Sanchez v. Board of Eastern New Mexico

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 25, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
FRANK SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-2124
(D.C. No. 1:07-CV-00051-LH-LAM)
THE BOARD OF EASTERN NEW (D. N.M.)
MEXICO, Roswell Branch Community
College District, MILBUR DOLEN;
ORLANDO CHAVEZ; JOSE
CHAVES; JOHN JACKSON;
ALBERTINA SILVA, Members of the
Board of Eastern New Mexico,
Roswell Branch Community College
District; RHODA COAKLEY,
CHAVES COUNTY CLERK; BOARD
OF REGENTS OF EASTERN NEW
MEXICO UNIVERSITY;
MARSHALL STINNETT; ALVA
CARTER; JAY GURLEY; DIEGO
ESPINOSA; PAULINE PONCE,
Members of the Eastern New Mexico
Board of Regents; BILL
RICHARDSON, in his capacity as
Governor for the State of New
Mexico; BEN LUJAN, in his capacity
as Speaker of the New Mexico House
of Representatives; BEN D.
ALTAMIRANO, in his capacity as
President Pro Tem of the New Mexico
Senate;
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, PORFILIO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Frank Sanchez appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for an award
of attorney’s fees and costs. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
Background
Mr. Sanchez filed a complaint alleging that the system of at-large elections
for membership on the Board of Eastern New Mexico University Roswell Branch
Community College District (ENMU), one of the defendants here, violated the
rights of Mexican-Americans under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973. The parties entered into a settlement agreement (Agreement), whereby
ENMU agreed to change its elective system to a single-member district system,
two of which were majority Mexican-American, in effect providing Mr. Sanchez
with the relief he sought in his complaint. As relevant to this appeal, the
Agreement provided that Mr. Sanchez “can petition the Court, as permitted in the
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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Federal Voting Rights Act, for a determination of the amount of any reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs within thirty (30) days after the filing of the Joint
Motion to Dismiss should the parties be unable to resolve this issue among
themselves.” App. at 71, ¶ 9. The parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissal and the
next day, the court filed its Order of Dismissal in which it “reserve[d] jurisdiction
to determine plaintiff’s request for reasonable attorneys [sic] fees and costs,” id.
at 48.
After the parties failed to resolve the fee issue, Mr. Sanchez filed the fee
motion contemplated in the Agreement, seeking fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973l(e)
and 1988(b). Section 1973l(e), part of the Voting Rights Act, authorizes a court
to award reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to a “prevailing party”
in “any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or
fifteenth amendments.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e). Section 1988(b) authorizes an
award of reasonable attorney’s fees in actions or proceedings to enforce any of a
number of civil rights statutes. The district court denied the motion on the ground
that Mr. Sanchez was not a prevailing party under Buckhannon Board & Care
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S.
598 (2001) (Buckhannon), and its progeny. 1 The district court observed that it
1
Although Buckhannon concerned an award of fees under other statutes that
permit fee awards to a “prevailing party,” the Court recognized that Congress
employed the same “legal term of art” in numerous statutes, including 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973l(e) and 1988, and that the Court had consistently interpreted these fee
(continued...)
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had not approved the settlement agreement or any of its terms; that the agreement
was not implemented in a consent decree or equivalent order; that the agreement
was not incorporated into any court order; and that the court had not retained
jurisdiction to enforce performance of the obligations assumed by the parties
under the agreement, each of which might suffice to confer “prevailing party”
status on Mr. Sanchez under Buckhannon and its issue. Indeed, as the court
noted, the Agreement was not even presented to the court until Mr. Sanchez filed
his fee motion. Because there was no “judicial imprimatur” on the Agreement, as
required under Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, the court concluded that
Mr. Sanchez was not a prevailing party for purposes of a statutory fee award.
Mr. Sanchez appeals.
Discussion
We examine a district court’s decision as to attorney’s fees “for an abuse of
discretion, reviewing its findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions
de novo.” Johnson v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 489 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007).
Applying this standard, we discern no error.
Mr. Sanchez’s first argument, that the district court erred in failing to
enforce the parties’ agreement concerning attorney’s fees, is not well taken. The
Agreement provided only that Mr. Sanchez had the right to file a motion with the
1
(...continued)
provisions. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602-03 & n.4. Thus, Buckhannon and
its progeny are applicable here.
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court for fees “as permitted in the Federal Voting Rights Act,” App. at 71, ¶ 9,
which is what he did. The district court enforced this provision when it
determined that Mr. Sanchez was not entitled to fees as permitted under the Act
because he was not a “prevailing party,” as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e).
The court’s ruling, therefore, was not contrary to the parties’ agreement.
Mr. Sanchez next argues that he is a prevailing party because the
Agreement effected a material change in the parties’ legal relationship, a
proposition largely undisputed by defendants and one we need not consider, and
because the change had the “judicial imprimatur” required under Buckhannon.
We disagree with Mr. Sanchez as to the latter point.
Buckhannon rejected the “catalyst theory” of fee recovery, “which posits
that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired result because the
lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.”
