offender situation
that was affecting both the offense level and the criminal history
category. 1 But it does seem to me that that is a substantial
enough sentence in this case to accomplish the statutory
objectives of sentencing.
1
In fact, under the PSR, the low-end sentence would have been 120
months.
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R., Vol. III at 39–40.
II. DISCUSSION
Collins contends the district court erred in assessing his counsel’s conduct
at both the sentencing and plea bargain stages. We reject both arguments.
A. Sentencing
Collins’s primary argument asserts that counsel was ineffective during
sentencing because he should have done two things: first, counsel should have
argued for a lower criminal history (IV) and offense level (28) calculation to yield
a lower unenhanced sentencing range; and second, he should have used that lower
calculation to argue that the career offender enhancement was excessive and
unwarranted. The district court granted a COA. It found that counsel was
constitutionally deficient due to his failure to communicate, especially regarding
the PSR. The court then denied relief because Collins did not show prejudice, in
other words, that, but for counsel’s errors, the court would have given a lower
sentence.
“When reviewing a district court’s denial of a § 2255 petition, we review
questions of law de novo and questions of fact for clear error.” United States v.
Harms, 371 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced his case, meaning that but for counsel’s
deficient performance, he would likely have received a lower sentence. United
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States v. Washington, 619 F.3d 1252, 1262 (10th Cir. 2010). This likelihood must
be “substantial, not just conceivable.” United States v. Rushin, 642 F.3d 1299,
1310 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011)
(citation omitted)).
We agree with the district court that Collins has failed to establish
prejudice. First, in the sentencing memorandum, counsel did present the exact
pre-enhancement guidelines range that Collins requested (84 to 104 months). 2
Collins argues that the presentation was not argumentative enough. But Collins’s
burden is higher than establishing a possibility that a more emphatic argument
might have yielded a lower sentence; he must establish a substantial likelihood
that a lower sentence would have resulted.
Second, even if counsel had emphasized that lower range, Collins cannot
show it is substantially likely that his sentence would have been reduced. He
argues that the district court had a “desire” to impose a sentence at the bottom of
the guidelines range as if the career offender provisions did not apply. But more
likely, the court intended to emphasize that 168 months was appropriate given the
many § 3553 factors it referenced during sentencing: the serious nature of the
crime, defendant’s lengthy criminal history, defendant’s life circumstances,
2
“But for the calculation as a Career Offender, Mr. Collins [sic] range of
punishment under the guidelines would be 84 to 104 months. This range is based
on an initial criminal offense level of 28 subtracting 3 points for acceptance of
responsibility and a Criminal History of IV (8 criminal history points).” R., Vol.
I at 103–04.
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deterrence, and protection of the public. It said that though there needed to be a
“substantial sentence,” given the recent life tragedies of the defendant, it was “not
persuaded that a sentence fully within the guideline range is necessary.” R., Vol.
III at 39–40.
Even if the district court specifically intended to impose the bottom-end
sentence as if the career offender enhancement did not apply, Collins cannot show
with a substantial likelihood that his counsel’s greater emphasis on a pre-
enhancement range of 84 to 104 months (versus the PSR range of 120 to 150
months) would have resulted in a greater downward departure. His actual
sentencing range of 188 to 210 months was correctly calculated, and the district
court then chose a sentence of 168 months. Changing the low end of an
inapplicable guidelines range might have affected the court’s decision, but Collins
cannot prove a substantial likelihood that it would have.
Collins points to United States v. Fernandez, 436 F. Supp. 2d 983 (E.D.
Wis. 2006), to argue that when counsel failed to push for a lower pre-
enhancement range, Collins was prejudiced because the court did not have the
opportunity to consider the drastic increase that the career offender provision
imposed. But Fernandez is not persuasive. There, the court concluded that the
career offender increase would conflict with the purposes of sentencing under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). Fernandez, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 984. Here, the court first
addressed the statutory factors and concluded there “needs to be a substantial
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sentence,” though not one “fully within the guideline range.” R., Vol. III at
39–40. It then concluded that 168 months would “accomplish the statutory
objectives of sentencing.” Id. at 40. We decline to find prejudice here because
even if counsel had pointed to an uncontestedly inapplicable guidelines range
more emphatically and cited a non-binding, fact-specific case, Collins has not
proven that he likely would have received a lower sentence.
B. Plea agreement
Collins’s second argument is that counsel was ineffective because he
materially misrepresented the consequences of the plea agreement. Collins does
not dispute that his criminal history properly categorizes him as a career offender.
But he does assert that his counsel led him to believe that the career offender
enhancements would not apply under the plea deal.
The district court did not grant a COA on this ground. It found that Collins
had not established “blatant and significant misrepresentations,” Mendoza v.
Hatch, 620 F.3d 1261, 1272 (10th Cir. 2010), but rather that the evidence showed
only a misunderstanding. Even if misrepresentations existed, the district court
said Collins could not establish prejudice “[c]onsidering the benefits defendant
received by pleading guilty and the lack of any indication that he likely would
have succeeded at trial[.]” R., Vol. I at 171.
We issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To satisfy this
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standard, Collins must show that “reasonable jurists could debate whether the
§ 2255 motion should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” United
States v. Zamora-Marquez, 565 F. App’x 695, 697 (10th Cir. 2014) (alterations
and citation omitted). We agree with the district court and deny a COA.
“In the guilty plea context, to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s error, the
defendant would have insisted upon going to trial.” United States v. Silva, 430
F.3d 1096, 1099 (10th Cir. 2005). “Material misrepresentations,” but not mere
miscalculations, can rise to constitutionally deficient performance. United States
v. Gonzalez, 209 F. App’x 842, 845 (10th Cir. 2006). Collins seems to concede
that he cannot prove misrepresentations, and instead argues that the
misunderstanding resulted from a significant deficiency in communication. This
argument was not presented to the district court and Collins has not demonstrated
that reasonable jurists would have addressed the material misrepresentations issue
differently.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we AFFIRM the denial of the § 2255 motion on
Collins’s ineffective assistance challenge regarding sentencing, DENY a COA on
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his ineffective assistance challenge regarding the guilty plea, and DISMISS his
appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Chief Judge
.
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