Frazier v. Werholtz

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 25, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
KEITH FRAZIER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 13-1135
(D.C. No. 12-CV-00354-RPM)
ROGER WERHOLTZ, Interim (D. Colo.)
Executive Director, Colorado
Department of Corrections; MICHAEL
MILLER, Warden, Crowley County
Correctional Facility; JOHN W.
SUTHERS, Attorney General, State of
Colorado,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Keith Frazier seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to
appeal the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. Frazier v. Clements, No. 12-CV-00354-RPM, 2013 WL
646659 (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 2013). We deny his request and dismiss his appeal.
Background
On June 13, 2002, a jury in Greeley, Colorado, convicted Mr. Frazier of
two counts of second-degree burglary and two counts of misdemeanor theft. The
convictions arose from burglaries at the homes of two teenage girls where
photographs and underwear were taken. Mr. Frazier was sentenced to two
concurrent 17-year sentences. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on
direct appeal. People v. Frazier, 02CA1999, (Colo. App. June 30, 2005) at 1 R.
135-156, cert. denied, 05SC602 (Colo. Nov. 23, 2005) at 1 Rawle 157. He
unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief pursuant to Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c),
the denial of which was affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Frazier, 09CA1175,
(Colo. App. Jan. 13, 2011) at 1 R. 237-251, cert. denied, 2011SC133 (Colo. May
9, 2011). After pursuing state post-conviction remedies, Mr. Frazier filed this
counseled habeas application.
In his combined opening brief and COA application, Mr. Frazier argues
that: (1) his custodial interrogation violated Miranda, Aplt. Br. at 12-13; (2) a
search of his brother’s home exceeded the scope of the search warrant, id. at 13-
15; (3) a photographic line-up depicting him in his work clothes was
“impermissibly suggestive,” id. at 15; (4) the denial of a request to sever counts at
trial deprived him of due process, id. at 15-17; and (5) continual ineffective
assistance of counsel throughout these proceedings has denied him due process,
id. at 17.
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Discussion
In order for this court to grant a COA, Mr. Frazier must make a “substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), such that
“reasonable jurists could debate whether (or for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Mr. Frazier must demonstrate that
“reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong.” Id. Mr. Frazier cannot rely upon claims not
contained in his counseled habeas petition. See Parker v. Scott, 394 F.3d 1302,
1327 (10th Cir. 2005).
Like the district court, we must defer to the state court proceedings on
these claims unless they “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or “resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
(2). Although the state raised the failure to exhaust several claims based upon its
expansive reading of Colo. App. R. 51.1, we may deny a claim on the merits even
absent exhaustion. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
A. Custodial Interrogation and Involuntary Statements
Mr. Frazier’s first issue is that his custodial interrogation violated Miranda
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and that the statements he made were in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Aplt.
Br. at 12-13; 1 R. 24-37. Concerning the Miranda claim, based upon Mr.
Frazier’s work-release status, the state court of appeals applied a test developed
in Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978), for determining whether a
person is in custody for Miranda purposes in the prison setting. 1 Rawle 138. We
have approved the Cervantes analysis, United States v. Scalf, 725 F.2d 1272,
1275 (10th Cir. 1984), and cannot say that extending the test to the work-release
context is an unreasonable application of federal law. Nor can we overturn the
state court’s factual findings, which tend to support the idea that this was not a
custodial interrogation and that his statements were not compelled or involuntary.
In any event, the state court of appeals correctly noted that Mr. Frazier’s
voluntary statements, even if in violation of Miranda, would not result in the
suppression of the physical evidence as fruits of the poisonous tree. 1 Rawle 142; see
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642 (2004). Thus, the state court of
appeals has the last word on these issues. See Frazier, 2013 WL 646659, at *2.
B. Search of Belongings
As his second issue, Mr. Frazier argues that the search of his belongings at
his brother’s house exceeded the scope of the warrant given that a box of
women’s undergarments and his journals were seized. Aplt. Br. at 13-14. This
issue was not raised on direct appeal, although the failure to suppress the journals
was part of an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim raised and rejected
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in state post-conviction proceedings. 1 R. 244-247, 1346-47. The trial court
determined that the journals could be searched for rental agreements and
photographs of female juveniles. Id. To the extent that Mr. Frazier is arguing the
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 1 R. 48-50, the state court of appeals’
analysis is not contrary to federal law as the journals contained other documents
(which could have been within the scope of the warrant). 1 Rawle 246. Moreover,
the officers were not required to ignore incriminating evidence. The district
court’s rejection of this claim is not reasonably debatable.
To the extent that Mr. Frazier is challenging the denial of his third claim in
his habeas petition, that the admission of testimony concerning the box of
undergarments violated due process, 1 R. 37-39, this claim certainly appears
unexhausted. On direct appeal, Mr. Frazier challenged the admissibility of
evidence concerning the box of undergarments on the basis that it deprived him of
a fair and impartial jury and on the state-law grounds that the evidence was not
relevant, but even if it was, the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed its
probative value, and also that it was improper character evidence. 1 Rawle 56, 78-81.