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600. Instead, under Buckhannon, “enforceable
judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees create the material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties necessary to permit an award of
attorney’s fees.” Id. at 604 (quotation omitted). The sine qua non is a “judicially
sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties”; a defendant’s
voluntary change in conduct “lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the
change,” even when the lawsuit was a motivating factor in the defendant’s
decision. Id. at 605.
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In applying Buckhannon, we have explained that, absent a judgment on the
merits or a formal consent decree, a private settlement agreement must bear the
marks of a consent decree in order to confer prevailing party status on a plaintiff:
[I]f a court does not incorporate a private settlement into an order,
does not sign or otherwise provide written approval of the
settlement’s terms, and does not retain jurisdiction to enforce
performance of the obligations assumed by the settling parties, the
settlement does not bear any of the marks of a consent decree and
does not confer prevailing party status on the party whose claims
have been compromised.
Bell v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 451 F.3d 1097, 1103 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation
omitted). Accordingly, “[a] fee award cannot be based on an order that merely
recognizes the fact of the parties’ agreement and dismisses the case because there
is no longer a dispute before [the court].” Id. (quotation omitted).
None of the methods for establishing the requisite judicial imprimatur is
present here. There is no judgment on the merits or consent decree. Nor did the
district court sign the Agreement, provide written approval of its terms, or retain
jurisdiction to enforce the obligations assumed by the parties. Instead, the district
court’s Order of Dismissal “merely recognize[d] the fact of the parties’ agreement
and dismisse[d] the case,” id. (quotation omitted), which does not satisfy
Buckhannon. Although the court did retain jurisdiction over attorney’s fees and
costs in the event the parties could not resolve the matter, the Agreement did not
obligate defendants to pay fees; it only provided that Mr. Sanchez could seek fees
and costs under the Voting Rights Act if the parties were unable to agree on fees
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and costs. Thus, the court’s continuing jurisdiction over the fee issue, standing
alone, does not amount to a judicial imprimatur on the terms of the Agreement
that effected the material change in the parties’ relationship.
Mr. Sanchez also contends that he could have obtained an order from the
district court enforcing the Agreement prior to the court’s entry of its dismissal
order, apparently due to the fact that the parties signed the Agreement on
April 16, 2008, but did not file the stipulation of dismissal until September 18,
2008, a day before the district court filed its Order of Dismissal. The flaw in this
argument is that any inherent power the court might have had to enforce a breach
of the Agreement while the suit remained pending, thereby “lend[ing] judicial
teeth to the merits of the case,” Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. Stem,
519 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2008), evaporated once the case was dismissed
without the court explicitly retaining jurisdiction to enforce the parties’
obligations under the Agreement. Consequently, any in-suit enforcement power
the court may have had does not constitute a judicial imprimatur on the material
terms of the Agreement.
Furthermore, that the Agreement is judicially enforceable as a matter of
contract law does not equate to an explicit retention of jurisdiction by the district
court that confers prevailing party status on Mr. Sanchez, as he appears to
suggest. This is because
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denying the difference between an “instrument” enforceable as a
matter of contract law and a court order enforceable as a matter of
judicial oversight . . . would render the prevailing approach to
settlement agreements (and the Buckhannon passages from which it
derives) meaningless, because any such agreement, however private,
is a legally enforceable contract.
Bell, 451 F.3d at 1103 n.7. Thus, representations made by ENMU’s counsel
during settlement negotiations to the effect that the Agreement would be
enforceable absent court approval appear grounded in contract theory, with little
applicability to “prevailing party” status for purposes of statutory fees, and cannot
fairly be characterized as a concession by defendants that the district court
retained jurisdiction to enforce the Agreement, as Mr. Sanchez argues, see Aplt.
Opening Br. at 14. Because parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by
agreement where there is none and estoppel does not apply, Prier v. Steed,
456 F.3d 1209, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006), defendants’ representations have no
bearing on whether there is an adequate judicial imprimatur in this case. 2
We also find no merit in the contention that the magistrate judge’s
oversight of the settlement process constitutes the judicial imprimatur necessary
to confer prevailing party status on Mr. Sanchez. According to Mr. Sanchez, that
oversight consisted of conducting status conferences regarding the state of the
2
In the district court, Mr. Sanchez expressed a similar argument in terms of
estoppel, which the court rejected. He has not explicitly advanced that theory on
appeal, but to the extent it is implicit in his appellate briefs, we agree with the
district court’s conclusion that estoppel should not bar defendants from arguing
that the Agreement lacked the necessary judicial imprimatur.
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settlement negotiations; entering an Order to File Closing Documents as a Result
of Settlement, which informed the parties that they needed to file a motion to
have the court approve the Agreement if they desired such approval; and entering
an order granting the parties an extension of time to file the closing documents.
Setting aside the de minimis role of the magistrate judge’s involvement in the
parties’ settlement negotiations, Mr. Sanchez has not identified any legal
authority that considers such judicial involvement a ground for concluding that a
party is a “prevailing party” for purposes of attorney’s fees. In fact, the law is to
the contrary: “A court’s mere involvement in the settlement . . . is not enough” to
render a private settlement agreement “sufficiently analogous to a consent decree”
such that it confers prevailing party status on a plaintiff. Bell, 451 F.3d at 1103(alteration omitted).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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