United States v. Lossiah

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 26, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 07-2087
v. D. N.M.
JASON LOSSIAH, (D.C. No. CIV-06-467-MV)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
AND DISMISSING APPEAL
Before KELLY, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Jason Lossiah, a federal prisoner, filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to
vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. 1 The district court, adopting the
magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied the motion. Lossiah filed a notice of
1
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka,
Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir.2003).
appeal with the district court and an application for a Certificate of Appealability
(COA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). The district court denied his application.
Lossiah renews his application for a COA with this Court and requests permission
to proceed in forma pauperis (ifp). 2 We deny a COA, but grant his request to
proceed ifp and dismiss his application.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2002, Lossiah was convicted by a jury of four counts of sexual assault.
He filed a post-trial motion for acquittal as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a
new trial. The district court denied Lossiah’s motion for acquittal because it
could not “second-guess” the jury’s determination of witness credibility and,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, determined a
rational juror could have found Lossiah guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (R.
Vol. I, Doc. 14 at 2.) The court granted Lossiah’s motion for a new trial based on
improper admission of evidence coupled with the court’s assessment, as a
“thirteenth juror,” of the credibility of the witnesses. (Id.) Lossiah’s second trial
was declared a mistrial when the government’s expert witness cried during her
testimony. A third trial culminated in a guilty verdict on two counts. Lossiah
again filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative, a new trial.
The court denied this motion and sentenced Lossiah to 121 months
2
Lossiah did not proceed ifp below and did not file a request with the
district court to permit ifp on appeal.
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imprisonment.
Lossiah appealed, claiming the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction and the verdicts were inconsistent. We affirmed his conviction.
United States v. Lossiah, 129 Fed. Appx. 434 (10th Cir. 2005). His subsequent
motion for reconsideration and rehearing in this Court, as well as his petition for
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, were denied. Lossiah v.
United States, 126 S.Ct. 465 (2005).
Lossiah filed the instant § 2255 motion on June 5, 2006, alleging his
second and third trials violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and his counsel was
ineffective in failing to raise the double jeopardy issue at the second and third
trials or on appeal. 3 The district court referred Lossiah’s motion to a magistrate
judge, who’s report and recommendation determined: (1) Lossiah’s second and
third trials did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the district court
denied his motion for acquittal, and (2) counsel was not ineffective for failing to
raise a meritless issue. Lossiah objected to the magistrate judge’s conclusions.
After de novo review, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's
recommendations and denied Lossiah’s § 2255 motion and his later application
3
Lossiah dos not claim he objected or opposed the declaration of mistrial at
his second trial or that it has any effect on his double jeopardy argument. See
Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227, 1236 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Where a
defendant requests or consents to a mistrial, there is no bar to retrial unless the
government acted in a manner intended to induce a request for mistrial.”).
Rather, he maintains the ultimate result of the first trial foreclosed the second and
third trials.
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for a COA.
II. DISCUSSION
A COA is a jurisdictional pre-requisite to our review. Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). We will issue a COA only if Lossiah makes a
“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). To make this showing, he must establish that “reasonable jurists
could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved [by the district
court] in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(quotations omitted). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear
error and its legal conclusions de novo. English v. Cody, 241 F.3d 1279, 1282
(10th Cir. 2001).
“The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against (1) a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same
offense.” Anderson v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1148, 1153 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotations
omitted). “Before the clause is implicated, however, some event, such as an
acquittal, must terminate the original jeopardy.” Id. Lossiah insists that, because
the district court used the words “insufficient evidence” when granting his new
trial, it was a judgment of acquittal. As recognized by the magistrate judge and
the district court, however, his request for acquittal was flatly denied. The
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court’s grant of a new trial is not the equivalent of an acquittal terminating the
original jeopardy. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982) (A judge’s
disagreement with a jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence does not have the
same force as an acquittal.) As the Supreme Court observed:
A reversal [based] on [the court’s assessment of conflicting
evidence], unlike a reversal based on insufficient evidence, does not
mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict. Instead, the
appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the
jury’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. This difference of
opinion no more signifies acquittal than does a disagreement among
the jurors themselves. A deadlocked jury, we consistently have
recognized, does not result in an acquittal barring retrial under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
Id. While the district court’s choice of the phrase “insufficient evidence” when
granting the new trial may have confused Lossiah, the jury’s verdict was not set
aside for insufficient evidence. Double jeopardy did not attach.
Counsel is not ineffective by failing to raise a meritless issue, thereby
vitiating Lossiah’s ineffective assistance claim. United States v. Orange, 447
F.3d 792, 797 (10th Cir. 2006) (“When, as here, the basis for the ineffective
assistance claim is the failure to raise an issue, we must look to the merits of the
omitted issue. If the omitted issue is without merit, then counsel’s failure to raise
it is not prejudicial, and thus is not ineffective assistance.”) (citation omitted).
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We DENY a COA and DISMISS Lossiah’s application. Lossiah’s motion
to proceed ifp is GRANTED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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