United States v. Harris

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 4, 2009
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 09-5051
v. (N.D. of Okla.)
DARREN LAMAR HARRIS, (D.C. No.4:89-CR-00091-TCK-6)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. **
Darren Lamar Harris, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s denial of his motion filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to
modify his sentence based on Amendment 706 to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (Guidelines or USSG). We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and AFFIRM.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
I. Background
A jury convicted Harris and several codefendants of conspiring to
knowingly and intentionally distribute cocaine base (crack cocaine). In early
1990, the district court sentenced Harris to 360 months’ imprisonment.
As a part of sentencing, the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) found
the conspiracy was responsible for the distribution of at least seven kilograms of
crack cocaine, and the PSR held Harris responsible for this entire amount.
According to the Drug Quantity Table effective at the time, the highest base
offense level for offenses involving controlled substances, USSG § 2D1.1, was 36
for 500 grams or more of crack cocaine. Therefore, after two levels were added
to Harris’s base offense level for possession of a firearm in furtherance of the
conspiracy and two more levels were added for obstruction of justice, Harris’s
offense level became 40. With his criminal history category of IV, his sentencing
range was 360 months to life, and the district court sentenced Harris to 360
months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, this court affirmed Harris’s conviction but remanded for
resentencing for various reasons. On remand, the district court made additional
findings affecting drug quantities: in particular, that Harris was responsible for
four kilograms of crack cocaine, given the amount of time that Harris was
involved in the conspiracy. The district court concluded, however, that under
USSG § 2D1.1, four kilograms of crack cocaine still resulted in a base offense
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level of 36. With the additional increase of two levels for the possession of the
firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy and two levels for obstruction of justice,
Harris’s total offense level remained 40, and his guideline range remained 360
months to life. The court again sentenced Harris to 360 months, which we
affirmed on appeal. United States v. Harris, 984 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1993).
In 2009, Harris filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to
§ 3582(c)(2), based on the crack cocaine modification contained in Amendment
706 to the sentencing guidelines. “The Guidelines, through Amendment 706,
generally adjust downward by two levels the base offense level assigned to
quantities of crack cocaine. Amendment 706 took effect November 1, 2007 and
was made retroactive as of March 3, 2008.” United States v. Sharkey, 543 F.3d
1236, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008). The district court denied Harris’s § 3582(c)(2)
motion, however, because it concluded that even after Amendment 706, Harris’s
guideline level remained the same. The district court also denied Harris’s request
for a downward variance pursuant to Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85(2007). 1
Harris consequently filed the instant appeal.
1
Moreover, the district court denied Harris’s motion seeking appointment
of counsel to file his § 3582 motion.
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II. Analysis
“We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of a statute or the
sentencing guidelines.” United States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539, 540 (10th Cir.
1997) (quotation omitted). “We review for an abuse of discretion a district
court’s decision to deny a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).”
Sharkey, 543 F.3d at 1238. Additionally, we construe liberally pleadings filed by
pro se litigants. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
1. Section 3582 Motion
Where, as here, a motion for sentence reduction is not a direct appeal or a
collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the merits of the motion depend on 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c). Smartt, 129 F.3d at 540. But § 3582(c) allows the court to
modify a sentence only if the sentencing range is subsequently lowered by the
Sentencing Commission.
Section 3582(c)(2) states that,
in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . the court may reduce the
term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section
3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, if such a reduction is
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.
Sharkey, 543 F.3d at 1238–39. The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement
at Guideline § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) dictates that a reduction of a defendant’s sentence
is not authorized under § 3582(c)(2) if the amended drug-quantity table “does not
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have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” Id. at
1239.
And Amendment 706 had no effect on the guideline range under which
Harris was sentenced, given the large quantity of crack cocaine attributed to
Harris at his resentencing: four kilograms. Indeed, at Harris’s resentencing, the
district court found his base offense level to be 36. Under Amendment 706,
Harris’s base offense level remains 36. Amendment 706 also does not affect
either of the two-level enhancements for possession of a firearm in furtherance of
the conspiracy and obstruction of justice. With his category IV criminal history,
Harris’s guideline range remains 360 months to life. Accordingly, the district
court properly denied Harris’s motion for relief pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) because
Amendment 706 did not lower his sentencing range. See Sharkey, 543 F.3d at1238–39 (holding a reduction in defendant’s sentence as a career offender was not
authorized under § 3582(c)(2) because Amendment 706 did not lower his
applicable guideline range). 2
2
Harris points out that two of his codefendants obtained resentencing
pursuant to Amendment 706. See United States v. Price, 298 F. App’x 779 (10th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Thomas, 297 F. App’x 817 (10th Cir. 2008). In those
cases, we reversed the district court’s denial of the defendants’ § 3582(c)(2)
motions because the court never found a specific drug quantity above 500 grams,
and thus the amendments lowered those defendants’ applicable guideline base
offense levels from 36 to 34. Price, 298 F. App’x at 780–82; Thomas, 297 F.
App’x at 818–19. In contrast, at Harris’s’ resentencing the district court
explicitly found that he and another co-defendant were each responsible for four
kilograms of crack cocaine, rather than simply a quantity “exceeding 500 grams”
(continued...)
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2. Variance
Harris also sought a downward variance based on the sentencing disparity
between powder and crack cocaine, citing Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S.
85 (2007), and the sentencing factors found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But because
Harris was ineligible for a sentence reduction under Amendment 706, the district
court lacked discretionary authority to reduce his sentence.
A reduction of a sentence is not authorized by § 3582(c)(2) if the
retroactive amendment does not have the effect of lowering a defendant’s
applicable guideline range. See USSG § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B); see also Sharkey, 543
F.3d at 1239 (“The district court did not resentence Sharkey and therefore had no
occasion to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”). 3 Moreover, Kimbrough
does not provide a separate basis for relief under § 3582(c)(2). See Sharkey, 543
F.3d at 1239 (explaining that we have previously rejected the argument that the
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), line of cases provide a separate
basis for relief under § 3582(c)(2)). Finally, to the extent Harris is arguing for a
2
(...continued)
of crack cocaine. The applicable sentencing guideline level given this quantity of
crack cocaine has not changed. Therefore, the district court properly denied
Harris’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. We held the same for his codefendant. See United
States v. Leroy, 298 F. App’x 711 (2008).
3
Section 3582(c) allows the court to modify a sentence in three limited
circumstances: (1) on motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons if special
circumstances exist; (2) if otherwise expressly permitted by statute or Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 35; or (3) if the sentencing range is subsequently
lowered by the Sentencing Commission.
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reduction below the amended guideline range, we have rejected such an argument
as well. See United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2052 (2009); see also United States v. Pedraza, 550 F.3d 1218 (10th
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2406 (2009).
* * *
For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
We also GRANT the petition to proceed in forma pauperis.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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