Bolden v. City of Topeka

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
May 1, 2009
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JAMES L. BOLDEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-3139
(D.C. No. 2:02-CV-02635-KHV)
CITY OF TOPEKA, (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
James L. Bolden bought two properties in Topeka, Kansas, at a tax sale.
The City of Topeka found the structures located on these properties unfit for
human habitation, and demolished them. In this action Mr. Bolden seeks damages
for the demolitions, charging that the City’s actions deprived him of property
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
rights protected by substantive due process. The district court held a bench trial
on his substantive-due-process claim, and ruled in favor of the City. He appeals.
The demolitions were performed in accordance with a Topeka municipal
ordinance that requires an owner to remove or demolish a structure if it is unfit
for human use or habitation and if it cannot be repaired at a cost of 15% or less of
its replacement value. Topeka Code, art. XI, § 26-551(a)(2) (1998). In this
appeal Mr. Bolden raises both a broad challenge and a narrow challenge to the
ordinance. His broad challenge asserts that schemes like Topeka’s, which require
an owner to destroy an uninhabitable structure rather than repair it when the
repair cost exceeds a threshold percentage of the structure’s value, are arbitrary,
unnecessary, and bear no rational relationship to public safety. His narrow
challenge asserts that the 15% threshold contained in this particular ordinance is
arbitrarily low and therefore lacks a rational relationship to public safety.
We affirm the judgment in favor of the City. Mr. Bolden fails to show that
he preserved the broad challenge by presenting it at trial. We therefore consider
only his narrow challenge to the ordinance. That narrow challenge fails, because
he has failed to show that the City’s choice of a 15% threshold bears no rational
relationship to a legitimate public purpose.
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BACKGROUND
A Kansas statute authorizes municipalities to adopt ordinances relating to
structures unfit for human use or habitation. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-4759(b). Such
ordinances are required to include provisions under which a public officer, after
notice and a hearing, shall determine whether a structure is unfit for human use or
habitation. Id. If the officer finds that it is unfit, and that “the repair, alteration
or improvement of the structure cannot be made at a reasonable cost in relation to
the replacement value of the structure,” the officer then issues an order that
“requires the owner, within the time specified in the order, to remove or demolish
such structure.” Id. § 17-4759(b)(3)(B). The statute further provides that “[t]he
ordinance of the municipality shall fix a certain percentage of such cost as being
reasonable.” Id.
Acting in accordance with this statute, the City in 1998 amended its
existing ordinance relating to unsafe structures to read in part as follows:
(a) After notice and hearing under this article, if the administrative
hearing officer determines that the structure under consideration is
unfit for human use or habitation or otherwise endangers the life,
health, property or safety of its inhabitants or the public, the
administrative hearing officer shall state in writing the findings of
facts in support of such determination and shall issue and cause to be
served upon the owner thereof an order which [provides that]:
(1) If repair, alteration or improvement of the structure can be made
at a reasonable cost in relation to the value of the structure, which
cost shall not exceed 15 percent of the replacement value of such
structure as established by the Shawnee County Appraiser, the owner
of the structure shall, within the time specified in the order, repair,
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alter or improve such structure to render it fit for human use or
habitation; or
(2) If the repair, alteration or improvement of the structure cannot be
made at a reasonable cost in relation to the replacement value, that is
to say, 15 percent or less of the replacement value of such structure,
which percentage is hereby deemed to be a reasonable standard by
which to require either repair, alteration or improvement, or removal
or demolition, the owner shall within the time specified in the order
remove or demolish such structure.
Topeka Code § 26-551(a) (1998).
The properties in question are located at 1146 S.W. Washburn and
421 S.W. Tyler in Topeka. Mr. Bolden purchased them at a Shawnee County,
Kansas, tax sale on August 29, 2001. On August 10, 2001, before Mr. Bolden
purchased the properties, an administrative hearing officer determined that the
house on the Washburn property was unfit for human use or habitation and that it
could not be repaired, altered or improved at a reasonable cost in relation to its
value. He therefore ordered that the house and all outbuildings on the property be
removed or demolished within 30 days.