The state court of appeals rejected this claim on the basis that the evidence was
relevant to show motive and that the trial court mitigated any danger of unfair
prejudice by limiting testimony to a single reference to the box. 1 R. 145-146.
Turning to the journals, the same appellate court conducted a similar relevance
and danger-of-unfair-prejudice analysis and upheld admissibility. 1 R. 153-154.
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Generally, the admissibility of evidence is a state-law matter. Here, the
state argued that the federal due process claim was unexhausted as it had not been
presented to the state supreme court on direct appeal in Mr. Frazier’s cert.
petition. 1 Rawle 1297, 1361-64. Though the federal district court did not deal with
this claim directly, it did conclude that there was no need to consider exhaustion
because it resolved all claims on the merits. Frazier, 2013 WL 646659 at *2. We
likewise avoid the exhaustion issue, and, given the findings of the state appellate
court on direct appeal on the evidentiary issues, Mr. Frazier cannot establish that
the admission of the evidence was “grossly prejudicial” and “fatally infected the
trial” such as to deny him due process. See Fox v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1286, 1296-97
(10th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
C. Photographic Lineup
As his third issue on appeal, Mr. Frazier argues that a photographic lineup
was impermissibly suggestive (because he was wearing a pizza delivery shirt) and
that appellate counsel should have appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion
to suppress an out-of-court identification on this basis. On post-conviction
review, the state court of appeals determined that the issue was not preserved by
trial counsel and therefore could not constitute ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. 1 R. 241-44. Although Mr. Frazier suggests that the federal district
court did not address this point, that court viewed the rulings of the state courts as
“definitive,” and the Colorado appellate court certainly did address it. We note
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that the contemporaneous objection rule is regularly enforced as a bar to federal
habeas review. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747 (1991); Wainright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88 (1977). Given procedural default, the state appellate
court’s determination that appellate counsel was not ineffective is not contrary to
federal law.
D. Severance
In his fourth issue, Mr. Frazier argues that the failure to sever counts
violated due process. On direct appeal, Mr. Frazier claimed that Colo. Crim. P.
R. 14 violated due process because it required him to come forward with
“important testimony” to demonstrate the need to testify on some counts and not
others. 1 R. 82-84. This claim was rejected on direct appeal because it was not
raised before the trial court. 1 Rawle 147. On post-conviction review, the state court
of appeals rejected the contention that trial counsel was ineffective for not raising
this claim, finding neither deficient performance nor prejudice. 1 R. 248-251.
The state contends that the claim is not exhausted because the issue was not
raised in Mr. Frazier’s post-conviction cert. petition to the Colorado Supreme
Court. 1 R. 1301-02, 1369-79.
The federal district court rejected the claim on the merits based upon a lack
of prejudice; Mr. Frazier had not demonstrated that his testimony would have
made a difference in the outcome. Frazier, 2013 WL 646659 at *2. Of course, all
that is required is “a reasonable probability” of a different outcome, “a
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probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Be that as it may, the conclusion of the
state court of appeals on this issue is not an unreasonable application of federal
law, particularly in regard to the performance prong of the ineffective assistance
of counsel claim—trial counsel perceived no reason why the severance rule was
unconstitutional, and the requirement that a defendant have a basis for asserting a
severance is routine. The state court of appeals distinguished Brooks v.
Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1971), the case upon which Mr. Frazier relied,
and could reasonably conclude that a due process violation did not occur. 1. R.
249-51.
E. Ineffective Assistance Throughout
The fifth issue raised by Mr. Frazier is ineffective assistance of counsel
based upon “no less than 18 separate acts and/or omissions committed by his
various attorneys representing him throughout the life of the instant matter” that
have rendered his assistance of counsel “ineffective.” Aplt. Br. at 17. In his
habeas petition (as his last claim), Mr. Frazier raised ineffective assistance of
counsel regarding the out-of-court identification and the search exceeding the
scope of the warrant, claims rejected above. 1 R. 48-50. He also claimed
ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the admissibility of his journals under
Colo. R. Evid. 404(b), 1 R. 51-52, which the state contends is unexhausted for
failure to mention it in the post-conviction cert. petition. 1 Rawle 1310, 1377-78.
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On direct appeal, the state court of appeals found no abuse of discretion in
the admission of the journals. 1 Rawle 154. Upon post-conviction review, it rejected
a similar claim (based upon ineffective assistance) as not raised on direct appeal.
1. R. 247. Plainly, the Rule 404(b) issue was considered. The court declines to
consider any other issues raised by Mr. Frazier not raised in the counseled habeas
petition.
We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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