King v. Downing

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 20 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
STEVEN KING,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 02-5029
v. (D.C. No. 01-CV-149-K)
(N.D. Oklahoma)
JIM DOWNING, SR.,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY , McKAY , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Steven King appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983complaint alleging his supervisor violated his First Amendment rights. King,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
a paid firefighter with the Berryhill Fire Protection District at the time of his
complaint, alleges Jim Downing, Sr., the volunteer chief of the Fire District,
restrained him from speaking about (a) allegations a coworker had misspent
money from a publicly funded volunteer association fund; (b) allegations about an
attempted theft of publicly donated charitable funds; (c) allegations of
unauthorized use of a gas credit card by unknown persons; (d) his complaints that
the Fire District had allowed his health insurance to lapse; and (e) his interest in
forming a union. King alleges that Downing threatened to fire him.
Downing responds he did not restrain King’s speech, but only admonished
King to stop his continual gossip and idle talk accusing others of
misappropriation and theft because King had no proof of any wrongdoing and
Downing feared King’s ceaseless and unfounded accusations were causing morale
problems within the department. Downing contends that he took no adverse
employment action against King.
It is well-established that a government employer cannot “condition public
employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected
interest in freedom of expression.” Connick v. Myers , 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
“However, when the government acts as an employer, the First Amendment does
not apply with full force.” Arndt v. Koby , 309 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2002)
(quotation omitted). “Thus, the government as employer ‘may impose restraints
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on the job-related speech of public employees that would be plainly
unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
Nat’l Treasury Employees Union , 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995)).
When a government employer has allegedly taken adverse action
because of an employee’s exercise of [his] free speech, we apply the
test derived from Pickering v. Board of Education , 391 U.S. 563(1968), and Connick [ ] , 461 U.S. 138. That four-part test asks the
following questions:
1. Whether the speech in question involves a matter of public
concern.
2. If so, we must weigh the employee’s interest in the expression
against the government employer’s interest in regulating the speech
of its employees so that it can carry on an efficient and effective
workplace.
3. Employee must show the speech was a substantial factor driving
the challenged governmental action.
4. If so, can the employer show that it would have taken the same
employment action against the employee even in the absence of the
protected speech?
Kent v. Martin , 252 F.3d 1141, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation
omitted).
Applying the Pickering/Connick balancing test, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Downing. It concluded that the issue of King’s
lapsed insurance and his interest in forming a union failed at the first step,
because both involved personnel issues, not protected speech that touched on
matters of public concern. See Connick , 461 U.S. at 146 (holding that if the
speech in question does not address a matter of public concern, there is no First
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Amendment violation). The district court further concluded that King’s claims
regarding the volunteer association fund issue, the purported theft of charitable
donations, and the alleged misuse of a gas credit card failed at the third and
fourth step, because King did not show that Downing took any detrimental or
adverse action against him.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same standard as did the district court. Summary judgment is
proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In cases involving
the First Amendment, the de novo standard is appropriate for the
further reason that in cases raising First Amendment issues an
appellate court has an obligation to make an independent examination
of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.
Arndt , 309 F.3d at 1250-51 (citations, quotations and alterations omitted).
On appeal, King first contends the district court erred in dismissing his
claim relating to his union organizing communications. King does not dispute the
district court’s conclusion, applying the Pickering/Connick test, that King’s
communications relating to forming a union did not involve matters of public
concern. 1 Rather, he contends the district court erred in applying the
1
We note that an employee’s speech or activity does not touch on a matter of
public concern merely because it is union-related. Rather, courts consider the
content, form, motive and context of the communications, as revealed by the
whole record. See David v. City & County of Denver , 101 F.3d 1344, 1355
(continued...)
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Pickering/Connick “public concern” balancing test to this claim. First, he argues
the test is inapplicable because of his contention that Downing violated his First
Amendment associational rights as well as his free speech rights. This court has
recognized that the Pickering/Connick public concern test “may be an inapt tool
of analysis” in some public employee/free association contexts. Schalk v.
Gallemore , 906 F.2d 491, 498 n.6 (10th Cir. 1990). The district court correctly
ruled, however, that where the free speech and free association claims are
identical, as they are in this case, application of the Pickering/Connick public
concern test is appropriate. See id .
Second, King argues a more appropriate analysis would be that used by the
Fifth Circuit in Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Independent School
District , 777 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1985). In that case, the court applied the
“‘material and substantial’” disruption of the school test articulated in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District , 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969),
to hold that a written school board policy prohibiting inter-teacher
communications concerning employee organizations during non-classroom hours
was unconstitutional. Tex. State Teachers Ass’n , 777 F.2d at 1053-55. The
1
(...continued)
(10th Cir. 1996). “To be protected speech, the expression must sufficiently
inform the issue as to be helpful to the public in evaluating the conduct of
government.” Withiam v. Baptist Health Care of Okla., Inc. , 98 F.3d 581, 583
(10th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Garland and Tinker analyses, however, are simply not applicable in this case
because they involve the review of speech restrictions in the unique public school
setting, whereas the Pickering/Connick tests are applicable in the “more general
public setting.” Miles v. Denver Public Schs. , 944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir.
1991). Moreover, unlike Garland , there is no allegation here that Downing
imposed a blanket prohibition on all present and future union-related speech by
all or a vast group of employees. Cf. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union , 513 U.S.
at 468 (holding unconstitutional a federal law imposing a prior restraint on a
broad range of speech by all federal employees, noting that a widespread, blanket
prohibition on governmental employees’ potential speech “gives rise to far more
serious concerns than could any single supervisory decision”).
Next, King contends the district court erred in finding no evidence of
adverse employment action with respect to his claims relating to the volunteer
association fund, the alleged theft of charitable donations, and the alleged misuse
of a gas credit card. King made a bare, conclusory allegation that Downing
retaliated against him by threatening to fire him. Nothing in the record, however,
connects this alleged general threat to King’s continued speech about the
volunteer association fund, the alleged theft of charitable donations, or the
alleged misuse of a gas credit card. Once a properly supported motion for
summary judgment is made, “the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts
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showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ,
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added)).
We agree with the district court’s assessment of the evidence, and conclude that
King presented no “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return
a verdict in his favor.” See id. , 477 U.S. at 256.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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