After he purchased the Washburn property and learned that the City
planned to demolish it, Mr. Bolden requested a hearing to appeal the demolition
order. An administrative hearing officer held a hearing, determined that
Mr. Bolden had no evidence of ability or plans to repair or rehabilitate the
Washburn property, and affirmed the demolition order. Mr. Bolden sought an
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injunction in state district court but he was unsuccessful and the City demolished
the house on the Washburn property in January 2003.
Meanwhile, on March 18, 2002, the City held an administrative hearing
concerning the structures on the Tyler property. An administrative hearing
officer again found that the structures located on the property were unfit for
human use or habitation and that the house could not be repaired, altered, or
improved at a reasonable cost in relation to its value. He ordered that the
structures be removed or demolished within 30 days. In February 2003, after a
state district court denied an injunction to prevent the demolition, the City
demolished the house on the Tyler property.
Mr. Bolden filed his complaint in this case in federal district court in
December 2002. As originally conceived, the case had a much wider scope than
it does now. Mr. Bolden’s second amended complaint, filed on August 15, 2003,
included claims relating to his janitorial contracts with the City, discrimination
claims relating to rehabilitation of his properties, and various other constitutional
and statutory claims, including challenges to the demolitions. The district court
dismissed or granted partial summary judgment on all claims in the complaint
except for Mr. Bolden’s claim that his janitorial contract was terminated in
retaliation for his protected speech. That claim went to a jury, which ruled in
favor of the City.
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In a prior appeal we affirmed in part the district court’s rulings against
Mr. Bolden, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. See Bolden
v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1152 (10th Cir. 2006). The parties stipulated
on remand that Mr. Bolden’s claims would be reduced to a single, remaining
claim: a substantive-due-process challenge to the City’s exercise of its police
powers in demolishing his property. On March 11, 2008, the district court held a
bench trial on this claim.
In its memorandum and order granting judgment to the City on this
remaining claim, the district court noted that Mr. Bolden “does not challenge the
notion that the City may deem certain properties uninhabitable and utilize a
percentage cost of repair to decide whether to order repair or demolition of those
properties.” Aplt. App. at 77 n.9. Rather, his challenge was “premised on the
argument that the 15 per cent demolition threshold in Section 26-551 of the
City[’s] unsafe structures code was not related to [its] legitimate government
interest” in protecting the public from unsafe structures. Id. at 76-77.
The district court ruled that although it was not the City’s burden to present
evidence of a rational basis for the 15% demolition threshold, the City had in fact
done so. The City showed that it had considered several different threshold
percentages, including those both higher and lower than the 15% threshold, before
adopting the 15% threshold as a balance between protecting a property owner’s
rights and encouraging regular upkeep of structures. Also, the City’s enforcement
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program relied primarily on exterior inspections of premises, reasoning that if the
exterior disclosed damage in excess of 15%, the additional damage to the interior
was probably also significant. If a higher threshold than 15% were adopted, the
City might have to conduct interior inspections to verify the overall level of
damage, altering its inspection scheme. The district court concluded that
Mr. Bolden had failed to undermine all rational explanations for the 15%
demolition threshold and therefore should take nothing on his claim against the
City.
ANALYSIS
“We review the district court’s legal conclusions in a bench trial de novo;
findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Ryan v. Am.
Natural Energy Corp., 557 F.3d 1152, 1157 (10th Cir. 2009). Whether a
challenged ordinance complies with substantive due process is a question of law
that we review de novo. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd. 526 U.S. 687, 753-54 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 93 F.3d 167, 172 n.6 (5th Cir.
1996).
Our review of legislation for substantive-due-process violations is highly
deferential. Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Comm’n,
889 F.2d 929, 935 (10th Cir. 1989).
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When local economic or social regulation is challenged as violating
substantive due process, courts consistently defer to legislative
determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory schemes.
Unless a state law trammels fundamental personal rights, we are to
presume that state legislatures have acted within their constitutional
power and are to require only that the law bears a reasonable relation
to the state’s legitimate purpose.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
An ordinance complies with substantive due process under the rational-
basis test if there is any conceivable rational relationship between the ordinance
and the government’s stated purpose. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208,
1216-17 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing rational-basis test in connection with equal-
protection claim). Because Mr. Bolden did not argue that the ordinance deprived
him of a fundamental right, the district court properly applied this rational basis
test to his claim.
As noted, in this appeal Mr. Bolden makes the broad argument that
statutes and ordinances which have any mandated threshold for the
demolition of an uninhabitable structure, regardless of the repair
costs for that threshold, violate due process in that they are arbitrary,
unnecessary and bear no rational relationship to the purpose of
eliminating the menace that these structures pose to the public health
and safety, when the conditions which make that structure a menace
to the public health and safety can be remedied by repairs.
Aplt. Opening Br. at 18 (emphasis added). He made a similar argument to the
district court at the summary-judgment stage, but he conceded that the district
court need not decide this broader issue, and it does not appear that he preserved
this argument for appellate review by presenting it at trial. As stated previously,
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the district court determined that Mr. Bolden “does not challenge the notion that
the City may deem certain properties uninhabitable and utilize a percentage cost
of repair to decide whether to order repair or demolition of those properties.”
Aplt. App. at 77 n.9.
Although he cites to the trial transcript in his brief, Mr. Bolden has not
provided us with a transcript so that we might verify what arguments he made to
the district court at trial. The record does, however, contain the final pretrial
order. This order indicates that by the time of trial, Mr. Bolden focused narrowly
on the 15% demolition threshold. In his statement of contentions for trial, he
said:
Plaintiff’s position is . . . very simple and straightforward--
destroying plaintiff’s property without compensation or the
opportunity to repair and abate on the extraordinarily low threshold
finding that the cost of repairs would exceed 15% of the replacement
value is arbitrary, unreasonable, and bears no rational relationship to
the City’s legitimate interest in public health and safety. This
violation of substantive due process rights caused damage to plaintiff
in the loss of property, loss of income, loss of investment, and
incurred expenses.
R. doc. 182 at 10 (emphasis added).
It is Mr. Bolden’s responsibility in this court to establish that he made his
broader argument to the district court at trial. See 10th Cir. R. 28.2(C)(2) (“For
each issue raised on appeal, all briefs must cite the precise reference in the record
where the issue was raised and ruled on.”). We do not consider claims that a
party failed to preserve at trial. See O’Connor v. City & County of Denver,
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894 F.2d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 1990). We will therefore not consider
Mr. Bolden’s broad challenge to the Topeka ordinance. 1
Turning to the narrow issue, we consider whether the 15% demolition
threshold bears a rational relationship to Topeka’s legitimate purpose of
protecting the public from unsafe structures. For essentially the same reasons
cited by the district court, we conclude that it does. As the district court noted,
“the [Topeka City] council found 15 per cent to be an appropriate demolition
threshold because that percentage afforded significantly more property rights to
home owners than the 10 per cent threshold [which it also considered] and created
more motivation to maintain habitable property than the 25 per cent threshold
[which it considered] -- a threshold which would not have significantly increased
property rights.” Aplt. App. at 78. Under rational-basis review, this court is in
1
This court has discretion based upon the circumstances of an individual
case to address an argument that was not presented in district court. United States
v. Jarvis, 499 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2007). But this is not a case that
warrants the exercise of our discretion to hear the omitted issue. Had Mr. Bolden
pursued at trial the argument that any percentage-based restraint on a property
owner’s right to repair his property was unconstitutional, the City could have
explored further its defense that he could not have performed such repairs in a
timely fashion in any event. The administrative hearing officer found, concerning
the Washburn property, that Mr. Bolden had not provided a proposed schedule or
demonstrated the financial ability to make the necessary repairs. The state court
also made a finding that he had been given an opportunity to make repairs on both
properties and had failed to make them. Unless Mr. Bolden was in a financial
position to repair the properties on a timely basis, he could hardly complain that
the challenged ordinance deprived him of the opportunity to do so. In this
circumstance it would be unfair to the City to allow Mr. Bolden to present this
argument on appeal.
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no position to second-guess this legislative judgment. See Powers, 379 F.3d at
1217.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Mr. Bolden’s motion to
file his reply brief out of time is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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